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To  the  President of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Co1rununities 
Dear  Mr.  Ortoli, 
On  14th January  1974,  the Council  of Ministers  of  the  European 
Communities,  on  a  proposal of the  Co1rnnission  of the European 
Communities,  resolved as  follows: 
"THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
H2ving  regard  to  the  Treaties establishing  the  European 
Communities; 
Having  regard  to  the  draft from  the  Commission; 
Having  regard  to  the  Opinion of  the  European Parliament; 
Whereas  the  Heads  of State or of Government meeting  in Paris 
on  19  and  20  October  1972  expressed  their resolve  to  define 
objectives  and  ensure  the  development  of  a  common  policy  in 
the  field of science  and  technology; 
Whereas  the  programme  which  is  the  subject of  this Resolution 
is  a  necessary element  for defining  the  long-term action of 
the  Communities  and  ensures  technical  backing  for  future 
decisions  of Community  Institutions  in  the  scientific and 
technological  field, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  RESOLUTION: 
The  Council  hereby approves  the programme,which will have  a 
duration of  one  year,  as  set out  in  the  Annex  hereto,  which 
Annex  forms  an  integral part of  this Resolution. 
The  Council  takes  note of  the  fact  that  the  Commission  proposal 
is no  more  than  a  preliminary experimental  programme  and  that 
the  Commission  intends  to  submit specific proposals  in  the near 
future  on  the  basis of  the  results of  this preliminary programme, 
and  with  the  assistance of  the  Scientific and  Technical Research 
Committee. 
ANNEX 
ACTION  PROGRAMME 
AS  REGARDS  FORECASTING,  ASSESSMENT  AND  METHODOLOGY 
In order  to  ensure  the  development  of a  Community  policy intle 
scientific and  technological  fiP.ld  the  European Communities  must 
try  to  determine  how  existing scientific and  technological capacity 
can best be  used  for  the  purpose  of keeping  the  objectives  and  instruments 
of  a  common  policy under constant  review.  The  guidelines  given  by  the 
Paris  Summit  Conference make  long-term forecasting,  an attempt  to  'check 
research by  research',and  a  study of  the  effects of scientific and 
technological  development  on  society and  the  economy,  particularly 
necessary. 2 
In order  to  achieve  the  aims  set out hereunder it is  proposed  to 
initiate a  preparatory phase  (preliminary experimental  programme) 
during which  an  attempt will  be  made  to  determine  to  what  extent, 
by  what means  and  according  to  what  timetable  the  European 
Communities  will  be  able  to  contribute  to  solving  these  problems. 
The  prepar.atory phase will  be  limited  to  one  year;  it will not 
prejudice  any  future  decisions. 
The  object of  the  preparatory phase  is  to  provide  answers  to 
two  specific questions: 
1.  In  the  context of  the  common  scientific and  technological 
policy,  should  the  European  Communities  undertake  a  majority 
study entitled  'Europe  Plus  30'(l)concerning  the  foreseeable 
or possible  developments  over  the  next  thirty years,  which  are 
likely  to  affect  the  progress  of  Europe;  and,  if so,  will  this 
study make  it possible  in particular  to  create  a  forecasting 
instrument which  can  be  constantly updated  ? 
If  the  answer  were  'yes',  it would  be  necessary  to  define, 
with  the  help  of  an analytical  table  of  the  studies  and 
forecasts  already carried out: 
- the  method  or methods  to  be  used; 
the  characteristics which  define  the  content,  i.e.: 
- the  limiting conditions; 
- the  areas  to  be  included; 
- the  structure of  the  study; 
- the  implementing  procedures. 
If  the  answer were  'no',  it would  be  necessary  to  define  the 
possible alternatives  to  aid  in effective  decision-making,  in 
the  field of  research  and  technological  planning. 
2.  Should  the  European  Communities  create  their own  Technology 
Assessment Office  in  an  attempt  to  evaluate  in advance  the  effects 
of  scientific and  technological  development  on  the  society and 
economy  of  the  Community  ? 
If  the  answer  were  'yes',  it would  be  necessary  to  define,  with  the 
help  of  an  analytical  table  of organisations  and  institutes  and  of 
work  which  has  been  carried out: 
- the  institutional structure  of  the  European  Technology  Assessment 
Office  and  its relationship with  the  Community  Institutions; 
- the  way  in which  this office  could  be  integrated  into  the 
Communities'  planning  and  decision-making  processes;  and 
- the  way  in which  the  creation of  a  new  centralised organisation 
could  be  avoided  by making  use  of existing organisations 
where  possible. 
If  the  answer were  'no',  it would  be  necessary  to  determine  what 
other possibilities were  available  to  the  Community  for  carrying 
out  the  task of  technological  assessment. 
(1)  The  study of  the  relevant questions will  be  carried out in cooperation 
with  the  European  Foundation  for  the  Improvement  of Living  and  Working 
Conditions  which  it is  proposed  to  set up. - 3  -
Achievement 
The  Commission will  assume  responsibility  for carrying out  the 
project  as  efficiently as  possible.  In order to  have  access  to 
outside  expertise,  the  Commission may  employ  experts  on  a  con-
tractual basis.  The  duration of  the  project shall not  exceed 
one  year  from  the  date  on which  the first contracts are  signed. 
~ 
The  maximum  cost of this  preparatory  phase is estimated at 
500,000 u.a.  (including expert assistance,  possible mission ex-
penses  and  any  complementary  studies carried out  outside)." 
On  April 1st 1974,  the Commission appointed me  Chairman and Director 
of  the  study  described in the Annex.  It has  been  carried out  by  a 
Project Board,  mainly  supervisory  and advisory,  and  a  Project Team, 
mainly  concerned with drafting the  present  report and with  studies 
ancillary thereto.  The  boundary between  the  functions  of  the  two  bodies 
has  been  flexible;  some  members  of the  Project Board have  drafted 
sections  of  this  report,  and all members  of the Project Team  have 
advised  on  the  general  conduct  of  the project.  The  work  has  been 
carried out in general  cooperation  rather than  by  any  rigid demar-
cation of  functions,  though  the  Project Board was  charged by its terms 
of  reference  to  transmit  to  the  Commission  a  separate  opinion  on  the 
report.  This,  too,  is transmitted by  the  present letter. 
The  Resolution of  the Council  of Ministers called for a  one-year 
study.  Between  May  and  September  1974 the  Project Board was  selected 
jointly by  the  Commission  and  the Director,  the  Project Team  was 
selected by  the Director,  and various  preliminary meetings  were  held. 
The  study proper began with  the first full  meeting of the Project Team 
in early October  1974.  The  Project Team  has  met at Les  Salines in 
France  (June  1974;  partial and  preliminary meeting),  at Wiston  House 
in Britain  (October  1974),  at Bergisch Gladbach in Germany  (January  1975), 
and at Venice  inltaly  (April  1975).  There  have  also been several 
partial meetings.  The  Project Board has  met  5  times  in Brussels,  and 
once  in London.  In June  1975  this Report was  submitted to the  Commission 
in draft,  and in July  the  Commission  transmitted its observations,  which 
were mostly  on matters  of  fact.  The  present  final  report  takes 
account  of those  observations,  but  remains  the sole  responsibility of  the 
Europe  Plus  Thirty Group,  comprising the  Project Board,  the  Project Team 
and  the Chairman  - Director. 
The  work  was  coordinated and  administered  from  an office in London 
kindly  let to  us  by  the U.K.  Science  Research Council. 
The  members  of  the  Project Board  and Project Team  were  as  follows: - 4  -
PROJECT  BOARD 
Dr.  L.  B~lkow 
Prof.  A.  Buzzati-Traverso 
Prof.  II.B.C.  Casjmjr 
Prof.  Umberto  Colombo 
Prof.  R.  Dahrendorf(l) 
Prof.  Bertrand  de  Jouvenel 
Lord  Kennet,  Chairman 
Or.  Alexander  King 
Or.  H.  Hermann  Koelle 
Dr.  Max  Kohnstamm 
Mr.  Keith Pavitt 
Prof.  P.  Piganiol 
Prof.  I.  Prigogine 
Prof.  P.  N~rregaard Rasmussen 
Senator Mary  T.W.  Robinson 
(l)  From  October  1974 
Gesch~ftsflihrer der Messerschmidt-
Bglkow-B·lohm.  G,In, b ...H. 
Senior Scientific Adviser  to  the  United  Nations 
Environmental  Programme,  formerly Assistant-
Director  for  Science,  UNESCO. 
President of  the  Royal  Academy  of Arts  & 
Sciences,  Amsterdam. 
Director of Corporate  Research  and  Strategic 
Planning,  Montedison,  Milan, 
Director of London  School  of  Economics, 
Formerly  a  European  Commissioner. 
Founder of Association Internationale 
Futuribles. 
Formerly Parliamentary Secretary for Housing 
and  Local  Government,  U.K.  Government. 
Chairman,  International  Federation of Institutes 
of  Advanced  Study,  Co-founder  Club  of Rome, 
formerly Director General  for Scientific Affairs, 
OECD, 
Professor of  Space  Technology  and  Systems 
Engineering.  Founding  Presiden~ Berlin 
Centre  for  Futures Research. 
Principal  of  the  European University 
Institute. 
Senior Fellmv,  Science  Policy  Research Unit, 
Sussex University.  Member  of Directorate  for 
Scier•tific Affairs,  OECD. 
Association Internationale Futuribles,  Paris. 
Professeur  ~ l'Universite Libre  de  Bruxelles. 
Professor of  Economic~ at  the University 
of Cc·penhagen. 
Professor of Law,  Trir•ity College,  Dublin. 
Barrister. Prof.  R.  Saint-Paul 
Dr.  Ing.  J.  Seetzen 
Prof.  H.  Thiemann 
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President du  Depar·tement  Economie  et 
Gestion au  Conservatoire  National  des  Arts et 
Metiers;  Directeur  du  Centre  Science, 
Technologie  et Societe;  Paris. 
ASA/  Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Grossforschungs-
Einrichtungen. 
Director General  of former  IIMT,  Milan. 
Counsellor and  R & D Coordinator, 
/ 
Nestle Alimentana  S.A.,  Vevey; 
Formerly Director General,  Battelle,  Geneva. 
Prof.  P.  de  Wolff  Professor of Econometrics,  University of 
Amsterdam. 
PROJECT  TEAM 
Dr.  Bernhard  Badura  Universit:it  Konstanz, 
Fachbereich Soziologie. 
Dott.  Ugo Businaro  Fiat,  Turin, 
Direzione  Centrale Ricerca  e 
Sviluppo. 
M.  Bernard Cazes  Commissariat-General  du  Plan, 
Prof.  M.  de  Cecco 
Dr.  Sam  Cole 
Prof.  Dr.  Meinolf  Dierkes 
Prof.  Dr.  H.  ·Flohn 
Sir George  Godber 
Dr.  Fran~ois  Hetman 
d'Equipement et de  la 
Productivite,  Paris. 
Prof.  of International Economics, 
University of Siena; 
Visiting Professor at ~he Royal 
Institute of International 
Affairs,  London. 
University of  Sussex, 
Science Policy Research Unit. 
Adjunct-Professor of Public 
Affairs at Carnegie-Mellon 
University,  Pittsburgh. 
Head  of Applied  Social  and 
Behavioural  Science  Research 
Division of  the  Battelle Inst., 
Frankfurt. 
Meteorologisches  Institut,  Bonn. 
Formerly Chief Medical  Officer,  England. 
OECD,  Directorate  for Scientific 
Affairs. Prof.  Dr.  J.  de  Hoogh 
Prof.  Torsten  Hus~n 
Mr.  Erling Joergensen 
Lord  Kennet,  Director 
Prof.  Dr.  Beate  Kohler 
Mr.  Gerald Leach 
Dr.  H.  Paschen 
Prof.  P.  Piganiol 
Mr. Terence  Price 
Prof.  ir. 0.  Rademaker 
Prof.  Giuseppe  Sacco 
Dr.  Craig Sinclair 
Prof.  Dr.  Kurt  Sontheimer 
Mr.  L •  Thi ri  e t 
( 1)  Mr.  J. M.  Thoruson 
Prof.  Guillaume  Wunsch 
Mr.  Walter C.L.  Zegveld 
(l)  From  March  1975 
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Landbouw-Economisch Instituut, 
The  Hague. 
Professor of  Education,  University  of 
Stockholm. 
Director,  Institute for  the  Study of 
International  Problems  in Education. 
Danmarks  Statistik~ 
President  of Central  Council  of Education 
of  Derunark. 
Formerly  Parliamentary  Secretary  for  Hous-
ing  and Local  Government,  U.K.  Government. 
Professor of Political Science, 
Technische  Hochschule,  Darmstadt. 
International Institute for Environment 
and Development,  London. 
Studiengruppe  fUr  Systemforschung, 
Heidelberg. 
Association Internationale Futuribles, 
Paris. 
Secretary General,  The  Uranium Institute. 
Formerly Director of  the  Defence 
Operational Analysis  Establishment, 
United  Kingdom. 
Technische  Hogeschool,  Eindhoven. 
Professor of Industrial  Economics  & 
Policy,  Department  of  Political Science, 
Florence University. 
Consultant,  Environment  Directorate, 
OECD. 
Professor of  Politics,  Geschwister-Scholl-
"  Institut  fur Politische Wissenschaft, 
Universit~t Mllnchen. 
Comwissariat a l'Energie Atomique, 
Departement  des  Progra1nmes  ,  Paris. 
Head  of  the  European Intercity Transport 
Study,  OECD,  Paris. 
/  /' 
Departement  de  Demographie, 
/ 
Universite Catholique  de  Louvain. 
Assistant Director,  Organization  for 
Industrial  Research  TNO;  Head, 
Industrial Liaison Department  TNO. 7 
The  Administrator  of  the  Project and  Secretary of  the  Project Board was 
Brigadier C.T.  Honeybourne,  the  Research Assistant was  Charles  Landry, 
and  the  secretaries were  Anne  Wood  and  Catherine  Gaynor. 
We  have  had  the  benefit of consultation with  the  Secretary General  of  the 
Council  of Ministers,  and  with  the  President,  several members  and  several 
officials of  the  European  Parliament.  We  have  also naturally been  in constant 
touch with  the  Commission  of  the  European  Colllmunities  and its dependent  organs, 
t~1roughout our work,  and  particularly with its Directorate  General  XII, 
for  Research,  Science,  and  Education,  to  which  we  were  attached. 
We  would  like  to  thank Commissioners  Dahrendorf  and  Brunner,  and  Director 
General  Schuster  and  his  staff,  for  their continuous  help  and  support. 
The  organisations  and  individuals who  have  helped the  project as  a  whole  and 
single  members  of  it are  unfortunately  too  numerous  to  list.  We  have  had 
the  sensation of apparently ubiquitous  and  unconditional  support,  and  wherever 
we  have  asked  for  help  and  advice  we  have  received it.  It has  grieved  us  to 
have  to  turn  away  a  great many  organisations  and  individuals  who  have  offered 
us  their resources. 
The  Annex  to  the  Council  Resolution of  14th January  1974 which  we  quote  above, 
and  which  constitutes  the  terms  of  reference  for  our  study,  places  forecasting, 
assessment,  and  methodology  in  the  context of  the  European  Communities'  scien-
tific and  technological  policy.  This  could be  read as  a  limitation on  the  content 
of  our study.But  the  phrase  which  directly governs  its content  is  this:  "A .•.• 
study ....  concerning  the  foreseeable  or possible  developments  over  the  next 
thirty years  which  are  likely  to  affect  the  progress  of  Europe".  Such 
developments  are multifarious,  and  transcend  science  and  technology. 
We  have  interpreted  these  phrases  liberally.  Science  and  technology affect 
everything else,  and  everything else affects  science  and  technology.  They  can 
in no  way  be  separated off  from  the  rest of  life:  we  are  a  scientific and 
technological  society,  and  there  are  interactions  everywhere,  as  we  are at pains 
to  point out. 
The  fact  that  this  study has  been  limited  to  one  year  (in practice  rather 
less)  has  forced  us  to  choose  a  particular method of work,  namely  a  rather  large 
number  of  people  working  together part-time.  The  alternative method,  a  smaller 
number  of  qualified people working  together full-tirne,  would  have  taken  too-long, 
since  first-rate  people  cannot  undertake  full-time  jobs without warning. - 8  -
The  Project Board and  Project Team  consisted mainly of scientists 
drawn  from many  fields,  social as well  as natural.  During this work 
none  of us  has  been,  as  we  are used to do,  directly exercising our 
professional  skills;  we  have  been bending our expertise to  the  less 
familiar task of  devising  a  new  instrument to assist policy-makers. 
In a  group  so disparate, it is only natural  tha~ not  everyone  of 
us  should agree with  everything in the  report.  What  matters is that 
all of us,  both in the Project Team  and  the  Project Board,  endorse it 
as  a  whole. 
This  report,  and  the  opinion of the  Project Board upon it, we  now 
submit.  It goes without  saying that we  are  ready  to undertake any 
further consultation,  advice,  or enquiry,  for which  the Council  of 
Ministers or the Commission of  the  European Communities  may  call 
upon  us. 
Yours  sincerely, 
Kennet, 
Chainnan and Director. 
22nd  September  1975 6th  June,  1975. 
Opinion  of  the  Project  Board  of  Europe  Plus  Thirty 
In  accordance  with  paragraph  2  of  its Terms  of Reference  where it is 
stated "The  Board  shall  give  the  Commission  an  opinion  on  the  final 
report of  the  Team": 
Noting  the  Resolution  of  the  Council  of Ministers  of  14  January  1974 
where  it is  stated:  "The  Council  takes  note  of  the  fact  ••..  that  the 
Commission  intends  to  submit  specific proposals  in  the  near  future 
on  the  basis of  the  results of  this preliminary programme"; 
Noting  that  the  preliminary  programme  concerned has  been  carried 
out  by  the  Europe  Plus  Thirty Project Team  during  1974  and  1975 
and  that its results are  the  report of  the Project Team; 
Having  advised  the  Project Director on  the  method  and  progress of 
the  work,  in accordance  with  para  3  of  its  terms  of  reference,  having 
been  aware  of  the  progress  of  the  work at all stages  and  having 
contributed  thereto; 
Having  carefully considered  the  Report  of  the  Project Team  submitted 
by  the Project Director; 
The  Project Board  transmits  the  following  opinion  thereon to  the  Commission 
of  the  European  Conmunities~ 
l)  The  Report  constitutes  a  valuable  set of  recommendations  to  the 
Commission  in  answer  to  the  questions  contained  in  the  Annex 
to  the  above  mentioned  Council  Resolution. 
2)  The  Board  endorses  unanimously  the  basic  philosophy of  the  Report, 
stressing  the  need  for  a  forward-looking  view and  indicating  the 
possibilities  for  a  systematic  and  rational  approach  to it at 
Community  level.  This  does  not mean  that every member  agrees  with 
all aspects  of  the  report  :  constructive criticism,  partly of  a 
technical nature,  will constitute  an  important  input  to  the  future 
work  to  be  undertaken. 
3)  The  Board  is  unanimous  in approving  the  recommendation  of  the 
report  that a  continuing  instrument  "Europe  Plus  Thirty"  should 
be  set up  and  that it should  gradually build  up  to  the  optimum 
staff level. - 2  -
4)  Given  the  present  period of  rapid evolution which  demands  that 
political decisions  be  taken  on  the basis  of  comprehensive 
integrated  forecasting studies,  the Board stresses  to  the 
Commission  the  urgency of  this matter. 
Signed  Kennet  Chairman  of  the Project Board 
and  Project Director 
Professor N.  Rasmussen 
Project Board members 
Chairman  ad  interim of  the  Project 
Board  for the  purpose  of  formulating 
the  above  opinion. 
Dr.  L.  Bt3lkow 
Professor A.  Buzzati-Traverso 
Professor Dr.  H.B.G.  Casimir 
Professor U.  Colombo 
Professor R.  Dahrendorf 
Professor Bertrand  de  Jouvenel 
Dr.  Alexander  King 
Professor Dr.  Ing.  H.H.  Koelle 
Dr.  M.  Kohnstamm 
Mr.  K.  Pavitt 
Professor P.  Piganiol 
Professor I. Prigogine 
Senator Mary  T.W.  Robinson 
Professor  R.  Saint-Paul 
Dr.  Ing.  J.  Seetzen 
Professor Dr.  H.  Thiemann 
Professor P.  de  Wolff MAIN  RECOMMENDATIONS 
We  recommend  that: 
1)  A  long-term  forecasting instrument,  Europe  Plus  Thirty,  should  be 
set  up  to  serve  the institutions of  the"European Communities  and, 
so  far as  the  latter may  desire,  their member  governments.  It 
should work to  a  time horizon of  5  years  and  longer.  (General 
Introduction,  Part I.l, pages  19  - 20,  Part IV,  pages  1  and  2). 
2)  Technology Assessment  should be  carried out  by  the  continuing 
instrument Europe  Plus  Thirty,  as  an integral part of its work. 
(Part III, Part IV,  pages  1  and  2). 
3)  The  forecasting  should be  integrated,  by  which  we  mean  two  things: 
(a)  Not  limited to  a  single sector,  but  encompassing  and 
integrating all sectors  relevant  to  the  long-teun 
future  of  the  European Communities,  or to  the parti-
cular problem area  under  examination  (Part 1.4, 
Part II.l, page  1). 
(b)  Integrated with the  European  Communities'  policy-
making  process.  (Partsl.3  and 1.4,  Part IV). 
4)  The  forecasting should be  so  devised that a  range  of  possible goals 
and  possible ways  to  reach  them  can be  examined.  No  one  goal  or 
policy would be recommended  above  others.  (General Introduction). 
5)  Europe  Plus  Thirty should adopt  a  flexible  and adaptive method of 
work,  employing  a  wide  range  of  quantitative and  non-quantitative 
methods.  (Part I.3.). 
6)  It should work  in 3  ways:  by  assembling work  done  elsewhere,  by 
letting contracts,  and  by  in-house  research.  (Part IV,  pages  4  to 7). 
7)  Europe  Plus  Thirty  should have,  as well  as  "generalists",  (Part IV, 
pages  11  - 12),  an  in-house staff with knowledge  of  the  following 
subjects:-
Agriculture,  fisheries  and  forestries  Part II.  4 
Social  structures  and values  "  II.  6 
Education  "  II.  7 
Science and Technology  "  II.  8 
Industry 
11  II.  9 
Energy  "  11.10 
Materials  "  11.11 
Environment  "  11.12 
Transport 
II  II.l3 
Economics  & Finance 
II  II.l5 
Defence & Disarmament  "  II.l6 
Politics & Institutions 
II  11.17 
Technology Assessment  Part Ill - 2  -
8)  For the  following  subjects  Europe  Plus  Thirty  should primarily 
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9)  (a)  The  governing body  of Europe  Plus  Thirty  should be 
a  Board of  12  members,  appointed by  the Commission 
of  the European Communities.  (Part IV,  pages  7  to 9). 
(b)  The  staff of Europe  Plus  Thirty should be  headed by a 
director assisted by  two  deputy directors.  (Part IV 
pages  9  and  10). 
(c)  The  staff should be  gradually built up  to  75  graduate 
professionals.  (Part IV  pages  10  to 14). 
(d)  Publication of work  should be  the  rule,  but unpublished 
studies  should not be  excluded if there is  good  reason. 
(Part IV  pages  14 to 15). 
(e)  Europe  Plus Thirty should be at the service of  the 
Commission  and  Parliament,  and also, if they wish it, 
of  the Member  Governments.  The  relationship of 
Europe  Plus  Thirty to the Institutions of  the Euro-
pean Communities  should be  kept  peunanently under 
review by  the Board of Europe  Plus  Th~rty.  (Part IV, 
pages  15  to  18). 
(f)  At  least  75%  of Europe  Plus Thirty's  finance  should 
come  from  the commission  (Part  IV,  pa~es 19  and  20). Gen.  1. 
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GENERAL  INTRODUCTION 
The  world  is bursting  in on  us.  It is  less  important  that 
we  are  French,  German,  British,  and  so  on,  than  that we  are 
Europeans,  and  less  important  that we  are  Europeans  than  that we 
are  human  beings.  Because  of  the  recent  revolutions  in  transport, 
communications,  and  weaponry,  it is world  forces  and world  factors 
which  shape  our  lives,  and  sometimes  threaten  them.  But it is 
still as  citizens of  a  single nation  that we  entrust power  to  those 
who  must  guide  and  protect us. 
legitimacy  remains  national. 
Events  are  global,  while  political 
That  this  paradox makes  it harder for  us  to  control  our  fate 
and  invent our future,  is well  understood.  We  as  Europeans,  acting 
at the  middle  level,  should  therefore  direct our  ingenuity  to  finding 
ways  of  reducing  the  effect of  the  paradox.  If we  can  achieve  greater 
control  of events  by  broadening political  legitimacy,  we  should  do  so; 
this  is  the  impelling  logic of  the  European  Communities~!)  And  if 
we  can  achieve  greater control of events  by  thinking ahead,  we  should 
do  that also;  that is  the  impelling  logic of  forecasting. 
The  rapid political change  and  extreme  economic  uncertainty of 
the  world  today  are  forcing all our  countries  to  take  cognizance  of 
trends,  and  of  the  interaction between  them,  which hitherto it was 
possible  to  ignore.  At  both national  and  Community  levels  we  should 
develop  whatever means  we  can  for  identifying necessary relationships 
(1)  In  law  there  is no  such  thing as  "the European  Community";  there 
are  only  the  European  Economic  Community,  the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community,  and  Euratom.  At first,  each of  the  three  had  its own 
Commission;  but  in  1967  the  three  Commissions  were  amalgamated, 
becoming  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  while  the  three 
Communities  themselves  remain  legally distinct. 
In political  and  social  reality,  on  the other 
certainly such  a  thing as  "The  European  Community". 
we  use  words  as  the context  requires.  "The  European 
the three  legally separate entities.  '~he European 
the  single socio-political  entity. 
hand,  there is 
In  this  Report 
Communi ties" are 
Conununity"  is 
"The  Commission  of  the  European  Communities"  is the  full  legal 
title of  the  famous  body in Brussels.  "The  European Conunission"  or 
"Corrmission"  is the  common  name  of the  same  body,  reflecting the political 
and  social  reality.  The  adjective "Community"  (as  in "Community  level", 
o~'Community system")  we  use  to mean  of or pertaining to either the single 
socio-political Community,  or one  or other of the  separate  legal 
Communities,  as  the  context  shows. Gen.  4. 
Gen.  5. 
Gen.  6. 
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between  the  policy sector and  long-term planning,  and,  in  the  light 
of  these,  elaborating alternative policies  and  strategies.  The 
object must  always  be  to  examine  what  is possible  for  Europe,  and 
what  is  impossible;  the  latter is generally easier  to  identify 
than  the  former,  and  provides  a  welcome  element  of certainty in 
an activity where  certainty is by  definition scarce. 
The  interdependence  of nations  has  long been accepted  in a 
general  and  superficial way,  but it has  now  reached  a  new  intensity. 
The  vastness  of  international  transactions,  especially  the  ever-
increasing  demand  for  energy  and  :mw  materials  with all its payments, 
investment,  and  monetary  consequences,  has  greatly increased  the 
importance  of  factors  external  to  each  country,  leaving strictly 
limited possibilities of initiative  to all but  the  biggest. 
The  e~~rgy crisis has  shown  how  a  problem  in one  field can 
penetrate  the  whole  economic,  social  and  political fabric.  Rapid 
population increase,  rising demand  for  food  and  especially protein, 
changing expectations  concerning  economic  growth,  agricultural 
innovation,  climatic change,  and  many  other problems  on  the  horizon, 
may  well  have  equally far-reaching  and  disconcerting effects,  some  of 
them  quite  soon.  We  have  in fact  reached  a  situation where  the 
interactions are  so  important  that it is difficult even  to  identify 
discrete  problems,  let alone  to  apply discrete  solutions.  Yet· the 
machinery of our governments,  designed  for earlier and  simpler days, 
is still organised sector by  sector and  can only with difficulty assess 
inter-policy conflicts,  or synergisms,  by  interdepartmental  committees 
or by  coordination at the  top. 
Communities. 
And  the  same  is  true  of  the  European 
It seems  to  be  generally accepted  that a  doubling of  the  population 
of  the  world  in just over  thirty years  is  inevitable.  By  far  the  greater 
part of  this  expansion will  take  place  in  the  less  developed  countries. 
In  1920,  the present European  Community  countries  contained 9.7%  of 
the world's population,  in  1970  it was  6.9%  and  in  2000  it is unlikely 
to  be  more  than  4. 6io. ( l)  This  changing proportion cannot fail  to  have 
(1)  EEC  figure  for  2000  from  the  OECD  report of  1974:  for  1920  and 
1970  from  the  U.N.  Demographic  Yearbook.  Estimates  of world  population 
from  various  U.N.  sources. Gen.  7. 
Gen.  8. 
Gen.  9. 
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major political consequences  for  the whole  world,  quite apart  from 
the  direct effects of  the  increase  such  as  pressure  on  food  and  raw 
materials.  The  much  smaller population  increase  probable  in  the 
industrial countries will also have  an  incommensurate  effect on  the 
demand  for  energy  and materials,  since  their per capita consumption 
is,  today,  between  20  and  40  times  that of  the  less  developed world. 
The  internal  social  effects of these  changes  would  be very  different 
in the  less  developed  and in the  industrial countries.  In the  fonner,  a 
doubling  of  the  present  population,  of very young  average  age,  would 
trebl. the workforce,  with inevitable  employment  difficulties.  In the 
latter,  zero  or very  small  growth  rates would  lead to  a  considerable 
increase  in the  average  age  and  hence  a  gradual  reduction in the active, 
though not  in  the  consuming,  population. 
Neo-Malthusian  doubts  are  now  raised everywhere  about  the 
possibility of  economic  growth  continuing  indefinitely,  because 
population doubling  and  the  development  of  the  poor  regions  would 
add  so  enormously  to  the  global  demands  for  raw materials  and  energy. 
The  problem  in  the  decades  to  come  will not be  so  much  the  absolute 
exhaustion vf  resources  but greatly increased costs,  including energy 
costs,  for working  the  more  difficult energy deposits,  which  are all  that 
will  be  left.  The  energy crisis has  given  us  a  foretaste  of difficulties 
which  could  become  quite  common.  But  - and  here  is  the  contradiction  -
we  have  allowed  energy  to  become  the  key  to  continued material  growth. 
The  very great increase which must  be  expected  in  the  demand  for 
food  can  apparently only  be  met  by  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  energy 
inputs,  particularly for mechanised  agriculture,  and  the  desalination of 
water.  Similarly,  nearly all substitution for  scarce or  expensive 
materials  seems  to  require  a  large  increase  in  the  use of  energy.  Two 
trends  are  here  on  a  collision course. 
We  can no  longer maintain  the  simplifying distinction of  the 
"three worlds"  or "four worlds".  There  is  a  continuous  spectrum of 
societies,  and  the  harmonisation of disparities within  this  one  world 
is clearly not mainly  a  humanitarian or philanthropic problem as it has 
so  often been presented  in  the  past;  it is  the  world's major political 
issue.  Already  the  OAPEC  countries  give  more  aid per capita Gen.lO. 
Gen.ll. 
Gen.l2. 
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than  the  OECD  countries.  Already  there has  been  a  call,  within  the 
General  Assembly  of  the  United Nations,  and  in OPEC,  for  the  creation 
of  a  New  International Economic  Order.  This must  be  taken as  the  first 
sign of a  movement,  likely to appeal  to  the  sense  of justice of  the 
majority of mankind,  which  the  developed countries will  find it unwise 
to  ignore  and  impossible  to  repress. 
Our  political systems  are ill adapted  to  face  major discontinuity 
and  neither precedent nor  the  traditional  indicators  give much  guidance. 
The  democratic  system with  its  3  - 7  year electoral cycle  concentrates 
political action upon  immediate  issues,  and  there  is  little opportunity 
or  incentive  to  elaborate  longer-term policies.  Thinking about  the 
future  is  therefore all  too  often relegated  to  party research groups, 
or academe,  and  to multinational corporations. 
The  time  scales of  the  worl~of politics,of administration,  and  of 
science  are  greatly different;  this  is  a  fundamental  fact of national  and 
world  development.  Research and  development  are essentially  (and 
increasingly)  long-term processes.  From  the  appearance  of a  new  concept 
in the  mind  of  a  scientist to its generalised application in the  form 
of  a  new  product,  process,  institution, or industry,  can be thirty 
years  or more.  In  such  contemporary  economic  thinking as  bases itself 
on  the  need  to  ensure uninterrupted economic  growth,  there is an  implicit 
reliance  on  the "technological  fix",  that is the asssumption that 
economic  forces will  themselves  summon  up,  from  the  cornucopia  of  science, 
a  continuous  flow  of necessary innovations.  It has  been so,  and it 
may  continue  to be  so.  But  it is  running a  notable  risk to  assume  that 
technology will  always  respond  smoothly  to  increasing needs.  Lead  times  are 
important,  and  a  smooth "fit" is not  likely;  the  risk is of  recurrent 
crises. 
To  meet  all these  dangers,  then,  democracy  itself must  be 
endowed  with new  tools  in education,  in participation,  in 
communication,  and in management.  It is not  our task to  suggest what 
these might  be.  Our  task is to  suggest  a  new  tool  for  democracy  in 
thinking about  these  dangers,  in understanding  them,  and especially 
in thinking about  and understanding  them all together.  Mapping  out 
alternative policies,  and  delimiting the  possible  from  the impossible, 
can be  regarded as  a  form  of  insurance against  the uncertainties of 
a  changing world.  An  individual who  does  not  protect himself  and  his Gen.l3. 
Gen.l4. 
Gen.l5. 
Gen.l6. 
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family  by insuring against  contingencies is  regarded as  irresponsible; 
on  the national  scale  (except  in the  defence  field)  such  foresight 
has  too  seldom been  expected. 
What  we  have  said applies  to all nations,  but  particularly to 
those  of  the  European  Community.  Western  Europe  today  has  relatively  few 
natural  resources,  but  a  highly  skilled,  educated  and enterprising 
population,  abundantly  capable  of  iunovation in technology,  in social 
evolution,  and  in politics.  What  we  lack in materia  grezza  we  make 
up  in materia  grigia.  The  European  Communities  therefore not only 
must  but  can  come  to  grips with  the  complexity of  the  situation and 
design the  change  they want,  rather  than merely  react belatedly  to events. 
But  we  cannot confine  ourselves  to  a  study of  the  Community  as  a 
system,  since it is an "open  system" within the world.  And  as  there 
are  reasons  to think that  the major  features  of the  1945-1975  period 
are  now  undergoing a  fundamental  change,  to  look  back at least to  the 
period of  1914-1944  seems  necessary if we  are to  envisage  our true 
context and understand our social momentum. 
The  period  1914-1944 began  and  ended with  great wars  which  shook 
the whole  of  Europe,  and  through it the world.  It was  marked  by  the  up-
surge of new  fo~s of governments,  communist  and  fascist,  which,  however 
important  their differences,  both  stood in stark contradiction to  the 
belief current  in pre-1914 Europe,  and apparently  triumphant at the  time 
of the  peace  treaties of  1919  - 1920,  that  every state was  bound to 
repeat  the  parliamentary  form  of government  developed in Britain. 
In the  economic world  the main  event  was  the  Great  Depression,  the 
break-up  of international  trade  and capital movements.  The  distress 
of unemployment  gave  rise to  a  new  imperative which was  to  dominate  the 
next  period,  1945-1975:  the  imperative  of  full  employment.  It also 
gave  rise to  social institutions which  added  a  new  dimension  to public 
finance:  that of social welfare. 
In  1914  there had  been  no  distinction between  the political use 
of the word  Europe,  and  the  geographical  one  •  Nobody  then would  have 
thought  of  Europe  in the  narrow  sense of Western  Europe  (the  outcome  of 
the  Second World War).  The  1914-1944 period ended  and the 1945-1975 
period began with  the division of Europe  into  two  parts.  Russia,  which 
had  played an  important  part in the first stages of  the  1914 war,  had  then Gen.l7. 
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changed  its  regir1e  aPd  stepped  out of it.  For  these  reasons  it did not 
take  part in  the  peace  making  of  1919  and  1920  and  was  thereafter 
considered by  the  Allies  as  outside  Europe,  an  "outsideness" which 
was  later extended  to  the  other countries  of  Europe  reached  by  the 
Russian  armies  in  1945.  The  ~lternative futures  for  Europe  which  we 
will  have  to  consider  cannot  assume  that a  division which  has  lasted 
a  mere  thirty years  will  continue  to  prevail  over centuries  of 
cultural and  political affinity. 
Not  only  is  the  Corrrrnunity  only  a  pa.rt of Europe,  it also  depends 
upon  phenomena  out~ide Europe  altogether.  The  main  feature  of  the 
last  30  years  has  been  the  role of America  in Europe,  and it is mainly 
by  the  position in  1945  of  the  outposts  of  the  Allied armies,  in which 
America  predominated,  that Western  Europe  is  now  defined.  Our 
tremendous  post-war  economic  development  was  seeded  and  made  possible 
by  American  aid,  and  the  receipt of  this  aid was  the  first occasion 
for  European  powers  to  put  together  their experts  in spelling out  the 
needs  of  Europe  and  measuring  the  "gap"  between  these  countries' 
capacity  to  finance  their  imports,  and  their possible means  of  payment. 
These  sessions  between experts  played  no  mean  part in  the  formation 
of  the  concept of  Western  Europe  as  an  economic  unit. 
Gen.l8.  While attention was  focused  on  economic  growth,  there  occurred 
Gen. 19. 
a  capital  change  in the  map  of the world,  from which  the  great  overseas 
empires  of all Western  European  states were  cancelled,  chiefest  of 
them  the British Empire.  The  lands  which  owed  some  fonn  of allegiance 
to  the British crown  had  covered nearly  three  times  the  extent of  geo-
graphical  Europe,  and  contained nearly  twice its population.  Now  they 
have  gone  their own  way.  The  British Commonwealth  and  the French-
speaking world  retain a  unity based  only  on  language  and  on  some  elements 
of  law  and  higher education.  One  may  see  in the  new  Lorn~ Convention  a 
possible  embryo  of  a  Community  Commonwealth,  but  the  situation is probably 
a  transitory  one,  since Asia  and Latin America  are excluded. 
If one  takes  a  long  backward view,  it appears  that  our  small 
peninsula  of  Eurasia  was  for  some  five  centuries  the  source  of  changes 
in  other parts  of the world,  the  launching  pad  of  impacts  on  their 
societies  and civilisations.  How  brutal  these  impacts  were  at first 
need  not  be  dwelt  upon  here.  The  point  of  present  interest is that  the 
peoples  whose  histories have  been  changed  by  the  impact  of  Europe  have 
now  acquired a  freedom  of action allowing  them,  in turn,  to  affect  the Gen.20o 
Gen.21 
Gen.22. 
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history of  Europe.  Notwithstanding  its great distance  from  Europe 
(in  terms  of  seafaring  two  centuries  ago)  and  notwithstanding  the 
smallness  of its population,  the  nascent American nation  was  the 
first to  have  a  return  impact  upon  Europe;  indeed,  its War  of 
Independence  generated  a  wave  of  influence which  played  a  great 
part  in  the  toppling  of  the  French monarchy,  and  the  introduction 
of bourgeois  democracy  in all Europe. 
The  Third World  could  once  be  thought  of  as  in  some  way  "outside". 
But  in the  years  to  come,  we  must  think  of  Europe  as  "within"  a  world 
system where  relative weights  may  change  very  rapidly.  There  have  been 
calculations  of  the  decades,  or generations,  which  the  poor countries 
would  take  to catch  up  with  the American  per caput  product  as it then 
stood,  but  this  was  a  narrow view  indeed.  Political  roles  do  not  wait 
upon  the  achievement  of  a  standard of  living.  The  very  period  during 
which  Western  Europe  became  substantially  dependent  on  Third World  resources 
was  also  tha~ during which  Europe  lost  any  form  of  overt  control  over  them. 
Soon  after the  French oil  find  in the  Sahara,  Algeria  ceased  to  be  part 
of  France.  Nigerian oil  and  independence  emerged  together.  Britain has 
been steadily  reducing its presence  in  the  Middle  East  since  1945.  At  the 
moment  that  Angola  proved  a  great  reserve  of oil,  Portugal at last  had 
to  concede  independence. 
It  seems  clear that the  next  thirty years will  be  marked  by  con-
tinuing vast  changes  in the  relationships  of  Europe  with  the  rest of  the 
world;  among  them  those arising  from  the  disappearance  of European 
ownership  in other  lands,  from  the  increasing external  ownership  of Europe, 
and  from  two-way migrations  of workers  of  different  sorts  and  qualifications. 
May  we  expect  a  class war  to  develop  on  a  world  scale?  Should 
industrialised societies as  a  whole,  given their consumption  of materials 
and  energy,  now  be  regarded as  among  the world's  exploiters,  and  the 
poorer societies as  a  whole  be  regarded as  the world's  exploited?  Was 
the  recent "energy crisis",  in which  some  of  the whole world's  have-nots 
stood shoulder  to  shoulder  to  raise  the  price  of  the  main  thing  the  world's 
haves  needed  from  them,  analagous  to  the  first strikes  in the  industrialised 
world;  when  each  country's  have-nots  stood  shoulder  to  shoulder to  raise  the 
price  of  their labour?  If there  is  indeed a  world class war,  will  any 
international  assembly  be  ready  in  time  to  articulate and mitigate iS .as 
the  parliaments  of  the Western world articulated and mitigated  our 
national  class wais?  Will  the  U.N.  family  of organisations  become  equal  to 8  Gen.  Intro. 
the  task  ?  Or  will  the  world  class war  follow  instead  the  bloody 
pattern of  the  Russian  one  1  These  questions  are  susceptible  of 
rational  discussion,  and  within  this  field of  discourse alternative 
aims  and  policies  can  be  formulated,  assessed  and  compared. 
Gen.23.  Thus  far,  we  have,  in a  sense,  been  discussing  the  question: 
"What  is Europe  that it should need  forecasting  ?"  We  must now  turn 
to  the  question:  "What  is forecasting  that Europe  should need it ?" 
Gen.24.  We  all try to interrogate the  future,  mainly in order to help 
us  decide what  to  do.  The  peoples  who  used  to  (and  those who  still 
do)  open  animals  to  see their entrails,  or cast pebbles  or drops 
of wine  on  the  ground,  or go  to  the  cloudy  and  euphonious  oracle,  did 
so  not  for curiosity but because  they  had  a  decision to make.  (Shall 
we  give battle?  Shall  I  build a  house?)  Divination was  for action; 
divination,  like  judgment  and  like will, was  a  component  of decision. 
Gen.25.  Equally,  in modern  times,  forecasting is  seldom  done  for its own 
sake;  it is done  to  help  someone  take  decisions. Even  in the  least 
planned national  economies,  economic  forecasting is supposed  to help 
manufacturers,  merchants  and entrepreneurs to place  themselves  in a 
position of their own  choice  in the  real world of unfolding events; 
and  the more  centrally planned  a  society is,  the more will  forecasting 
seek to help a  government which,  by  definition,  takes  many  and weighty 
decisions,and the  less will it be  distinguished  from the  planned 
enforcement  of those  decisionsthemselves. 
Gen.26.  In  recent  years  a  whole  academic world  of  forecasting has  grown 
up,  and many  sub-worlds within it.  We  will  none  of  us  forget  that much 
of it was  initiated in the u.s., and that  some  of it contributed to 
policies  of the  Kennedy  and Johnson  administrations which,  in Vietnam 
and in the  strategic relationship with  the  Soviet  Union,  almost  entirely 
failed in their purposes.  It is also  right  to  remember  that this 
whole  structure of techniques  is  only  a  concentration in specialist 
hands  of  a  universal  human  function,  and that although the "scientific" 
competence  of  the American  thinktanks  was  often high,  their political, 
historical and philosophical  competencewas  sometimes  low  or even  non-
existent. 9  Gen.  Intro. 
Gen.27.  So  far  forecasting  has  mainly been  done  by  people  trained  in  the 
Gen.28. 
physical  sciences,  and  the  more  number-based  social  sciences;  the 
epistemology of  forecasting  is still in its infancy.  For  the  time 
being,  practitioners  from  these  sciences might agree  that  the  use-
fulness  of  long-term forecasting is clearest in certain fields, 
which  fall  into  two  groups.  First:  if decisions or actions  taken 
now  or in  the near future  can  produce  important consequences  in  the 
long  term,  then  forecasts  for  a  correspondingly  long period are  useful. 
Some  major  infrastructural  investments  (for instance,  in  transport and 
education)  are  irreversible,  and  inevitably last for  a  very  long  time. 
Again,  the  development  of new  technologies  may  produce  permanent  changes 
in people's  lives.  Second:  forecasting  in  some  fields  itself demands 
forecasts  of associated factors  in other fields  which might not in 
themselves  have  given rise  to  a  need  for  long-term forecasting. 
What  exactly is meant  by  a  long-term forecast?  It usually consists of 
deductions  from  a  set of assumptions  and  hypotheses,  and  propositions  or 
discourses  surrounding  those  deductions.  The  assumptions  are  usually quite 
numerous,  but are not  always  made  explicit.  For  instance,  it is  sometimes 
assumed  explicitly that  there will  be  no  world  war  during  the  forecast 
period;  more  commonly,  that assumption  is left implicit along with  a  great 
many  others.  The  art of  forecasting  lies  largely in  the  development  and  use 
of  deductive methods,  allied with  the  application of  commonsense, 
imagination and  judgement. 
Gen.29.  The  assumptions  on  which  a  forecast  is  founded  may  arise  in various 
Gen.JO. 
ways.  Some  may  be  technical  or other assumptions  within  the  sector where 
the  forecast is being made.  Others may  derive  from  forecasts  already made 
in other sectors;  for  instance,  forecasts  in many  sectors need  to  draw  on 
population and  income  projections.  Foredasts  in one  sector appear  as  inputs 
to  others,  and  the  comprehensive  and  coordinated  interchange  of sector 
forecasts  is  thus  a  large part of  integrated  forecasting.  A  third sort of 
assumptions  concern policy;  they postulate,  for  the  purpose  of  the  forecast, 
that certain policies shall continue  or shall be  changed  in specified ways. 
All  these  sorts of  assumptions  can  be  varied  for  the  purpose  of  the 
exercise,  and  thus  lead  to  different forecasts.  Some  of  them  may  be 
varied within postulated  limits  of uncertainty,  by  taking  upper  and  lower 
limits.  Policy assumptions  can  be  varied if it is desired  to·forecast  the 
consequences  of alternative policy choices.  It is possible  in  this way  to 
examine  rather speculative hypotheses  and  thus  to assist a  public  power  (in Gcn.31. 
Gen.32. 
Gen.33. 
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our case,  the  European Communities)  in promoting,  if it so  wishes,  public 
debate  on  alternative  directions  and  opportunities. 
The  prime  object of  forecasting  is  to  provide  estimates  relating 
to  the  future,  based  on  rigorous  analysis  of  the  present  and  past,  as 
a  contribution  to  the  assessment  of existing or possible  new  policies. 
The  fore~ast,  of course,  is  only  one  element  in  such  an  assessment.  A 
secondary object of  forecasting  can  be  to  help  society at large  to  appreciate 
the  longer-term prospects  facing  it,  and  the  potentialities  for  change. 
It can  be  a  contribution  to  the  self-consciousness  of  a  society,  and 
thus  to  its self-government. 
But  forecasting  should  by  no  means  be  confined  to  the  elaboration 
of  that which  can  be  expressed numerically,  however  wisely  that may  be 
done.  It must  also  keep  a  firm  and  distinct hold  of political  and  social 
reality,  and  any  forecasting  team must  include  people  who  know  how  to  do 
that.  This  means  people  with  experience,  preferably direct,  of politics, 
since  they  are  the  people  who  know  without calculation whether  a  given 
calculation  leads  into  the  area of  impossibility by  implying,  for  instance, 
that  the  old may  welcome  change  or  the  young  forego  it,  that  those  "whose 
wrongs  give  edge  unto  their  swords"  can  be  oppressed  for  ever,  or  that 
ignorance,  any  more  than  injustice,  can  be  perpetuated.  Forecasting  for 
human  beings  can  only be  done  by  the  whole  human  being,  and  calculation  is 
only  one  among  the  human  gifts • 
To  say  anything  about  the  future,  we  must  know  the  past.  There  is  only 
faint  forecasting without  the  projection of historical  trends.  In  the 
·fields  we  shall  discuss  later,  historical  time  series  data  are  to  be  had 
to  very  varying  degrees.  The  extrapolation of  single  trends  enables  you 
to  know  (supposing  you  have  good  data)  what would  happen  if everything went 
on  happening as  it had  happened  before,  if nothing  ran out,  and  if  the  impact 
of  some  other  trend  or  trends  did not disturb  the  one  you  were  extrapolating. 
The  provisos  are  obviously at least as  important as  the  extrapolation, 
which  is why  this necessary but humdrum  part of  forecasting  is  now  recognised, 
when  it is  done  alone,  as  being naive.  Things  do  run  out;  other  trends 
do  hit yours,  and  they are  quite  often  trends  no  one  was  measuring at all. 
(For  example,  the  oil price  increase  of  1973-74  could not have  been  foreseen 
by extrapolating  the  oil price  trend,  or  the  oil  depletion curve,  or  from 
their interaction.  But it could  have  been  foreseen  by  extrapolating  two Gen.34. 
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political  trends:  that of post-colonial politics  in general,  and  that 
of  the  reaction of  governments  everywhere  to  the  occupation of  their 
territories by  invading  armies.  The  probable  interaction of  these 
trends with  that of  the  oil price was  not hard  to  discern.  But 
since  they  could not be  cast in  the  fonn  of "historical  time  series 
data",  they were  invisible  to  the  specialist eye. 
If by  systems  analysis  and modelling  we  work out  the  cross-impacts 
of various  current  trends  upon  each other,  for  instance  energy  use, 
materials  use,  agricultural productivity,  population  growth,  we  very 
soon hit disaster in all sorts  of ways.  But disaster has  often been 
foreseen  in  the  past,  and  did not occur,  because  "we  saw it coming" 
and  we  took avoiding action.  By  changing policy we  changed  the 
trends,  and  cancelled  the  foreseen  impacts. 
Gen.35.  Cassandra was  always  right  and  always  disbelieved.  She  said: 
"The  city will  be  taken  and  sacked."  The  people were  already besieged; 
capture  and  sack was  precisely what  they  feared,  so  they  put  her 
prophecy  down  to  defeatism and  did nothing they  had  not  done  before. 
And  the  city was  taken and  sacked. 
Gen.36.  We  must  remember  why  Cassandra  was  always  right  and  always 
disbelieved:  her ears  and  eyes  had  been  cleansed  by  the  Serpent  of 
Understanding when  she  was  a  child,  so  that  she  should 
read  the  signs  of nature aright.  When  she  grew  up  Apollo,  the  god  of 
moderation  and  harmony,  wooed  her,  but  she  refused  him.  Since  he  could 
not  take  away  the gift of prophecy,  he  left her with  the  curse  of in-
credibility.  The  Serpent  had made  her a  good statistician,  systems 
analyst,  and  scenario writer,  but  she  refused the  god  of  daylight  and 
political  reasoning.  If she  had  said:  "The  Greeks  may  be  preparing 
some  trick;  let us  think of all  the  tricks  they might  prepare  and  guard 
against  them",  then these propositions  could have  been  debated  and  have 
led to action.  But  no;  she  refused to explain herself,  and went  straight 
for  the  theatrical effect of the unqualified  future  tense:  "The city will 
be  taken  and  sacked."  She  was  an  immoderate mystagogue,  and  her mystagogy 
caused the city to  be  destroyed when  her prescience  could have  saved it. 
Gen.37.  A  prophecy  of woe  is only  true when  disbelieved,  and  only belief 
can  falsify it.  Otherwise  put:  if people  believe their present  courses 
will  lead  to disaster,  they will  amend  their courses.  Otherwise  put 
again:  the  publication of unfavourable  trends  leads  to  their correction. Gen.38. 
Gen.39. 
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But Cassandra must  always  haunt  us;  if we  do  not explain  the 
publications  and  make  sure  they are  accepted  for what  they are, 
the  city will again  be  lost,  and  it's a  bigger city now. 
One  thing Cassandra  did not  do  was  to  put  her prophecy in the 
conditional  mood:  "If we  d"id  nothing,  the citywould be  taken and  sacked. 
On  the other hand if we did this,  that or the  other, it .would  not  - it's 
up  to us".  Setting forth alternative  courses  of action (of which 
inaction is  one)~and measuring their effects  on  a  trend projection,is, 
in the  case  of  a  "bad"  trend projection,  a  way  of helping  people  to 
bend  away  from it.  It is a  way  of correcting any  naive  tendency  to 
"believe"  a  projection,  as if it were  a  prediction. 
There  should  be  no  hesitation in admitting that in a  field 
which  depends  as  much  on  epistemology  as  forecasting does,  we  in Western 
Europe  are  hampered  in any  international project  by  our  language  differences. 
In English,  which  happens  to  be  the  language  in which this  report was 
edited,  there are at  least thirty tenses  and  tense uses 
which  apply to  the  future(l). 
(1)  Take  the verb !2_g£,  and  consider a  person who  has  not  gone 
somewhere,  but  whose  going is under  discussion.  We  can  say: 
He  will  go 
He  would  go 
He  can  go 
He  could  go 
He  shall  go 
He  should  go 
He  must  go 
He  has  to  go 
He  ought  to  go 
He  may  go 
He  might  go 
He  is to  go 
He  was  to  go 
He  is going 
He  will  be  going 
He  would  be  going 
He  should  be  going 
He  could be  going 
He  must  be  going 
He  ought  to  be  going 
He  may  be  going 
He  might  be  going 
He  was  to be  going 
He  is bound  to  be  going 
He  is bound  to  go 
He  has  to  be  going 
He  was  going 
He  is about  to  go 
He  will  be  about to  go 
He  was  about  to  go 
He  is  by  way  of going 
He  is by  way  of being  about  to  go 
Add  to  this  the  double  negatives,  as  in  "He  can't not go"- etc. Gen.40. 
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Every  one  of  these has  a  different meaning,  and  probably 
none  of  them  can be  automatically  translated,  in all contexts,  into 
any  one  tense in any  other language.  The  other European  languages 
all have  their own  wealth of distinctions in the  future  use  of 
verbs  (though perhaps  none  has  quite the unbridled fertility of 
English)  and  probably  from  none  of  them  can  any  of these uses  be 
translated one-for-one into any  of the others.  This  general  fact 
constitutes the  first difficulty in any  attempt at forecasting  by  an 
international  team of workers.  But it is fortunate  that our  languages 
are  so  rich in inflections of meaning,  and  a  full  and  conscious  use  of 
those inflections is  one  good  way  of avoiding  the misuse of  forecasting. 
Very many  of  the  common  objections  to  forecasting  spring  from  a 
confusion between  shall, will,  and would.  You  can  only  say that,  for 
instance, wealth  shall  be  more  evenly  distributed if you  yourself have 
decided it shall,  and if you  are in a  position to enforce  your decision. 
You  can  only  say wealth ~  be more  evenly  distributed if you  believe 
nothing can  stop it becoming more  evenly  distributed,  whatever happens. 
And  you  can  only  say wealth ~  be more  evenly  distributed if you  go 
on  to describe the conditions which  must  be  met  if it is to be  so. 
~  is the  language  of decision,  will is the  language  of prediction, 
and ~  is the  language  of  forecasting.  It was  because  she  said will 
that Cassandra was  disbelieved and,  because  disbelieved, vindicated. 
Gen.41.  We  turn now  to  the  meaning  we  shall ourselves  assign  to  the  word  fore-
casting.  We  agree  with Bertrand  de  Jouvenel(l)  in disliking not only  the 
word  prediction- all agree  that is  a  mug's  game  - but also  projection 
and  even  forecasting itself.  We  agree with him  that conjecture is 
the  safest word.  We  like the  French word  he  coined,  Futuribles,  a 
word which  can be  translated into Italian but not  into  the  other 
Community  languages,  even by  neologisms.  It rests  on  the oldest  sense 
of  the Latin word  futurus,  which means  about  to be  generated.  It is 
also  the  future  participle of the verb ~t  and it has  a  strongly 
passive  ring to it.  Somebody  has  to  do  something  now  if there is to 
be  a  future;  they have,  precisely,  to beget it on  the  present.  All 
this meaning  inheres  in his  French  neologism  futuribles;  it means 
all those  things we  might  beget  upon  the  present and which might 
(1)  L'Art  de  la Conjecture;  Paris  1958 - 14  - Gen.  Intro. 
therefore  turn  out  to constitute the  future  (l)  Action  there must 
be;  it is unavoidable;  we  can,  therefore must,  shape  our  futures. 
(If we  don't  someone  else will.)  Diversity there is:  things will 
turn out  in one  of many  possible ways,  and  that is why  we  have  a 
variety of choice until  the  last minute.  And  certainty there is  too,  but 
it resides  only in the  negative.  We  can never be  certain what  things 
will  happen,  but we  can be  certain that  some  things will not.  It may 
be  that the greatest  service a  forecaster can  render a  decision-maker is 
in delimiting the  impossible. 
Gen.42.  But  we  are going to use  the word  forecasting  throughout  this  report. 
We  do  not mean  by it simply  the casting  forward  of past  experience or 
projection,  though we  include that.  We  use it rather in the way  one 
says  "cast your mind  forward",  like "cast your mind  back";  "try to 
imagine",  like "try to  remember".  By  forecasting we  mean  simply 
casting around  ahead  of  us  by  the application of all the mental 
processes which may  rationally be applied to  the  future,  save  one  alone: 
decision. 
Gen.43.  It is clear that there is  no  point in forecasting  except  to help 
decision and  that  one  cannot  rationally decide without  forecasts.  But 
the  two  things are different in nature,  and they  should be,  and are, 
done  by  different  people.  Only  rulers may  take  decisionsabout  the 
future  of society,  and in democracies  only  elected politicians may 
rule.  The  distinction is obvious,  and  so is the  reason why  we  labour it. 
Gen.44.  What  sort  of  forecasting,  then,  will  be  useful  to  those  we  elect 
to  rule  us,  in  their decisions  ?  One  may  deploy  in one's mind  an  image 
of  the  future  as  a  cone.  The  further we  look ahead,  the  wider  is  the 
range  of possibilities  open  to  us,  the  more  numerous  the  futuribles. 
Tomorrow will  probably be  pretty like  today,  the  day after  tomorrow 
less  like. 
(1)  This  discussion only holds  good  for English,  French,  and  Italian, 
which  have  the  words  future,  futur,  futuro.  The  German  and  Dutch 
Zukunft  and  Toekomst  simply mean  that which  is  coming  towards  us 
The  Danish word  Fremtid means  "forward-time". 15  Gen.  Intro. 
Outside  our  "conA."  lies  the  impossible:  (for instance, 
short-term reduction  in world  population without  war  or  famine). 
Inside  it,  lies  the  range  of  the  possible. 
Gen.45.  Now  let us  consider  the plane which  can  be  thought of  as  lying 
across  the  base  of  the  cone  ,  say  thirty years  hence.  It strikes 
us  as  very broad:  so  many  future  states  of  world  and  European 
society may  rationally be  imagined.  But  we  would  like  Europe  Plus 
Thirty (if it comes  into existence)  to  be  able  to  present  to  the 
Communities' decision-makers  a  number  of  conceivable  future  conditions 
of European  society,  including  its relations with  the  rest of  the 
world,  states  of  things  which  could,  without  flying  in  the  face 
of  reason,  be  provisionally adopted  as  long-term goals;  states 
which  do  lie  on  the  plane  across  the  base  of  the  cone  of possibility 
thirty years  ahead,  or at whatever shorter term may  be  adopted  for  a 
particular purpose.Inconoeivable  states  of affairs which  could not, 
for whatever  reason,  be  rationally adopted  as  goals,  lie 
outside  the  cone  altogether. 
Gen.46.  Let  us  now  suppose  that  the  decision-makers  ad0pt  one  of  the 
described  states of affairs  as  their goal.  The  choice  of  a  particular 
goal  thirty years  ahead  implies  the  adoption,  at  the  right  time  or 
times,  of  the  means  or policies  to  reach it.  But  there  are 
usually many  alternative  combinations  of means  to  a  given  end.  If 
we  want  to  have  a  tree  twelve  feet high  in  thirty years'  time,  there 
are  many  things  we  can  do  tomorrow.  We  can  plant an  acorn.  We 
can plant a  six-foot  tree  and  cut it back  so  that it grows  regularly 
over  the  thirty-year period;  we  can  plant a  six-foot  tree,  let it 
grow  uncut  to  twelve  feet,  and  then  prune  it so  that it keeps  to  that 
size,  and  so  on  ana  so  on.  But  if we  do  nothing  for  twenty-nine 
years,  so  that our will  for  a  twelve-foot  tree  in  thirty years  becomes 
a  will  for  a  twelve-foot  tree next year,  we  can  do  nothing but  buy  a 
twelve-foot  tree. 
Gen.47.  There  are  many  things  we  can  do  now  to  get our  tree  the  size  we 
want at  the  time  we  want,  but as  time  goes  by  there  are  fewer  and  fewer. 
The  cone  running  from  the small  definite  now  of actuality  to  the 
wide  plane  of possibility X years  ahead  must  be  echoed  in our  imaginatior1 
by  an  inverse  cone  running  from  the  wide  now  of means-choice  to  the  small 16 
definite  then,  X years  hence,  of  our  chosen  goal.  These  two 
interpenetrating cones,  the  end-choice  cone  with  its apex  now 
and  its base  in  the  tuture,  and  the  means-choice  cone  with  its 
base  now  and  its apex  in  the  future,  seem  to  us  a  useful  image 
of what  really happens  in forecasting  and  planning. 
Gen.  Intro. 
Gen.48.  One  of  the  main  products  of  Europe Plus  Thirty could  be  the 
Gen.49. 
description of an  appropriate  number  of  alternative  states  of 
European  society and  of  its relations with  the  rest of  the  world. 
any  one  of which  could,  without requiring  the  impossible,  be 
adopted  (provisionally but usefully)  as  the  goal  to  be  reached 
in,  say,  thirty years'  time.  The  plane  could  be  placed not at thirty 
years,  but at any  shorter date,  where  the  cone  will be  narrower. 
The  incompatibilities  between  these  possible  goals  would  be  set out, 
and  the  costs  and  benefits of each  described.  The  benefits would 
be  in  terms  of  social  goods  apparent  to  all at the  time,  as  now 
justice,  harmony,  real wealth,  "quality of  life",  etc.  - none  of 
them,  it is worth noting,  strictly quamtifiable.  The  costs would 
be  opportunity costs.  Each  alternative  goal  could  be  structured 
to  give  pre-eminence  to  one  social  good,  and  the  costs  of  choosing 
it would  be  the  rejection of  the  other goals,  which  gave  pre-
eminence  to  other goods.  We  would  like  to  give  this  way  of setting 
things  out  the  name  of  teleonomy,  the  arranging of goals,  as  in 
agronomy,  the  arranging of  land.  Europe  Plus Thirty would  from  time 
to  time  present  revised  teleonomies,  as  the  general  perception of 
what  is  desirable  or possible  or  unavoidable  changes,  as  forecasting 
techniques  develop,  and  as  time  itself unfolds. 
This  description  is  highly  schematic,  not  to  say  ideal. 
At  least until  forecasting  reaches  a  stage of  development which  is 
now  only  imaginable,  the reality will no  doubt  be  much  more 
muddled.  But  one  thing which  we  do  believe  could already be  done 
with  some  confidence  is  the  separation of  the  possible  from  the 
impossible.  The  cone  itself can  be  drawn,  and  probably  drawn  rather 
clearly.  Inside,  uncertainty will prevail,  but outside will  be  a 
"no-go  area",  and  this  awareness  in itself could  save us  and  our 
descendants  from  a  multitude  of woes. 17  Gen.  Intro. 
THE  "TELEONOMY"  CONCEPT 
(See  Figure) 
The  future  is  regarded  as  an  ever widening  Cone  of possible 
situations.  (Cone  of Goal  Choice).  Everything  inside  the  Cone  ABC 
is considered  to  be  possible  and  everything outside  impossible. 
The  straight lines  indicating  the  surfaces  of  the  (three-dimensional) 
cones  are not,  of course,  trend projections  or anything of  that 
nature;  they are  simply a  schematic  representation of  the  frontier 
between possible  futures  and  impossible  futures. 
The  points G30/l,  G30/2  and  G30/3  lie within  the  bounds  of 
possibility.  The  distinction and  description of  these  points 
constitutes  a  teleonomy,  i.e.  the  arranging of alternative goals, 
as  in agronomy,  the  arranging of  land.  Suppose  that point,  or 
situation,  G30/2  is  chosen as  a  goal  for  the  Community.  Then  the 
Cone  of Means  Choice  (dotted  cone  M30/l  - G30/2  - M30/2)  with its 
apex at Goal  G30/2,  will  widen  as it is projected back  tofue 
situation  today,  showing  the  range  of possible means  open  to  our 
choice  now,  and  also  the  narrowing of  the  Cone  as  time  advances. 
If a  15  year  goal  (Gl5/2)  is  selected,  the  range  of means  to 
attain it is  smaller  than  in  the  case  of  the  more  distant goal  - G30/2 
(Cone  Ml5/l  - Gl5/2  - Ml5/2). 
As  emphasised  in  the  text,  this  concept  is just that:  a  concept, 
a  way  of  imagining  things.  In real  life  the  business of  choosing  ends 
and  means  is,  as  everyone  knows,  much  less  tidy. M
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Throughout  this  report we  hope  the  reader will  remember  our 
general  purpose:  to  devise  a  new  instrument which  will help  the 
power  centres  of  the  European  Communities  to  make  wise  decisions 
in  a  largely,  but not wholly,  uncontrollable world. 
Gen.Sl.  What  that instrument  should  look  like,  T:  recommend  in 
Gen. 52. 
Part  IV  below.  A meaningful  instrument will cost an  annual  sum 
which,  while negligibly  small  in the  normal  scale  of  research costs, 
yet  runs  to  a  few  million units  of account,  and  the  institutions 
of  the  Community  will very properly  look critically at  the  figures. 
Hardheaded  people will  think of  the  economic crisis which  began  in 
1974,  of  inflation,  of  "runaway public  expenditure",  of  the  undesirability 
of allowing new  Community  instruments  to proliferate,  of  the  uncertain 
economic  future.  But  they  should  remember it is precisely  to  reduce 
the  likelihood of  these  things  continuing or recurring  in  the  future 
that Europe  Plus  Thirty would  exist.  It would exist (among  other 
things)  to  foresee  crises,  to  forecast about  the  underlying  causes  of 
inflation,  and  to  reduce  the  uncertainty of  the  future.  The  troubles 
which  Europe  Plus  Thirty could help  to  remove  are  the  very  same  troubles 
which might persuade  short-sighted people  to  refuse  to  set it up  at all. 
It is  a  vicious circle.  It would  be  paradoxical  - it might  even  be 
tragic  - if the  Community  were  to  think it was  already  too  ill to 
reach  for  the medicine. 
The  shape  of  this  report 
Our  report  is necessarily complicated,  and  at  this  point we  shall 
pause  to  outline its structure.  In Part I,  we  describe  first  the 
forecasting which  is already  done  by  the  European  Communities  and  in 
their member  countries  (Chapters  1.1  and 1.2.).  We  look at the 
scene,  and  answer  the  questions:  what  is  done  now  ?  Should more 
be  done  ?  If so,  does  the  capacity  to  do  it exist ?  Next,in 
Chapter 1.3.,  we  come  to  the  actual  business  of  forecasting  under 
three  headings:  the  inputs  you  need,  the  methods  you  can  use,  and 
the  way  to  put  the  outputs,  or results,  to  the  best use.  In  that 
chapter we  look at forecasting  in general,  with only passing  reference 
to  the  particular needs  of  the  European  Communities.  But  in Chapter 
I.4.  we  suggest  some  purposes  and  principles  in  the  light of which Gen. 53. 
Gen. 54. 
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long-tenm forecasting  should be  done  by  and  for  the  EuropeanCommu-
nities themselves,  in  the particular instrument called Europe 
Plus Thirty,  which  we  recommend  should  be  created.  In  the  whole 
of Part I,  we  insist on  the  need  for  integrated "cross-sectoral" 
forecasting,  but we  say little or nothing about  the  sectors 
themselves,  which must  go  to make  it up.  Part I  is general; 
it treats,  especially in Chapter I.3., of general methodology, 
and  in Chapter I.4.  of  a  methodology  for  the European Communities. 
Part II becomes  particular.  Chapter II.l.  introduces  the 
Part as  a  whole,  and  gives  in passing  three examples  of  the way 
integrated problem-oriented  forecasting is and  coulrl  be  carried out, 
as  opposed  to  the  teleonomy we  have  already described  in  this 
Chapter.  The  remainder  of Part II (Chapters  2  to  17)  discusses 
sixteen separate  fields  or sectors,  in each of which we  consider 
the  possibility and  desirability of  long-term forecasting being 
undertaken  a)  at all,  and  b)  by  Europe  Plus Thirty.  We  conclude 
that in most of  them  Europe  Plus Thirty should be,  to  a  greater or 
less extent,  actively engaged,  but in some  that it should not,  since 
the  necessary work  is already  done  elsewhere.  Part I  gives  the  bones, 
Part II puts  the  flesh  on  them.  We  are  by no means  certain that it 
is better to consider  the  general aspects  first and  the  sectoral 
aspects  later (as  we  do)  than  to  do  it the  other way  round.  If he 
had  to  read  about  the  sectors first,  the  reader would  ask:  "yes, 
but can all  these  things  be  related  ?"  Reading  about  the  general 
aspects first will no  doubt  leave him  feeling;  "yes,  but where  is 
the  substance  of all this  1  What  is all this actually about  ?" 
There  are  disadvantages  both ways;  but we  ask  the  reader  to be 
patient for specifics while  we  go  into  the  generalities.  Part I 
and  II together answer  the  greater part of  the first question put  to 
us  by  the  Council  of Ministers.  (See Letter of Transmission above). 
In Part III we  consider Technology Assessment,  on which  the 
Council  of Ministers  asked  us  to  report in its second  question. 
We  attempt a  definition,  and  point out  the  overlap between  this 
work  and  forecasting about,  especially,  technology,  industry,  society, 
and  the  environment,  which  we  have  already treated in Part II.  We 
suggest some  ways  in which  the  technology assessment work of Europe 
Plus  Thirty could be  related  to  the  existing powers  and  functions 
of  the  European Communities. Gen.SS. 
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In Part IV  we  turn finally  to  the  constitution and  working  of 
the  new  Community  instrument Europe  Plus Thirty,  and  to  the  way  it 
should be  related  to  the  Communities'  existing institutions. 
Gen.S6.  The  Annexes  are  self-explanatory.  They  contain matter which, 
though necessary  to  our purpose,  is  too  detailed  to  find  a  proper 
place  in  the main  text.  Annex  1  supplements  Chapter 1.2.,  and 
Annex  3  supplements Part III. PART  I. 
I.l.l. 
I.l.2. 
I.1.3. 
CAPACITY  AND  PROCESS 
1.  EXISTING  FORECASTING  AT  THE  LEVEL  OF 
THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
I .1. 
The  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  has  for  years  been 
using  various  instruments  of  forecasting,  in order  to  develop  policies 
which  are  relevant not only  to  the  problems  of  today,  but also  to 
those  of  tomorrow. 
We  are  asked  to  make  recommendations  about  a  possible  new 
instrument,  and  that  instrument,  if it  ~s  created,  will  have  to 
fit with  what  already exists.  It will  have  to  b.L  1nstitutionally, 
and  also  as  regards  its purposes. 
examining  the  intended  interface. 
One  cannot  design  a  fit without 
Our  own  terms  of  reference 
express  a  need  which  is felt by  the  Commission  and  the  Council. 
What  is  the  origin of  that need  ?  Only  when  this  question  is 
answered,  however  summarily,  would it be  justifiable  to  suggest 
how  to  meet  it.  In  this  chapter,  therefore,  we  ask: 
a)  What  are  the  forecasting  needs  of  the  European 
Communities  ? 
b)  How  have  they been satisfied up  to  now,  and  what 
needs  in particular have  or have  not been satisfied  ? 
c)  What  problems  have  to  be  considered which  could  pre-
judice  the  effectiveness  of Europe  Plus  Thirty  ? 
From  these  considerations conclusions  can  be  drawn  about  the 
contribution  that Europe  Plus  Thirty could make  to  the  future  of  the 
European  Community,  and  how  it should  be  constructed. 
ideas  are  laid out  in Part  IV  of  this  report. 
The  Forecasting Needs  of  the  European Communities 
The  corresponding 
To  anticipate  the  conclusion,  we  start from  the  assertion  that: 
a)  It  follows  from  the  nature  of  the  European  Communities 
that  they  are,  to  an  even  higher  degree  than nation 
states,  dependent  upon  long-term  forecasts;  and 
b)  That  for  the  formation  of national  as  well  as  European 
policies  long-term forecasting with  a  European 
dimension  is  increasingly necessary. 1.1.4. 
2  I.l. 
a)  The  European  Communities  carne  into being by  a  gradual  process 
of integration,  stretching  from  the  ECSC  to  Euratom  and  the  EEC,  which 
may  continue  into  the  planned  economic  and  monetary  union,  and  more 
and  more  other areas.  The  development of  the  European  Communities  was 
a  response  to  the  changed  requirements  of  the  member  countries,  which 
agreed  to  share  sovereignty  in certain areas.  Accordingly,  the 
further  development of  the  European  Communities  - that is,  the  streng-
thening of  their competence  and  the  extension of  their radius  of 
action  - depends  upon whether  the  members  believe  that,  for  instance, 
the  problems  of environmental protection or external monetary policy 
can  in future  be  better dealt with  on  a  European  rather  than national 
level.  This  presupposes  a  forecast not only of  future  problems  but 
also of  the  development of national  and European  policy-making 
capacities  and  of  good  strategies  for  solving  these  problems. 
b)  Long-term forecasting  is  increasingly gaining  in  importance, 
because political decisions  increasingly have  long-term effects which 
cannot  - or cannot easily - be  changed.  Equally  the mastering of 
future  problems  depends  on  technical  and  social  systems  whose  own 
process  of maturation  is becoming  longer  and  longer. 
The  increased  interweaving of  the  economies  of  the  member  states 
of  the  European  Communities,  and  consequently  the mutual  influence of 
social  and  political processes  upon  each  other~ means  that even  short-
term  policy planning  on  the national  level cannot be  done  without 
regard  to  developments  in other countries of  the  Community.  The 
longer  the  time  horizons  for planning are,  the  stronger are  these 
interdependencies.  For  instance,  we  cannot make  statements  about 
the  long-term industrialisation of a  certain region without at the 
same  time  forecasting  developments  in prices,  demand  and  employment. 
The  individual member  states of  the  Community,  and  the  Community  as 
a  whole,  are  therefore  dependent  to  a  comparable  degree  upon  long-term 
forecasts  with  a  European  dimension. 
I.l.S.  There  are  thus  two  different  tasks  for  Community-wide  research 
on  the  future;  first  to  contribute  to  goal-seeking  for  the  further 
development  of European  integration (if that is desired),  and  second 
to  help set out options  in various  fields  of European policy,  and  to 
help  select  the  means  of realising  the  options  chosen. 3  I.l. 
Forecasting  on  the  level of  the  European  Communities 
!.1.6.  One  can  probably  infer  that,  in  forecasting,  demand  determines 
1.1.7. 
supply;  so  in order  to  assess  past forecasting activities  and  to 
describe  the  way  in which  Europe  Plus  Thirty would  operate~  we 
should  ask who,  and  in what  way,  sets  the  goals  of  integration, 
and  who  is entrusted with  the  implementation of  Community  policy  ? 
The  goal-seeking process  in  the  European  Communities 
In contrast  to  the nation states,  the  centres  of political 
decision  in  the  European  Coilu  :.mi ties  cannot freely decide  upon 
their goals;  they are  bound  by  the  limits  of  the  founding  Treaties. 
These  limits are much  narrower  than  those  of a  national  constitution; 
the  parties  to  the Treaties not only  limiLed  the  competence  of 
the  European Communities  to  certain functions  of  government,  but 
at the  same  time  laid down  certain goals,  which  are  embodied  in 
the  Treaties.  Thus  the  Treaty of  Rome  determines  the  general 
economic  and  socio-political goals  of  the  EEC,  and  lays  down  the 
manner  of  their realisation,  namely  by  the  construction of  a  common 
market according  to  certain principles.  The  Treaty itself can  be 
seen as  a  programme  of  long-term policy planning,  concerned  only 
with achieving  the  Community  goal,  and not with setting any new 
goals. 
1.1.8.  From  the  prehistory of  the  founding Treaties  one  can  learn 
1.1.9. 
little about  the  use  of forecasting.  More  instructive are  the 
proposals  for  a  European  economic  and monetary  union.  Infue 
late  1960's,  after the  creation of  the  customs  union,  and  the 
virtual achievement of  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty,  the  European 
Community  was  in a  state of  unstable  balance.  Every means  of 
stabilising the  situation implied political decisions  as  important 
as  the  Treaties  themselves. 
The  Treaty of Rome,  in spite of its forward-looking nature,  was 
not based  on  forecasting  in  the  strict sense  of  the  word.  Scientific 
policy consultation was  commissioned  by  governments  only after  the 
basic political decisions  had  been  taken.  Equally with  economic  and 
monetary  union;  the  decision  of  the  1969  Hague  summit  conference 
was  a  response  to past and  present problems.  The  "phased plan" I.l.lO. 
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was  not based  on  any analysis  of  long-term  tendencies,  but was 
merely  an  attempt  to  describe  a  static model  of monetary  union; 
it is  perhaps  not  surprising  that  the  decision was  overtaken  by 
events. 
Corresponding  tendencies  are  apparent  if we  consider  the 
ongoing  decision-making process.  In decisions  on  European 
integration  the  governments  of  the  member  states have  regarded 
it as  their prerogative  to  lay  down  the  common  goals  of a 
European  economic  and  monetary  union  (Hague summit),  and  have 
secured  for  themselves  direct participation  in the working  out of 
proposals  and  procedures  (Werner Report).  The  detailed  follow-up 
of  these  decisions  was,  to  be  sure,  handed  over  to  the  Commission, 
but it is  in  fact still carried out  in close  cooperation between 
the  Commission  and  senior civil servants of  the  member  states  in 
various  committees. 
I.l. 
I.l.ll.  When  it is  a  question of setting new  goals  for  the  Communities, 
I.l.l2. 
the  Commission  clearly plays  a  subordinate  role,  but  this  fact  says 
nothing  about its significance  in  the  European  goal-seeking process, 
or  teleonomy,  as  we  called it earlier. 
It is well  known  that  the  Commission  very early on  put  forward 
proposals  and  preliminary studies  for  the  further  development  of  the 
Common  Market  towards  an  economic  and monetary  union.  But  comparable 
ideas  were  also  developed  by  independent experts  and  in various 
national ministries,  and  the  continuous  and  close  cooperation between 
the  Commission  and  member  states makes  it nearly impossible  to  trace 
ideas  and  political initiatives back  to  their origins.  Still, 
it is precisely  the  position of  the  Commission  as  the  turntable  around 
which  the  European  Communities  network of  communicatio~s is disposed 
which  would  enable  it to  make  a  special  contribution  to  conceiving 
future  developments.  It is  in a  good  position  to  solve  problems  in 
a  way  appropriate not only  to  the  state of affairs at Community  level, 
but also  to  the  balancing out of diverging national  interests.  It 
already fulfils  this  task within  the  scope  of  the  Treaty:  the 
right  to  initiative was  given  to  the  Commission  for  these  very 
reasons. 5  I .l. 
1.1.13.  Even  if the  Commission,  from  the  viewpoint  of  its critics, 
1.1.14. 
has  lost its political  impetus,  it is still  the  organ  of  the 
European  Communities  which  is most  capable  of policy planning. 
We  cannot expect continuous  conceptual  work  either  from  the 
Council  or  from  the  Committee  of  Permanent Representatives. 
Political initiatives by  the  Council,  or  rather by  individual 
Council  members,  are  generally  the  result of  domestic  perceptions 
and  processes.  The  permanent  representatives  differ  from  ~he 
Council  in  that  they work  continuously,  but  the  tasks  they  are 
charged with  and  the  structure  of  their organisation makes  them 
more  akin  to  an  international administration,  from  which  one  cannot 
expect planning.  Their worKing  programme  is  determined  by  the 
preliminary work  of  the  Commission,  and  by  the  decisions  of  the 
Council  itself.  It is highly  fragmented;  many  and  changing 
experts,  according  to  the  subject area,  are  brought  into 
consultation. 
The  European  Parliament is even  less able  than national  parliaments 
to undertake  policy  planning,  because  of its structure and its  limited 
powers.  The  Economic  and Social  Committee,  made  up  of the  representatives 
of various  social and  economic interests,  not  only  lacks  political legi-
timacy  and  continuity in its work,  but  the Treaties  confine it to  an 
advisory capacity.  For these  reasons  the Commission  of  the  European  Com-
munities  is the appropriate  patron  for  a  European  forecasting instrument. 
It not  only  disposes  of  comprehensive  factual  and  political information, 
but it is already  the  institution that  receives  forecasts  and  bases  pro-
posals  on  them  for  future  Community  policies.  Nevertheless, it still 
cannot  be  the  soleaddressee of forecasts,  because  policy decisions  are 
made  in the Council  of Ministers  and are based not  only  on  Commission in-
puts but also,  and perhaps mainly,  on opinions  formed  nationally.  The 
effectiveness  of  forecasts,  (that is, whether their results are  taken  into 
account  in policy decisions)  depends  in part upon whether they can influence 
political discussion in the  member  states. 
1.1.15.  The  general  situation,  as  we  see  it,  is  this:  the  European  EconoQiC 
Community  have  now  achieved  almost all its original  goals,  and  this 
naturally brings  on  a  certain lack of  impetus  and  direction.  It 
wishes  now  to  set new  ones,  and  for  this  reason  stands  in need  of 
the  long-term  integrated  forecasting which  can help it to  do  so. 1.1.16. 
1.1.17. 
6  I.l. 
Existing  Forecasting  in  and  for  the  European  Communities 
Forecasts  have  been  prepared  by  the  European  Communities  since 
their est.abli shment.  With  few  exceptions,  they are  short or medium-
term  forecasts  of  development  in particular sectors:  for  instance, 
the  trends  in  demand  for  and  supply of coal,  steel,  farm  produce 
etc.  They  are  restricted  to  single sectors  because  they are  regarded 
as  instruments  to  help  formulate  and  implement  the  policies  embodied 
in  the  Treaties.  The  European  Communities  themselves  were  buitt  up 
according  to  the  principle of sectoral  integration,  and  the  structure 
of  the  Commission,  as  the  central administrative  body,  is geared  to  the 
individual  tasks  laid  down  in  the  Treaties.  Each Directorate-General 
is  responsible  for  a  particular policy area,  has  its own  need  for 
forecasting  and,  at least until  recently,  has  had  the  untrammelled 
right  to  commission  the  studies it wanted.  We  shall  therefore  base 
our  account of  the  forecasting  now  carried out on  the  areas of activity 
of  the  Commission's  individual Directorates-General. 
Various  departments  of  the  Commission  of  the  European Communities 
such  as  the  Legal  Service,  Spokesman's  Group,  and  the  Directorate-General 
for  Financial  Control,  can  be  ignored here,  since  their responsibilities 
do  not  require  forecasting.  There  are  also  a  number  of Directorates-
General  which,  in  the  past,  have  been  concerned with  devising only 
qualitative guidelines  for  a  forward  policy programme;  one  example  is 
External Relations.  Forecasts  in  the  strict sense  of  the  word  have 
in  the  past been  restricted  to  rather  few  fields:  energy,  industrial 
affairs,  particularly where  they are  governed  by  the  ECSC  Treaty, 
economic  and  financial  affairs,  and  agriculture.  The  use  of fore-
casting became  more  widespread  as  new  fields  of activity opened  up 
for  the  Communities  (for example  regional  policy and  environmental 
protection),  and  as  the  existing Directorates-General  attempted  to 
use  forecasts  as  an  instrument  for  promoting  a  European policy in 
certain areas  such  as  transport. 
1.1.18.  Here  is  an  account,  based  on  the  Commission's  p·resent division 
into Directorates-General,  of  the  European  Communities'  forecasting 
activities.  Ten  Directorates-General undertake or obtain 
forecasts  or  futures  studies  of  one  sort or another. I.l.l9. 
External Relations 
Directorate-General  I 
7  I.l. 
Only  limited  forecasts  are  drawn  up,  for  instance  of  the  trends 
in world  trade  in  the  three  years  ahead,  but no  quantified  forward 
studies  are  available  to  underpin notions  such  as  that of  a  European 
Mediterranean Policy. 
Economic  and  Financial Affairs 
Directorate-General II 
Short-Term 
I.1.20.  Preliminary economic  budgets  for  the  next year are  prepared 
I.l.2l. 
by  the  Member  States;  the  appropriate  Commission  departments,  and 
the  Short-Term Economic  Policy Group  of  the  Economic  Policy  Committee 
(formerly  the  Short-Term Economic  Policy Committee)  summarise  these 
preliminary economic  budgets,  check  them  for compatibility,  and 
compare  them  with  the  Commission's  annual  forecasts.  The  procedure 
is  completed  by  the  adoption of  the  economic  budgets. 
Annual  reports  are  drawn  up  on  the  economic  situation  in  the 
Community  and  on  the  outlook for  the  coming  year,  which  serve  as  a 
basis  for  formulating  the  economic  policy guidelines  to  be  followed 
by  the  Member  States  in  the  following  year. 
DG  II also prepares  short-term economic  forecasts  on  the 
basis  of  information  supplied by  the  individual Member  States. 
Medium-Term 
The  Study  Group  on Medium-Term  Economic  Assessments  is  responsible 
for  drawing  up  reports  on  the  economic  outlook  in  the  European 
Community,  covering  a  period of  five  years.  The  members  of  the  Study 
Group  are  appointed  by  the  Commission.  The  forecasts  are  used  as  a 
basis  for medium-term  economic  policy  prog~ammes.  Forecasts made 
before  1973  have  been  re-examined  following  the  enlargement of  the 
Community  and  in  response  to  the  raw materials crisis,  and  have  been 
presented,  with  revised  figures,  as  projections  for  the  period  1974-78 
in  the  form  of  a  report  to  the  Council  and  the  Commission  in preparation 
for  the  Fourth Medium-Term  Economic  Policy Programme,  which will  probably 
cover  the  period  1976-80.  In accordance  with  the  Directive  on 
stability adopted  in early  1974,  the  Member  States of  the  Community  are I.l.22. 
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also  obliged  to  prepare medium-term  forecasts  covering  a  five-year 
period.  The  same  Directive also  laid  down  new  provisions  governing 
the  Community's  medium-term  programmes. 
There  are  also  occasional  future-oriented  studies;  recent 
examples  are  "Le  profil  de  1' e'volution  e'conomique  sur  longue  pe'riode 
du  Royaume-Uni"  and"L'influence  de  la situation conjoncturelle 
presente  sur  l';volution probable  de  l'Italie au  cours  des  cinq 
prochaines  annees,  1973-1977".  Other  studies  are  designed more 
as  qualitative guidelines  for  a  medium-term Community  policy, 
e.g.  the  report of  the  Working Party on  Economic  and  Monetary  Union 
1980,  or  the  report of  the  Economic  Policy  Committee  on  the  medium-
term  problems  raised  by  progress  on  the  road  to  economic  and 
monetary  union  (1973-1978). 
Methodological  studies  dealing not only with  short-term but 
I.l. 
also with medium-term  and  long-term economic  forecasting have  alsobeen 
mdertaken.  For instance,  the Central  Planning Bureau  of  the Netherlands 
Government  in collaboration with  DG  II,  has  constructed  a  model  to 
explain  and  forecast  the  relationship between  trade  cycles  in  the 
national  economies  in Europe,  which  was  to help  guide  short-term 
economic  policy decisions at European  level;  the  METEOR  Project: 
"European Model  for  Economic  Transmission Effects  and  Balancing 
Operations".  Another model  is  to  be  used  to  forecast economic 
developments  in Europe  over  the  next six  to  seven years.  Its 
construction was  entrusted by  the  Study Group  on  Medium-Term  Economic 
Assessments  to  the  University of Louvain  (COMET  Project - Community 
Medium-Term  Model).  A  third study  deals  with  the  methods  of breaking 
down  overall  final  demand  by main  functions,  taking  account of  the 
problems  raised  by  the  analysis of  long-term economic  prospects. 
Industrial  and  Technological Affairs 
Directorate-General III 
The  ECSC  and  EURATOM  treaties are  the  basis  on  which  forecasts 
are made  for  steel  and  the nuclear field.  The  short-term forecasts 
have  a  time  horizon of one  year,  the medium-term  ones  generally five 
years,  and  the  long-term  forecasts  15  years.  The  forecasts  are made 
by  the  services  of  the  Commission  itself,  since qualified personnel 
from  the earlier ECSC  and  EURATOM  Commissions  have  been  absorbed  into 
DG  III • I.l.23. 
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Studies  of  individual  industrial sectors carried out  by  DG  III 
(textiles,  paper,  shipbuilding,  aviation,  etc.)  are  based  on  the 
short  and  medium-term  estimates of  the  trends  for  each  sector. 
They  arethe  basis  on  which  guidelines  for  action are  proposed 
for  each  sector. 
Individual medium-term  and  long-term  forward  studies 
(for  exampl~ shipbuilding  1971-80)  are  carried out on  behalf of 
the  Commission,  sometimes  at  the  suggestion of  the  industrial 
associations  concerned,  by  ad  hoc  committees  which  largely base 
their work  on  existing projections. 
The services  of  DG Ill are also  trying to  develop  medium  and 
long-term activities,  into which  they  can  feed  sectoral  information 
for  a  forward  looking  input-output model.  This  model  is being 
developed  by  an  outside  research  institute and  is  intended  to 
reveal  the  interdependencies  of  sectoral  industrial  development. 
Social Affairs 
Directorate-General  V 
I.l. 
As  to  planning  in  the  field  of social policy as  a  whole,  amediurn-
term  group  under  the  chairmanship of the Director General  is  preparing a 
forecast  for  the  period  1977-80  and  plans  for  the  Commission's  work 
in  that period.  Discussions  are  proceeding  about  a  similar exercise 
for  the  decade  beginning  1980. 
Forecasting  in  the  field of  employment  has  recently received 
more  attention.  Firstly,  short-term forecasts  of  employment  prospects 
are monitored,  including  those  produced  by national  governments  or 
their agencies,  and  by  the  Directorate-General  for  Economic  and  Social 
Affairs.  This  information  is  used  as  the  basis  for  internal  documents 
on  short-run  employment  prospects.  Secondly,  work  on  medium-term 
employment  prospects  is carried out in  conjunction with  a  group  of 
experts  from  Member  States.  This  group  is  identifying  the  likely 
trends  in  employment  in  the major  economic  sectors  of  the  Member  States 
up  to  1980,  and  putting  the  results  of various national  forecasts onto 
a  comparable  basis.  Original  research work  is also  commissioned  in 
order  to  establish alternative empirical  forecasts  on  the  basis  of  a 
standard methodology. 10 
In  the  field of social budgets  work  is currently  in hand  on 
the  development  of  common  methods  of  forecasting  by  the  Member 
States. 
Article  7  of  the  regulations  of  the  European  Social  Fund 
provides  for  preparatory studies  and  pilot schemes.  They  are 
important  in  testing possible  future  orientations  for  the  Fund, 
but  they contain at  the  most  incidental  forecasts,  generally  taken 
from national  statistics. 
Agriculture 
Directorate-General  VI 
1.1.24.  Medium-term  forecasting  for  the  common  market  in agricultural 
I.l. 
products dates  back  to  the  early 1960's.  The  most  recent projections 
of  the  production and  consumption of agricutural products  only cover 
the  period until  1977.  They  concern about  50  agricultural products 
and  were  drawn  up  for what were,  when  the  study was  commissioned,  the 
six  founder  Member  States  and  the  four  candidates  for membership. 
The  calculations  are  based  on  statistical series produced by  the 
Statistical Office of  the  Community  of Six,  and  on national  statistics 
for  the  candidate  countries.  The  national  studies were  prepared by 
research  institutes  in  the  various Member  States  under  the  direction 
of  the  Commission  and  a  summary  was  produced  by  the  latter. 
The  next  forecasts will not only be  drawn  up  according  to  a 
somewhat  different procedure  but will also  cover  a  longer period 
(the  years  1980  and  1985  are  envisaged  as  time  horizons);  there 
are  also plans  to  roll  them  forward  each year. 
Methodological  studies were  commissioned  by  the  Community  in 
the  early 1960s.  A comprehensive  description  and  review of  the 
technical methods  and  models  for  forward  analysis  in agriculture 
was  obtained  under contract as  part of  a  study callecl "Agricultural 
Forecasts:  I.  Methods,  Techniques  and Models,  II.  Possible 
Applications  of Certain Models,  Methods  and  Techniques  in  the 
Community".  The  report of  this  study concluded  that  there was  as 
yet no  statistical  information  adequate  for  refined methods,  and 
that even  the  methods  examined  were  not  suitably tailored  to making 
long-term supply  forecasts. 11  I.l. 
Forecasts  for particular sectors of  the  agricultural market have 
also been  prepared,  some  of which  use  models.  Examples  include  a 
paper  on  the  sensitivity of  the  parameters  of  a  model  for  estimating 
pigmeat production. 
There  has  also been  forecasting  about  the  agricultural workforce. 
Transport 
Directorate-General VII 
1.1.25.  Indicators  for  short-term  transport forecasts  are  currently 
I.1.26. 
being  developed.  In addition  to  general  economic  trends  they  aTe 
to  cover  important  features  cf  the  transport market,  and  are  to  be 
linked  to  a  medium-term  forecasting model.  A permanent  information 
service  on  the  situation and  trend of  the  freight  transport market, 
which will  have  a  time  horizon of  two  or  three  years,  is also  planned. 
The  necessary statistical material  is  to  be  supplied  by national 
authorities  and  undertakings,  and  collated and  evaluated at 
Community  level. 
Long-Term 
Long-term  forward  studies  of passenger  and  freight  transport 
are  to  serve  as  a  guide  for  infrastructure  investment  in  the 
Community.  The  European  Commission  i~  taking  part with  OECD  in 
a  programme  called COST  33,  forecasting  the  demand  for  passenger 
transport between major  urban  agglomerations.  The  time  horizons  of 
this  study are  1985  and  2000;  a  report will  probably be  made  in  1976. 
We  refer  to it again,  particularly in Chapter II.l. 
A report called ''Preliminary Research with Reference  to  the 
Development of a  Forecasting Model  for Freight Transport  in  the  EEC" 
was  submitted at  the  end m  1974  by  a  contractor.  It recommended  that 
the  proposed  freight  study should  be  closely aligned on  the  COST  33 
passenger study as  regards  the  time  horizon  involved,  the  breakdown  by 
geographical  region,  the  socio-economic definition of a  region,  the 
comparability of  the  socio-economic  data  on  which  both  studies  are 
based,  and  the  transport systems  to  be  covered.  The  project would 
use  a  model. 1.1.27. 
I.l.28. 
Research,  Science  and  Education 
Directorate-General  XII 
12 
Two  studies  in  the  methodology of  forecasting  have  been 
corrunissioned  or  supported  financially:  "A  Feasibility Study of 
Socio-Economic  Models  of Europe"  and  "The  physical  sub-system  -
Definitions  and Relationships".  Both  studies were  carried out 
by  university research  groups.  These  introductory studies  could 
be  considered  as  a  modest contribution by  the  Commission  to  the 
possible  development of a  major socio-economic  simulation model 
for  Europe.  Our  own  study,  "Europe  Plus  Thirty'~ which  was  set 
up  by  a  decision  of  the  Council  of Ministers,  is attached  to  DG  XII. 
Regional  Policy 
Directorate-General  XVI 
As  yet no  coherent  forecasts  exist of  the  regional  development 
I.l. 
of  the  European  Community  as  a  whole.  However,  within  the  framework 
of  the  FLEUR  study  (factors  of  location in Europe),  which  is being 
carried out under  contract  to  the  Commission,  forecasts  with homogeneous 
data might  become  possible.  A feasibility study  on  forecasting  the 
balance  between  regional  labour  supply  and  demand  in  the  Community  has 
also  been  undertaken  on  behalf of  the  Commission. 
At  the  request of  a  number  of Member  States,  the  Commission  has 
also  sponsored  studies  on  the  development  of certain particular regions. 
Any  short-term or medium-term  forecasts  contained  in  these  studies were, 
however,  taken  from  forecasts  for  the  country  in question. 
Energy 
Directorate-General  XVII 
Short-Term 
I.l.29.  The  Commission  prepares  an  annual  report on  the  short-term energy 
situation  in  the  Community,  which  contains  forecasts  for  the  following 
year.  For  the  coal  sector,  a  separate  one  year market  forecast  is 
drawn  up. 
Medium-Term 
1.1.30.  Medium-term  forecasts  and  guidelines  for  individual  sources 
of energy  such  as  gas,  coal  or oil are  prepared at irregular intervals. 13 
Long-Term 
I.l.31.  The  European  Commission's  long-term energy  forecasts  cover 
15-year periods  and  are  rolled  forward  every  5  years.  In 
preparing  the  forecasts,  the  Commission's  departments  draw  on 
statistical material  available  in  the  Member  States,  bearing 
in mind the medi urn- term  economic  forecasts  for  the  Community. 
The  statistical sources  and  forecasting methods  have  been 
continually  improved  over  the  past years,  but  the  energy crisis 
has  meant  that  the  "Prospects  for  the  development of primary  energy 
requirements  in  the  Community  1975  - 1980  - 1985"  and  the  "Outlook 
for  the  Community's  Long-Term Energy  Supplies  1975  - 1980  - 1985" 
require  revision,  and  has  also made  it doubtful  whether it is 
possible  to  go  on  using  the  existing forecasting methods. 
In mid-1974,  the  Commission  submitted  to  the  Council  a 
comprehensive  research and  development  programme  for  the  energy 
sector which  is  intended  to  contribute  a  long-term  improvement 
in  the  energy situation  in Europe.  In  this  report  the  Commission 
sees  systems modelling  as  a  suitable  instrument  for  developing 
alternative  opt~ons for  a  common  R & D strategy,  but considers  that 
the  techniques  require  further  improvement,  with  the  Community 
undertaking  the  necessary work. 
Systems  modelling  is also  to  be  used  in ~  near  future  for  two 
other studies:  one  concerns  the  socio-economic  consequences  of 
different energy  supply breakdowns,  and  the  other consists  of  an 
economic  appraisal  of different energy  supply  and  demand  patterns, 
mainly  in  the  investment field. 
Credit and  Investments 
Directorate-General  XVIII 
I .1. 
I.l.32.  Surveys  among  undertakings  and  trade associations  indicate what 
the  probable  supply situation in  the  coal  and  steel sectors will  be 
and,  on  this basis,  the  Directorate-General  for Credit and  Investments 
prepares  annual  supply  forecasts  for  the  following  four years. 
These  forecasts  serve  as  a  basis  for  decisions  on  the  gra~ting of 
industrial  and  reconversion  loans  under Articles  54 and  56  of  the 
ECSC  Treaty.  In order  to  prepare  the  "general objectives"  for 
the  steel market,  which at present are  being  laid down  for  the 
years  1980  and  1985,  the  Directorate-General  uses  a  similar 14  I.l. 
procedure  for  gathering  information on  new  business  invesbnent and 
investment plans  to  estimate  the  supply situation in  the  steel market. 
Forecasts  of  demand  trends  are  prepared by Directorate-General III 
(Industrial  and  Technological Affairs).  The  "general objectives" 
are  revised every  five  years. 
Budgets 
Directorate-General  XIX 
1.1.33.  In cooperation with national  government  deparbnents  and  in  the 
1.1.34. 
I.l.35. 
I.l.36. 
light of  the  estimates  of  the Medium-Term  Economic  Policy Programmes, 
this Directorate-General prepares  financial  forecasts  which  cover 
three  years  and  are  rolled forward  annually. 
Methodological  studies are  being carried out at  the moment  to 
improve  the  forecasts. 
Others 
Besides  work  done  in and  for  the  various Directorates-General, 
some  forecasting may  be  expected  to  be  carried out in or for  two 
new  dependent organs  of  the  European Communities,  one  of which has 
been  decided  upon  by  the  Council,  and  the  other of which  is  to be 
proposed  to it by  the  Commission. 
The  European Foundation  for  the. Improvement of Working 
& Living Conditions. 
This  Foundation,  which has  been  decided  upon  by  the  Council  and 
is  to  be  in Dublin,  will undertake  research into working  and  living 
conditions,  including  the environment,  and  their  improvement. 
Long-term studies,  such  as  that on  water  supply prospects  in Europe 
in  the  next  thirty years,  which at present are  done  under contract 
for  the  Commission's  Environment  and  Consumer  Protection Service, 
may  then  become  the  responsibility of  the  Foundation. 
European  Communities  Institute for Economic 
Analysis  and  Research 
This  Institute, which  is  to  be  proposed  to  the  Council  by  the 
Commission,  springs  from  the  desire  to place policy measures  for  the 
further  economic  integration of  the European Communities  on  a  more 15 
scientific footing.  The  Institute would  carry out both economic 
research  and  medium-term  forecasting,  and  would  deal with  the 
methodological  problems  of economic  forecasting. 
Problems  and  difficulties of  forecasting at Community  level. 
General  tendencies  and  experience 
I.l. 
I.l.37.  The  rather numerous  forward  studies carried out  for  the  European 
I.1.38. 
1.1.390 
Communities  concentrate  on  short and  medium-term  forecasting.  The 
Commission  is,  however,  increasingly aware  that it must also have  at 
its disposal  longer-term forecasts  if it is  to  be  in a  position  to 
develop  a  coherent system of 2oals  and  strategies  into which  to fit 
its short and medium-term policies.  Similarly,  there  has  been more 
and more  evidence  of  the  limitations of sectoral  forecasts,  and 
attempts  are at present being made  to  overcome  them  through closer 
cooperation  between  the  Directorates-General concerned  and at 
Commission  level,  and  also by  contracting out work  on  integrated 
forecasting models. 
Under  the present arrangements  the  responsibility for deciding 
whether or not  forward  studies are  to  be  carried out lies with  the 
individual Directorates-General  unless,  that is,  such  studies  are 
mandatory  under  one  of  the Treaties or under  a  Council  decision. 
Only  recently have  attempts  been made  to  achieve  inter-departmental 
coordination:  in early  1974,  a  study group  was  set up  to  coordinate 
proposed  studies  internally;  it began its work  only at  the  beginning 
of  1975. 
A number  of  problems  and  trends  have  appeared  in  the  preparation 
of Community  forecasts. 
3ince  they have  no  lower-tier administrations,  the  European 
Communities  are  dependent  on  statistical material  and  forecasts 
provided  by  the Member  States.  The  insufficient comparability 
of national statistical data  and  forecasting  procedures  is  thus 
the  first obstacle  to  be  overcome.  The  Statistical Office of  the 
European Communities  makes  a  major contribution  towards  overcoming 
I 
it.  Once  standardisation is achieved,  the next problem  to arise 
is  the  inadequacy of  traditional forecasting methods.  Accordingly, 
various Directorates-General  have  commissioned  the  construction of 
forecasting models  within  their own  fields,  which have  revealed  that 1.1.40. 
1.1.41. 
1.1.42. 
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computer  science  does  indeed  offer almost  unlimited possibilities 
but  that  the  present state of  economics  and  social science,  and 
also  the  existing  level of  information,  impose  considerable 
constraints.  Because  of  their high  degree  of  aggregation  and 
above  all  their necessarily narrow assumptions,  these  studies 
have  so  far been of  only  limited  use  in policy-making.  The 
small  size of  the  Commission's  staff means  that most  forecasting 
work has  to  be  contracted out.  However,  preparatory work  in  the 
Commission must  be  carried a  certain distance  before  outside 
experts  can  be  asked  to  draw  up  forecasts. 
The  contribution of  forecasting  to policy planning 
at European  level. 
As  the  party commissioning  forward  studies has  so  far been 
identical with  the  party for which  they are  intended,  the  forecasts 
have  in  a  sense  met  the  Commission's  information needs.  But  this 
does  not yet mean  that they are  appropriately assessed  or used  for 
the  formulation  of policy proposals. 
The  inadequacy of many  forecasts  has  given  rise  to  some 
reticence,  because  their statistical base  is  too  narrow,  or  their 
theoretical premises  are  disputed,  or  the  results  are  too  general, 
or  fundamentally  interdependent relationships have  been  disregarded. 
Other difficulties  in exploiting  the  results  for  policy-making have 
been  due  to  a  lack of planning at  the  receiving end. 
I.l. 
In  a  number  of areas,  such  as  medium-term  economic  programming, 
forecasts  are  an  integral part of  programme  planning,  of which  Council 
decisions  or Treaty provisions  are  the  basis.  Not  only is  there 
thus  a  guarantee  that· the  results  of  the  forward  studies are  taken 
into  account when  programmes  are  being  drawn  up,  but  there  is also 
permanent  and  close  cooperation between  outside experts,  Commission 
officials,  and  officials of  the  Member  States.  In other contexts, 
the  decision whether  or not  to  use  forecasts  for  formulating 
Community  policy  in  a  specific field  depends  on  how  relevant  the 
information provided  is  to  the  work of  the  Directorate-General 
concerned.  This  raises  the  problem of  interdepartmental  coordination. 
Programme  planning within  the  individual Directorates-General  is 
still in  its infancy.  Consequently,  there has  been  no  assurance  that 
forward  studies  are  always  commissioned  in consultation with other 
departments  or  in accordance  with criteria previously agreed. 17 
This  problem exists  regardless  of  the  formal  allocation of 
responsibilities  for  studies,  which varies  from  one  Directorate-
General  to  another. 
I.l. 
1.1.43.  Nevertheless,  as  a  general  rule,  the  Directorates-General have 
1.1.44. 
been  provided  - to  the  extent  this  has  been  financially,  statistically 
and  methodologically possible  - with  the  short and  medium-term  forward 
information necessary for  the  limited policy sectors  covered.  One 
generally noted  shortcoming has  been  the  lack of wider-ranging 
forecasts  as  a  prerequisite  for  and  adjunct  to  forecasts  in  individual 
sectors;  the  desire  to  obtain  forward  studies of  immediate  practical 
relevance  has  meant  that interest has  focused  on  short-term and  medium-
term  sectoral  forecasts.  In addition,  the  Commission's  internal 
organisation makes  for  a  rigid division between  the  sectors  covered, 
so  that it is difficult  to  identify and  successfully pursue  any 
interest  that extends  beyond  a  single  department. 
But  the  European Communities  need  precisely  these  long-tenT 
integrated  forecasts  of  economic,  political and  social  trends  in 
order  to  steer their own  course.  This  requires political planning 
at Community  level,  it requires  the  coordination of  the  proposals 
and  programmes  of  the  individual Directorates-General  so  that  they 
form  a  comprehensive  concept of  Community  policy.  Only  through 
such  a  planning process  can  the  feasibility of,  and  possible 
alternatives  to,  specific policy choices  be  considered. 
!.1.45.  The  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  finds  it just as 
!.1.46. 
difficult as  other big administrations  to  plan its  tasks  and 
programmes  coherently.  As  an  international organisation,  it ha~ 
to  cope  with additional  problems.  And  as  the  first international, 
multilingual  administration  in all history  (as  far  as  we  know)  to 
have  some  direct power  over  the  lives  of actual people,  it also has 
to  cope  with  completely unprecedented  ones  as well. 
Policy planning  requires  the  collation and  processing of 
complex  information  and  the  goal-oriented coordination of possible 
courses  of action.  The  ability to  achieve  this coordination 
depends  on whether  the  body  directing policy is capable  of arriving 
at a  consensus  and  of  taking political action.  The  thirteen 
Commissioners,  acting  together,  constitute  the  Commission's  controlling 
body.  Their unity  is  in practice  impaired  by  the  way  they are 18  I.l. 
The  appointed  and  by  the  lack of direct political  legitimation. 
Commission  is,  it is  true,  designed  as  a  collegiate body,  but 
functions  de  facto  on strict departmental  principles.  An  excessive 
workload,  the  continued existence  of  separate Treaties,  and  the 
working methods  of  the  Committee  of  Permanent Representatives  are 
further  reasons  for  this  state of affairs.  To  this extent,  it 
is clear why  the  Commissioners,  acting as  a  body,  do  not carry out 
their programming  and  coordinating  tasks  in an  optimum way. 
I.1.47.  The  responsibility for  coordination cannot,  however,  be  taken 
over by  the  Commission's  departments.  They  possess neither  the 
political  legitimation nor  the necessary power;  the  result is  that 
they  can play only  an  auxiliary role  by helping  ei~her to  cut down 
the  surfeit of  information or  to  coordinate  implementation of  the 
various  departments'  separate  tasks.  The  Commissioners'  cabinets, 
the  Secretariat-General,  and  the  Legal  Service could be  particularly 
important here;  they are  the  points  on  which  the  flow of  information 
converges. 
I.l.48.  The  scope  for  "autonomous  self-coordination" at  the  level of 
I .l.  49. 
the Directorates-General is  limited;  it is  largely restricted  to 
an  exchange  of  information and  the  formal  delimitation of spheres 
of work.  It is still too  early  to  judge more  recent  tentative 
coordinating efforts,  for  instance  in  the  conLracting out of 
research by  the  Commission.  These  and  other attempts  are  an 
indication  that a  shortcoming has  been  recognised  and  has  to  be 
remedied. 
It would  not be  right for  us  to  pursue  these points  further, 
but we  will  return in Chapters I.3.  and  1.4.  below  to  the  general 
question of how  forecasts  may  best be  turned  to  account in policy-
making. 
In  the meantime  we  note with  encouragement  a  speech made  by 
President Ortoli  to  the  European Parliament  in February  1975;  in it 
he  propounded  that  the  action programme  of  the  Commission  should  be 
seen  as  a  comprehensive  programme,  so  that  the  Commission  "could  do 
justice  to  its regained vocation  as  a  political organ",  and  so  as 
"to give  the  work  of European  unity a  different dynamic  and  a 
different dimension." I. 1. 50. 
I.l.Sl. 
I.l.52. 
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Conclusion. 
We  began  this  chapter by mentioning  the  need  to  attend  to  the 
relationship  between  the  proposed  new  continuing  instrument of  long-
term  integrated  forecasting  and  the  short and  medium-term sectoral 
forecasting which  already exists;  we  have  now  briefly reviewed  the 
latter and  found  that quite  a  lot has  been  done,  is being  done,  and 
is proposed,  and  that it is,  in general,  not very well  coordinated. 
Clearly  the  amount  and variety of  the  work  is  such  that some  general 
principle will  have  to  be  adopted  to  govern  the  interfaces with 
Europe  Plus  Thirty,  if it comes  into being. 
arrangements  would not be  gc J(j  enough. 
A series of one-to-one 
We  think  this principle  can be  found  in  the  time-horizon of 
the  work  concerned.  If the  existing sectoral  forecasting  is really 
short-term,  a  year or less,  we  do  not  foresee  any  problem.  The 
short-term enterprises  and  Europe  Plus  Thirty can  be  useful  to  each 
other,  but no  coordination is required between  them  beyond  the 
assuring of  a  mutual  flow of  information.  If  the  sectoral  work 
is what  one  could  conveniently call medium-term,  say between  one 
and  four  years  in  time-horizon,  the  coordination will have  to  be 
more  thorough.  A certain harmonisation of methods,  and  a  certain 
community of assumptions,  would  be  extremely useful.  If Europe  Plus 
Thirty can  be  instrumental  in bringing about  that harmonisation  and 
that community  of assumptions,  not only between itself and  each  of  the 
existing medium-term sectoral projects,  but also  among  the  latter, 
that would  be  in itself a  minor  justification for its existence. 
We  recommend  that  the  laborious  work entailed should  be  promptly 
undertaken,  if Europe Plus Thirty comes  into being. 
Where  the  sectoral  forecasting  looks  to  a  term  longer  than 
four  years,  and  where  the  longer  time-horizon must  (or should)  tend 
to  make  it multi-sectoral or integrated,  there will  be  severe 
dangers  of overlap,  waste,  and  confusion.  We  strongly recommend 
that  these  dangers  should  be  faced  immediately.  If Europe  Plus 
Thirty is  to  have  any  purpose,  it must  be  a  truly  integrated project, 
which means  that it must work  in all fields where  long-term  fore-
casting makes  sense.  (We  identify  these  fields  in Part II below.) 
It will  be  necessary  immediately  to  consider and  decide  whethe~ 
if long-term forecasting  is being  done  in  the  integrated project, 
it is also  a  good  idea  to  do  it in a  series of separate  sectoral 20 
projects.  We  are  convinced it is not.  If our view were  accepted, 
it would  lead  to  the  absorption of  some  projects  and  studies  into 
Europe  Plus  Thirty,  those  with  a  time-horizon  of more  than  four 
years.  There  is  no  reason  why  this  should  be  any  loss either  to 
the  Commission  tt the  European  Communities  or  to  those  whose 
livelihood  depends  upon  it.  Much  good  work  is already being  done; 
it will  be  better done,  and  very-probably by  the  same  people,  even 
in  the  same  place,  if it is  done  as  part of  an  integrated network 
project such  as  we  describe  and  commend  in Part IV  of our  report. 
To  avoid misunderstanding,  we  emphasise  that in  the  case  of 
instruments  where  long-term forecasting  is  likely  to  be  only  a 
small  part of  their work  (such,  for  instance,  as  the  Foundation  for 
the  Improvement  of Living  and  Working  Conditions,  the  proposed 
European  Communities  Institute  for Economic  Analysis  and  Research, 
and  the  Energy Research  Programme)  we  are not proposing  that  the 
instrument  should  be  absorbed  into  Europe  Plus  Thirty;  our 
proposal  concerns  only  long-term forecasting. 
I.l. PART  I  I.  2. 
I.2.1. 
General 
2.  FORECASTING  CAPACITY  IN  MEMBER  COUNTRIES  OF  THE 
EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
In the  present  chapter,  we  look at what  sort of  forecasting is 
already being  done  in the countries  of  the  European Communitits,  because 
whatever instrument is created  for  the  Community  itself, that  instrument 
should be  carefully  related to  the  existing capacity,  and  should of 
course use it where  appropriate. 
I.2.2.  In  the  last ten years  several  investigations  of the  scope  of  fore-
I.2.3. 
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casting have  been  carried out  in Europe  and  elsewhere.(!)  The  results  tend 
to  show  that  forecasting as  a  formal  activity is increasing.  The  range  of 
techniques  employed  has  also  incr~ased, and  so  has  sophistication in general. 
There  is considerable variety in the pattern of  forecasting in 
different countries,  and in the methods  used.  It depends  on  the issue 
under consideration,  cultural  outlook,  personalities,  the organisation 
(including organisation of  government),  and  previous  experience.  To 
understand precisely why  forecasts  are made  and why  particular methods  are 
used  today would  involve  extensive historical analysis.  This  chapter con-
tains  ~eneral observations,  and is supplemented by  Annex  I, which  discusses 
in more  detail the  fields,  orgauisation,  methods,  scale,  purposes,  sponsors 
and  end-users  of  forecasting,  both  governmental  and non-governmental,  in 
each  EEC  country,  in international  organisations,  the  rest of Western. 
Europe,  Eastern Europe,  North America  and Japan.  We  have  !coked outside 
the  Community  at this  point,  because  we  think that can  only  broaden our 
understanding  of what  goes  on within it, and  because Europe  Plus Thirty 
will  have  to  forecast  about  the  Community's  position in the world,  and 
will  therefore  need  data  from· outside. 
Our tenns  of  reference bind  us  to  look  closely at existing fore-
casting capacity,  and  this we  have  done.  But  we  would  caution against 
any  attempt  to  concoct  an "analytical table"  of it.  It changes.  Good 
individuals move.  Ventures  fail.  Other ventures,  sometimes  of high 
quality,  go  unperceived  from modesty  or poverty.  .  As  well  as  the 
general  indicators contained in Annex I, we  are  transmiLting to  the 
(1)  For  example,  N.  Sombart:  Long-term Planning and Forecasting in 
Europe.  Long  Range  Planning  Vol.  5,  No.  2. 2 
Commission  privately,  that  is,  separately  from  this  report,  a  list 
of names  and  addresses  of  forecasting  institutions.  It is  the  best 
we  have  been  able  to  compile  at a  given moment  in  time.  It is not 
complete;  still less  is it an  indication of merit.  We  recommend 
that it be  among  the  functions  of  a  continuing Europe  Plus Thirty 
to maintain  such  a  list as  this  up  to  date,  and  to  make  it fuller 
and  more  infonnative. 
Forecasting  in Europe 
I.2 
I.2.5.  European  forecasting  lies between  two  polar  stereotypes:  the  Soviet 
!.2.6. 
Union  (highly centralised preparation of  rigid  five-year plans  based 
on  estimates  of  economic,  social and  technological possibilities at a 
national,sectoral  and  regional  level)  and  the  United  States  (largely 
decentralised  forecasts,  with  an  emphasis  on  short-term issues,  by 
departments  and  agencies  at all levels  of  government,  and  by  industries 
and  universities,  with minimum  coordination). 
In  the  Netherlands,  the  Federal Republic  of Germany,  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  Belgium,  government has  a  strong  regional  element,  and 
much  planning  is  decentralised.  In France  the  reverse  l.S  the  case.  In 
the  United  Kingdom  power  lies  largely with  individual ministers,  and 
long-range  planning  tends  to  take  place  on  a  departmental  basis.  France 
and  the  Eastern European  countries  have  for  ~orne  time  produced  comprehen-
sive medium-term plans.  In  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany,  like  the 
United  States,  there has  been no  planning of  this kind.  The  Netherlands, 
Italy and  Sweden  have  produced  long-term,  macro-economic  projections 
on  a  less  comprehensive  basis,  and  have  tended  to  focus  on  a  particular 
issue  such  as  regional  sectoral disparities  in Italy,  or  industrial pro-
duction in the  Netherlands.  In the main,  it has  been undertaken to help 
tackle  a  particular problem,  or even  to  generate  a  sense  of purpose. 
Plans  usually cover  a  five-year period  and  are either regular, 
as  in France,  or occasional,  like  the  ill-fated British National  Plan 
of  1965. 
1.2.7.  All  European nations,  within  their Ministries of Finance,  have  for 
many  years  carried out annual  budgetary forecasts,  usually based  on 
econometric models.  Most  engage  in mid-term  forecasting  up  to  five  to 
ten years.In  industry and  government  budgetary planning,  much  shorter - 3  - I. 2. 
planning horizons  operate;  they are  dictated  largely by  the  prevailing 
discount  rate and  (it is  commonly  believed)  by  the  lifetime of  democratically 
elected parliaments,  but  there is  a  consensus  that  the  amount  of  long-term 
thinking has  increased.  The  annual  budget  is what  affects  people's  lives, 
and  the very  great difficulty of translating long-term strategies into 
short-term tactics  has  meant  .:.hat  National  Plans,  even where  t:hey  have 
been coordinated by  the  finance ministry,  have  tended  to  have  less effect. 
If we  want  to identify the  kinds  of  forecasting which  really  do  assist 
policy-making,  we  shall  have  to  remember this. 
I .2.8.  As  well  as  finance ministries,  most  government  departments  carry 
out  forward  planning and  have at  least a  nominal  forecasting capability. 
At  this  level  studies are intended to  provide  background  information  for 
policy  formation  (bPforehand)  and  assessment  (afterwards).  Sometimes it 
is done  for specific policies but  often,  for  example with  demographic 
forecasts,  for a  wide  range  of policies. 
I.2.9.  Overall  plans  sometimes  originate within the  finance  ministry, 
but  more  often in departments  set up  for the  purpose.  The  aimsof  overall 
plans vary.  Often  they have  been initiated (as in France,  the United 
Kingdom  and Ireland)to  relieve  economic  troubles.But they are also intended 
to  provide  strategic guidelines within which  sectoral and  regional  policies 
may  be  devised.  The  need  for  such guilelines  has  become  accepted  for 
many  reasons,  particularly  perhaps  because  of the  increase  in public 
involvement  in industry. 
1.2.10.  Where  the  preparation of an  overall  plan is not  the  lntention,  the 
need  to coordinate  plans  and  forecasts  between ministries is increasingly 
recognised.  In Eastern Europe,  and  to  a  lesser degree  in France,  formal 
coordination has  existed for  several  decades.  In the United  Kingdom  and 
the  Netherlands it is more  recent,  and inter-ministerial activity is 
obtained more  often through  committees  than  through  joint analyses. 
Most  countries suffer from  lack of  inter-depa~tmental communication. 
Traditionally powerful  finance ministries  are  loth  to  concede  power to 
national  planning agencies.  In the United  Kingdom,  coordination was 
significantly improved when  a  number of  spending  departments were 
grouped into new  and  larger  'super-departments'  (e.g.  Department  of  the 
Envi rorunent). - 4  - 1.2 
1.2.11.  Typically  the  time  scale  for ministerial  forecasl:.s  is  five  to 
ten  years,  but  1985  and  the  end  of the  century have  been  collullon 
horizons  for about  a  decade.  There  is at  least  some  recognition of  the 
physical,  technological,  social  or economic  time  scales characteristic 
of  each policy area.  Land  use  planning,  for  example,  is  recognised as 
having  physical  implications  up  to  and  beyond  sixty years  (the theoretical 
physical  lifetime of  dwellings).  Energy  requirements  are considered 
on  a  scale of  several  decades,  corresponding to  the  lead time  for  new 
technologies,  the  economic  life of  power stations,  and  ptysical  limitations 
(fossil  fuel  reserves,  environment).  Some  aspects  of  social  policy  (for 
example,  planning  for  retirement  pensions)  also  require  forecasts  of at 
least thirty years. 
!.2.12.  Although  the  time  horizon  and  scope  of  forecasting  do  seem  to  be 
extending,  several  countries which  have  experimented with  forecasts  and 
plans  of  long  time  span or great detail are  now  redirecting their efforts 
towards  less  ambitious  projects.  The  attempts  during the  1960's to  produce 
long-term,  very  detailed forecasts  of wide  scope  were  not  entirely 
successful.  In Hungary,  in France  and in Ireland,  for  example,  the  time 
horizons  of  government  forecasts  have  shortened,  and  the  level  of detail 
in  long-term  forecasts  has  been  reduced  significantly. 
!.2.13.  Social  factors  are  becoming  increasingly  promine~t in governmental 
and  other forecasts:  in  some  cases  this means  attempting to display 
social  and  environmental  costs  in economic  terms,  in others it involves  merely 
indicating the  social  implications  of  economic  and other policies. 
Problems  arising  from  increasing urbanisation and industrialisation, 
the ecological aspects  of  environment,  and most  recently the  energy 
crisis,  have all contributed to  this widening of  perspectives.  In 
several  countries  new  government  departments  which  fOCUS  Oil  these  issues 
have  been  established.  A need  for  'social indicators' with which  to 
monitor the  effects of social policies is  recognised;  we  return  to  this (l) 
fascinating  subject  later.  The  Netherlands  and  Sweden  have  set up  agencies  to 
examine  the  assumptions  and goals  implicit in government  policy. 
(1) 
See !.4., pages  8  - 10. 5  1.2 
!.2.14.  But  the  purpose  of  'forecasting'  is  seen differently in different 
European  countries,  and  in each country  the  perception and  emphasis 
has  changed  continuously.  In Eastern Europe,  France,  Italy,  Belgium and 
Norway,  forecasting  has  been closely  intermeshed with planning,  and  has 
thus  been more  "political".  In the  Netherlands,  the  United Kingdom  and 
West  Germany,  it has  been more  removed  from  the  hurly-burly. 
!.2.15.  There  are also differences  in  the  overall  approach  to  forecasting. 
Some  countries,  such  as  the  United Kingdom  and  Norway,  emphasise  the 
formulation  of alternative hypotheses  concerning  future  trends.  By 
contrast,  in France  the  approach  to mid-term planning has  been  to  specify 
by  systematic  (iterative)  trial and  error  the  policies which  - taken  to-
gether with estimates  of social and  technological  changes  - will  lead  as 
close  as  possible  to  a  specified s;et of objectives.  In  some  countries 
(e.g.  Hungary)  attempts  have  been made  to  arrive at such  'solutions'  by 
using  programmed  optimisation methods.  (It  is worth mentioning here that 
world-wide  the  only  body  known  to us  practising anything  like  teleonomy 
is the  Economic  Council  in Japan.) 
!.2.16.  An  important factor  determining  governmental  planning activity is 
the  level of public  ownership  in a  country;  whether,  for  example,  fore-
casts are oriented  toward  revenue  or production.  Even  in East European 
countries,  as  experience  in Hungary  shows,  there  is  a  conflict between 
perceived  industrial and  governmental  forecasting needs,  industry  in 
general  preferring a  shorter planning horizon.  In the  West,  different 
perceptions  with  regard  to,  say,  the  question of  taxes,  m~kes full 
cooperation between  companies  and  governments  quite difficult.  Never-
theless,  the  expectations  of businessmen  concerning  levels  of  investment 
and  of  technologis~concerning the  lead  time  for  new  technologies  are 
relied  upon  by most  government  agencies  in making  detailed sectoral 
forecasts.  On  the  other side  although most  industrial  forecasts  are 
narrowly product-oriented,  some  industries  (e.g.  oil and  transport) 
find it essential  to  consider a  wide  range  of social  and  environmental 
issues. 
!.2.17.  This  applies particularly  to  large  firms  and  public ventures  (including 
nationalised  industries)  many  of which  have  their own  long-range  forecasting 
groups.  The  size of  a  firm  and  the  character of  its products naturally 
have  a  greater  impact  on  its planning effort  than  does  the  pattern of 
natio~al economic  planning.  Where  interests  do  not clash directly, 
several  companies  cooperate  to  sponsor  research associations  or 6 
conferences.  There  are,  in fact,  several  fora,  both  governmental 
and  non-governmental  (such  as  the  ECE  seminars  for  senior economic 
advisors  or  the  Institute of Administrative  Science Congress),  for 
exch~nging ideas  about  forecasting methods  and  applications. 
1.2.18.  It is  difficult  to  make  generalic.ations  about  forecasting 
research  in universities,  private organisations  and  consultancies. 
If anything,  interest in  forecasting  among  them  exceeds  that  in govern-
ment  departments  or  industry.  Some  universities conduct  programmes  of 
research  into  forecasting  in general  and  in relation  to  spe~ific topics. 
Attitudes  to  work  by  universities  and  consultants vary between 
countries;  in Europe  (compared with  the  United States)  university 
research  tends  to  be  viewed  as  'too academic'  or  irrelevant.  However, 
most non-governmental  research contributes  to  a  widening of perspective 
which  is  lacking  in narrowly defined  governmental  forecasts,  and points 
to neglected  issues which  are  often not viewed  as  central problems  by 
the  governments  of  advanced nations.  In some  countries  (for example, 
I.2 
the  United Kingdom)  it has  been  stated as  a  deliberate policy  that 
speculative  long-term issues  should be  aired publicly via uon-governmental 
sources. 
1.2.19.  There  is  considerable variation in  the  level  of  interdependence 
and  cooperation between  government  and non-government  research  teams. 
This  also  includes  groups  not engaged  specifically in forecasting,  such 
as  government statistical offices and  many  university deparbments  which 
collect and monitor data.  Although  they are not mentioned  here  in 
any  detail,  such  groups  are clearly vital  to  the  overall  forecasting 
activity. 
1.2.20.  The  pattern of  international association and  cooperation between 
governments  in forecasting  seems  to  be  geographically,  economically, 
and politically determined;  probably  in that order.  In Eu:ope,  France 
has  greater cooperation with Italy and  Belgium  (and Eastern Europe) 
than with other nations.  Dutch  links  tend  to  be  with  the  Federal Republic 
of Germany,  the  United Kingdom  and  United  States.  The  Scandinavian 
countries  are  close  to  each other;  Germany  to  the  U.S.A.,  etc.  Language 
and  culture place greater barriers  on  joint projects  than  differences 
in method  or approach.  There  is  rarely a  complete  correspondence 
between  the activities of  a  government  department  in one  country and 
its  (nominal)  opposite  number  in another. - 7  -
I.2.21.  The  work  of inter-governmental agencies,  such as  the  United 
Nations  and OECD,  especially the  latter, is often well  thought  out 
and  executed.  Although  OECD  is not  strictly a  European organisa-
tion,  all  the Western  European countries are members.  It is 
certainly one  of  the main  sources  of  comparative  data,  not  only  in 
the  field of conjunctural  economics,  but  across  a  wide  span of 
I.2. 
sectoral activities  such as agriculture,  energy,  science  and  technology, 
environment,  education,  social  policy and  development  aid.  Further-
more,  its work is, in general,  rather more  concerned with  the  longer-tenn 
trends  than that of other international organisations.  However,  OECD 
has  made  little attempt  to initiate an integrated forecasting approach 
of the  type which  we  advocate  in our  report.  Its work  is essentially on 
a  sector by  sector basis with little consideration of the  significance 
of inter-sectoral influences  and impacts.  We  consider that its work 
cannot  be  regarded as  an alternative to  the creation of a  5ound  and 
integrated forecasting capacity within the  Community,  w~ere such 
forecasts,  to  be  effective, must  necessarily be  close  to  the points  of 
analysis  and  decision.  The  European  Commission  and Council  are to 
some  extent an executive,  having  powers  of their own,  and  forecasting 
done  by  them or for  them  should  therefore  be  more  policy-oriented than 
can,  or need,  be  the case in OECD. 
The  Methods  Employed 
I.2.22.  We  describe  and consider the methods  of  forecasting as  such in 
Chapter !.3. 
The  range  of  techniques  used in forecasting has  increased in the 
last twenty  years,  and greater sophistication is evident in many  fore-
casting exercises.  There  are several  reasons  for the  increase in the 
use  of sophisticated (usually mathematical)  methods.  First,  techniques, 
technology  and expertise have  been carried over  from military,  engineer-
ing and scientific endeavours.  The  operations  research and  'systems' 
approaches  had their origins in the  Second World War.  Second,  there 
has  been  a  tendency  since the War,  in government  econoruic  planning 
particularly,  to  define  a  relatively small  set of objectives  (economic 
growth,  full  employment,  etc.)  and to  adopt  a  managerial  approach to 
achieving these objectives which in itself helped to  promote  the use 
of more  fonnal  techniques.  Finally,  there has  been  a  demand  for methods 
which  can  cope with issues which are  realised to  be  increasingly complex. 8 
1.2.23.  For  the  resolution of  issues which  have  recently become  political 
eye-catchers  (energy,  and  ecological aspects  of  the  environment) 
systems  analysis  and  sophisticated modelling methods  are  often used. 
International  agencies  and  international non-governmental  projects 
are  sometimes  front  runners  in experimenting with  and  supporttng 
studies  based  on  new  techniques  such  as  dynamic  modelling.  In  long-
term  economic  studies,  both  formal  mathematical methods  and  informal 
discursive methods  are  generally used.  All  countries  carrying out 
long-term exercises make  use  of non-formal  methods  such  as  qualitative 
analysis  (including scenario writing),  international comparisons,  and 
of course  the  simple  extrapolation of past  trends.  The  degree  of 
emphasis  depends  on  the  overall approach  used.  Although econometric 
methods  have  often given  reasonable  forecasts,  they have  proved 
insufficiently responsive  to  unusual  circumstances.  In general  the 
more  detailed  an  analysis,  the  more  expert  judgement  as  opposed  to 
econometric  or other models  is  relied  upon.  Even  with  short-term 
forecasts  there  are  considerable variations  in approach  and  in  the 
assumptions  underlying  the  models  constructed  in different countries, 
which will  be  a  problem  in itself for  any  integrated  forecasting 
instrument set up  by  the  Community. 
1.2.24.  In France,  Italy,  the  Netherlands  and  the  United Kingdom  experience 
with  the  use  of aggregated  economic  models  is generally considered  to 
have  been  satisfactory.  Although  the  Czechs,  Italians  and  Dutch  have 
all experimented with non-linear versions  of  their aggregate macro-
economic models,  there  is  a  tendency  for models  actually employed  in\ 
the  management  of  economies,  and  particularly  trade models,  to  be 
mathematically relatively simple.  They  consist for  the most.part 
of  linear relationships.  Optimization methods  and  dynamic  programming 
are  used  less  often.  One  reason  for  this  is  the  low quality of  data, 
which makes  estimation of  relationships difficult and  the  use  of more 
sophisticated methods  of  dubious  value.  This  situation is  i~proving, 
although Europe  as  a  whole  still lags  behind  the  United States.  We 
return  to  the  question of  inputs  later  in Chapter I.3. 
I.2.25.  There  have  been  failures,  from all of which  we  must  lea~n.  It has 
proved  difficult  to  produce  consistent  long-term demographic  forecasts 
as,  for  example,  the  experiences  of  both  the  Netherlands  and  the  United 
Kingdom  show.  Attempts  are  being made  to  extend  the  extrapolative 
methods  based  on  fertility rates  and  cohort analysis  to  include other 
1.2 I.2.26. 
I.2.27. 
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non-demographic variables.  Similarly,  models  of technological  change 
have  tended to  be  too  primitive.  In  an  industry  such  as  electronics, 
a  new  generation of  components  may  appear in commercial  application 
less  than  five  years after the  discovery  of the basic physical 
phenomenon.  In other industries,  such  as  nuclear power,  forecasts 
of  lead- times  are hazardous.  For this  reason  estimates  of expected 
technical  changes  and  costs  tend to  be  based  upon  the  opinions  of 
large numbers  of  industrial and  scientific researchers.  This  seems 
to  be  especially true of Japan and  the Soviet Union.  The  PPBS 
(Planning,  ProgrammiRg  and Budgeting  System)  has  had mixed  fortunes  in 
several  of the  countries  in which it has  been introduced,  particularly 
in the United States,  and has  largely been  replaced by  the  less  compli•  .. 
cated  'management  by objectives'  approach.  One  of  the more  commonly 
advanced and  charitable  reasons  for this  failure in the United States 
is that its introduction across  a  wide  range  of  government  departments 
more  or less  simultaneously overstrained the  supply  of policy analysts. 
But  difficulties which might  be  viewed as  teething troubles  are 
to  be  distinguished  from  inherent  limitations in forecasting methods. 
Input-output methods,  for example,  were  strongly criticised by many 
other economists  when  first introduced by  Leontief.  Today  input-
output tables are an  invaluable part  of the  government  economist's 
armoury. 
Conclusion 
The  information contained in Annex  I  suggests  that there is  an 
increased awareness  of  the  need  for  forecasting both insiae and  out-
side  government,  in all countries.  In particular there appears  to 
have  been  a  continuing,  and  in many  cases  increasing,  interest in 
longer-term  forecasts.  The  scope  of forecasts is al£o broadening, 
as  is  the  range  of  techniques  employed. 
There  are considerable  differences  between patterns  of activity, 
even  among  countries  of  the  European  Community.  The  trends  have 
certainly not all been in the  same  direction. - 10  - 1.2. 
1.2.28.  In Europe  and  elsewhere  forecasting is part of a  continuous 
process  of  experimentation in methods  and organisation.  The  aim of 
this activity should be  to  contribute to  the  formulation  and  implementa-
tion of worthwhile  policies.  This  increasingly involves  a  questioning 
of basic values  and assumptions  which cut  right across  sectoral and 
national interests.  Satisfactory procedures  for  reconciling the 
resulting broad objectives with short-range policies,  and  bringing 
together the  research,  forecasting,  and  planning  functions,  have  yet 
to be  devised.  We  think that if a  Europe  Plus Thirty is set up,  it 
should be not  only  because the Community  (as  opposed to its member 
countries  downhill,  and  the OECD  uphill)  needs it, but also because 
it should,  and  can,  contribute to the devising of those  procedures. PART  I  I.3. 
I.3.1. 
I.3.2. 
1.3.3. 
3.  THE  FORECASTING  PROCESS 
We  have  now  considered  the  following  questions:  Should  the 
European  Couununities  do  anything  new  in order to  come  to grips with 
the  increasing complexity of their public  life?  What  is Europe 
that it should need  forecasting,  and what  is  forecasting that  Europe 
should  need it?  (General  Introduction.)  How  does  the Community 
at present use  forecasting in choosing its goals  and  fonnulating its 
policies?  (I.l.)  And  what  sort of forecasting capacity at present 
exists within  the  European  Communities?  (I.2.,  and Annex  I.)  We 
have  suggested that the  Community  does  indeed stand in need  of a  long-
term  forecasting capacity,  and we  must  now  begin to  review the 
methodological  elements  out  of which  such  a  capacity could be  con-
structed. 
In this chapter,  we  discuss: 
a)  the  inputs  needed  for  long-term  forecasting; 
b)  the available methods  of  forecasting;  and 
c)  what  can  be  done  to  ensure  that the  results of  fore-
casting do  in face  contribute  to  decision-making 
and  planning. 
We  discuss  forecasting in general,  with  only  passing  reference 
to  the particular needs  of the  European Communities.  Only  in the  next 
chapter,  I.4.,  do  we  consider the  principles which  should  govern  the 
putting together of all  these  elements  into  a  particular continuing 
operation:  integrated forecasting  for the  European Communities.  After 
that,  in Part II, we  briefly  review  the  experience  and  the difficulties, 
the  possibilities and impossibilities,  which  pertain to attempts at 
forecasting in each  of  a  number  of different sectors. 
This  chapter,  on "the forecasting  process",  falls  into  three parts: 
inputs,  methods,  and  outputs.  Forecasting is a  process  and  like most 
processes it requires  raw materials:  the  inputs  of  forecasting are 
in the  fonn  of  information about  the  past  and  present.  Like all human 
processes, it uses methods;  sometimes  alternatively,  sometimes  sequen-
tially,  sometimes  in combination.  The  methods  of  forecasting are  described 
in the  second  part of this chapter,  and  are  grouped  to  show  what  part of  the 
forecasting  process  they are most  use  for.  Like all processes,  again, 1.3.4. 
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forecasting  gives  rise  to  an  output,  a  product or results,  and,  if it 
is  to  serve  its purpose,  this  output has  to  be  brought  to  the  right 
person  in  the  right  form.  The  relationship  between  forecasting  on  the 
one  hand,  and  planning  and  decision making  on  the  other,  is  treated 
in  the  third part of  this  chapter. 
We  use  the  analogy of  food.  If forecasting  is  a  meal,  then  the 
inputs  are  the  raw  foodstuffs,  and  statisticians  the  farmers.  The 
methods  are  the  pots  and  pans  in  the  kitchen.  The  outputs  are  the 
meal  itself,  and  policy-makers  are  the  guests.  The  forecaster, 
the  central  figure  in  the  chain,  is  the  cook.  This  chapter  treats 
first of  farming  and  harvesting  (inputs)  second  of  cooking  (methods) 
and  third  of  laying  the  table  and  serving  (outputs). 
Input:  the  raw materials 
Introduction 
If we  want  to  forecast  about  something,  we  must  know  what  it 
is,  and  to  know what it is  we  must  know  its history,  however 
slightly.  This  is  true  even  if a  forecast  is mainly based  on 
guesswork,  since  guessing  itself can  only  be  based  on  some  kind 
of knowledge  about past developments.  Thus,  forecasting  requires 
a  certain awareness  of  the  present and  its history:  it needs  input. 
In  this  chapter we  shall  discuss  first its main  component: 
information,  i.e.  statements  about  perceived  facts,  about whether 
something  does  or  does  not exist,  numerical  statements  about  its 
existence,  and  qualitative statements  of all sorts.  The  quality of 
forecasts  depends  critically but not exclusively  on  the  quality of 
the  input,  whether  we  use  conceptual  models  in our minds,  or  the 
computer models  which  reflect  them.  The  existence or non-existence 
of  time  series  of  accurate  and  consistent data greatly affects  the 
possibility of  forecasting.  But  knowledge  about  the  past is not 
sufficient,  as  the  following  example  will  illustrate. 
Example 
I.3.5.  Input  requirements  for national  forecasts  of  consumption  patterns 
several  years  ahead  may  illustrate  the  different  types  of  input needed 3 
in  the  forecasting  process.  This  type  of  forecasting  is  done  in 
several  countries either by  government  authorities  for national  economic 
forecasts,  or by private organisations or  firms  to  help  plan  future 
production  of  goods. 
1.3.6.  The  first step  in  this particular process  - as  in most  forecasting 
consists  of  choosing  a  "model"  - whether conceptual,  mathematical,  or 
other - that can  "explain" past and  present  consumption  trends,  in  the 
hope  that it will hold  true  also  for  future  trends.  To  choose  and 
to  test models,  you  need all kinds  of historical  inputs,  qualitative 
as  well  as  quantitative.  You  have  to  be  able  to  "explain"  slow, 
systematic  changes  in  the  composition of  household  consumption  (e.g. 
the  declining percentage  of  food  in  the  daily budget),  and,if possible, 
also more  sudden  shifts  in  consumer behaviour  such  as  those  caused  by 
the  introduction of  the  automobile. 
A good  forecasting model  is  one  that displays  identifiable  and 
stable  relationships  between  the  variable  you  want  to  forecast  and  a 
set of  "explanatory variables" which  can  be  accepted with  confidence, 
or can  be  controlled by  the  forecaster or his  boss  (by policy,  say,  or 
by  sales promotion).  Experience  in many  countries  shows  that  fairly 
realistic "models"  of  consumption patterns  can  be  constructed,  provided 
variables  such  as  income,  household  composition,  and  trends  in relative 
prices  are at hand. 
1.3.7.  Careful  studies of  changes  in  relative prices  have  shown  some 
fairly stable  long-term  trends  (e.g.  labour-intensive  goods  and  services 
becoming  more  and  more  expensive).  Similarly,  studies  of  demographic 
and  sociological  data  reveal  that  the  household  composition  in Europe 
has  so  far  changed  fairly systematically over  time  towards  smaller 
households,  the  number  of  children per family  decreasing  and  the 
span  of years  without  small  children  in  the  average  family  increasing, 
largely  independently of  short-run economic  and  social  changes.  All  these 
are  useful  in assessing  the  future.  As  regards  the  remaining  explanatory 
variable,  future  trends  in  income  (distribution),  the  forecaster will  have 
to  rely on  the  results of other forecasts,  (e.g.  of  the  levels  of  employment 
and  economic  activity).  Frequently,  then,  the  forecaster will  have  to 
use  several  assumed  future  income  trends  themselves  based  on  historical  evidence 
of past developments. 1.3.8. 
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It will  be  obvious  that no  fool-proof  long-term model  can  be 
made  to  explain all  the  changes  in consumption patterns.  Even  if 
careful  studies  of past experience  confirm relationships  which 
seem  to  withstand  short-term disturbances,  this  stability may  not 
endure.  Therefore  the  forecaster must  go  on  collecting new  inputs 
to  confront his  forecasts  with  developments  in  the  real world. 
Are  new  family  structures or new  life-styles emerging  which  may 
radically change  consumption patterns  ?  Will  the  consumer 
behaviour of  young  families  in  the  late  70's  or 80's  begin  to  level 
off (saturate),  in  a  reaction  to  the  "economic  growth  era"  of  the 
SO's  and  60's  ?  These  are  questions  of great  importance  in  fore-
casting  long-term consumption patterns;  but many  of  the  necessary 
inputs  are  themselves  forecasts,  and  thus  only verifiable with  the 
passage  of  time. 
More  about Inputs 
I. 3. 
1.3.9.  Different  types  of  forecasting  require  different  types  of 
input.  Very  often,  the  main  input has  to  be  knowledge  of  the  past 
as  it led  up  to  the  present:  historical data series,  or  time  series 
data,  to  use  the  statistical  terms.  Sometimes,  knowledge  of  the 
present situation may  suffice,  but only when  other "outside  information"  is 
at hand  as  a  substitute for history.  That outside  information may  be 
in  the  form  of  technical  "laws",  for  instance  concerning  the  energy 
requirements  of alternative patterns  of  production.  (For  instance, 
the  production  of  steel  and  of most fertilizers  requires much  energy, 
while  textile  industries mostly  consume  relatively little.)  "Outside 
information" may  also  come  in  the  form  of  accepted political plans,  for 
instance  plans  for  the  regulation of agricultural  production and  trade 
in  the  Community.  In  the  latter case  the  forecaster may  say:  "Since 
you  are  determined  things  in  this  field  shall  be  done  thus,  I  assume 
they will  be  done  thus.  Let  us  .now  see  what effect that might  have 
on  things  in other fields".  Of  course,  if they are not,  or not  for 
long,  "done  thus",  then  the  forecaster's  work may  turn out  to  be  less 
relevant  - unless  indeed  things  were  no  longer "done  thus"  precisely 
because his  forecast  showed  that would  have  been  a  bad  idea. - 5  - I.3. 
I.3.10.  The  data  problems  in forecasting are  formidable.  Most  of  the 
historical  data which would  be  most  useful  to  a  forecaster  do  not  exist. 
Those  that  do  exist tend not  to  be mutually  compatible  (even when 
officially pre-digested),  and  many  of  them  cover only  a  few  decades  with 
relatively  coarse  (yearly)  time-intervals,  displaying undesirable traits 
like collinearity,  and  not  being  law-abiding at all  (e.g.  not  converging 
towards  stable prooability distributions).  And  perhaps worst  of all are 
data which  are  outdated.  As  the British economic  forecaster,  Professor 
R.J.  Ball,  pointed out at a  recent International Conference  on  Dynamic 
Modelling  and  the Control  of National  Economies  (Warwick,  July  1973): 
"Forecasting  •••••  is often  like trying tq  find  out  where  you  are  going 
when  you  don't  know  where  you  have  been." 
In  long-term  economic  forecasting,  for instance,  the  data 
available may  consist  of  time  series  ending  3  or 4  years  ago.  Some  of  the 
figures  in the model,  e.g.  the  so-called technical  coefficients in the 
input-output tables,  may  date  back  even  longer,  perhaps  10  or 15  years. 
Luckily,  these  coefficients  seem  to  change  fairly slowly,  but  economic 
model-building might  yield more  reliable  forecasts if more  up-to-date 
values  of,  for  example,  these  input-output coefficients were  available. 
According  to  the  present  commitments  of  the statistical bureaus  of  the 
member  countries,  input-output tables,  and  hence  those coefficients, will 
be  updated  more  frequently  in the  future. 
I.3.11.  Even  so,  the  existing systems  of statistical data  collection and 
handling in the  European  countries  have  been  constructed primarily 
for evaluating past  and  present  developments  and  policies,  and not  for 
forecasting.  Changing  them is a  very  slow  and  laborious  process  in a 
single country,  not  to  speak of  the difficulty of  getting those  processes 
in  9  countries  to  converge  into  full  compatibility at the  same  time. 
I.3.12.  On  the national  level,  major  improvements  of  the statistical 
base  are  required to  serve  long-term  forecasting.  For instance,  apart 
from  the  input-output coefficients mentioned above,  we  still lack  data 
on  other structural  changes  in  some  of  our  economies  (as  opposed  to short-
term cyclical  or conjunctural  changes)  such as  those  in patterns  of 
consumption,  in composition of  the  labour  force  and in weekly  hours  of work, 
in growth  patterns  for  the  public sector,  and  so  on  and  so  forth. 6 
I.3.13.  Europe  Plus  Thirty must  decide  what  data it needs,  and  ask 
for  them.  If  they  do  not exist,  it will have  to  negotiate  for  them 
to  be  procured with  the  Community  Statistical Office  in  Luxembourg, 
with  the  national  statistical services,  and  with  anyone  else  who  can 
procure  them.  Only  as  an  exception would  it collect primary  data 
itself.  For  specific projects it might  sometimes  be  useful  to 
conduct,  or contract out,  specific  sample  surveys. 
I.3.14.  If  the  general  economic  development  of  the  Community  is  to  be 
I. 3. 
analysed,  compatible national  accounts  data  and  input-output  tables  have 
to  become  available.  This  will  involve  a  further  development  of  the 
application  in  the  member  countries  - on  the  most  detailed  level  -
of  common  definitions  and  classifications within  the  field of national 
accounts  data.  Only  when  this  is  realised can  Community-wide  data 
series  be  constructed,  and  be  analysed  by  such criteria as  urban/rural, 
highly-developed/less-developed,  etc.,  and  by  economic  and  other 
sectors  for  the  Community  as  a  whole,  instead of  by nations  as  at 
present.  The  pioneering work which  has  already started at  the 
Statistical Office  of  the  European  Communities  on  a  common  input-output 
table  is very  promising. 
I.3.15.  In  some  cases  data  can  be  obtained  by historic&  reconstruction. 
In  fields  without  ready-made  historical  time  series,  the  need  for 
"hindcasting"  is  obvious.  In many  countries  the  need  for macro-
economic  time  series  covering  several  decades  has  led  economic 
historians  to  make  impressive  studies  enabling  them  to  put  together 
comparative  time  series  for  key variables  from  circumstantial 
evidence.  Europe  Plus  Thirty should,  if necessary,  stimulate  this 
sort of work. 
I.3.16.  Few  things  are  more  important  than  the  continuous  checking  of 
forecasts  against what  happens.  If events  seem  to  be  writing  a 
scenario which  was  not  among  those  considered  by  the  forecasters, 
the  sooner  that  is  detected  the  better.  The  data needed  for  this 
continuous  validation may  be  different,  though not very different, 
from  those  needed  for  the  forecasting  itself.  Most  forecasting 
models  will  contain a  set of  exogenous  or  independent variables 
(determined  outside  the  model)  and  a  set of  endogenous  or  dependent 
variables,  the  values  of which  it is  the  task of  the  model  to 
"determine".  The  values  of  the  exogenous  variables  in  forecasting 
have  to  be  assumed  in advance.  In  these  cases  it is very  important, 7  I.3. 
as  soon  as  preliminary estimates of  the  "true" values  of  these  variables 
are  available,  to  check  the  model  values. 
I.3.17.  In  the  real world,  and  hence  in realistic models  of  economic, 
social  and  technological  developments,  there  is  usually a  certain 
sub-set of variables which  is more  significant in determining  the 
results  than  others.  Raw  material prices,  investment  in key 
industrial sectors,  demand  for  automobiles,  are  examples  of  such 
variables.  These  variables  have  great  influence  in many  ways. 
In  fact,  quite  substantial  changes  in many  other variables  have 
less effect on  the  total  economy  than  do  changes  in  these  "influential 
variables" within  the  margin  of error with  which  the  latter can 
themselves  be  measured. 
Non-Economic  Input 
I.3.18.  Even  for  long-term economic  forecasting,  one  needs  inputs of 
a  "non-economic"  nature:  information  on  social  developments  such 
as  trends  in married  women  working  outside  the  home,  and  the  effect 
of  this  on  the  birthrate,  labour conditions,  preferences  for  different 
types  of work  and  for  leisure  time,  trends  in  family  patterns,  and 
changes  in "life style" more  generally.  Fortunately,  this non-
economic  input  is  increasingly needed  for  shorter-term purposes 
as  well.  Many  governments  and  political parties have  started 
to  question  the  social  benefits  of certain state activities  in 
their present  form  (health  services,  education,  etc.)  because  they 
are  absorbing  an  ever-increasing part of  their countries'  resources. 
Until  fairly recently,  it was  common  to  judge  success  in  these  fields 
by  the  resources  allocated  to  them,  but  tnis  is clearly unsatisfactory, 
indeed misleading; 
to  be  evaluated. 
it is  the  effects of  these  allocations  that have 
If we  want  to  know  how  healthy  the  people  in  a 
country are,  we  must  look at its health statistics, not  its health 
expenditures.  Hence  the  growing  interest in non-economic  yardsticks 
over  the  past decade,particularly  the  so-called social  indicators, 
which  are  now  being  developed  in many  countries,  in  the  European 
Commission,  and  in  the  OECD.  For if we  want  to  plan expenditures 
aright,  we  must  find  means  of establishing  the  relation between 
expenditure  and  the  results of expenditure. 
output  tables  for welfare. 
We  must  make  input-8 
I.3.19.  This will not be  easy,  if only  because  there  is not always 
agreement  between  the  variations  of  the  indicators which  seek  to 
represent people's "objective" conditions,  and  the  way  the  latter 
are  perceived  subjectively.  For  instance,  a  recent  survey  about 
levels  of  satisfaction carried out  for  the  Conm1:ssion  (see 
1.3. 
( 1) 
Trente  Jours  d'Europe,  January  1974  )  showed  that  the  average  standard 
of  living  in  the  EEC  rose  by  about  20%  between  1968  and  1973,  while 
25%  of  the  respondents  thought  they were  worse  off  than  five  years 
ago,  and  33%  declared  that  they  had  noticed no  change  in  their 
situation.  Two  alternative  interpretations are  possible:  1)  that 
the  58io  who  declared  "worse  off"  or "no  change"  did  enjoy  an  actual 
increase  in  their standard of  living,  which  was  offset by  some 
hidden  deterioration  in other  components  of  their welfare;  and 
2)  that at least part of  the  discrepancy  between  perception and  reality 
is explainable  in  terms  of  the  uneven  character of  the  progress  of 
~  standard of  living;  namely  that  the  rich got  richer and  the  poor 
did not.  In either case,  this  is  an  important example  of  the  sort 
of social  information which  should  be  available  to  policy-makers, 
since it provides  an  argument  against  taking  the  'output'  of public 
policies  too  literally,  and neglecting  their socio-psychological 
aspects. 
I.3.20.  The  concept of  social  indicators must  be  handled with care. 
It grew  up  because  researchers  and  social planners  recognised  that, 
on  the  one  hand,  direct measurements  of social policy effects were  very 
often  impossible,  and  that,  on  the  other,  the  available measures  of 
total  income,  production  and  resource  allocation were  insufficient or 
even misleading.  As  indicators  of  the  success  of policies,  in  the 
present state of  the  art,  a  social  indicator can  only  give  an  indirect 
measure  of  the  social wellbeing  of  a  population.  For  example, 
recognising  on  the  one  hand  the  impossibility of measuring  "the health" 
of  a  population,  and  on  the  other  the  limited  relevance  of measuring 
health services  expenditures,  attempts  are  being made  to  construct 
indicators  based  on  average  lifetime/mortality,  numbers  of visits  to 
doctors,  days  spent  in hospital,  and  so  on. 
So  far,  there  is no  generally accepted  idea  about what  social 
indicators  are,  and  it is  interesting  that one  publication which 
at present holds  international attention,  the  OECD's  "Social  Indicators", 
is  subtitled,  more  correctly,  "List of  Social  Concerns  Common  to Most 
(1)  Published  by  the  Paris  Information Office  of  the  Commission of  the 
European  Communities. 9  I.3. 
Member  Countries".(l)  But  social  indicators  are  conceivable,  and 
Europe  Plus Thirty should certainly play its part in  identifying 
them  and  developing  their use. 
1.3.21. 
1.3.22. 
1.3.23. 
In  the  very difficult forecasting  that  concerns  non-economic 
aspects  of society,  experime.ttal  social  innovation  deserves  special 
consideration.  Controlled social  innovation  programmes,  set up 
according  to  the  rules  of  experiment  design  known  from  the  physical 
and  biological  sciences,  are  rare,  some  would  say  impossible. 
During  the  sixties  a  few  experimental  social  programmes,  or  something 
very near,  were  conducted  in  the  U.S.  on negative  income  tax, 
family  planning,  different  types  of housing  subsidies,  etc.  In 
Europe  the  OECD  has  started a  programme  concerning  "innovation  in 
the  service  sectorll  which  comes  close  to  experimental  innovation. 
Just as  nature  often sets  up  different situations which natural 
scientists  can  observe  and  compare  ("de  facto  experiments"),  so 
political events,  or history,  often set up  different social 
situations which  can  be  studied  in  the  same  way.  For  instance: 
in Britain  the  telephone  service  is  state-owned,  the  pubs  are  owned 
by  the  brewers,  and  domestic  water  is paid  for  by  a  fixed  local 
property  tax.  But  there  is  one  town  where  the  telephone  system  is 
privately owned,  one  town  where  the  pubs  belonged  for  decades  to  the 
state,  and  one  town  where  domestic water  is metered.  If anybody 
wanted  to  investigate  the  social or economic  effects of  those  alternative 
innovations  in  that country,  historical accident  gives  him his  "de 
facto  experiment".  And  there  are  hundreds  of  such  situations 
throughout  the  Community,  waiting  to  be  identified and  examined. 
The  countries  of  the  Community  which  have  different systems  for 
this or  that,  themselves  constitute a  web  of  de  facto  social  innovation: 
each has  evolved  its own  pattern of  social  service,  health service, 
education,  even  foreign  policy.  In  the  1950's  the  advantages  of 
early intervention  in psychiatry were  demonstrated  in  the  Netherlands 
at  the  same  time  as  some  mental  hospitals  in Britain were  experimenting 
with  "open"  (unlocked)  wards.  Both  experiments  yielded  results,  and 
the  policies have  been  adopted  elsewhere.  Infue  1960's Denmark 
made  an  intensive effort  to  provide better and  more  decentralised 
services  (including social  and  occupational  training)  for  the 
(1)  OECD,  Paris  1973. 10  1.3. 
mentally handicapped.  Others watched,  it worked,  lessons were  learned. 
The  Cm~unity itself is, after all,  one  vast  and  unprecedented social  experiment. 
External  Relations 
I.3.24.  Europe  Plus Thirty will  have  to  operate  in  the  greatest possible 
knowledge  of  global  trends.  At  present much  data  is  lacking,  or 
too  unsystematic  and  unreliable  for  forecasting. 
Europe  Plus  Thirty will  have  to  enter  into working  arrangements 
with  the  most  relevant  institutions  to  get  the  world  perspective 
indispensable for  assessing European  prospects.  The  institutions 
are  listed at Annex  1,  pp  31-35.  It is  clear that forecasts 
concerning  the  Community  have  to  contain assumptions  about what will 
happen,  or may  happen,  or cannot happen,  in  the  rest of  the world. 
These  assumptions  must  be  explicit. 
The  question will arise  again  and  again  how  these  assumptions 
are  to  be  made.  Other people's  figures  and  forecasts  should  be  used 
where  possible.  Where  not,  Europe  Plus  Thirty will have  to  obtain 
what  figures  it can  and  make  its own  forecasts  for  other parts of  the 
world  as  well.  The  work  of  judging what  to  use  will  itself be 
considerable.  For most  continents,  it will  be  a  financial  and  man-
year  problem,  but as  regards  Eastern Europe  a  diplomatic  problem may 
exist as  well,  since  the  Soviet attitude  to  the  European  Community 
is still uncertain.  If that is  so,  we  recommend  that every effort 
be  made  to  solve  it;  forecasts  about  our part of Europe  have  to  be 
related  to  the  best available  forecasts  about  the  other part.  In 
many  things  Western  Europe  does,  it is  as  strongly conditioned  by  the 
giant beyond  the  rivers  as  it is by  the  giant beyond  the  sea,  and  in 
some,  more. 
I.3.25.  Many  of  the  Community  countries  are  now,  even  in  the  higher 
reaches  of politics  and  administration,  extremely poorly  informed 
about  the  rest of  the  world.  This  is  a  general  fact,  not specially 
related  to  forecasting.  But  in order  to  avoid  suffering  from  the 
general  insularity it will  be  necessary  for Europe  Plus  Thirty  to 
scan  one  of  the major world monitoring  reports,  perhaps  the 
Summary  of World  Broadcasts  produced,  about  100  pages  a  day,  by  the 
BBC. 11  I.3. 
Methodology 
Available  Methods 
I.3.26.  If inputs  are  to  forecasting  as  a  farm  is  to  a  hot dinner, 
I.3.27. 
I.3.28. 
methods  are  as  kitchen utensils:  indispensable,  but  largely inter-
changeable.  Good  cooks  and  good  forecasters  can  do  great  things 
with  simple  tools  provided  the  right ingredients  are  available, 
whereas  even  the  most  sophisticated  tools  are  of little use  in  the 
hands  of  the  inexperienced,  or  in  the  absence  of edible materials. 
In short,  it is  the  way  in which  the  available methods  are  used 
that counts.  In both cases  seemingly minor mistakes  are  sufficient 
to  make  the  end  results  unpalatable.  But here  the  analogy ends, 
since errors  in a  kitchen result at worst  in  indigestion while 
errors  in forecasting may  be  more  serious.  And  whereas  cooking 
confidently aims  at eliminating our hunger,  no  amount  of  forecasting 
will  ever eliminate  our uncertainty about  the  future.  It  can  only 
help  us  to  anticipate  future  developments,  and  to  reduce  our  un-
certainty about  them. 
However  sophisticated forecasting methods  may  appear,  underlying 
them  are  certain  simple  heuristic notions,  such  as  that processes  can 
be  explained  in  terms  of simplified structures,that  there may  be 
causal mechanisms  acting between different parts  of  the  structure, 
and  that all  these  have  a  certain continuity of  time  and  space.  The 
use  of  these  notions  permits  generalisations  and  theories  to  be  made. 
Knowing  this,  one  can  cut away  much  of  the  confusion  and mystique 
surrounding  forecasting methods,  and  more  readily  judge  their merits 
and  limitations. 
Most  of  the methods  described  in  this  chapter have  been  developed 
for  industrial or commercial  short or medium-term  forecasting,  and 
were  derived  from the.methods  of  the  natural  and  engineering  sciences, 
where  the  characteristics of  the  systems  under observation naturally 
make  a  systematic  quantitative  approach most  likely  to  be  successful. 
Long-term  forecasting  has  tended  until  recently  to  be  more  visionary, 
consisting mainly of literary images  of utopian or catastrophic 
futures;  many  kinds  of professionals  are  now  searching  for better 
ways  of  probing  the  distant future  and  of  improving  the  discussion 
about it.  Most  long-term  forecasting  is  concerned with  the  identification I.3.29. 
I.3.30. 
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and  clarification of  broad  trends  and  options,  since  the  constraints 
upon  long-term choices  are  less  sharply defined  and  understood  than 
those  on  short-tenn ones.  Long-term  trends  conversely are more  open 
t0  our  influence.  Although  this  implies  a  greater  freedom  of 
choice,  the  ramifications  of  any major  long-term decisions  are  likely 
to  be  more  widely  felt,  and  to  have  implications  for  a  far greater 
number  of policy areas.  A worthwhile  long-term forecast has  therefore 
to  be  wide-ranging  and  complex,  and  to  involve  the  joint expertise 
of  many  different disciplines;  long-term  forecasting  of  a  single 
trend,  or within  a  single  sector or nation,  is of  little value. 
The  various  forecasting  techniques  can  be  usefully categorised 
by  the  following  three  purposes  they  serve: 
(a)  to  combine  and  to  carry  forward  quantitatively or 
quasi-quantitatively expressed knowledge  of  the 
past  and  the  present; 
(b)  to  help  to  imagine  the  future,  or  a  future,  or futures, 
by  developing hypotheses; 
(c)  to  help  determine  what might or must be  done,  now  and 
later,  to  make  things  go  the  way  we  want. 
In what  follows  we  use  the  portmanteau words  (a)  projection, 
(b)  image  creation,  and  (c)  policy analysis.  All  three  can 
and  should  be  used  in  defining both  cones  described  in  the  General 
Introduction,  though  projection  serves  more  for  the  definition of 
the  goal-choice  cone,  and  policy analysis  for  the  definition of  the 
means-choice  cone. 
In  the  pages  which  follow  (see  boxes),  we  describe  a  number  of 
methods  which  have  proved  or which  promise  to  be  of  use  in  forecasting 
and  related activities.  Their  theoretical  legitimacy and  their 
practical utility vary greatly.  This  is  one  reason why  we  present 
these  descriptions with  considerable hesitation:  there  is no 
correlation between  the  "value"  of  any  method  and  the  amount  of paper 
we  use  to  describe  it.  Our  second  reason  to  be  hesitant is  that  the 
very  idea of  long-term  forecasting has  met  with  rather strongly 
polarised  responses,  even  in  the  scientific world.  In  our opinion, 
long-term forecasting  has  been either rejected  too  flatly or swallowed 
too  whole,  by  too  many  people.  Therefore,  our  description of  fore-
casting methods  faces  - like  forecasting  itself - a  Scylla and  Charybdis 
situation:  on  the  one  hand,  it may  over-impress  people  and make  them - 13  -
expect  too  much  from  forecasting;  on  the  other hand,  because  of  the 
extreme  briefness  of  most  of our descriptions,  it is all  too  easy 
to  find  fault with  them.  We  are  not  even  certain that all  can  be 
regarded as  forecasting methods;  that is why  we  called them "of 
use  in  forecasting  and  related activities". 
With  these  reservations,  then,  let us  turn to  the  description 
of  these "kitchen utensils".  It will,  after all, give  an  idea  of 
the variety of approaches,  and if it removes  the  false  impression 
that  gaming with  a  complex  computer model  is the very  essence  of 
forecasting, it will  serve  one  purpose.  As  we  see it, and  describe 
it later on,  forecasting is an interdisciplinary team effort making 
a  flexible  use  of the  great variety of "utensils" available. 
The  presentation here  roughly  corresponds  to  an  increasing 
level  of sophistication,  moving  from  straightforward graphical  and 
intuitive methods  to  those which  require more  data  input  and more 
complex manipulation.  The  kind  of  forecasting  each  serves  best 
(i.e.  projection,  image  creation,  or policy analysis,  as we  described 
them  above)  is mentioned in each case. 
1.3.31. 
'SIMPLE  METHODS' 
Single-Variable Extrapolation  (Projection) 
This  consists  of  the extrapolation into the  future  of 
a  particular variable  from  a  table  of historical 
data.  The  data  are usually displayed graphically 
and  the curve  fo~ed from  the  points  is  extended 
into  the  'future'.  This  may  be  done  by  eye  or 
with  the  aid of statistical techniques,  which allow 
the best  'fit' to  the historical data  to  be  found, 
given the  general  shape of the  curve  (e.g.  linear, 
logistic,  exponential). 
1.3. I.3.32. 
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Extrapolation is widely  used  in many  fields.  Its  use 
for prediction must  assume  that  the  mechanisms  under-
lying  observed historical  trends will  continue 
undisturbed.  We  discuss  the  naivete  of  this  assumption 
in  our General  Introduction.  It is of no  direct use 
for  long-term forecasting  (where  mechanisms  are  usually 
expected  to  change),  but it can,  and  should,  provide  a 
preliminary basis  for  discussion. 
Envelope  Curves  (Projection) 
These  are  used  to  forecast  possible  future  trends  for 
a  given variable  (usually  technological),  from  time 
series data.  The  method  is  based  on  the  observation 
that  a  technology  is often replaced  by  a  'superior' 
technology  when  the  first begins  to  show  diminishing 
returns  for  further  improvement  in  some  critical 
parameter,  generally money.  The  data  for  each 
successive  technology are plotted against  time,  giving 
a  family  of overlapping curves  from  which  the  'envelope 
curve'  - tangential  to  and  connecting  the  family  of 
curves  - is  drawn. 
(1) 
The  usual  example  is  in  forecasting  transportation 
speeds;  a  set of curves  is  drawn  representing  the 
increase  in maximum  speed  over  time  for horses,  cars, 
trains,  aircraft,  etc.,  as  shown,  for  illustrative 
purposes  only. 
(1)  Erich Jantsch:  Technological  Forecasting  in Perspective,  OECD, 
1967 I.3.33. 
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Generally,  however,  one  expects  the  envelope  to  be  a  logistic 
curve  ('S'  shaped),  similar  to  those  representing  individual 
techniques.  The  method  has  been  used  to  estimate  the 
maximum  performance  from  a  given class  of  technologies. 
Analysis  by Precursive Events  (Projection) 
The  idea here  is  to  f0recast  a  particular  technological  or 
social  trend  from  time  series data  of past developments 
whose  behaviour  is  thought  to  be  analagous.  The  method 
has  been  used  to  forecast  developments  in  racing  cars 
and  aircraft,  and  to  forecast  the  saturation of markets 
for  various  goods.  The  maximum  speed of  transport 
aircraft has  been  found  to  increase  in  a  way  similar 
to  that previously observed  for military aircraft. 
Crime  trends, strange as  that may  seem,  have  been  fore-
cast in  a  similar way,  e.g.  Europe  following  the  United 
States.  The  assumption  that  two  phenomena  will  follow 
'parallel'  paths  of  development,  one  following  the  other 
after a  fixed  time,  may  be  justified if there  is  a  causal 
1.3. 
relationship  between  them  or if their progress  has  a  common  cause. I.3.34. 
I.3.35. 
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'INTUITIVE'  METHODS 
Scenarios  (Image  Creation  and  Projection) 
Scenario writing describes,  in words,  possible  future 
events  and  the  forces  giving rise  to  them. 
It is  in universal  use  wherever  forecasting  is attempted, 
and  constitutes  the  main  vehicle  for  the  application of 
human  intelligence  to  the  problem of  the  future. 
Delphi  (Image  Creation  and Projection) 
Unhappily  named  after  the  Delphic  oracle,  this  is  a 
technique  for  obtaining  from  a  group  of  individuals  a 
consensus  on  some  topic or event,  usually a  forecast 
when  an  event will  occur or  (to help  assess  R & D 
priorities)  when  a  scientific breakthrough will  be 
realisable.  A questionnaire  is circulated  to  experts 
asking  for estimates  of when,  for  example,  a  given 
technological  development will  occur.  The  replies are 
analysed,  the  experts  are  informed  of  the  "spread" of 
estimated  dates  and  of  the  arguments  put  forward  by 
the  other participants,  and  are  invited  to  revise  their 
estimates.  The  process  is  repeated  several  times. 
Originally developed at  the  Rand  Corporation,  Delphi 
has  been extensively used  by  industrial bodies  to  fore-
cast technical  change.  It is  a  very popular method  in 
Japan.  The  advantages  claimed over viva voce  discussion 
are  that social distortions arising  from  differences  in 
status  and  personality are eliminated;  that is  to  say, 
people  are not cowed  by  a  powerful  person or  talked  down 
by  a  garrulous  one.  In practice it does  produce  some 
shift in people's  estimates  towards  the middle,  but  this 
would  only be  valuable  if it could  be  established that 
the  truth commonly  lay near  the  middle  and,  if it could, 
the  second  and  subsequent  rounds  of a  Delphi  would  be 
unnecessary  in any  case. 
I. 3. I.3.36. 
1.3.37. 
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Brainstorming  (Image  Creation) 
This  is  a  way  of obtaining new  insights  into  a  problem 
through  intensive  talking.  Participants are  asked 
contribute  ideas,  even  if they  do  not  seem  to  be 
directly relevant:  there  is  some  evidence  that more 
'good'  ideas  are  produced  by  this means  than if only 
'good'  ideas  are  sought.(l)  No  attempt is made 
to 
to criticise,  discuss  or explore  the  ideas  which  come 
up  in  the  brainstorming  session,  since  this might  inhibit 
it,  thus  negating  the  purpose. 
later. 
Order can be  introduced 
Brainstorming has  been  used  in  industry and,  to  some 
extent,  in military forecasting  (NATO  Long-Term 
Scientific Studies). 
Morphology  (Image  Creation  and  Policy Analysis) 
The  word  morphology  ("study of  forms")  was  first 
appropriated  in  1942  to  describe  a  particular way  of 
exploring alternative  strategies  for  achieving  a  given 
end.  The  issue  to  be  explored  is  broken  down  into 
component  elements,  all possible states of each are 
identified,  and  finally all possible  combinations  of 
these  states are  listed and  mapped  and  their relative 
performance  estimated. 
It has  been  used  to  study  technological  choices  available 
in rocket construction.  In one  such  study( 2)  eleven 
factors  were  identified,  and  between  two  and  four 
alternatives were  identified for  each  (e.g.  gas,  liquid 
or solid propellant:  internal or external  thrust 
1.3. 
generation)  giving  a  total of over  25,000  possible  combinations. 
( 1)  Jantsch E.  o;>. cit. 
(2)  As  above. I.3.38. 
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Morphology  is mainly  an  attempt  to  structure  thinking 
rather  than  a  forecasting  device.  It is,  for  a  system 
•vhich  can  be  broken  down  into  quasi-independent  components, 
a  useful  way  of  reducing  the  risk  that viable  alternatives 
will  he  overlooked. 
SEMI-QUANTITATIVE  ANALYTICAL  METHODS 
Relevance  Tree  (Policy Analysis) 
This  useful  and  important  technique  is best understood 
through  an  example.  We  quote  here  one  devised  by 
Beate  Kohler  and  Renate  Nagel. (l) 
The  tree  (see  figure)  reads  downwards.  The  purpose  in 
this  case  is  a  large  one:  to  find  a  good  way  to  increase 
social welfare. 
By  a  quantitative method  outlined  below,  what might  appear 
to  be  the  optimum  chain of alternatives  from  the  present 
to  the  future  goal  can  be  determined.  Our  figure  is 
incomplete  in  that  (a)  not all  the  possible alternatives 
are  spelled out at each  stage  and  (b)  only  the  final  chosen 
route  in  this hypothetical  situation is  indicated  - the 
application of  tax  incentives  to  savings  in order  to 
encourage  property  formation  as  a  basis  for  social welfare. 
At  each  stage  a  quantitative value  is worked  out  for  each  of 
the  alternatives.  This  is  done  by means  of  a  matrix  in 
which  the  alternatives  are  matched  against criteria.  The 
criteria are  gfven weightings  (adding  up  to  1)  and  the 
alternatives  'significance numbers'  (also  adding  up  to  1). 
The  criteria weightings  relate  to  the  long-term goal  (i.e. 
they  are  'vertical'  with  regard  to  the  tree  as  a  whole  seen 
from  a  particular stage);  the  'significance numbers'  assess 
(1)  (Die  Zukunft  Europa~,  Bildungswerk  Europhlische  Politik, 
Cologne,  1968)  as  it is presented  in And  Now  the  Future, 
PEP,  London,  1971. 
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the  contribution of  the  alternatives to  each  criterion 
(i.e.  they are  'horizontal'  and  refer only  to  one 
particula~ stage).  The  table  gives  a  matrix  for  the 
seventh  stage  in  the  tree  shown  in  the  Figure.  There 
is  (not produced  here)  a  corresponding matrix  for  each 
stage.  The  numerals  in brackets  are  the  products 
obtained  by multiplying criteria weightings  and  significance 
numbers;  the  sum  of  these  products  gives  the  'relevance 
number'  of each  alternative. 
savings'  wins  easily. 
In  this  example  'tax-free 
If all  the  relevance  numbers  obtained at each  stage  in any 
chain of  alternatives are multiplied  together,  the  result 
is  the  'relevance  figure'  for  that chain.  Comparisons 
of  these  figures  allows  conclusions  to  be  drawn  about which 
chain  is  best. 
STAGE 
l 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
F  I  G U R E 
An  example  of a  relevance tree 
Social welfare 
Employee participation 
in  management 
I  I 
Property formation 
I 
State initiatives  'Mixed' initiatives  'Pr.ivate' initiatives 
I  I 
Compulsion  Encouragement 
I  I  I 
Tax incentives  Subsidies  Exhortation 
I  I  I 
General  Regional  Income-related 
I  I  I 
Tax-free savings  Tax-free capitai  Tax-free property 
' 
I 
All savings  Some kinds of savings 
1.3. 1.3.39. 
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Matrix  for Stage  7  of Figure 
Criteria 
weighting 
Alternatives 
lax-free  Tax-free 
savings  capital 
Net  property  formation  0.4  0.7  0.2 
(0.28)  (0.08 
Social  justice  0.3  0.6  0.2 
(0.18)  (0.06) 
Minimisation of  loss  of  0.2  0.1  0.3 
tax  revenue  (0.02)  (0.06) 
Minimisation of administrative  0.1  0.2  0.3 
costs  (0.02)  (0.03) 
RELEVANCE  NUMBER  0.50  04 23 
Cost~Benefit  __ Analysis  (Policy Analysis) 
The  aim  is  to  judge  the  desirability of  a  proposed  project 
or policy.  A  time  horizon  is specified and  all  the  con-
sequences  of  the  proposal  that  can  be  foreseen  arP  listed. 
Costs  and  benefits  are  attached  to  each  consequence, 
usually  in monetary  units,  with  discounting  to present 
values,  and  total  'costs'  and  'benefits'  are  compared. 
This  is  of  course  the  basic method  used  in private  and 
1.3. 
Tax-free 
property 
0.1 
(0.04) 
0.2 
(0.06) 
0.6 
(0.12) 
0.5 
(0.05) 
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public business  to  determine  investments.  It is also  used 
by  governments  in assessing  largescale  technological projects. 
It permits  systematic  evaluation,  although  problems  of 
subjectivity in  excluding or  including  phenomena,  and  of 
weighting  them  properly,  are  formidable.  In  some  studies 
using  a  simple  checklist,no effort is made  to weight 
phenomena.  This  avoids  quantification problems,  but 
provides  no  means  of  separating  important  and  unimportant 
factors. I  3.40. 
I.3.41. 
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Planning,  Programming  and  Budgeting  System  (PPBS) 
(Policy Analysis) 
This  is  a  large-scale planning  system,  evolved  for  the 
management  and  control  of  resource  allocation.  Like 
cost-benefit analysis,  it is more  correctly described  as 
a  planning  technique  than  as  a  forecasting  one,  but 
it is closely allied.  The  planning phase  of  PPBS 
involves  the  definition of objectives  and  testing  for 
incompatibilities.  Various  methods,  such  as  trend 
extrapolation or mathematical modelling may  be  invoked 
here.  Programming  involves  the  sub-division of 
objectives  and  developments  of  strategies  (programmes) 
for  achieving  these  'partial'  objectives;  these alternatives 
may  each  be  subject  to  a  cost-benefit analysis,  and  be 
represented by  a  relevance  tree.  Budgeting  requires  the 
allocation of  resources  according  to  the  'value'  of each 
possible  progamme. 
PPBS  was  introduced  in  the  USA  in  1961  (and  subsequently 
elsewhere)  with  a  view  to  tying  together all  the  work of 
the  Department of Defence.  The  main  result was  intended 
to  be  a  flexible  five-year plan. 
Empirical  studies(l)  on  the  effects of PPBS  on  Government 
planning are contradictory,  but suggest  that it may  be  useful 
in  some  areas  of planning. 
NETWORK  METHODS  (E.G.  PERT:  PROGRAMME  EVALUATION  AND  REVIEW 
TECHNIQUE,  AND  CPM:  CRITICAL  PATH  METHOD)  (POLICY  ANALYSIS) 
I.3. 
Network  techniques  are  used  as  a  management  tool  for  the  control 
of  complex  projects,  and  provide  yet another device  for 
'structured checking'.  They  are  designed  to  facilitate  the 
making  and  management  of plans.  A network  of possible 
steps  in all branches  of  a  project or strategy is mapped  to 
determine  the  critical  'path'  on  the  basis  of,  e.g.  lowest 
'  cost or  least  time.  CPM  involves  the  construction of  'flow 
charts'  indicating alternative  combinations  of  factors 
(1)  E.  Jantsch  op.  cit. 1.3.42. 
1.3.43. 
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required  for  the  realisation of  a  project,  and  estimates 
are  then  made  of  the  time  required  for  these  factors  to 
be  developed  to  the  necessary  degree.  In  this  way 
possible bottle-necks  are  indicated  and  evidence  is 
provided  of  where  the  greatest input  of effort will  be 
needed  to  complete  the  overall project.  PERT  is similar. 
It involves  stochastic inputs,  and  is  used  to  compute 
probabilities  for  the  time  or cost  involved  in  a  project. 
It was  developed  first for  the  Polaris missile  system. 
Surveys  of  thirty-seven government  financed  R & D 
projects  in  the  U.S.  suggest  that PERT  offered no 
improvement  in  technical  performance  but  reduced  the 
b  b.l·.  f  t  t•  (l)  pro  a  1  1ty o  a  cos  or  1me  overrun. 
Decision  Theory  (Policy Analysis) 
Relevance  trees,  cost-benefit analysis,  PPBS,  PERT  and  CPM 
may  all be  considered  as  branches  of  'decision  theory'. 
Under  this heading,  however,  we  consider methods  where 
explicit account  is  taken of external events.  A set 
of policies  is specified and  the  future  events  which  are 
expected  to  influence  the  effectiveness  of  the  choices, 
but over which  the  decision maker  has  no  control,  are 
listed and  weighted  by probability of occurrence.  An 
'optimum'  (e.g.  a  least cost)  solution which  gives  an 
acceptable  probability of attaining  the  overall  goal  is 
sought.  In Risk Analysis,  probability distributions  are 
used  rather  than  'absolute'  probabilities  to  give  guide-
lines  for  an  optimum  pattern of strategies. 
Goal  Setting and  Goal  Weighting  (Policy Analysis) 
Goal  setting is  sometimes  used  as  part of  a  planning process. 
It makes  the  distinction between  'desirable'  and  'achievable' 
goals.  It may  begin with  a  brainstorming session  to  collect 
elements  for  a  goal hierarchy  to  be  constructed with  the  help 
I.3. 
(1)  Analytical Methods  in  Government  Science  Policy Evaluation, 
OECD,  1972. 1.3.44. 
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of  cause-effect relationships.  An  alternative  way  of 
collecting meaningful  goal  elements  is  the  "content 
analysis"  of various  programmatic  documents.  A "goal 
hierarchy''is  evolved.  The  goals  defined  do  not  require 
information with  respect  to  time  or  space,  or magnitude: 
they  are  only "directional". 
The  weighting  of  the  goals  with  respect  to  their relative 
importance  within  one  level  of  the  goal  hierarchy can  be 
carried out  in  a  matrix by  "pairwise  comparison"  or other 
suitable methods.  If a  goal  system of higher order  is 
available,  to  which  the  goal  system considered  belongs  as 
a  subsystem,  then  the  goals  of  the  superior  system  should 
be  used  for  the  weighting  process.  The  relative  importance 
of  the  goals  is  determined  by  a  subjective  value  judgement 
and  indicated with  the  help  of  a  cardinal  scale.  Surrnning 
up  these  numerical  values  for  any  one  line of  the  matrix 
leads  to  relevance  figures  which  then  are  normalized  and 
as  such  represent  the  percentage  distribution of  the  overall 
weight  among  the  goals  at one  level  of  the  hierarchy. 
Methods  are  available  to  take  into consideration  the  inter-
dependence  between  the  goals. 
A goal  system  can  be  made  operational  by  assigning suitable 
indicators  to  each  goal  element  located  on  the  highest  level 
of  the  goal  hierarchy.  Their quality as  measuring  devices 
for  determining  the  degree  of  goal  achievement  produced  by 
alternative  courses  of action  is  taken  into  consideration 
by  a  separate weighting  factor. 
Analysis,  below). 
Value  Analysis  (Policy Analysis) 
(See  note  on  Conflict 
Value  Analysis  has  been  developed  out of  decision  theory. 
It is  the  most  general  case  of  a  cost-benefit analysis, 
since it allows  various  cost criteria  to  be  used  during 
one  specific valuation within one  goal  hierarchy. 
1.3. I.3.45. 
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It aims  to  allow one  to  add  up  the  value  of apples,  trees 
and  hospitals,  since  the  measuring  scale  is "dimensionless". 
The  "value"  of  the  state of  a  system as  judged by  an 
individual  is quantitatively weighted  on  a  subjective basis. 
Full  goal  achievement  is  given  a  value  of  1.  The  con-
tribution of  a  project or course  of action which  aims  to 
improve  the  state of  a  system is  then measured  on  the  value 
scale,  and  the  sum  total  of all weighted  arguments  for or 
against it is derived.  The  derived value  describes  the 
degree  of  improvement of  the  system  under consideration after 
the  action has  been  completed.  A goal hierarchy is needed 
to make  a  value  determination.  Indicators  in  time  series  are 
needed  for  the  conversion of objective  information  to 
subjective value  as  seen  by  the  person making  the  valuation. 
Utility functions  are  used  to  formalise  this  conversion  and 
make  it explicit.  These  utility functions  are  selected or 
constructed by  the  person undertaking  the  analysis.  In  this 
way  the  different values  of  interest groups  in  judging a 
certain action or situation may  be  made  "explicit". 
Value  analysis  allows  one  to  determine  the  relative merits  of 
alternative  courses  of action  from  the  different view points 
of various  interest groups  or persons,  and  to measure  the 
expected effects  of  a  project on  a  system over  longer  time 
periods.  (See  note  on Conflict Analysis  below). 
Conflict Analysis  (Policy Analysis) 
Conflicts existing or  to  be  expected  among  individuals, 
interest groups,  nations, etc.,can be  described,  measured 
and  ranked  wi~h the  help  of  formal  goal  analysis.  Conflicts 
arise when  chere  are  differences  in goal  structures  and/or 
goal  priorities,  especially where  the  latter are  strongly 
influenced by  time.  By  measuring  the  degree  of disharmony 
or incompatibility between  any  two  goals  (by "pairwise 
comparison")  and multiplying  this  factor  by  the  difference 
of  their respective weights,  one  obtains  a  "conflict factor" 
indicating  the magnitude  of  a  potential conflict between  the 
adherents  of different goal  systems.  These  conflicts can 
be  ranked  for  any  one  point  in  time,  provided  that  the  weights 
I.3. I.3.46. 
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of  the  goals  are  given  as  functions  of  time. 
Conflict analysis  can  also  be  extended  to  the  indicator 
level  and  thus  will  produce  detailed  information  on 
conflicts with  respect  to  the  target dates  or sizes  of 
individual  goals. 
If such  an  analysis  is carried further,  one  can  investigate 
the  degree  to  which  these  conflicts might  be  reduced  or 
eliminated  by  suitable courses  of action. 
Note:  the  last  three methods  listed,  Goal  Setting and 
Weighting,  Value  Analysis,  and  Conflict Analysis,must 
obviously be  used  with  extreme  caution,  since  they all 
rest on  assumptions  about what  other people  think.  This 
is at best a  risky procedure,  and  at worst may  lead  to 
damaging  delusions. 
Graph  Theory  (Projection  and  Policy Analysis) 
Graph  theory  is  designed  to  improve  understanding of  the 
structure  and  mechanism  of  complex  systems.  It is  really 
more  of  an  element  in many  forecasting  techniques  than  a 
forecasting  technique  in  itself.  A diagram  is  drawn 
indicating interactions  between  parts  of  a  system;  lines 
may  be  arrowed  to  indicate direction of  interaction 
(directed graphs).  The  graph may  be  represented  by  a 
matrix which  can  reveal  certain features  of  the  system, 
e.g.  the  number  of  linkages,  whether  elements  are  related 
indirectly,  and  other general  features  and  patterns. 
In  some  respects,  the  advantages  claimed  are  similar  to  those 
of computer models,  i.e.  that complex  chains  of  interactions, 
unlike  simple  two-element  interactions,  cannot  be  grasped 
intuitively.  However,  quantification is not carried  to  the 
same  extent,  so  only general  features  of  the  system are 
obtained as  output.  It has  applications,  for  example,  in 
sociology  to  communication  networks  and  "cliques". 
example  of  the  latter is  shown  below:(l) 
A trivial 
(1)  M.A.  Beauchamp:  Elements  of Mathematical  Sociology, 
New  York,  Random  House,  1970. 
I.3. 1.3.47. 
1.3.48. 
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1  2  3  o--yo 
4 
People  represented  by  points  2,  3  and  4  form  a  "clique", 
while  1  and  2  are  friends  but  do  not  share  a  common  friend. 
Here  visual  identification is  easy,  but  in  examples  which 
may  involve  many  people,  Boolean matrix algebra provides 
a  helpful  aid. 
Markov  Chains  (Projection) 
A matrix  is  drawn  up  to  represent  the  probability of 
transition of  individual objects  or persons  from  one 
class  to  another,  usually  on  the  basis  of past data. 
For  example,  individual people  are  assigned  to  income 
groups,  and  data  used  to  indicate  how  the  number  of 
individuals  in each  group  has  changed  over  time.  This 
permits  the  calculation of  the  'transition matrix'  which 
shows  the  fraction of  those  individuals  formerly  in  each 
income  group  which  has  moved  to  each  of  the  other  income 
groups.  This  matrix can  then  be  applied  to  the  latest 
data  set  to  forecast  future  distributions,  assuming  that 
the  for~es historically governing  changes  in  income 
distribution  (which  need  not be  specified)  remain  the  same. 
Game  Theory  (Projection  and  Policy Analysis) 
I. 3. 
Game  theory  is  concerned with  decision-making  where  alternatives 
are  influenced by  the  actions  of others.  A set of possible 
strategies  for  the  'players'  is  devised,  and  the  optimum 
strategy'  for  one  player,  given  the  alternatives available 
to  the  other,  is calculated. 
A  •  1  (  d  11  k  )  l  •  th  I  •  d'l  I  (l)  s1mp  e  an  we  - nown  examp  e  1s  e  pr1soners  1  emma  • 
Two  prisoners  are  separated  and  told  by  their captors  that  they 
will get  a  10  year  sentence  if  they both confess  and  5  if neither 
(1)  M.A.  Beauchamp:  op.  cit. I.3.49. 
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confesses;  if one  confesses  and  the  other  does  not,  the 
former  will  get  5  years  and  the  latter 20. 
each  do  ? 
What  should 
No.  2 
Confess  Not  Confess 
No.  l  Confess  (  -10,  -10  -5,  -20) 
Not  Confess  (  -20,  - 5  -5,  - 5) 
The  first number  in each pair refers  to  prisoner No.1,  the 
second  to  prisoner No.2.  According  to  game  theory,  each 
calculates his  'expected'  or  'average'  return  from  each 
strategy.  For  each  prisoner confession means  10  or  5 
years;  non-confession means  20  or  5.  Thus  both  reduce 
their  'expected'  sentence  by  confessing,  which  represents 
the  best strategy for  each  individually according  to  the 
theory,  even  though  this means  that each  gets  10  years 
instead of  the  5  which  would  result  from neither confessing. 
I.3. 
This  is  in  fact  a  weak  example,  since  trust is not  incorporated. 
Moreover,  numbers  are  often difficult  to  determine  in more 
realistic examples,  particularly where  the  object is  to  fore-
ca~  behaviour  rather  than  devise  a  strategy;  it is not  always 
clear what  people  want  to  maximise. 
Game  theory has  been widely experimented with,  notably,  by  the 
Rand  Corporation  in America, for military strategy and  politics. 
Some  hold  that American military failures  in  the  Vietnam  War 
were  partly due  to  excessive  reliance  on  this method,  and it 
was  certainly much  used  in  the  1960's  in  the  unsuccessful 
attempt  to  devise  ways  of halting  the  arms  race without 
seeking  agreement with  the  Soviet Union.  It is  apparently 
no  longer widely  used  by  sociologists,  mainly  for  the  reasons 
given  above,  and  its limitations  are  indeed  obvious. 
Cross-Impact  (Projection and  Policy Analysis) 
Cross-Impact methods  are  designed  to  illustrate  the  effects 
of policies or  future  events  on  various  related  phenomena. I.3.50. 
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A matrix  is constructed,  with  rows  and  columns  labelled 
with variables  related  to  a  particular  theme,  e.g. 
transport.  The  matrix element  shows  the  magnitude 
of  the  impact  of  each  one  variable  on  each other. 
The  number will  be  positive,  negative  or  zero  according 
to  whether  the  first variable  increases,  decreases  or 
doesn't affect  the  other.  A Delphi  survey  is  often 
used  to  obtain values  for  the  matrix elements  representing 
the  'cross-impacts'. 
The  technique  has  been  adapted  to  enable mathematical 
calculations  to  be  carried out on  a  computer  showing 
possible  future  developments  of  the  variables  selected. 
The  effects of  governmental  or corporate  policies can  be 
included at the  outset or during  the  computer  run. 
The  technique  has  been  applied  to  the  'Minuteman'  missile.(l) 
It suggested  a  73%  probability of  deployment,  as  opposed  to 
the  20%  probability obtained  in  a  Delphi  survey of  the  same 
experts  who  provided  the  cross-impact values. 
was,  of  course,  deployed). 
'QUANTITATIVE'  METHODS 
Input-Output  (Projection) 
(Minuteman 
This  method  is  used  to  represent  the  dependence  of different 
elements  in  a  system on  one  another  and  to  represent 
transfers  between  them.  The  form  of  representation is 
similar  to  that used  in  cross-impact;  a  matrix is set 
up  whose  elemen~r~present  (traditionally)  the  value  of 
purchases  of  each  industry or sector  from  each other,  per 
unit value  of output produced.  This  relates  final  demand 
(l)  T.J.  Gordon  & H.  Hayward:  Initial Experiments  with  the 
Cross-impact K:atrix Method  of  forecasting  Futures, 
Vol.I.  no.  2.  pp.l00-116~ 
I. 3. !.3.51. 
1.3.52. 
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to  final  output of each  industry or sector.  The 
technique  was  originally static,  but several  attempts 
have  been made  to  dynamise  it.  The  matrix elements  can 
be  made  time-dependent  to  permit  representation of,  for 
example,  technical  change. 
The  method  is widely  used  in economics,not only as  an 
accounting  framework,  but also  to  evaluate  the  consequences 
of changes  in  final  demand  (e.g.  disarmament)  or of 
bottlenecks  in  the  economy.  Successful  attempts  have  also 
been made  to  let an  input-output model  be  part of  a  more 
general macro-economic  model. 
Regression Analysis  (Projection) 
This  is  a  statistical  technique  used  to  verify hypotheses 
about  relations  between  variables  which may  be  of  any 
nature  (economic,  social,  etc.)  and  to  estimate  the 
magnitude  of  the  coefficients which  appear  in  the 
specification of  these  relations.  The  statistical data 
required may  be  either  time  series or data  referring  to 
a  set of persons,  firms,  etc., at a  given moment 
or  durb•g  a  given period.  Such  relations  often play  a 
very  important  role  in  forecasting models. 
Multivariate  Analysis  (Projection) 
This  is  used  to  determine,  from  data,  the  best variables 
with  which  to  represent  a  given  system.  The  method 
involves  the  identification of mathematical  quantities 
which may  not correspond  to  real  features  of  a  system 
but provide  a  concise  description of it;  i.e.  'canonical 
factors'  or  'principal  components'  from  a  set of data, 
enabling  a  system  to  be  parameterised with  the  smallest 
number  of  'orthogonal'  variables  or associations. 
Multivariate  techniques  are  used  in ecology,  sociology 
(particularly in  the  analysis  of  survey questionnaires) 
.and  economics. 
• 
1.3. I. 3. 53. 
• 
I.3.54. 
30 
ANALYTIC  SOLUTIONS 
Mathematical  Models  (Proiection) 
These  aim  to  represent mathematically  the  interactions  between 
factors  in  a  system,  usually with  a  view  to  exploring  their 
future  relationships.  The  essential  difference  between 
these  methods  and  those  described  above  is  that  they  have 
a  greater  theoretical  content. 
A mathematical  representation of certain relevant  features 
of  a  system  is  sought which  is  simple  enough  to  be  tractable 
algebraically.  'Realism'  is  often sacrificed  for  this  end, 
in  the  belief  that manipulation of  ideas  is often more 
fruitful  if they are  simplified at a  more  abstract level. 
The  value  of  this  approach  is  that it permits  the  dependence 
of  the  solution on  the  different contributing  factors  to  be 
easily seen,  and  so  also permits  concepts  and  theories  to 
be  extracted more  easily. 
The  method  is  used  extensively  in economics  and  ecology 
(e.g.  predator-prey models).  It enables  ideas  to  be 
explored  quickly,  cheaply,  and  (if one  understands  the 
mathematics),  clearly • 
Computer  Solutions  (Projection) 
Simulation models  are  usually constructed  for exploratory 
purposes  where  the  theories  are  rather weak  or  the 
calculations  are  highly complex,  so that simple  algebraic 
solutions  cannot be  obtained.  Models  may  be  deterministic, 
contain optimising or other control  routines,  or be  stochastic. 
Relationships  between variables  are  specified individually, 
either algebraically or directly into  a  computer  simulation 
language,  and  the  consequences  of  their interactions,  which 
may  have  time  delays,  are  projected. 
1.3. I.3.55. 
I.3.56. 
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Stochastic Methods  (Projection) 
Stochastic methods  include  Monte  Carlo  simulation,  i.e. 
randomly  selecting values  for  parameters  from  probability 
distributions.  In  this  approach,  explj~it account  is 
taken  of  uncertainty  in  the  input data;  the  model  may 
be  run  for  several  hundred  combinations  of  values  for 
input variables,  a  value  for  each  3uch  variable  being 
selected at random within  its  range  of  uncertainty for 
each  run.  In  this way  a  range  of  values  for  the  output 
variables  is  obtained which  provides  a  measure  of  their 
uncertainty. 
Variable 
__  Jloat  probable 
In1 tial  { 
Uncertainty 
Time 
Gaming  Models  (Project,  Image  Forming) 
These  models  are  computer  simulations  which  contain an 
explicit recognition of  the  role  of  human  choice.  These 
models  usually  include  a  causal  simulation model,  in  a 
game  theory  situation.  They  attempt  to  separate  out 
'intangible'  factors  which  are  given  values  in  tLe  course 
of  the  computer  run  by  an  operator  (or operators  who  may  have 
conflicting goals).  Thus,  'policy decisions'  can  be 
directly inserted  to  influence  the  observed  evolution of  the 
model.  This  method  is most  useful  in situations where  the 
separation of subjective  and  objective  features  of  a  system 
is possible. 
I.  3. 32  1.3. 
'Optimization'Technigues  (Prolection  and  Policy Analysis) 
1.3.57.  These  include  linear programming,  non-linear programming, 
quadratic  programming,  calculus  of variations,  optimal 
control  and  many  others. 
!.3.58. 
These  methods  are  employed  in  an effort to  determine  the 
best method  of  reaching  an explicitly defined  goal;  they 
belong  to  the  second  cone  described  in I.l.,  the  cone  of 
means-choice,  with its base  now  and  its apex  in  the  future, 
at  the  already selected goal. 
A mathematical  'objective  function'  whose  maximum  or 
minimum  value  represents  a  desirable  situation is  formulated 
and,  subject  to  specified constraints,  the  'policy'  needed 
to  obtain  the  desired goal  is calculated.  An  exa~ple is 
the  Bariloche world model,  where  human  life expectancy  is 
the  quantity  to  be  maximised  subject  to  various  economic 
constraints.  The  model  suggests  how  available  resources 
should  be  allocated between various  sectors  of  the  economy 
to  achieve  this  goal. 
These  methods  were  generally developed  for operations  research 
and  widely  used  in an  industrial context.  They  provide  a 
useful  method  when  model,  objectives  and  constraints  can  be 
stated realistically. 
A peripheral  research proposal 
We  touched  in our General  Introduction on  the  long history of forecasting. 
We  have  still available  to  us  thousands  of  forecasts  made  in  the  West  over 
the  last  two  thousand  five  hundred years,  and  in  the  East over  the  last 
four  thousand years,  about events  that have  long  since either happened  or 
failed  to  happen.  That until  the  last hundred  they were mainly qualitative 
and  not quantitative  should not worry  us;  they were  still forecasts.  But 
this wealth of historical material  remains  virtually unexamined.  There - 33  - 1.3. 
have  been  a  few anecdotal  anthologies  of old forecasts;  Yesterday's 
Tomorrows,  by  W.H.G.  Armytage  (l)is a  notable  one.  In his ~~~~Conjecture 
Bertrand  de  Jouvenel(Z)  analyses  a  few  eighteenth and  nineteenth century 
European  forecasts,  but only  for  example,  not  in  the  pursuit of  general 
lessons.  We  think Europe  Plus  Thirty should  do  what it can  to  have  these 
lessons  pursued  by  stimulating certain historical  research. 
There  might  be  one  or more  research  programmes  in which  the  writings  of 
social philosophers,  of  statesmen,  and  of historians,  were  scanned  to 
identify forecasts.  They  should  seek  to  identify  the  method  used  in 
making  each  forecast,  and  should classify  the  forecasts  into "good"  and 
"bad",  that  is  to  say,  whether  the  assertion identified as  a  forecast,  with 
whatever  qualification it carried,  later turned  out  to  be  "the case".  The 
lessons  learned might  be  useful not only  to  Europe  Plus  Thirty,  but  to 
forecasters  everywhere. 
The  State of  the  Art 
1.3.59.  Over  the  last  two  decades,  as  we  have  noted,  increasing attention has  been 
given  to  the  problem of ~  to  probe  the  future.  Initially,  this was 
attempted mainly by devising piecemeal  a  whole  range  of  techniques,  such 
as  those  we  have  described,  some  quantitative  and  others non-quantitative 
and  not  always  strictly scientifically based,  for  the  attack on  specific 
problems.  None  of  these  has  proved  completely satisfactory or generally 
applicable.  More  recently,  comprehensive  but not always  sophisticated 
attempts  have  been made  through  dynamic  modelling,  including methods  which 
react with  the  policymaker.C3)It would  be  wrong  to  assume,  however,  that 
techniques  are  already  in existence which  could make  Europe  Plus  Thirty 
immediately  and  universally effective.  Nevertheless,  the  need  for it is 
so  overwhelmingly  urgent  that it would  be  wrong  to wait until more  adequate 
methods  are  perfected.  We  are  certain,  therefore,  that Europe  Plus Thirty 
should  be  established without delay,  both  bo  undertake  long-term forecasts 
through  the  use  of appropriate  combinations  of existing,  admittedly  imperfect 
techniques,  and  to  develop  and  stimulate  the  development  of  larger dynamic 
models. 
There  is no  royal  route  to  the  future  for  the  Community. 
scouting and  pathfinding  remain indispensable. 
(1)  Routledge,  London  1968 
( 2)  Pari  s  19  58 
(3)  We  describe  one  such  reaction at Annex  2 
Incessant j_  •  ·~  • 60. 
1.3.61 
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Ma~hematical modelling has  been most  successful  in  the  engineering  sciences, 
for  obvious  reasons;  with  a  man-made  system  ~ore often  than  not  the  real 
system  obeys  the  theory  underlying  the  model.  But,  for  instance,  in  the 
study of  ecological  processes,  opportunities  for  satisfactory controlled 
experiment  are  rare,  systems  are  often highly complicated  and  data difficult 
to  gather.  Ecological  theories  based  on nutrient  flows  and  on  basic 
physical  and  chemical  principles  have  been  developed,  and  many  field  stations 
have  been  set  up  to  examine,  for  instance,  new  crop  strains or fertilisers. 
Nevertheless,  ecological  theory is mainly at an  elementary  level.  Even  in 
the  physical  sciences,  many  complex  phenomena  are  only  understood  in  an 
'order of magnitude'  approximation,  even  though  the  underlying  elementary 
mechanisms  are  known  to  a  high  level  of precision.  For  example,  the 
critical  temperature  of  a  super-conductor,  or  the  tensile properties of  an 
alloy,  are  usually  determined  experimentally,  not  by  calculation. 
One  would  therefore  expect  the  more  quantitative  forecasting methods  to  be 
more  applicable  to  the  physical or  'ponderable'  component  of  any  issue, 
and  this  is  so;  for  example,  computer  simulation models  are  very  useful 
in meteorological  work,  and  probably also  in certain aspects  of fore-
casting  in  ecoromics,  resources  (including energy),  transport and 
communications. 
Quant~tative methods  have  a  lesser use  in other areas,  but,  for  example, 
in  agric~lture and  sociological  studies,  multivariate  techniques  (see  p  29) 
are  invaluable  for  data analysis.  But otherwise,  the  scope  of quantitative 
meth0ds  is  limited  in  the  social  sciences.  Fundamental  questions  such  as 
how  to  define  variables  and  scales  and  how  to  measure  - and  anticipate  -
changes  in  the  complicated pattern of human  preferences  and  relationships 
have  not  been  solved,  and  may  never be.  Controlled experimentation  is 
almost  impossible.  Different  (and  maybe  contradictory)  theories  of  society 
may  be  found  equally valid  to  the  extent  that  they  can  be  tested,  and  may  be 
equally widely  advocated.  Moreover,  theories  about  society and  society 
itself evolve  together,  whereas  theories  about  the  physical world  are  usually 
taken  to  be  successive  approximations  to  the  way  it has  really been 
functioning all  the  time. 
1.3.62.  Yet  a  good  understanding  of social processes  is essential  to  forecasting  in 
almost  all Clreas.  Although  many  attempts  at quantification he..ve  been made 
and  certain short-term regular patterns  of behaviour have  been  found  to  be 
reasonably predictable,  "explaining"  long-term processes  is  far more 
difficult.  Under  low  information conditions,  the  estimation of  a  model's - 35  - 1.3. 
coefficients  becomes  a  problem  in  itself. 
difficult or  impossible. 
Model  validation  is either 
All  this  does  not mean  that  the  prospects  of  quantitative methods  in social 
forecasting  are  hopeless.  But it does  mean  that  their scope  is  limited, 
and  that semi-quantitative  and  qualitative methods  still have  to  be 
extensively relied on. 
I.3.63.  Uncertainty  in  forecasting arises  on  the  one  hand  from  uncertainty  in data 
and  theory,  and  on  the  other  from  the  many  difficulties of manipulating  them. 
Where  data are  few  and  theory  is weak,  no  amount  of  sophistication can 
compensate,  and  modesty  befits  forecasting.  A keen  understanding of  the 
plethora of  implicit biases  and  sources  of  uncertainty  in one's  own  forecast 
is vital,  but exceedingly difficult  to  achieve.  If only  for  that reason, 
Europe  Plus  Thirty should,  wherever possible,  expound  its work  to  competent 
outside  audiences  on  the  one  hand,  and  pay  close  attention  to  what  is  done 
elsewhere  on  the  other  (see Part  IV  below). 
More  about  the  forecasting process 
I.3.64.  An  experienced  forecasting  team has  at its disposal various  methods  which, 
as  we  noted,  it will  apply as  a  particular problem  seems  to warrant.  The 
choice will  depend,  among  other  things,  on  the  kind  of  issues  and  the 
purpose  for  which  the  forecast  is  intended.  Any  group  of  forecasters 
should  develop  ways  of working  to&ether which make  the  best use  of  the 
available  talent and  information  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  decision-makers 
in question,  and  to  suit  the  intended  forum  of discussion.  The  methods 
sought ought  to  provide  the  right kind  of  communication  across  the 
specialist areas  of  reasearch within  and  outside  a  research  team.  If  they 
do,  that will  reinforce  two  things:  inter-disciplinary  team  work  and 
"multi-disciplinary individuals".  Often  the  difficulty of  achieving  the 
first has  meant  that most  synthesis  is  left to  be  achieved  by certain 
individuals,  but  this  is not  the  best way  to  do  it.  In  a  forecasting  unit 
with  an  integrative  role,  the  work  is best carried out by  teams  of "multi-
disciplinary  individuals",  that is people  expert in one  field,  but with  the 
ability  to  perceive  and  understand  the  relevance  of  information  from  others. 
The  importance  of building  up  this particular skill cannot  be  over-
emphasised. 
I.3.65.  Equally  important  is  communication between  forecasters,  policy-makers  and 
the  public at large.  By  presenting an  overview of  the  linkages  between 
complex  policy areas,  by making  sure  that all  important  asp~cts are  brought - 36  - 1.3. 
out explicitly and  clearly,  by  showing  the  conceivable  consequences  of 
different policies,  and  by  many  other means,  it can help  structure  thinking 
and  communication  about alternative  futures  among  all concerned.  Long-
tenn  forecasting  can  be  a  form  of mutual  education  by  public conjecture  and 
hypothesis. 
1.3.66.  Although  a  certain method  may  seem most  appropriate  to  the  analysis  of  a 
particular  issue,  its results may  not satisfy  the  policy making  process  it 
is  designed  to  serve.  Urgency  for  information maLks  democratic  government: 
politicians  facing  urgent  problems  cannot wait  for  comprehensive  analyses 
to  emerge.  Almost  by  definition,  many  important  issues  are  new  in  one  or 
more  ways  and  although  they could,  in principle,  be  "best" dealt with  by  a 
certain combination  of methods,  if that combination  takes  too  long,it is 
useless.  So  the  more  simple  and  straightforward  forecasting methods  have 
so  far  tended  to  provide  inputs  to  urgent policy questions,  despite  their 
acknowledged  inadequacy.  We  hope  that by  devoting  unprecedented  attention 
to  the  rhythm  of  the  decision cycle  (which  we  consider below),  Europe  Plus 
Thirty will  be  able  to  go  some  way  to  putting  this  right.  In  the  meantime, 
we  note  that  a  "better" forecast which  arrives  too  late need not  be  entirely 
wasted;  it can  be  checked  against events  and  the  lessons  can  be  turned  to 
account next  time.  So  can  the  lessons  learned  from  the  "successes  and 
failures"  of  everybody else's  forecasts  (which  is why  forecasts,  perhaps 
more  than  anything else,  ought  tote published). 
Europe  Plus  Thirty would  be  well  placed  to  improve  on  existing methods  and 
combinations  of methods  in  forecasting,  because it would  be  looking at all 
aspects  of  the  life of  a  quarter of  a  billion people  who  are  among  the  most 
"developed"  in  the  world,  because  those  people  have  a  new,  still rudimentary, 
form  of  common  government,  because  it would  be  closely and  directly related 
to  the  decision-making  process  of  that government,  and  because  this collection 
of attributes  does  not  apply  to  any  other forecasting  agency  in  the  world. 
Using  forecasting:  the  outputs 
1.3.67.  So  much  for  the  kitchen.  We  turn now  to  the  table. 
When  discussing  the  use  of  forecasting,  it is  important  to  have  a  correct 
mental  image  of  the  subject,  which  is ~  one  of  a  policy-maker  rapidly 
turning  the  pages  of  a  booklet containing  forecasts.  We  would  on  the 
contrary adopt  a  systems  view and  regard  a  forecasting  institute as  a  unit 
continuously  interchanging  information with  its "customers"  on  a  number  of 
different  levels.  Such  an  intricate system  cannot be  described  in  a  single 
paragraph;  in  fact,  most  of Part IV  is  devoted  to  a  description of  the - 37  - 1.3. 
relationship as  we  see  it for  Europe  Plus Thirty.  In  the  rest of  this 
chapter,  we  base  ourselves mainly  on  the  experience  of nation states since 
that  is,  so  far,  the  main  experience  which  is  relevant  to  the  European 
Community. 
The  policy-making cycle 
1.3.68.  Let  us  start with  a  simplified,  schematic,  picture of  the  policy-making 
cycle.  It does  not correspond  to  any particular part of any particular 
power  structure,  and  there  are  parts of particular power structures  which 
do  not  resemble  it at all.  But  we  think most  of  them  do  resemble  it, most 
of  the  time. 
a)  We  will break into  the  cycle at a  point where  the  public  power 
concerned has  a  policy:  the  policy is being applied,  is having 
some  effect,  and  is not  too much  questioned.  (There  are moments 
like  that,  very brief ones.)  Then  defects  in  the  policy begin 
to  appear=  it is not having  the  desired effect;  or it is,  but 
the effect itself begins  to  appear pointless or noxious. 
This  ends  the  first phase. 
b)  So  the  organs  of  power  enter  the  second  phase  of  the  cycle: 
consideration of policy change.  This  means,  first of all, 
seeking alternative policies which  promise  to  achieve  the 
objectives  of  the  former  policy  in  a  better way,  or  to 
achieve  new,  successor objectives  instead.  The  search will  take  into 
account  three  kinds  of  evidence:  1)  experience  gained 
during  the  first phase,  2)  the  experience  of others,  if 
any  who  have  been  pursuing different policies  (de  facto 
social experiment)  and  3)  forecasting  about  the  possible 
effects of various  alternative  new  policies,  (which will 
itself,  of course,  also  take  1  and  2  into  account).  After 
this,  the  various  policy options  have  to  be  evaluated,  their 
costs  and  benefits  have  to  be  compared,  and  a  choice  has  to 
be  made.  This  does  not mean  that  the  policy maker will 
automatically  follow  the  reasoning  of  his  forecasters  and 
policy analysts,  because  he  also  has  to  consider  the  immediate 
demands  of  the  electorate who  put him  where  he  is,  to  say 
nothing  of his  own  conscience  and  standards.  The  outcome  of 
this  phase  of  our  idealised policy-making  pr~cess is  the 
selection (or confirmation)  of  one  or several  objectives 
expressed  in dates  and  figures  (Goal  Choice  Cone)  and  the 
fonuulation  of plans  of action to achieve  them  (Means  C~oice Cone). 1.3.6<). 
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The  third  and  last phase  of  the  policy cycle  consists  of putting 
whatever  plan  is  adopted  into action  by  the  exercise  of  the 
political  power  appropriate  to  the  social  framework  within 
which  it is  to  operate  (implementation). 
This  sketch  of  a  decision-making  process  laid  up  in heaven  is 
useful  because  it enables  us  to  see  that  forecasting  affects  the  cycle 
of  policy-making  in  two  of  the  three  phases,  and  is affected by  it in 
the  third.  Near  the  end  of  the  first phase,  when  the  defects  of 
the  current policy are  beginning  to  appear,  forecasts  must  already  be 
at hand  to  explore  the  long-term  future  context  in which  new  policies 
would  take  effect,  to  see  if it may  not  undergo  changes  that would 
themselves  affect  the  choice  of  a  new  policy. 
In  the  second  phase,  forecasts  have  to  be  made  of  the  costs  and 
benefits  of  the  alternative policies  so  as  to  reveal  their positive 
and  negative  impacts.  This  aspect of  forecasting  is all  the  more 
important when  it is carried out  for  a  social  and  economic  entity  the 
size of  the  European  Community,  because  the  decisions  that  the  EEC  takes 
have  multiple  consequences,  not only within  the  member  countries,  but also 
on  other countries. 
1.3,70.  The  third phase,  that of policy  implementation,  affects  forecasters,  for 
as  soon  as  they  know  the  policy  to  be  applied,  they have  to  set up 
observations  to  check  the  accuracy of what  they  themselves  have  been 
saying about  it.  And  on  this  we  wish  to  enlarge. 
We  think  that many  of  the  failures  of  forecasting  so  far  have  been  due 
to  lack of  contact between  forecasters  and  policy-makers  during  and 
concerning  the  implementation of  a  particular policy,  which  is no  doubt 
due  to  the  correct conviction of  both  sides  that  the  forecaster has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  process  of  implementation  itself:  that is  for 
executive  government  and  belongs  to  elected politicians and,  under  them, 
administrators.  But  this  does  not mean  the  forecaster has  nothing  to 
learn  from  the  implementation  phase  of  the  policy cycle.  By  definition, 
the  implementation problems  are  the  largest where  the  gap  between  plans 
and  reality  is greatest,  and  any  forecaster who  ignored  the  significance 
of  this  gap  would  be  of  little use  to  his  fellow men. 
1.3.71.  Real-life  examples  are  plentiful  on  the national  level:  ambitious  building 
plans  that were  not  realised  (sometimes  because  the  responsible 1.3.72. 
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administration coulu  noc  spend  the  money  voted);  plans  to  eliminate 
regional  disparities  that  turned  out  to  have  all kind  of consequences  -
except  the  expected  and  desired  ones;  agricultural  and  industrial  reforms 
that  ran  aground  because  of  various  deadlocks;  even  (so  far)  the 
Community's  own  plans  for  economic  and  monetary  union;  and  so  on  (energy) 
and  so  forth  (transport).  The  mechanisms  that play  a  part are  numerous; 
they  range  from  intrinsically ill-conceived plans  to  the  influence  of 
particular political  leaders  and  the  inertia or  incompeten~e of 
administrative  units.  Any  forecasting  that  ignored  these  difficulties 
would  be  "Weltfremd",  and  if anything  is  liable  to  be  more  dangerous 
than  a  "wrong"  forecast,  it is  a  "Weltfremd"  forecast.  Corrupt 
administration,  powerful  and  eccentric political  leaders,  a  stubborn  and 
apparently  "reactionary"  regional  public  opinion,  all  these  are  part of 
the  real  world,  and  the  real world  is what  forecasters  are  attempting  to 
forecast  about. 
We  must  now  return  to  the  policy-making  and  forecasting  cycle 
as  a  whole,  and  ask:  what  are  the  practical  arrangements  which 
might  come  closest  to  achieving  this  ideal  cycle  in  the  real  and 
muddled  world?  To  answer  this  question,  we  must  consider  the 
transfer of  knowledge  on  two  different  levels:  the  political and 
administrative. 
The  political level 
It is not  ~nough for  the  policy-maker  (whether  for  instance  a  national 
minister or  a  European  Cormn:is:; ioner)  to  have  by  him  peep le  who  are 
executing his  current policy;  so  much  is obvious.  He  must  also  have  -
and  close  by  him  - people  whose  job it is  to  help  him  sort out all  the 
pressures  towards  change,  and  all  the  ways  in which  change  can  be 
considered.  (Of  the  latter,  the  attempted  rationality of  forecasting 
is  only one.)  These  people  must  have  a  carefully considered mix  of 
professional  and  political backgrounds,  and  must  be  organised  and  placed 
in  the  structure  in exactly  the  best way.  What  this means  in practice 
is  bound  to  depend  to  some  extent on  the  politics  and  personality of  the 
decision-maker.  "People  of  the  Left"  commcmly  favour  planning,  and 
"people  of  the  Right"  commonly  look  askan':e  at it,  but  there  is  no  left/ 
right division  in attitudes  to  forecasting.  This ·is  another  reason  for 
keeping  planning  and  forecasting  separate  in  our minds. 
1.3.73.  In  the  governments  of  the  member  states,  the  central  planning  arrangements 
within  the  bureaucracy  and  the  individuals  who  take  part  in  them  vary - 40  - 1.3. 
widely  in  their ability  to  handle  the  "prospective  approach"  to  social, 
technological,  and  political affairs,  and  in  their 
ability  to  ensure  that its fruits  are  available  to  the  right 
minister at  the  right  time.  This  is  so  not only  from  country 
to  country,  but also  from ministry  to ministry within  the  same 
country.  The  best are,  as  far  as  we  can  see,  faultless,  the 
worst might  just as  well  not  be  there at all;  it is  indeed  a 
wide  spread.  The  OECD  is  just beginning  a  comparative  study 
of  government  machinery  among  its member  states,  which will 
probably  deal with  this  problem  among  others.  We  think  the 
European  Commission  and  Council  should  follow  and  contribute 
to  that  study,  and  perhaps  conduct  a  parallel one  of  their own; 
it could  be  smaller  in  range,  since  the  differences  in structure 
(though  not,  as  we  have  said,  in efficiency)  are  less  among  the 
Community  states  than  among  the  wider membership  of OECD. 
On  the  other hand  it would  have  to  be  more  thorough,  since it 
is,  or should  be,  among  the  functions  of national member 
bureaucracies  to  cooperate  structurally with  the  Community 
bureaucracy. 
If experience  shows  one  thing,  it is  that without direct 
personal  access  of  the  forecaster  to  the  decision-maker himself, 
the  whole  operation is bound  to  be  accident prone. 
concrete  proposals  about  this  in Part  IV  below. 
We  make 
The  administrative  level 
1.3.74.  Whether  they  are  European  or national,  complex  administrations 
owe  their very  existence at least partly  to  the  need  to  coordinate 
and  condense  an  enormous  flow of  information,  ideally  so  that details 
are  taken  care  of at  the  appropriate  levels  on  the  way  up  while  the 
essence  is  transmitted  to  the  top.  Necessary  as  this process  is, 
it entails  the  possibility that  important  information may  be 
suppressed  or distorted,  perhaps  because  it simply  is not  recognised 
as  such,  because it was  nobody's  job  to  do  the cross-sectoral  scanning 
which  alone  could have  recognised it.  In any  case  the  infoDmation is 
bound  to  be  delayed but, after all, that is better than if it were  to 
remain  unnoticed in a  flood  of trivia. 
What  can we  learn  from  this?  At  least two  things: 1.3.75. 
1.3.76. 
1.3.77. 
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Any  administration must  keep  a  close watch  on  how  it filters 
information,  and  how  long  the  transmission of  information  takes. 
The  communication  system between  a  forecasting  instrument  and  the 
public  power  it serves  should  be  designed  so that: 
(1)  information  is  exchanged  at all  relevant  levels, 
(2)  the  links at each  level  are  as  short as  possible, 
(3)  the  recipients  and  the  producers  of  forecasts  have 
direct access  to  each  other at all  these  levels. 
So  much  for  the  first aspect of  a  complex  organisation:  its 
multi-level  structure. 
Another,  equally  importan~ aspect  is  that national  administrations 
have  for  centuries  had  to  split up  their activities  - and  hence  their 
·communications and  planning  procedures  - either by  departmentalisation 
or decentralisation,  or  by  both.  Long-term  problems  are  now  so  wide-
ranging  and  so  interrelated  that  this  traditional  slicing of activities 
is  becoming  less  and  less  satisfactory.  Yet  the  tendency  towards 
fragmentation still flourishes,  paradoxically stimulating  the  need  for 
integrated or  indeed  re-integrating  forecasting while  making  it ever 
more  difficult to  convert its results  into effective policies  and  plans. 
Fascinating examples  can  be  found  in almost  any  member  country. 
In  one  or  two  cases,  a  distinct  improvement  has  been  achieved  by 
changing  the  degree  of differentiation.  For  example,  where  certain 
broad  tasks  of national  govPrnmentahad  come  to  be  distributed over  a 
large  number  of  relatively autonomous  ministries  or directorates 
(having  any  number  of overlaps),  reorganisation  into  a  smaller number 
of  "big  spenders"  has  substantially  improved  the  situation. 
From  a  forecasting  point of view,  countries  characterised by 
strong  centralisation appear  to  be  in  a  favourable  position,  at least 
at first sight.  The  difficulties of collecting  timely,  consistent 
and  accurate  data,  of  using  forecasting  in decision-making  and  planning, 
and  of effectively  implementing  plans,  seem  here  less  formidable. 
Conversely,  if the  different parts  of  a  country  have  a  constitutionally 
guaranteed  autonomy,  even  the  collection of basic  data may  demand 
excessive  effort and  cost. 
On  the  other hand,  strong centralisation of  a  country may  also 
mean  strong ministries  or directorates;  in  some  lights it looks  like  a 
choice  between horizontal  and  vertical  dislocation.  Indeed,  some 1.3.78. 
I.J.7Y. 
1.3.80. 
- 42  - I. 3. 
count r i <'s  mnnagc  lo  combine  pronounced  dcccn l ral i sat ion  wllh  strong 
sp('ci:tl isl  mlnlstri<'s.  In either case,  the  coordination  of 
forcc:tsl i.ng,  planning  and  the  implementation  of  plans,  may  present 
almost  insunnountable  problems.  To  be  sure,  these  problems  have 
not  gone  unnoticed,  and  a  variety  of  attempts  has  been  made  to 
overcome  them  (project groups  for  governmental  and  administrative 
refonns,  commissions  for  social  and  economic  change,  task  forces 
assembled  to  attack  the  problems  "as  a  whole", end  so  on  and  so  forth). 
When  the  European  Community  was  set up  in  the  1950's  and  60's 
there  could  be  no  question of  its  resembling  a  centralised state; 
it had  of  course  to  be  far more  regionalised  than  even  its most 
rcgionalised member.  To  horizontal  disgregation,  which  was 
incvilable,  was  added  vertical  disgregation  (which  was  perhaps  not 
so  necessary);  ministerial  compartmentalisation was  so  well  established 
in  the  member  countries  that it was  instantly reflected  in  the  structure 
of  the  Commission. 
This  does  not  imply  that  the  prospects  for  forecasting at this 
level  are  hopeless.  On  the  contrary,  as  we  argued  in Chapter  I .1., 
precisely because  of  its  long-term  integrative  charac£er,  Europe  Plus 
Thirty may  - provided it is  granted  enough  time  and  weight  - help  to 
bring  about  a  greater sense  of  direction  and  a  better coordination of 
planning. 
It  is  clear  from  all  this  that European  Communities 
forecasting will  have  to  be  done  in  a  situation characterised  by 
powerful  cress-currents.  Because  of  its  long-term,  integrating 
nature,  it may  help  to  reduce  the  differences  between  what  seems 
to  be  necessary  and  what  seems  to  be  achievable,  but only  if it has 
been  designed  so  as  to  take  account  of  the  perils  among  which  it has 
to  operate. 
Conclusion 
The  European  Community  is very different  from  any  individual 
country  and  the  long-term  integrated  forecasting  instrument it needs 
will  be  quite  different  from  any  other forecasting  unit  in existence. 
It will  have  a  greater variety of  contacts  and  clients,  and  its modes 
of  operation will  probably  be  different.  It will not  do  any  significant - 43  -
data-collection itself.  It ·will  have  several clients;  we  discuss 
this  in Part  IV.  It will  have  to  serve  the  Commission,  to  assist 
ils  planners  in  developing  and  evaluating  programmes  of action, 
and  to  inform  both  the  public  (including all kinds  of  groupings) 
and  the  Parliaments  of  the  Community  and  its member  countries. 
As  we  pointed  out at  the  end  of Chapter I.l.,  the  degree  of 
"autonomous  self-coordination"  between  the  many  Directorates-General 
of  the  Commission  is  limited.  There  is  thus  a  risk  that Europe  Plus 
Thirty will  be  confronted with  the  heterogeneous  forecasting  requirements 
of  the  Commission's  individual  departments,  which  could,  if 
it  were  careless  or weak,  lead  to  a  fragmentation  of  its own 
activities.  The  best way  to  avoid  this,  and  to  ensu-re  that  the  fore-
casting results wi 11  be  useful  for practical  action,  is  that those  respon-
sible  for  planning should  take  part  in the  preceding  problem analysis, 
data  evaluation and  discussion  on  the  criteria for  relevance,  so  that 
they  can  see  by  direct experience  how  everything  hangs  together. 
The  difficulties of  providing  the  Communities  with effective  fore-
casting are  formidable,  but not  unsurmountable.  We  have  discussed 
them  at  length because  Europe  Plus  Thirty must  be  set up  and  work  in 
full  recognition of  their existence. 
We  are  convinced  that  the  difficulties have  to  be  surmounted 
and  that  the  work  has  to  be  done.  There  is  really no  choice. 
The  question  is whether or not  the  European  Communities 
make  the  best possible  use  of  the  available  knowledge,  combined with 
the  intuition,  the  ~ift for  hypoth~sis,  the  imagination  and  all 
other faculties  at man's  disposal,  to  prepare  for  the  future. 
This  is what  we  call Integrated Forecasting,  and  we  shall  attempt 
to  describe it in  the next chapter. 
Meanwhile,  the  answer  is  obvious. 
I. 3. PART  I 
I.4.1. 
4. 
Introduction 
INTEGRATING  FORECASTING  AT  THE  LEVEL  OF 
THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
In the  last chapter we  discoursed in general  about  the  inputs 
of  forecasting,  about its methodology,  and  about its integration with 
the  planning and  executive  process.  We  now  consider the  lights  by 
which  these could be  put  together to  provide what  a  particular public 
power,  the European Communities,  needs  in  1976  and  onwards,  and shall 
try to  suggest  the  governing purposes  and  procedures which might  be 
adopted  for this task. 
I.4. 
Before addressing ourselves  to  the more  difficult parts  of this 
task,  let us  briefly describe the first most  obvious  step  towards  inte-
grated forecasting that a  European  forecasting unit might  take:  the 
integration of existing sectoral and national  forecasts. 
A first step towards  integrating forecasting 
1.4.2.  Since  the  European Community  is made  up  of member  states that are 
doing  forecasting and  connected studies  for public  policy  purposes 
(although mainly  for the  short and medium  te~), it appears  that the 
first  step towards  integrating Community-wide  forecasting  could be  the 
process  depicted in Figure  1, 
FIGURE  1 
which  provides  two  routes  from  national  sectoral  forecasts  to  Community 
comprehensive  forecasts:  via Community  sectoral  forecasts  and via national 1.4.3. 
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national  comprehensive  forecasts.  Since the  Community  has  its own 
sectoral  policies,  is already  a  Common  Market,  and  intends  in due  course 
to  become  an  Economic  Union,  the  upper  route, via  Community  sectoral 
forecasts,  is clearly  the  more  useful  for its purposes.  But  the  lower 
route, via national  comprehensive  forecasts  should also  be  followed,  if 
manpower is available,  for  two  reasons.  Firstly, it would  provide  a  check 
on  the  upper  route  and,  secondly, it would  parallel  the main  route  by 
which,  for the  time being,  Europe  Plus  Thirty could obtain comprehensive 
forecasts  about  the world outside  the  Community,  namely,  by  the  integration 
of national  aggregates. 
A.  National  scale:  from  sectoral  to  comprehensive  forecasts 
Every national  comprehensive  forecast  represents  a  convergence  of 
three partial  forecasts,  each  deriving  from  a  particular "resource"  or 
group  of "resources":  people,  goods  and  services,and geographical  space, 
and  each  setting out,  for a  nearer or further  time  horizon,  what might 
be  the  future  situation on: 
a)  The  demographic  aspect:  the  number of total inhabitants  and  of  the 
active population,  broken  down  by multiple criteria:  age,  sex, 
education  level,  employment  sector,  socio-professional  class etc. 
b)  The  socio-economic  aspect:·  production,  imports, incernal  ~nd external 
use  of national  production,  social  parameters,  calculated on  the  basis 
of  the  demographic  data  and  on  hypotheses  about  the  behaviour of 
economic  and  social  agents,  and  distinguishing between different 
industrial sectors,  public versus  private enterprises,  etc. 
c)  The  geographical  aspect:  the  distribution of the  above variables 
according to  regional  and  type-of-settlement criteria  (rural versus 
urban, metropolitan versus  small  and medium cities, city centre 
versus  suburb,  etc.). 
1.4.4.  The  techniques  of  this integration of sectoral  forecasts  into  a 
national  framework  are not  uniformly  advanced.  It seems  to  us  that 
aspects  (a)  and  (b)  are  adequately articulated,  and  so  are aspects 
(a)  and  (c),  but we  have  to  admit  that we  do  not  know very well  how 
to  integrate aspects  (b)  and  (c),  that is:  to  foresee  either the 
socio-economic  implications  of different spatial alternatives, 
or the spatial implications  of  socio-economic alternatives. - 3  - 1.4. 
Nevertheless,  we  feel  intuitively that the  two  aspects  have  strong mutual 
influences which it would  be  good  to  unravel  in advance,  rather than 
contenting oneself with  ex  post  facto  perceptions.  Most  of  the  necessary 
work will  have  to  be  done at national  level,  and  Europe  Plus  Thirty could 
and  should  encourage  and  help coordinate this. 
B.  From  National  to  EEC  scale:  Sectoral  Forecasts 
1.4.5.  To  make  this step,  Community-wide  standardisation of  data  is 
urgently needed.  This  sectoral integration to  Community  level would 
present  no  further difficulty if all  the  resources  concerned  stayed put 
inside each member  country;  in that case it would  be  enough  to add  up 
all the national  figures  to arrive at a  European total.  Unfortunately  for 
forecasters,  the  stay-put case is not  the  general  one. 
1.4.6.  As  we  shall  see in Part II, Chapter 3,  forecasting migration is 
the  most  fragile  part of  demographic  forecasting.  This  difficulty is 
accentuated by  the  principle of  free movement  of  persons  inside  the  EEC, 
and  by  the possibility that heavily  labour-exporting countries,  like 
Turkey,  may  sooner or later become  members  of  the  Community.  That  is  one 
important  source  of incompatibility among  national  forecasts  and it 
consequently  furnishes  an argument  in  favour of trying to  construct  a 
Community-scale  forecast which would,  in effect,  apply  a  coherence test 
to  the national  forecasts. 
1.4.7.  The  geographical  aspects  seem at first sight  simpler,  since  land 
does  not  move  (though the  juridical ownership  of it does),  and  since the 
internal  frontiers  of  the Community  are,  in the absence of territorial 
claims,  stable.  So  one  might  conclude  that  totting up  national  fore-
casts  of  land use  (particularly  for urbanisation)  would necessarily 
lead to  a  coherent  total at the European  level.  But  there are  two 
exceptions  to  this  rule.  The  first  follows  from  the  existence of migra-
tory movements  - among  the active population like workers  in frontier 
zones,  and  among  the  inactive,  like  retired people  - for which  the 
summation  of national  forecasts might  come  to  a  non-zero  result.  The 
second  exception concerns  the  resources  one  might  call  common,  or not 
appropriated,  like  stocks  of  fish  beyond national  zones,  the  atmosphere, 
and  international waterways.  These  resources  present  a  problem in 
that  they  could give  rise to  claims  or uses  by  two  or more  member  states !.4.8. 
!.4.9. 
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which  are mutually  incompatible.  Since  they are not yet  generally 
the  object of explicit forecasting,  this difficulty has  not  yet been 
clearly felt,  but  there is  no  doubt  that here  too  the  summation of 
national  forecasts  need not necessarily  lead  to  a  correct Community 
forecast.  That is  the  second field in which  the application of a 
coherence test would  be  justified. 
!.4. 
As  regards  goods  and  services, it could be  that the  sum  of  the 
exports  to its Community  partners  foreseen  by  each member  differs  from 
the  sum  of  the  foreseen  imports  over all member  states.  This  risk has 
been increased by  the oil crisis, which  c.ould  lead the West  European 
nations  to "export their deficits" by  reducing  purchases  and boosting 
sales.  Now  it is clear that the  sum  of  these  courses  of action would 
lead to  results which are incompatible with the  expectations  of  the 
separate countries.  The  problem has  certainly not  gone  unobserved, 
but its solution is hindered by  the  fact  that the national  foreign 
trade  forecasts  of the member  countries  do  not  always  distinguish 
between the  EEC  and the  rest of the world.  This  obstacle has  been sur-
mounted  by the European Commission's  Study  Group  on  Medium  Te~ Economic 
Assessments,  which  has  mounted  a  coherence test taking as its point of 
departure  the total volume  of imports  foreseen  by  the member  countries 
for  1978,  and inferring  from it the  proportion which,  according to past 
trends,  should  go  to  swell  intra-EEC  export  flows.  The  result  represents 
the  fraction of total  imports which is assumed  to  be  covered by  exports 
out of the EEC.  The  relation between  this  future  result and  the total of 
exports  going  out  of the  EEC  allows  us  to  see whether the expected  growth 
of the  latter is implausible. 
It is clear therefore that the compilation of Community  sectoral 
forecasts  does  not  pose  especially arduous  problems  and  the  risks of 
incoherence are  fairly  limited.  As  to  the sectors which  should be  tackled 
first,  this must  depend  on  an assessment of urgency which  can most  use-
fully be  made  when  the work is about  to start.  No  doubt at the moment 
energy  and agriculture would be  high  on  the list, but  that is only at the 
moment.  Five years  ago it would  have  been  environment,  and  two  years 
hence  there may  have  been another "crisis",  perhaps in  raw material  depen-
dencies  or in labour mobility.  Owing  to  the crisis-oriented way  affairs 
have  been managed until now,  accents  tend  to shift rapidly.  As  to  the 
most  serious methodological  difficulty:  the inter-relation of  economic  and 
geographical  aspects, it sterns  not  from  the Community-wide  character of the 
forecasts,  but  from  the  present state of our knowledge. - 5  - I .4. 
C.  EEC  scale:  from  Sectoral  to Comprehensive  Forecasts 
1.4.10.  Technically,  the work at this stage would  be  the  same  as  that 
1.4.11. 
1.4.12. 
at  (A),  i.e., the  integration of national  sectoral  forecasts  into 
national  comprehensive  forecasts.  This is the stage which would 
provide  some  of  the  teleonomies  we  suggested in 1.1., it would 
define the first cone  (goal-choice cone),  and  should be  conducted 
so as  to  provide the  sharpest  separation of the  impossible  from  the 
possible. 
D.  From  National  to  EEC  scale:  Comprehensive Forecasts 
If stage  (C)  above  yields  the  results we  hope  and believe it can, 
then  this work  should be  done  as  a  check  on it, and  as  a  frame  of refer-
ence  for whatever integration of  extra-Community  forecasting  has  to  be 
attempted.  Since  the national  comprehensive  forecasts  do  not yet  really 
exist, it could not  be  started as  soon as  (C). 
We  turn now  to  the  question how  long-tenn integrated forecasting 
could be made  most  useful  to the Community. 
A  future-oriented approach to policy making.  Some  key  concepts 
The  approaches  and procedures  used in public policy making in all 
countries  and at every  level  have  not  yet been adequately adjusted 
to  the  pace,  content,  and scale of change  that is - and will  continue 
to  be  - experienced,  both within European societies and in their world 
environment.  This multi-faceted change  creates  new  demands,  as well 
as  new  opportunities,  for collective action to arise out  of deliberate 
and  systematic thinking  by  the political and administrative institutions 
responsible  for the  future  of the  European  Community.  What  we  are  trying 
to identify throughout  this  report is a  systematic approach to  public 
policy,  which  presumes  that  prescribed goals will  be more  likely to  be 
achieved by  a  thoughtfully  detennined course  of action than by  relying 
on  chance,  intuition or short-tenn compromises  and  expediency.  There 
is no  unanimously agreed phrase  for  such an attitude towards  action. 
While we  talk here about  forecasting  and  policy analysis,  alternative 
phrases  such as  long-range planning or even  systems  analysis  could 
equally be  used.  More  than the  label, what matters is the  substance. 6 
1.4.13.  As  we  wrote  in our  general  introduction,  we  think our  era  is 
characterised by  two  great  groups  of  changes  now  in  progress. 
One  is  the  new  insistence  in Western  Europe  on  greater social  relevance 
from  government policies,  and  reduced  human  inequality.  The  other 
comprises  the  increasingly "systemic" nature  or  interconnectedness  of 
society's  problems  and  the  emergence  of  a  "world  system"  in which  no 
country  can ever  again  be  an  island  unto  itself,  and  in which  a  new 
volatility of  social  structures  is  bound  to  create more  and  more 
"discontinuities"  in  the  fabric  of  human  history.  These  two  clusters 
constitute  a  strikingly new  environment  for collective action.  They 
make  some  older concepts  obsolete,  and  call for  fresh  approaches.  We 
shall now  try  to  clarify some  new concepts  of policy making  that 
follow  from  these  large-scale  transformations  in people's  thoughts  and 
their societies. 
The  expectation of  social  relevance 
1.4 
r.4.14.  By  social  relevance  we  mean  that  the  members  of  a  polity increasingly 
expect public  policy  to  make  a  real  difference  in  their condition 
1.4.15. 
in  a  direct,  tangible  way.  This  expectation  is at variance with 
conventional  styles  of  policy  in which  outcomes  are  expressed  and 
measured  by  the  amount  of  resources  used.  By  contrast,  its 
fulfilment  requires  result-oriented policy making.  This  implies 
that consciously collected  information about past or current 
results  is  taken  into account while  making  decisions,  which  is 
in itself a  kind  of Copernican  revolution  in  the  world  of politics. 
Among  other  things,  it would  imply  that  the  goals  (instead of  the 
means)  would  have  to  be  specified  in meaningful  terms,  and  that 
policy evaluation would  be  done  on  a  regular basis. 
The  drive  for  greater equality 
This  drive  is  bound  to  affect public policy because,  up  to  now,  the 
typical  way  to  assess  a  policy consisted of  looking at its average 
outcomes,  while  there  is now  a  greater concern  for  its distribution 
among  various nations,  age  groups,  sexes,  socio-economic  classes, 
residential areas, and, so  on. 1.4.16. 
1.4.17. 
1.4.18. 
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The  "systemic"  character of  social  issues 
This  refers  to  the  well  known,  though  often  ignored,  interrelations 
typical  of  advanced  societies where  developments  in  one  sector both 
influence  and  are  influenced  by many  other sectors.  The 
traditional picture of  a  direct relationship  between means  and 
goals  has  to  give  place  to  a  more  complex vision,  in which  any 
policy or  programme  may  be  helped or hampered  by what  happens 
in other areas  of  public action,  on  which it may  in  turn have  a 
number  of positive and negative effects.  Hence  the  current 
interest in  impact  assessments  comparing alternative  systems 
(in production,  transportation,  service  delivery,  etc.)  in 
terms  of  their comparative  advantages  and  disadvantages. 
The  perception of  the  world  as  a  system 
The  word  "system"  is  used  to  emphasise  the  existence of  an  inter-
national  configuration  in which  the  effects of  trends  or events 
in  one  region  are  disseminated very  fast  into  the  world at large. 
The  more  one  sees  things  this way,  the  less  can  one  ignore  extra-
national/EEC  forces,  and  the  external  impacts  of  domestic/EEC 
policies,  and  the  less  can  one  believe,whether implicitly or 
explicitly,  in  uniquely national/EEC  solutions. (l)  More  and 
more,  the  existence  of  "only  one earth"  requires  that policy 
makers,  including  the  Community  policy-makers,  take  factors  and 
impacts  outside  Europe  into  consideration.  By  no  means  an  easy 
task,  particularly so  because  its methodology  is still in  its 
infancy. 
Thevolatility of  society - Discontinuities 
Discontinuities  in  technology,  social  custom,  culture,  and  so  on, 
seem  to  be  another key attribute of  the  current period.  In  times 
of greater stability it was  legitimate  to  see  the  future  as  a 
more  or  less  enlarged version of  the  past,  but  the  most surprising 
thing  now  is  a  "surprise-free projection"  that happens  to  come  true. 
To  detect or anticipate  important  incipient  trends  through  futures 
research is  becoming more  and  more  indis pensa. b le  to  pol icy making. 
(1)  The  duality national/EEC  is meant  to  suggest  that  "parochi~lism" 
is  a  relative concept,  according  to  whether  one  thinks  in  terms 
of one's nation vs.EEC,  or of EEC  vs. the  rest of  the  world. - 8  - I.4 
Some  preliminary  steps  towards  integrating Community  forecasting 
!.4.19.  These  concepts  have  now  to  be  translated into operational methods  and 
procedures  for  in an  imperfect,  that is human,  world  even  the 
soundest  principles  of  conduct  must  be  adapted  not  only  to political 
realities  but  also  to  the  current  limitations of  the  state of  the art 
in  forecasting,  policy analysis,  planning and organisation.  We  hope 
the  following  suggestions will  help to  go  beyond muddling  through while 
avoiding the  traps  into which  too  many  endeavours  towards "scientific 
policy-making"  have  fallen in the  past.  We  shall  discuss  these  steps 
as  so  many  building blocks  in a  decision-making process. 
Result-oriented approach:  social  reporting and  evaluative  studies 
1.4.20.  We  have  seen that the  first  consequence  of  the  need  for  social 
relevance  is that  policy-design variables  should  reflect the effects 
on  the "target population"  as  closely as  possible.  At  present this is 
not  the case.  To  repeat  an  example  we  used earlier:  in health 
rnatters  the most  widely  used information is the  amount  of  public  and 
private expenditure allocated to medical  care,  which  - although 
pleasantly precise,  readily obtained,  and easily compared  to  other 
expenditure  - gives  an  indirect  and  distorted picture of  the  real 
health of  the  people.  Expenditure  on  education is an equally bad 
way  to measure  the  "educatedness"  of a  generation.  Hence  the interest 
in social  indicators  - ie.  measurements  of  those aspects  of  social 
realicy which  are  of direct normative interest  - which  we  mentioned 
in the  last chapter. 
1.4.21.  One  way  of  turning  the  few  currently available social indicators 
to  practical use  would  be  to  undertake  social  forecasting  to  obtain 
qualitative answers  to  such basic  questions  as:  in which  direction are 
the  consticuent  factors  of  the welfare  of  the  Europeans  likely to 
develop in the  future?  Are  they  likely to  progress,  stagnate or 
regress?  We  believe that before  launching a  series  of  forecasts 
intended to  delineate  the  range  of  possible  futures  in various  areas of 
social  concern  (the  goal-choice  cone)  one  should undertake  a  thorough 
assessment  of  the  present  situation and  the  recent history.  At  the 
risk of  repeating what  we  have  already  said in the  preceding chapter,  we 
mention  the  following  two  reasons: 1.4.22 
1.4.23. 
1.4.24. 
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There  is no  meaningful  break between  future  and  past,  but 
rather a  continuum which  unites what  has  existed until  now  and  a 
plurality of  imaginable  futures.  Yet,  though  the  fabric  may 
be  continuous,  certain  threads  may  be  broken,  and  texture  and 
colours  may  change  abruptly.  We  cannot  predict where  and  how 
such  changes will  occur in the  future,  but  the  least we  can 
do  is to  draw  upon  the  lessons  derived  from  the  route  travelled 
so  far. 
Two  key  problems  of any  result-oriented social  policy making 
are  perhaps  best  tackled by  looking at  the  past first,  identify-
ing the  components  of  European Welfare  (using,  e.g.,  the  OECD 
List(l))  and  gauging the  extent to which what  we  see  indicates 
"progress".  These  problems  concern: 
a)  the  differences  between intermediate  consumption  (alloca-
tions)  and  end  product  (result);  and: 
b)  the  choice  of a  method  of non-monetary weighting  for  the 
things measured 
Concerning  (a).  If we  want  to  know  how  the health of  Europeans 
has  changed  (improved or deteriorated)  since,  say,  1955,  we  must 
first "operationalise"  the  concept  of health.  Unfortunately, 
most  of  the available data  relate to  the  technical,  financial, 
and  human ~  allocated to  the health care delivery  system, 
representing what  the  economists  would call  'intermediate 
consumption', while- as  discussed earlier- the variable  of 
concern is of course the  effect or1end  product'  called health. 
Concerning  (b).  When  dealing with market  goods  and  services, it 
I.4 
is possible to  synthesise the  diversity of  upward  and  downward 
movements  in different  sectors into a  single aggregate,  by 
weighting  the contribution of  each  sector through  the market  price 
of its output.  This  enables  us  to calculate the  GNP  and,  for 
instance,  the way  it changes  owing to  increased industrial  and 
tertiary output  on  the  one  hand  and  a  decline in agricultural 
employment  on  the  other.  It is hard to  transpose  this  approach 
to an area  like that  of health,  even  though  one  is  faced with 
the  same  kind  of  problems,  i.e. that  of measuring  changes  in 
opposite  directions  by  a  single aggregate  figure:  it can 
(l)List of Social  Concerns  Common  to most  OECD  Countries  -
OECD,  Paris,  1973. - 10  -
happen that death  rates  drop at  the  same  time  that disability 
among  the  elderly increases.  Certainly the  utilisation of  "shadow 
prices" makes it possible  to make  certain comparisons,  but  their 
use  is strictly limited.  If,  for  example,  the  "value"  of  the 
supplementary  years  of  a  working  person  is  represented  by  the 
wage  he  or she  earns,  people  outside the  labour  force  would  be mis-
represented seriously.  The  difficulties  become  even more  formid-
able when  one  tries to  compare  changes  in dissimilar social concerns 
(like  crime,  communications,  transportation and  pollution). 
1.4 
!.4.25.  This  is why,  in our opinion, it makes  no  sense  to  synthesise 
!.4.26. 
!.4.27. 
these  divergent  developments  arbitrarily into  some  kind of,social 
GNP  by  assigning "market values"  to non-market  outputs.  (See  1!.15 below.) 
The  only  reasonable  course  is  to  translate the  developments  as  best  one 
can  into  (non-monetary)  social  indicators,  leaving  everyone  to make 
his  own  weighting  in view  of the  diversity  of  past  and  future  develop-
ments.  (We  will meet  exactly the  same  problem in connection with 
effect- or impact-assessment). 
The  result-oriented approach makes  sense  only if the  studies  are not 
conducted  once  and  for all,  but  steadily or at  regular intervals. 
The  accumulation  of  social  knowledge  thus  obtained would  be  not  only 
of  scientific interest but also  of the  highest  political value, 
because it would  provide  the  Communities with  a  collective  feeling 
of  their "present"  state,  and  thus  of  a  shared  future. 
One  possible  form  for these  enquiries  into European welfare 
might  be  the  gradual  development  of  a  social  report,  published at 
regular intervals  as  part  of and  backing  for  the  forecasting or 
teleonomies  (for instance  every  two  years),which would  not  aim 
immediately at extensive  coverage,  but would  proceed  step by  step, 
dealing first with  the  more  tractable aspects  of the matter. 
!.4.28.  For policy  evaluation,  social monitoring is not  sufficient.  To 
stick to  the  same  example:  states of health in a  country  depend 
on  many  factors  apart  from  health care  delivery  (for instance, 
environmental variables  and "life styles").  Therefore  we  think 
there is  a  separate  case  to be  made  for evaluative studies.  Their 
aim would  be  to assess,  about  some  condition of society,  the  amount 
which  is due  to  a  specific policy  or programme,  and  the "residual" 1.4.29. 
- 11  - I.  4. 
explainable in terms  of  other factors  (including  the  effe~t of other 
policies,  whether intended or not).  Policy  evaluation  could  follow 
this  pattern: 
t 
Specification of  the  goals,  that is  to  say:  the  desired  future 
shape  of  a  system  (e.g.  exploitation of  technology,  education, 
transport,  agriculture.  Goal-Choice  Cone:  see  General  Intro-
duction). 
Translation of  this  desired  shape  into  a  certain number  of  indica-
tors.  We  suspect  these will  often have  to  be  tailor-made.  (Loca-
tion of "goal"  on  the  plane across  the base  of  the  Goal-Choice 
Cone.) 
Rough  estimation of  the  desired values  of  these  indicators.  (This 
is optional,  for it may  be  sufficient to  establish an  ordinal 
ranking  and  to  show  the  direction and  sequence  the  indicators 
should move  if the  relevant  policy is to be  considered successful.) 
Determination of  the  real  and  the  desired  rate  of approach  to  the 
goals  (relevant  to  Cone  of  Means-Choice). 
Measurement  of  the  changes  owing  to  the  policies assessed.  This 
is  a  difficult task,  but it should  be  done  whenever it is possible 
to  compare  the "treated" with  an "untreated"  sample  (i.e. not 
affected by  the  policy in question). 
Social  Eguality 
An  insistent  demand  for social  equality is indisputably part of 
the  current Zeitgeist in Europe,  a~td  policy making  has  to allow  for it 
more  than  ever.  Even  policies explicitly  focussed  on  redistribution of 
income  are still largely unconcerned  about  the  real  effects  of  the 
huge  amounts  of money  they  recycle  every  year as  social  cash benefits. 
Of  great  importance are also  those  sectoral  policies  that  do  not  have 
clear egalitarian goals  but nevertheless  strongly affect distribution. 
For instance,  the  discussion about  revising the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy would  be  much  improved if it could  be  based  on  adequate  studies 
assessing its social  and  international  distributive effects. 
So  we  suggest  that new  major policies at  EEC  level,  before being 
introduced,  should  be  assessed with  regard  to  the  way  their various 
benefits  and  disbenefits are  likely to  be  distributed among  different - 12  - I.4. 
social  groups,  different member  nations,  and different  parts  of  the 
world outside  the  European Community.  This  is par excellence  a 
job  for  Europe  Plus  Thirty. 
Policy interactions 
1.4.30.  One  big advantage  of  the  approach advocated here is that it aims 
to  reveal  the interactions among  policies,  and their expected and  unex-
pected effects  on  any  group  of people. 
There- are many  ways  of  comparing alternative policies in terms 
of costs and  effects, monetary  and  otherwise;  the  importance  of not 
forcing  individual  effects into  the  straightjacket of cash valuation 
or utility-weighted units must  be  re-emphasised.  There  are  several 
reasons  for this: 
that a  single measure  of effectiveness would  conceal  areas  of 
strength or weakness  in each  solution,  and would make  impossible 
cross-impact  comparisons  between  systems; 
unquantifiable  irnpacts  would have  to  be  excluded  from  the analysis, 
so  they would  have  to  be  displayed in a  different, "softer",  and 
possibly  less  convincing  form. 
finally,translating qualitatively different  impacts  into  commen-
surate units  implies value  judgements  by  the analysts,  which 
may  or may  not  be visible,  and may  or may  not  agree with  those 
of the  decision makers.  This is especially troublesome in a 
political  environment  such  as  the  European Community  wher~ one 
has  to  consider a  diversity of  decision makers at different  levels, 
and where  development  of agreement  on the  desired weighting or 
importance  of various  impacts  is a  significant part of the  de-
cision process itself.  Therefore  the  procedure  used  for  comparing 
the  impacts  should probably  seek  to  show  the alternative policies 
ranking  for each particular effect,  rather than evaluating them 
by  some  common  yardstick. 
~rld perspective 
1.4.31.  The  increasing interdependence  between  the various  parts of  the 
world means  that the approaches  outlined abQve  should be  applied to  the - 13  -
external  policies  of  the  Community  as well  as  the  internal  ones. 
This  implies:  (1)  identification of  the  constellation of  policy 
goals  (among wnich  some  trade-offs will  have  to  be  struck); 
1.4. 
(2)  comparison  among  alternative policies  (according  to  a  pattern 
rather similar to  effect assessment);  and  (3)  sensitivity analysis 
of  the  rankings  thus  obtained,  to  see whether they are  substantially 
changed  by  taking into account  different  future  "world  developments". 
In saying this, we  are  aware  that it is a  counsel  of perfection. 
Towards  fruitful  forecasting 
!.4.32.  It is widely accepted that  sound  policy making  must  take  due 
consideration of the  future  under  two  aspects:  (1)  as  a  potential 
outcome  of current  processes  and  (2)  as  the  intended goal  of deliberate 
actions.  As  explained at the  end  of  the  preceding chapter, it is 
very difficult to  ensure  that  the  results of  forecasting are effectively 
used in the  policy-making  and  planning  process.  Consequently,  fore-
casting  runs  a  grave  danger of degenerating into  a  substitute for 
action,  rather than making  a  contribution to it.  No  ready  recipe 
exists to avoid this  degeneration,  and  tl1~  two  additional  suggestions 
we  now  put  forward  do  not,  in themselves,  provide  any  guarantee• 
They are: 
a)  That  exploratory  forecasting  be  conducted  by  Europe  Plus Thirty 
within the  framework  of  the  social  and  general  monitoring we 
described above.  This  would mean  that  social  forecasting is 
initiated only  in those  fields  where  retrospective  studies  on 
welfare components  have  already been  completed,  whether 
nationally or by  the  Community  as  such.  Several benefits 
could  b~··expected.  Firstly,  the  forecasters  would  not  have  to 
spend  a  lot of  time  gathering data  on  past trends.  Secondly, 
social  reporting would hopefully  take  on  a  new  dimension  thanks 
to this  two-way  interaction between assessment  of past  perfoDn-
ance  and  scanning through  possible alternative new  developments. 
And,  thirdly, it would  provide  a  built-in mechanism against 
proliferation of  forecasts  done  primarily  for  technical  display. - 14  -
b)  As  far as  policy-oriented studies  are concerned,  it would 
be  a  safeguard against  irrelevance  to  reverse  the  usual  path, 
which  starts by  looking at the  future  and  often stops  before 
policy analysis  proper.  That  is to  say,  a  policy  formulation 
process  would  be  initiated as  described earlier, with  the whole 
gamut  of effect-assessment taking place in the  context of  the 
world as  of  now.  Logically, it is only after this  that it 
would be  advisable  to  consider more  distant  time  horizons  to 
check whether  reasoning about,  say,  1990,  instead of  1975, 
1.4. 
makes  any  difference  in the  rankings  of  the policy alternatives. 
Then,  roughly  speaking,  there are  two  possibilities.  Either the 
relative effects are not  significantly altered,  or they are and 
only  the  latter would warrant  a  fuller study of those  postulated 
future  changes  that  do  seem  to make  a  difference. 
Priorities 
1.4.33.  We  conclude with  a  word  about  priorities.  Throughout  this  chapter 
three  pairs  of  complementary variables were  used: 
Past versus  Future:  To  look into  the  future  is  a  basic 
requirement  for effective collective action;  an awareness 
of  the  past is indispensable; 
Process versus  Policy:  Social  reality is a  mix  (in varying 
proportions)  of  processes  (or "les  pesanteurs  sociologiques") 
and policies,  or of conditions  and will,  to  use  different 
language; 
EEC  versus  Outer World:  The  European  Community  is,  like  every 
living entity,  divided between  the  conflicting loyalties  of 
what it owes  to itself and  what it owes  to  the  outer world, 
and  this  tension is present  everywhere,  including the  choices 
that will  be  made  about  our  recommendations. 
1.4.34.  By  combining  these  three  pairs  of variables  we  obtain eight cells, 
which  allows  us  to  display  the  gist of  our proposals  in tabular  form. 
Processes 
EEC  Policies 
1ntra-EEC 
(1) 
(5) 
PAST 
Outer World 
(2) 
(6) 
FUTURE 
1ntra-EEC 
(3) 
(7) 
Outer World 
(4) 
(8) 15  1.4 
Cell  ( 1)  Social  and  other monitoring,  in welfare  terms 
where  possible,  within  the  Community. 
Cell  ( 2)  Worldwide  monitoring. 
Cell  ( 3)  Exploratory facet of  forecasting;  ) 
)  Mainly  Cone of  goal 
Cell  ( 4)  Contextual  exploratory forecasting.  )  choice. 
Cell  (5)  Ex  post  facto  evaluation of  EEC  internal policies. 
Cell  ( 6)  Ex  post  facto  evaluation of  EEC  external policies. 
Call.  (7)  and  (8)  :  Policy analysis  proper,  combining  goal 
definition,  impact  assessment,  and  means  choice. 
Teleonomy  as  a  whole. 
This  scheme  is  of  course  extremely simplified.  Europe  Plus 
T~irty cannot neglect any of  the  cells.  But  as  a  very  rough  guide, 
we  suggest  that  the  following  order of  priority be  assigned  to  them 
as  objects  of work. 
No.2  will have  to  be  eliminated  for  systematic  study;  it is  simply 
too  vast.  It must  just be  held present  in  the  mind,  and  interrogated 
when  necessary. 
No.6  can  also  be  eliminated,  since  Community  policies  towards  the 
outer world  really only began with  the  Yaound~ Convention  of  1971,  and 
are  too  recent  to  be  assessed  fo:c  the  moment. 
We  recommend  that most  attention be  given  to  Nos.  7  and  8,  and  to 
the  other  four  - that is,  1,  3,  4,  and  5  - as  backing  and  context  for 
7  and  8. 
Conclusion 
1.4.35.  We  have  felt  the  temptation,  in  this  chapter  and  the  last,  to  go 
further  and  to  lay out  in  some  detail  an  actual  programme  of work  for  Europe 
Plus  Thirty,  complete  with  instructions  regarding  the  nature  and  form  of 
inputs,  the  methods  of  forecasting  to  be  adopted  for  each  stage or sector 
of  the  work,  quantified relationships  between variables,  values  for 
technical  coefficients,  sets  of  equations  to  be  derived  and  applied,  etc. 
etc.  We  have  resisted  this  temptation out of  a  wish  to  avoid  prejudicing 
the  freedom  of action of  the  first director of Europe  Plus Thirty.  His 
job,  and  that of his staff, will  be  extremely difficult in any  case,  and 16 
we  do  not  think it will  be  made  easier by  too  detailed a  "manual ·of 
instructions"  laid down  in advance.  If  the  right man  is  selected, 
he  will  be  at least  the  professional  equal  of  the  forecasters  who  have 
worked  on  this  report,  and  we  would  not  feel  justified in  tying his 
hands  any  tighter  than we  have  already  done  in  the  foregoing  chapters, 
and  shall  do  in  the  following  ones,  especially  the  immediately 
following  chapter 11.1.,  which  contains  three  detailed examples  of 
problem-oriented  forecasting. 
I.4 PA"RT  II. 
FIELDS  FOR  FORECASTING 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
II.l.  1.  As  we  explained  in  the  General  Introduction,  this  is  the  point 
in our  report where  we  turn  from  the  general  to  the particular. 
In Part I  we  described  the  forecasting needs  of  the  EEC,  how 
these  were  - or were  not - fulfilled  up  to now,  and  where  and  how 
forecasting  is  done  within EEC  countries  and  elsewhere.  We  then 
gave  a  general  survey of existing methods,  their possibilities,  and 
II.l. 
the  problems  that may  attend  their use,  and  finally we  attempted  a 
general  outline of what  we  mean  when  we  speak about  long-term  integrated 
forecasting  for  the  Community  as  a  whole. 
we  mean  two  things: 
By  integrated  forecasting 
its being  integrated well  enough  with  the  Community  policy-making 
process  to  be  of  real help  to  those  developing,  implementing 
and  evaluating policy; 
its not being  limited  to  a  single sector like  technology,  or 
economics,  but encompassing all sectors  relevant  to  the 
particular problem area  in question,  and  to  the  teleonomies 
we  described  in  the  General  Introduction. 
II.l.2. During all  the  remaining  sixteen chapters  of  this Part,  we  would  ask  the 
reader  to  remember  our overriding  insistence  on  integration.  We  are 
aware  that by  including  so much  material  on  these  sixteen separate 
sectors,  we  risk his  forgetting it;  that risk we  have  to  take. 
Western  Europe  is not  such  a  light or simple  phenomenon  that we  can 
throw up  an  airy arch  and  say:  "Look,  that will  take  the  strain". 
It is on  the  contrary old,  heavy,  hurtling,  and  complex;  and  a  very 
great deal  is known  about it and  all its parts.  A proposal  for 
forecasting which  took little or no  account of  this weight  and  complexity 
of knowledge  would  not be  a  worthy  answer  to  the  questions  we  have  been 
asked  by  the  Council  of Ministers. 
II.l.  3.  But  before  embarking  on  the  sixteen sectoral chapters,  we  shall 
here  give  three  examples  of  the  way  we  think integrated forecasting might 
be  carried out  to  meet particular demands,  or solve particular problems, 
as  opposed  to  the  general  process  of  long-term forecasting,  or  teleonomy, 
as  we  described it in our General  Introduction.  These  three  examples 
are  intended  to  help  bridge  the  gap  between  general  and  particular. II.l.  4. 
II.l.  5. 
2 
Three _examples  of  integrat~d forecasting  directed  to 
Policy analysis. 
Our  three  examples  concern  1)  a  high-speed  railway  system, 
II.l. 
2)  a  low  energy-use  scenario,  and  3)  the  effects of different 
education patterns,  especially on  labour.  The  first,  on  transport, 
is  in  fact already being  carried out;  it is  the  COST  33  programme 
undertaken  jointly by  the  Commission  and  OECD,  and  mentioned  in I.l. 
above.  We  commend  it as  a  well-thought out  job.  The  other  two, 
on  energy  and  education,  are not being  done  anywhere  as  far as  we 
know,  but  they well  might  be.  They  are  thus  naturally described 
more  tentatively  than  the  first,  which  has  already had  the  benefit 
of much  skilled definition  and  refinement. 
A Transport example 
This  example  is very much  technology oriented  and  is  in fact 
close  to  a  technology assessment. 
A proposal  has  been made  for  the  construction of  a  very high-
speed  railway network  for  passenger movement  between major European 
cities.  This  proposal  would  require  cooperation between  govern-
ments  and  probably major  government assistance  in several ways. 
It is  therefore  relevant  to put  the  following  questions:  what 
would  be  the  long-term effects of  such  a  development  on  the  volume 
and  pattern of passenger  traffic by  road,  rail  and  air,  on  transport 
costs  (including man-hours  spent  travelling),  energy  consumption, 
accidents,  air pollution,  land  use,  regional  distribution of 
population and  employment,  and  on  the  cities  served  by  the  system  1 
In order  to  answer  these  questions,  one  needs  to  forecast 
events  both with  and  without  the  propos~d railway  system.  Of 
course,  there may  be  more  than  one  possible "without" situation. 
II.l.  6.  In  this  example  the  endogenous  variables  consist of  the  railway 
system  and  other  transport and  planning  factors  that could  be 
controlled and  specified as  part -of  the  policy on  which  the  forecast 
is  based.  They  are  primarily  technological. 3 
The  exogenous  variables  include: 
size  of  population by  country; 
distribution of population  by  region; 
11.1. 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
iv) 
v) 
vi) 
vii) 
viii) 
ix) 
distribution of  population between  urban  and  rural areas; 
distribution of  population  by  household  size; 
gross  regional  product by  region; 
average  household  income  by  region; 
distribution of household  income  (by  income  group); 
proportion of car-owning  households  by  region; 
unit operating costs  (in real  terms)  of cars,  aircraft 
and  railways. 
The  fixed  factors  include  those  parts of  the  transport  system 
not  subject  to  change,  geographical  features,  climate,  social habits 
and  conventions,  political conditions  and  economic  policies. 
The  dependent  factors  are  then  those  effects which  the  fore-
caster is asked  to  forecast,  i.e.  traffic volume,  costs,  energy 
consumpcion,  etc. 
II.l.  7.  It is clear  that  the  endogenous  variables must  be  carefully 
defined  and  specified as  forecasting  assumptions.  The  exogenous 
variables must  be  forecast  for  the  target year.  The  fixed  factors 
must  be  identified.  Then,  given  these  three  sets of factors, 
functional  relationships must  be  found  between  them  and  the 
dependent variables.  It is  these  relationships which  constitute 
the  technical part of  the  forecasting  procedure. 
II.l. 8.  Now,  in  the  example  cited,  the  transport  system provides most 
of  the  endogenous  variables  and  the  fixed  factors;  these  parts of 
the  work  lie within  the  normal  competence  of  a  transport specialist. 
But  the  exogenous  variables,  on  which  the  results  of  the  forecast 
depend,  consist mainly of matters  outside his expertise.  He 
is not  the  best person  to make  forecasts  of population  and  income; 
nor of  the  prices of materials  and  labour  upon  which  future  vehicle 
operating costs will  depend. 
Again,  while  some  of  the  dependent variables  are  transport 
variables,  others  are  not,and  lie outside  the  transport specialist's 
field,  e.g.  environmental  effects  and  regional  policy  issues. 
Transport  studies  often raise  social  and  political  issues  which  are all 
too  easily  ignored  in a  straight technolGgical  approach. 4 
II.l.  9.  An  integrated  transport forecast of  the  type  described  should 
be  able  to  draw  on  other forecasters  for  the  demographic  and  economic 
forecasts  he  requires;  and  in  the  development  of  functional 
relationships  between  the  dependent variables  and  other factors, 
assistance  should be  obtainable  from  specialists  in  the  various 
fields  involved.  Theserelationships are  of value  to  both sides; 
the  environmentalist is  as  interested in  the effect  of  transport 
on  the  environment  as  is  the  transport planner.  In other studies 
it will be  the  environmentalist who  comes  to  the  transport specialist 
for  a  forecast;  for  him,  transport may  be  an  exogenous  variable. 
II.l.lO.  A study of  this  type  would  ideally call  for  an  even broader 
II.l. 
framework,  including  research  on  people's need  for  transport services. 
This  would  mean  an  empirical  investigation of  the  reasons  for which 
people  travel,  their development,  and  their dependency  on  and 
elasticity against costs  and  convenience.  The  acceptance  of  a  future 
system by  its potential users  is  one  of  the most  tricky questions 
for  the  systems  analyst. 
A high-speed  passenger  transport  system  is  only one  among  many 
transport systems,  and  inevitably has  repercussions  on  the  development 
of  the  others,  so  that fixed  factors might have  to be  treated as 
variables  in a  second  round  of  the  study. 
II.l.ll.  Thus,  for  this particular example  of  a  high-speed  railway project, 
one  sees the  need for close collaboration between  forecasters  working 
separately on  the  demographic,  macro-economic,  energy,  regional 
planning  and  environmental  fields  as  well as  the  transport sector 
itself. 
An  Energy  example 
II.l.l2.  Suppose  that  the  European Commission  decided  to  examine 
deliberate policies  to  reduce  energy  growth  rates  substantially. 
Studies  of  this kind have  already  been made  in  the  USA  and  started 
in many  European countries.  A question might be  put as  follows: 
given  a  specified  (low)  rate of  energy  growth,  what effects would 
be  expected  on  certain energy  using  sectors  ? 
II.l.l3.  Within  the  Commission  and  its affiliated institutions  there  is 
much  expertise  on  how  to  design  lower  growth  rates  for  energy supply. 
These  questions  fall within  the  energy  sector.  What  the  Commission - 5  - II.l. 
now  lacks is the expertise to consider the multitude of impacts 
that  low  energy  growth would  make  on  energy-using sectors;  that is, 
on  the  demand  side of  the  energy equation.  These  impacts  are 
certain  to  be  complex,  with effects  that reverberate  throughout 
many  different sectors.  They  demand  integrated  forecasting. 
II.l.l4.  This  example  is  one  in which  scenario writing would  play an 
important part,  although  systems  modelling would  no  doubt  come 
into  the  picture  as  well.  To  illustrate,  we  give here  just some 
of  the  questions  that would  have  to  be  considered by  forecasters 
working within and  across  the  subject areas  considered  in Part II 
of our report: 
II.l.lS.  Agriculture  is  a  fairly energy-intensive  industry.  Would 
the  use  of machinery  and  fertilisers  decrease,  and  the  use  of 
labour  increase  ?  What  effects would  the  latter change  have  on 
land  use  planning,  transport policies,  and  the  like  1  Since 
animal  products  are  the  most  energy-intensive,  would  countries 
like  the  Netherlands  be  more  affected  than others  which  are 
predominantly cereal-producers  1  Since more  intensive  production 
of  any kind  increases  energy  use,  what are  the  implications  for 
broad  policies of  food  self-sufficiency and  of  food  imports  1 
Could  agriculture  itself become  a  substantial energy-supplier 
through  the  conversion of animal  and  vegetable wastes  into 
fuels,  or even  by  growing  crops  intended  solely for  fuel  production  1 
Infthe  European Middle  Ages,  brushwood  was  cultivated for  fuel,  and 
cowdung  is still the  main  hoHsehold  fuel  of India.  Again,  what 
are  the  regional  implications  1 
II.l.l6.  Industry uses  energy-intensive materials  and  has  increasingly 
replaced  labour  by  energy-intensive machinery.  Would  there  be 
a  partial return  to  more  labour-intensive methods,  and  if so,  with 
what  implications  for  employment  rates,  settlement patterns,  the 
siting of  industry,  transport,  and  so  forth  ?  Would  there  be 
significant shifts  in material  usage,  and  with what  effects  on 
trade  (e.g.  natural  rubber  and  textiles  in place of syrithetics)  ? 
Which  sectors of  industrr would  be  most affected  1  Might  some 
industry  (e.g.  aluminium)  respond  by  transferring out of Europe  1 
What  changes  would  there  be  in  the  relative prices of different 
products  and  services  1  And  how  might  these  affect consumer 
choices;  with new  patterns of  'selective growth'  ? 6 
11.1.17.  Transport would  certainly experience major  impacts.  These  in 
turn  could affect  regional  planning,  urban  forms,  the  siting of 
facilities  such  as  'out of  town'  shopping  centres  and,  not  least, 
tourism.  Forecasts  would  need  to  ask  searching questions  about  the 
degree  to  which  transport  industries  can  adapt  - e.g.  by  producing 
more  energy-efficient vehicles  - and  the  d~gree  to  which  public 
policies  could  be  influential  - e.g.  the  promotion of public  as 
I1.1.18. 
opposed  to private  transport.  One  would  also need  to  examine  the 
possible  role  of  Communications  in  reducing  the  need  for  personal 
travel. 
Environment  and  pollution  impacts  might  be  considerable. 
Lower  energy  growth  would alleviate many  pollution problems 
which  arise directly from  the  burning  of  fuels,  but might 
create new  ones.  .Pollution abatement  itself consumes  energy: 
would  industries  be  able  to  'afford'  it 7  New  products  designed 
to  help  save  energy might  impose  health risks  on workers:  the 
use  of  the  highly  toxic weedkiller paraquat  to  save  cultivations 
on  the  farm  is a  notable  example.  Many  similar effects would 
need  to  be  forecast;  for  example  by  technology  ~sessment methods. 
11.1.19.  Science  and  Technology;  to  what  extent could  innovation be 
II.l. 
di~ected towards  more  energy-efficient production,  such as  enzyme 
technology,  integrated  'total energy'  system5,  more  durable  'long 
life'  products,  re-cycling  techniques,  and  so  forth  7  What  would 
be  the  effects of  any  of  these  changes  on  other sectors:  employment, 
industry,  materials,  etc.  etc.  and  on  energy  demand  itself ? 
11.1.20.  In  these  and  other ways  the  forecaster  on  the  energy  sector 
needs  the  close  collaboration of  forecasters  working  in other 
sectors,  just as  they  in  turn need  his particular expertise. 
An  Education-Employment  example 
II.l.21.  This  third  example  is  the  most  challenging of all since it 
has  to  deal  with many  unknowns.  It would  require  a  highly "creative" 
and  informed  group  of professionals  to  come  up  with  results. 
Suppose  that  the  Commission wished  to explore  the  implications 
of certain proposed educational  programmes. 
put  to  Europe  Plus  Thirty as  follows: 
A question might be 11.1.22. 
11.1.23. 
7 
What  are  the  implications  for  the  active  population of  a 
raised  level  of  formal  education  and  a  system  of  recurrent 
education  1 
The  first task of Europe  Plus  Thirty when  confronted with 
this  question would  be  to  set it in an analytical  framework. 
This  would  mean  more  precise  specification of  the  question, 
which  would  require  refinement.  Secondary education is now 
universal  in most western European  countries,  and  higher 
education is  fast becoming  an  activity for  the  general  public. 
Schemes  providing for  educational  leaves-of-absence  and  family 
support during  these  leaves  are  being  explored or  legislated 
for  in several countries.  In short,  given  our current knowledge 
of  the  numbers  of people  that will most probably fill each cohort, 
and  the  likelihood of  their attaining given  educational  "levels", 
we  may  expect  a  labour  force  with  a  higher  level  of  formal 
education at the  end  of  the century,  and  one  that continually 
updates  its skills and  knowledge  through  recurrent,  job~oriented 
training.  (See  II.7 below) 
The  implications  of  these  dependent variables  are  both 
complicated  and  extensive.  They  reveal  connections  with several 
other sectors.  As  a  preliminary and  illustrative  listing of 
those  implications  we  suggest  the  following.  Some  of  these are 
dealt with  in greater detail  in  the  following  sections  of Part II. 
a)  Would  women  continue  increasingly  to  work  outside  the  home  ? 
II.l. 
What  changes  in work patterns  (especially if women  choose 
part-time work)  and  in family  life,  and  what  changes  in  the 
demand  for  day  care  centres,  pre-school  programmes  etc.,  could 
be  expected  ?  What  would  be  the  effect of  less maternal 
care  for  infants,  and  more  institutional care,  on  their 
characters  when  they  grow  up  ? 
b)  How  would  a  raised  level of education affect  the  ability of 
the  individual  to  cope  with modern  society  ?  In what  ways 
would  improved  education  increase  awareness  of  the  functioning 
of  society and  social relationships,  and  therefore  of how  to 
better make  one's  way  in  the  world  ?  Examples  might  be  the 
use  of contraception,  access  to  official  "channels"  and 
programmes,  and  to  some  degree,  the  reduction of accident 
rates  and  imprmved  health.  Woul~ a  generally raised  level 8 
lead  to  increased  competition  for  the  good  things  of  life, 
or an  increased  acceptance  that  they must  be  shared equally  ? 
c)  To  what extent would  access  to more  education by all lead 
to  increased pursuit of education for its own  sake  ? 
If education  becomes  less  important  in securing  individual 
financial  security (see II.7 below),  would  it then  be  thought 
of  by many  students  less  as  a  means  to  more  money  and more 
as  an  end  in itself ? 
d)  To  what extent would  a  shift of emphasis  on  the  intrinsic 
value  of  education mean  decreased  educational equality  ? 
If education  loses  its  force  as  a  means  to  financial 
security,  would  it become  less attractive  to  those  in 
"under privileged positions"  ?  Would  the  economically 
disadvantaged  therefore  tend not  to  take  advantage  of 
educational  opportunities  ? 
e)  What  would  be  the  economic  impact of recurrent education 
in  terms  of  GNP,  public expenditure,  etc.  ?  How  would 
it affect  the  cost of  teachers,  and  the  cost of physical 
facilities  and  their modification  ? 
f)  What  effects would  raised  levels  of education have  on work 
organisation  ?  Would  better educated workers  demand 
changes  in  job  design  and  organisation,  and  greater 
participation,  etc.  1  To  what extent would  these  changes 
include  rotation,  and  different mixes  of  tasks  1 
g)  Would  there  be  an  increased  imbalance  between  the  number  of 
graduates  and  the  number  of  traditionally appropriate 
openings  for  them  ?  If people with  advanced  education 
begin  to  take  "lower"  positions,  what effect would  this 
have  on  pay differential between,  for  example,  manual  and 
non-manual  work  1  What  repercussions  would  this  have  on 
the  aspirations  of  the  less-educated worker,  and  on  job 
design  ? 
h)  How  would  raised  formal  education affect  the  doing  of 
unpleasant work  ?  How  would  "dirty" or unattractive work 
be  redesigned  or upgraded  to  be  more  attractive  ? 
Alternatively,  to what extent could or should it be  moved 
II.l. 9 
to  other parts of  the  world  ?  How  would  this affect foreign 
worker  arrangements,  and  balance  of  trade,  and  what  would 
be  the  political considerations  ? 
i)  What  kind  of, and  what  increase  i~ provisions  for mid-career 
education could  be  expected  ?  How  would  the  job  training 
programmes  and  paid  leaves  of  absence  for  recurrent education 
bring about  increased flexibility in  terms  of substitution 
for  the  worker,  re-entry etc.  ? 
II.l.24.  These  three  examples  illustrate  the  sort of  issues,  and 
their relationship with neighbouring expertise,  that Europe  Plus 
Thirty could  tackle  if required. 
THE  SECTORS. 
II.l.25.  We  turn now  to  the  sectors  themselves.  In a  series of 
shoTt chapters  we  consider sixteen different fields  of human 
activity or knowledge,  and  ask in each  case whether  forecasting 
in  that field might  be  a  necessary part of  integrated  forecasting 
and,  if so,  whether it is being  sufficiently done  elsewhere,or 
needs  to  be  done  by Europe  Plus Thirty.  If it does,  we  suggest 
what  Europe  Plus Thirty should  do  about it. 
II.l. 
Most  of  the  chapters point out  the  linkages  between  their own 
subject matter and  those  of  the  others,  which  is of course  the  essence 
of  integrated  forecasting.  In order  to  display  these  linkages  as 
comprehensively as  possible,  we  provide  a  matrix by way  of 
illustration.  The  influence  of  the  sector at  the  head  of  each 
column  on  each of  the  sectors  down  the  left-hand side  is  shown  thus;~ 
for  large: JQ]  for  smaller but  rec? 1,  and D  for negligible.  By 
"influence",  we  mean  two  things:  1)  Would  a  change  in  the  top  sector 
entail a  change  in  the  left-hand sector  ?  and  2)  Does  the  top 
sector make  demands  on  the  left-hand sector 1 - 10  -
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We  have  discussed at  some  length what  order we  should  place 
the  following  chapters  in;  it was  impossible  to  find  a  wholly 
satisfactory sequence.  This  is simply  a  reflection on  the whole 
subject  of  this  study:  because  everything  hangs  together in a  single 
web  of  dependency it does  not  matter very  much  where  we  begin. 
Therefore,  no  deep  meaning  should  be  ascribed to  the  order we  have 
adopted.  Le  tout  est  dans  le tout,  et vice versa. 
II.l. 
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fll..  CLIMATE 
I1.2.1.  We  start this  Part of  our  report with  a  discussion of  the  possibility 
of climatic forecasting,  for  obvious  reasons;  the  climate  is  the  final  and 
absolute arbiter of  human  destinies.  If it changes,  there  is no  fighting 
against it;  we  just have  to  change  our  ways  of  life.  To  anticipate  the 
nature,  the  scale,  the  speed,  the  signs,  and  the  causes  of  changes  in the 
climate  would  be  helpful. 
But  first,  a  word  about  terminology.  In meteorology,  a  long-term 
weather  forecast  means  a  week,  or  at most  a  month.  In climatology,  it means, 
say,  thirty years.  For  the  time-scale of Europe  Plus Thirty,  which  we  have 
defined  as  4  - 30  years,  we  must  obviously  adopt  climatological  language. 
We  elaborate  below. 
Historical  Background 
I1.2.2.  From  time  to  time  rather abrupt shifts of  climatic patterns  are  observed. 
The  last one  happened  between  1959  and  1963,  and  was  partly due  to  the  eruption 
of  the  Agung  volcano  in Bali  in  1963.  It consisted of  an  average  cooling of  the 
lower  troposphere  (0-5,500 meters)  of  the whole  zone  betw~en 65°N  and  90°N,  by 
O.S6°C. 
Between  1920  and  1960  climatic conditions  had  been  unusually  favourable, 
and  this makes  it easy  for  us  to  forget  that  in  the  last 500-600  years 
considerably worse  conditions  prevailed.  What  _has  happened  may  happen  again; 
we  have  to  understand  why  it happens,  and  that means  looking at  the  historical 
data  to  see  if patterns  and  causes  can  be  established. 
II.2.3.  Instrumental  observations exist  from  about  1680  onwards.  Those  aside, 
there  are  enough  reliable  indirect  sources  to  allow us  to  evaluate  the 
climatic  development  during  the  last millenium;  for  instance weather diaries; 
tree  rings;  pollen investigations  in peat-bogs;  cereal  prices.  With  the 
help of  this  'proxy'  data,  H.  Lamb  (l)  has  estimated  the  following  values  for 
middle  England,  compared with  the  period  1901  - 1950,  in °C. 
(1)  H.H.  Lamb,  Palaeogeogr.,  Palaeoclim.,  Palaeoecol.  1  (1965) Time  Period 
4000  B.C. 
1150  - 1300  A.D. 
1600  - 1700  A.D. 
Winter 
+ 1.0 
- 0.1 
- 1.1 
- 2  -
Temperature 
Summer 
+  2.0 
+  0.9 
- 0.5 
Year 
+  1. 6 
+  0.7 
- 0.7 
Preci[>i tat  ion 
Summer 
+  157o 
- 157o 
0 
Year 
+  107o 
+  3io 
+  2io 
II.2. 
II.2.4.  The  Middle  Ages  (ca.  900  - 1300)  were  clearly warmer  and  drier  than 
today  in  the  warm  season  (vegetation period);  wine  was  produced  in England. 
After  several discontinuities,  with  anomalies  that  even  by  today's  standards 
were  extreme  (especially  1310  - 1350  and  1428  - 1460),  there  was  a  transformation 
which  began  in about  1560.  This  cold  and  snowy  period  is exaggeratedly referred 
to  as  a  "little ice  age".  The  period  lasted with  a  few  small  breaks until  1850; 
it was  marked  by  strong precipitation and  a  high water  level  of  the  lakes  in 
the Mediterranean area,  in  the  Near  East  and  in Southern Russia;  drift ice 
blocked  the  coast of  Iceland  for  five  to  six months  a  year  and  even  advanced 
to  the  Faroes. 
II.2.5.  Whereas  the  warm  period  in the Middle  Ages,  with noticeably  less  storms 
on  the Atlantic  and  the  disappearance of drift ice  along  the  East  Greenland 
coast  south of  ca.  70°N,  brought  about  good  conditions  for  cultivation in 
most  European  countries,  yet  the  period  of  anomalies  at  the  end  of  the Middle 
Ages  and  especially in the "little ice  age"  brought many  crop  failures, 
especially in marginal  lands  such  as  Iceland,  Scotland  and  Norway.  The  average 
growing  season was  shortened  by  several  weeks.  The  appearance  of worldwide 
stratospheric  turbidity after volcanic  eruptions  (e.g.  1601,  1783,  1815, 
1883  and  1912)  led  to  much  adve~se summer  weather. 
II.2.6.  The  development  of  the  climate  in the northern hemisphere  in  the  past 
15  years  has  shown  that  the  40  year  period  1920  - 196~ usually defined  as  a 
"normal  period",  was  in fact  abnormal,  especially if related  to  the  last 
500  - 600  years.  The  latest development  has  many  traits which  correspond 
more  to  the  climate of  the  latter half of  the  19th century,  than  to  the 
decades  before  1960.  These  changes  have  had  a  strong  economic  impact  upon 
some  areas  (India,  the  Sahel belt).  The  recent  cooling of  the Arctic  (by - 3  - 11.2. 
about  1°  - 2°  on  a.  yearly basis,  by  3°  - 6°C  for  the winter months)  may  have 
led  over  several  years  to  a  shift of climatic  regimes,  at least in Africa  and 
large  parts  of  South Asia,  affecting  the water balance. 
11.2.7.  The  sensitivity of agricultural  production  to  climatic anomalies-
such  as  drought  or  shortening of  the  growing  season  - is hardly  less  today 
than it was  two  centuries  ago.  Recent  developments  give  good  examples  of 
the  political  consequences  of  food  shortages:  revolutions  in Ethiopia  and 
Mali,  and  the  crisis  caused  by  surreptitious  Soviet  grain purchases  in 
America  in  1973  and  1974.  An  earlier climatically induced political event was  the 
great  emigration  to  America.  The  potato-blight  famine  of  1846  in Ireland 
was  effected  by  a  period  of  extreme  humidity during  the weather-sensitive 
growth  phase  of  the  potato. 
11.2.8.  Today,  it cannot  be  excluded  that  the world's  grain harvest might  be 
reduced,  after  simultaneous  climatic  anomalies,  by  about  10  percent  in one 
year  or  by  15  percent or  even more  in  two  consecutive years.  Taken with  the 
continuing  population growth rate,  this might  eventually  lead  to widespread 
social unrest,  to  increased  international  tensions,  and  to  their expression 
in,  for  instance,  increased  terrorism. 
And  indeed,  the  last ice  age  itself was  only  17,000 years  ago.  The  ice 
disappeared  8,500  years  ago  in Scandinavia  and  6,500  years  ago  in Canada. 
6,000  years  ago  there was  a  world-wide  warm  period which  lasted ·for  several 
centuries.  In this  period  the  Arctic drift ice retreated  to  the north coasts 
of Spitzbergen and  Greenland.  The  transition between  the  Ice Age  and  the 
post-glacial warm  period  between  12,000  and  10,500 years  ago  was  characterised 
by  very  abrupt  climatic  changes,  and  the  decisive upheavals  may  have  taken 
place within a  lifetime.  Later climatic changes,  too,apparently did  not 
occur  slowly,  but rather rapidly  in  the  form  of often repeated  large-scale 
weather  patterns.  This  situation leads  one  naturally  to  consider whether 
anomalous  atmospheric  conditions  could  be  forecast  for  a  whole  year  and,  more 
to  our  purpose,  whether  assertions  can  be  made  about  the  longer-term development 
of  the  climate. 
Methods  of  climatic forecasting 
II.2.9.  In contrast  to  the weather of  a  day  or  a  week,  the  word  climate 
is used  for  the  average  atmospheric  conditions  of  a  decade  or  a  "normal" - 4  - II.2. 
Ll1irly  year  period.  By  climatic  forecasting  we  understand  periods of  one  year 
and  beyond.  Whether,  and  if so  how,  a  realistic forecast  on  a  physicomathe-
malical  basis  is  possible,  is being  actively discussed  in  learned  circles. 
Monthly  forecasts  are  being  made  by different meteorological  offices,  in  the 
USA,  UK,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  and  also in the  USSR  with  empirical  and 
semi-empirical methods;  they  are not  coordinated.  The  results  are  only 
partially satisfactory:  temperature  forecasts  are  slightly better  than  random 
guesses,  whereas  it is difficult  to maintain that rainfall  forecasts  are  an 
improvement  on  chance.  Most  long-term forecasts  are  only  published  in  learned 
and  official circles,  and  are  only of  limited  use  for  economic  planning. 
11.2.10.  The  position  today  is  that  short-term weather  forecasts  (24-48  hours) 
drawn  up  by  numerical  (physico-mathematical)  methods  can  be  extended  with  some 
skill  to  forecasts  up  to  about  5  days.  Some  experiments  have  indicated  that 
by  including yet  more  physical  processes  in  the  models  8  - 10  day  forecasts 
can beachieved.  This  work  is being  carried  forward  at  a  new  institute for 
medium-range  weather  forecasting  at Reading,  in  the  UK,  financed  by  the 
governments  of  the  Community  countries  plus  Austria,  Greece,  Portugal,  Spain, 
Sweden,  Switzerland and Yugoslavia. 
11.2.11.  Climatic  forecasting  is not  simply  extended  weather  forecasting.  It 
needs  to  include data  on  physical  processes  at  the  interfacesbetween atmosphere, 
ocean,  ice,  and  the  upper  layers  of  the  solid earth.  Research  on  this,  empirical 
as  well  as  on  a  model  basis,is progressing.  The  comprehensive  models  which 
have  been  developed  so  far  are  capable  of  taking  the  interaction between 
atmosphere  and  ocean  into  consideration;  they  enable  us  to outline  a  fairly 
realistic simulation of  the  existing climate,  even if the  mesh  of  the  grid  is 
still too  coarse.  But  a  satisfactory climatic  forecast  cannot  be  expected 
from  them;  we  still need  improved  simulations  of  the  physical  processes,  but 
the  tremendous  amount  of  calculations  required  is prohibitive.  Undigested  data 
~each the meteorological offices  in  the  range  of  hundred  of millions  a  day. 
So  we  need  to  reach  simultaneous  solutions  in  a  system of at  least  7  non-linear 
differential  equations  at  several  hundred  thousand  grid  points.  The  world  is 
represented  by  some  10,000  grid  points,  each  representing about  400  Km  of  the 
world's  surface horizontally  and  2  Km  vertically.  There  are  6  - 12  levels  in 
the  atmosphere  alone,  going  up  to  30  Km,  and  the  interaction between  the 
different  levels  must  be  taken  into  account.  All  small  and  medium-sized 
processes  have  to  be  parameterised,  that is,  expressed  as  functions  of· larger - 5  - II.2. 
processes.  Even  for  the  most  efficient computers  the  time  needed  for  a 
result  is  about  10%  of  the  forecast  time,  which  for  our  thirty-year  purposes 
would  mean  that  a  computer  would  need  several  years  just  to  work  out  the 
calculations.  Meteorology's  demands  on  computers  are  far  greater  than  those  of 
other  sciences.  Many  experts  hope  that  the  development  of  new  model  types 
on  a  statistical-dynamical  base will  bring  improvements. 
11.2.12.  Given all  this,  we  cannot  say whether  or  to  what  degree  climatic 
forecasting  for  a  year  or  a  decade will  become  possible.  At  least  two 
important  climatogenic  processes  cannot  reasonably  be  forecast:  large 
volcanic eruptions  (e.g.  Krakatoa  1883,  Agung  1963, )and  possible  fluctuations 
in  the  sun's  radiation.  But  progress  in other  fields  has  been  so  remarkable 
and  encouraging  that  the majority of  experts  have  recently reached  a  conditionally 
•t•  t•t d  h  ·b·l·  f  l.  .  f  (l).  pos~  ~ve at  ~  u  e  to  t  e  poss~  ~  ~ty o  c  ~mat~c  orecasts 
Weather  and  Climate Modification 
11.2.13.  Understanding  the  way  man  modifies  weather  and  climate  has  become  one 
of  the  most  challenging  tasks  of meteorology.  Since  the  local  climate 
depends  to  a  large  extent on  the  physical  properties of  the  underlying 
surface,  its vegetation  and  soil,  any  substantial modification of  these 
can alter essential climatic  parameters.  A good  example  is  an  irrigated 
oasis:  here  the  maximum  temperature  is  3- 5°  C  lower  than  in  the  surrounding 
desert,  while  the  relative  humidity  increases  by  20-30%.  Deforestation, 
overgrazing of natural  grasslands  (after the  destruction of  the  great  predator 
animals  and  the  domestication of goats,  cattle,  etc.)  and  irrigation have 
caused  not negligible climatic  changes  during  the  last 4-8,000  years  in 
Europe,  the  Mediterranean,  Near  and  Middle  East,  India  and  China,  over 
2 
many  millions  of km  . 
11.2.14.  Since  the  beginning of  the  industrial era,  the  emission of  C02  from 
fossil  burning  fuels,  from  air pollution of various  sorts  and  the  direct  input  of 
energy  into  the  atmosphere  e.g.  waste  heat  from  power  stations)  have  added 
substantially  to  the  hitherto nearly  imperceptible  processes  described  above. 
The  co
2
-content has  increased  from  290  to  about  325  ppm  (part per million) 
and  will  (on  present  trends)  reach  the  400  ppm  mark,  probably  soon after 
the  turn of  the  century. 
(1)  WMOLGARP  Conference  on  Climate Modelling,  July/August  1974;  to  be 
published in ·GARP  Publication Series. - 6  - II.2. 
II.2.15.  In spite of  the oil crisis,  the  trend of man-made  climatogenic 
factors(!)  is  expected  further to  increase,  though  perhaps  more  slowly. 
The  exponential  growth of  population together with  the industrialisation 
of  the Third World  and  the  raising of its living standard will  be  respon-
sible  for that,  even if energy conservation and near-zero,  or even  zero or 
negative,  growth  rate in the  developed  countries  wer~ to  replace  the  recent 
trends. 
II.2.16.  The  co2  storage capacity  of  the  oceans,  which at present absorb  about 
50  percent  of co2  from  fossil  combustion,  is  limited.  Leading specialists 
expect that,after a  mixing period of about  60  years,  the  stored carbon 
dioxide will  be  released into the air and  that an  increase of  the air's 
co2-content by  a  factor of  5  or more  might  be  expected in the  second 
'2) 
half ot  the  next  century.'  These  inadvertent man-made  effects might  then 
lead  to  a  general  warming,  and  to  the  retreat of  the Arctic  sea  ice into a 
position like that of  the  early Middle  Ages.  The  diversion of  fresh water 
for irrigation from  the  Siberian and Canadian  rivers,  if that were  to 
occur  on  a  large  scale,  would accelerate  the  retreat and  thinning of  the 
Arctic  sea  ice.  With  a  drastic increase  of co2,  even its central part, 
which  has  probably  remained  constant  during the  last million years,  could 
eventually disappear.(J)  In this  case  a  northward  shift of all large-
scale climatic belts by  several  hundred  kms.  might  be  expected,  together 
with a  disappearance  of  the winter rains  in the Mediterranean,  Near  and 
Middle  East,  Soviet Central Asia,  and California/Utah.  Since at present 
about  8  percent of the  run-off waters  from all continents is used  by  Inan, 
such  a  shift would necessitate,  in many  densely  populated areas,  a  drastic 
readaptation to  a  new  and unprecedented pattern of agriculture and water 
supply.  (A  major  retreat,  or even  the  disappearance  of the  floating Arctic 
sea  ice would not,  any more  than an ice cube melting in a  glass  of whisky, 
cause  a  rise of  the  sea  level.  The  melting of  the  continental  ice  sheet 
of  Greenland,  on  the other hand,  would;  but  this  should be  a  very  slow 
process  lasting probably more  than  1,000 years.) 
(1)  SMIC  Report:  Inadvertent  Climate  Modification.  Report  of  the  Study 
of  Man's  Irapact  on Climate.  MIT  Press,  1971,  308  pp. 
(2)  (As  in No.  1  on  page  5.) 
(3)  M.I.  Budyko.  Izmeniya  Klimata.  Leningrad,  1974,  280  pp. - 7  - II.2. 
II.2.17.  Now  this  catastrophic chain of  events  is  something which might 
happen;  nobody  can  say it &!1,  and  nobody  can  even  say  how  likely it is 
to happen.  It is taken seriously in  learned circles;  that is all we 
can  say  at the moment,  and  that is good  enough  reason  for the nations  to 
press ahead with  the  construction of  the models  we  have mentioned above, 
since only  by  their use  can the  probabilities of these  events  be  made 
amenable  to  discussion.  Until  this,  there  can  be  no  basis  on which  to 
consider whether we  ought  (because  of this  scenario)  to start burning 
less  fossil  fuel  now,  or indeed planning  for a  new  sort  of  economy  in a 
hundred years'  time. 
II.2.18.  In many  countries man's  ability intentionally to modify  the 
weather has  been  extensively investigated during the  last decades.  It is 
possible to dissipate supercooled  fogs  (which,  however,  represent  only 
5  percent of all  fogs),  but many  other programmes  -artificial rainfall, 
hail  prevention,  mitigation of  tropical hurricanes  - have  led to contro-
versial  results(l).  This  is the  more  true if one  takes  into account 
the  large and  sometimes  unexpected side effects.  Some  types  of  clouds 
along the  upwind  slopes  of mountains  can be  stimulated to  increased rain-
fall;  but  this means  only  a  redistribution of  rainfall,  at the expense  of 
downwind  areas.  In the absence  of cloud-fonning  processes  - e.g.  during 
droughts  or in arid countries,  where it is most wanted  - artificial 
stimulation of effective rainfall is  (and will  remain)  unsuccessful. 
(1)  National  Academy  of Sciences:  Weather and ClL  .. ate Modification, 
Problems  and  Progress.  Washington,  D.C.,  1973,  258  pp. 
W.N.  Hess:  Weather and Climate  Modification,  New  York,  1974, 
1025  PP• - 8  - 11.2. 
At  any  rate,  more  research  is needed  before  reliable results  for 
the  operational  use  of weather modification  can  be  obtained.  Because  of 
the  dimensions  of decisive  experiments  in  an  unlimited  atmosphere,  the 
soci.;tl  and  legal  aspects  at national  and  international  levels  should  receive 
increasing attention.  There  is  already  a  proposal  at  UN  to  ban  the 
usc  of weather modification;  its "peaceful"  use  may  be  just as  much 
in  need  of  regulation. 
11.2.19.  One  of  the  most  urgent  purposes  of mathematical  models  is  to  describe 
the  possible  effects of  (a)  unpredictable natural  events  and  (b)  the 
inadvertent  and  intentional  impacts  of man  on  the  climatic  system. 
(a)  covers  volcanic  eruptions,  fluctuations  in  the  sun's 
radiation in different bands  of  the  spectrum,  and, 
possibly,  partial  surges  of  the  Antarctic  ice. 
(b)  covers  the  influx of  energy  and  C02;  air pollution 
including  the  effect of  supersonic  transport  on  the 
stratosphere;  transformation of vegetation,  eg.  in 
the  equatorial rain forests;  and  large  reservoirs 
river-turning,  and  irrigation projects. 
11.2.2J.  These  "sensitivty studies"  (l)  i.e. mathematical  experiments  on 
the  response  of  the  model  to  such events,  are  an  indispensable  step 
towards  long-term climatic  forecasts.  They  may  be  useful  for  some 
socio-economic  decisions;  especially for projects  dealing with climate 
and  weather modification,  for  estimates  of  the  climatic effects of 
particles  in  the  air,  of  the  co
2 
content,  and  of  thermal  pollution. 
To  test  these  models  we  need meteorological  and  oceanographic 
observati0ns  in  largely predigested  form. 
( 1)  We  are  speaking here not of  the  sensitivity with which  the  model 
represents  reality,  but of  the  degree  to  which  one  group  of 
variables  as  represented  in  the  model  shows  itself sensitive 
to  changes  in others. - 9  - II.2. 
Implications  and  Applications of Climatic Forecasting 
11.2.21.  The  history of  the  climate  over  the  last 1,000 years  is,  as  we  have  seen, 
much  more  varied  than experience  of  the  last decades  would  suggest,  and  we  . 
need  to  reconstruct  the  climatic history of  the  last  800  - 1,000  years with 
the  help of  studies  based  on  quantifiable  "proxy"  data.  This  laborious 
preparation of data  should  be  encouraged  and  supported.  The  unrepeatable 
early observation series  (especially before  1850)  should  after critical 
review be  refurbished,  made  comparable,  and  then published.  We  would  hope 
that  the meteorological offices of  the  Community  countries will  selectively 
process  their own  mass  of observations  and  derive  from  them representative, 
homogeneous  and  standardised  time-series.  The  same  applies  to  all other 
countries,  given  the  global  character of  the  climate.  This  work will 
probably  be  initiated  and  encouraged  by  the  World  Meteorological  Organisation, 
and  there  need  be  little action by  the  European  Communities  as  such. 
11.2.22.  For  the  development  of climate  forecasting models,  we  need  at present 
a  series  of "sensitivity studies",  to which  the  results of model  calculations 
and  forecasts  in  the  socio-economic  f~eld can  be  subjected.  Or  again,  one 
can  feed  the  results of climatological models  into  an agricultural  production 
model.  An  empirical model  with regional  dependencies  is  in development  at 
the  University of Madison,  Wisconsin,  USA  (Department  of  Environmental 
Sciences).  Further  investigations of  the  social  consequences  of climatically 
conditioned  famines  are  being mounted  in international cooperation. 
A climatic forecast  can  be prepared  with  a  loose  connection  to other 
sectors,  and  the  results  can  then be  put  into multisectoral  models,  and  the 
other way  round.  The  results of  the  various  alternative  inputs  can  then 
serve  as  a  base  for  politico-economic discussion. 
II.2.23.  At  the  moment  several  institutes  for meteorological  forecasting 
are  being built up;  they will  no  doubt  undertake  the  development  of suitable 
models,  or  at  least  the  preliminary  phases  of  them.  The  Communities  as 
such  could,  as  far  as  was  desired,  support  these efforts.  A model  developed 
for  8-10  day  forecasts  can  be  further  developed  so  as  to  estimate  climatic 
trends  with  regional  differentiation,  by  the  inclusion of physical  processes 11.2.24. 
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such  as:  interaction between atmosphere/ocean/ice;  interaction 
between  the  atmospheric  water balance  and  soil moisture;  turbidity 
caused  by  tropospheric particles;  and  thermal  pollution. 
II.2. 
The  provision of all available  climate  data  in a  predigested  form 
plays  a  special  role,  that is:  the  presentation of anomalies  in 
elements  of  the  climate  (temperature,  precipitation,  surface pressure) 
on  a  global basis  for  each year,  even  each  season.  These  ought  to  be 
made  available  back  to  1850,  and  if possible before,  and  be  stored on 
magnetic  tape.  A  thorough  treatment of  these  data  is necessary,  because 
they  serve  as  a  test not only  for model  calculations  and  sensitivity 
studies,  but also for historical studies of circulation anomalies  occurring 
simultaneously in far  distant areas,  of  their causes,  and  of  their perhaps 
quasi-cyclical nature.  The  simultaneous  appearance  of climatic anomalies 
with  economic  effects has  to  be  investigated by all available statistical 
methods.  The  collection of data and  empirical  studies  of  this kind  is 
especially necessary at the  beginning,  in order  to verify and  supplement 
model  calculations.  It can  be  done  at relatively low cost in universities 
or small  research institutes,  and  would  deal with  a  neglected aspect of 
the  overall  problem. 
11.2.25.  All  this,  of course,  is a~  job;  not specifically a  European 
11.2.26. 
one:  we  mention it here  because it will  (or should)  provide  the  general 
framework  within which,  in climatology,  Europe  Plus Thirty must operate, 
and  draw its own  local conditions. 
Of  the  other sectors  in which  Europe  Plus  Thirty will  be  forecasting, 
the  one  most  obviously sensitive  to climatic change  is  that of agriculture, 
forestry  and  fisheries.  The  implications  are  of  their nature  even more 
critical for  food  storage  than  food  production.  Health  and  energy 
consumption are  also  directly dependent  on  climate.  Through  these  three  -
food,  health and  energy  - most of  the  other sectors considered  in this 
section of  our  report depend  indirectly on  climate. 
Recommendations 
a)  Climatology  is not a  subject where  Europe  Plus Thirty,  as - 11  -
the  long-teDn  forecasting agency of  the  European Communities, 
will  need  to  do  its own  for~casts.  It will  be  enough if it 
knows  what  is going  on  elsewhere,  and  encourages  studies which 
are useful  to it.  It should  from  time  to  time call  conferences 
or seminars  on  the subject, but  should not nonnally devote 
resources  to  research contracts or other down-line work. 
b)  Within this  limitation,  Europe  Plus  Thirty should encourage 
quantitative historical  studies  of climatic fluctuations  on 
a  global basis,  including their effects  on  food  production, 
and  the  collection of: 
(i)  Meteorological  data  back to  about  1850. 
(ii)  "Proxy Data"  back to about  1000  AD. 
c)  It should  likewise  encourage i)  the setting up  of a  data  bank 
suitable for testing all kinds  of climatic forecasting 
models  and  for detailed investigation of the  space and time 
correlation of climatic anomalies,  and ii) climatic pre-
diction models  of the atmosphere-ocean-ice-soil  system 
with sufficient resolution for the European area.  The 
results of both should be available  to Europe  Plus  Thirty. 
d)  Europe Plus Thirty should be  able  to call on  the services of 
a  climatologist or agrometeorologist with a  good  knowledge 
and awareness  of climatic history and  the climate-harvest 
relation.  It should take account  of  long-tenn climatic 
scenarios in all its work. 
11.2. PARI'  Il 
3.  POPULATIO.lj 
Brief Historical Outline 
II.3.l.  All  planning  for  people,  and  thus  all  forecasting  for  people, 
must  start (after climate)  from  some  thoughts  about  how  many  people 
one  is planning or forecasting  for,  and  what  age  and  sex  balance 
II.J. 
there  is  or may  be.  We  therefore  turn next  to  demographic  forecasting. 
It is  a  twentieth  century phenomenon.  Before  that,  some  authors 
had  concerned  themselves  with  demographic  development,  but  t~ey were 
trying  to  discover  a  general  'law',  like Malthus  in his  famous  work, 
which  explained population  ten~\''ncies  by  means  of  a  law pre  sen ted 
generically and  in  a  form  hard  to  quantify.  It was  more  the  product 
of  doctrines  and  theories  of population  than  of  a  scientific approach 
to  population  forecasts.  Toward  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth century, 
an  attempt at  the  mathematical  formulation  of  a  'law'  of  population 
was  made  by  the  Belgians  Quetelet and  Verhulst.Cl)  Verhulst applied  a 
function,  which  was  known  as  logistic,  and  which  was  much  u~ed.  Despite 
other attempts  such  as  the  recent  recourse  to  the  methods  devised  by 
Box  and  Jenkins(,2)for  several  decades  demographers  have  more  or  less  given 
up  attempting  to  project  the  total  size of  a  population  by  means  of  any 
more  or  less  complex mathematical  function.  First of all  the  rigi6ity 
of  the  function makes  it impossible  to  take  into account  the  fairly  rapid 
changes  to  be  encountered  today  in fertility and  in spatial mobility  in 
the  industrialised countries.  Secondly,  the  users  of statistics are 
no  longer satisfied by mere  knowledge  of  the  projected absolute  size of 
the  population.  Increasingly,  they need  information atout  the  development 
of  other characteristics of  the  population  :  numbers  of births  and  deaths, 
number  of migrants,  structure of  the  population  by  age  and  sex,  etc. 
This  is  because  demographic  forecasts  are  needed  today  to  work  out secondary 
or derived  forecasts  (school  attendance,  working  population,  households, 
housing,  etc.)  which  require at  the  very  least a  knowledge  of  the  future 
population by  sex  and  age. 
II.3.2.  During  the  two  decades  before  the  second world war,  demographers 
began  to  concentrate  on  working  out  forecasts  by  the  'component method'. 
{1)  A.  Quetelet:  Sur  1 1homrne  et  le  d~veloppement de  ses  facult~s,  ou 
Essai  de  Physique  Sociale.  (2 vol.)  Paris  1835. 
P.  F.  Verhulst:  "Notice sur la  loi  que  la  population suit dans  son 
accroissement",  dans  "Correspondance mathematique  et 
physique"  publiee  par A.  Quetelet,  Bruxelles  1838. 
(2)  As  in  ~  L.M.Saboia:  Modelling and  forecasting  populations  by  time 
series,  Demography,  1974,  11  (3),  483  - 492. - 2  -
Here  the  population was  projected by  age  and  sex,  differentiating the 
separate  development  of  fertility,  mortality,  and,  if relevant,  of 
spatial mobility.  Briefly,  this method would  start with  a  population 
broken  down  by  age  and  sex  according  to  a  census  taken  at moment  t 
(the  'vector'  at moment  t).  A so-called  'projection matrix'  is 
then  applied  to  it,  summarising  the  fertility,  mortality  and  possible 
spatial mobility within  the  span  of  a  period of n  years,  and  one  thus 
obtains  the  population  (projected)  at  the  moment  t+n.  The  'population 
vector'  can  also  take  into account  the  structure of  the  population 
according  to marriage  status,  or any  other  demographic  feature.  The 
'projection matrix'  will  take  into  account  these  added  structures  by 
incorporating probabilities of  transition  from  one  status  to  another. 
But  in  the  absence  of  data  such characteristics are  in practice  usually 
limited  to  structure  by  age  and  sex,  sometimes  taking marriage  status 
into  account. 
11.3. 
11.3.3.  At  present all industrialised countries  use  this  component method 
for  their demographic  forecasts.  It also  gives  information about 
demographic  events  (births,  deaths,  possibly marriages  and  migrations) 
that are  likely  to  occur during  each  stage  of projection.  Lastly,  it 
makes  it possible  to  take  into  account  the  separate  development of  the 
components  of  the  trend (fertility, mortality,  spatial mobility),  and it 
may  incorporate  the  relations  between  them. 
restrict ourselves  to  this  type  of  forecast. 
Choice  of  assumptions 
In what  follows,  we  shall 
1I.3.4.  Demographic  forecasts  are  always  worked  out on  the  assumption  that 
the  population  in question will never by  struck by  a  catastrophe.  More 
so,  demographers  frequently  accentuate  the  uncertainty of  their forecasts 
by  basing  them  on multiple  assumptions.  In  an  extreme  case,  that of  the 
'Royal  Commission  on  Population'  in Britain in  1950,  no  less  than 
sixteen different forecasts  were  presented  to  the  prospective  users, 
based  on  different assumptions  of  probable  development  of  the  components 
of  the  demographic  trend.  The  advice  of  the  United Nations  in  this 
context  is more  modest;  it consists  of  a  medium  forecast  described  as 
'the most probable',  flanked  by  two  other forecasts  describ~d as 
1high' 
and  'low'.  International practice  does  not  always  follow  the  advice 
of  the  United Nations;  in  the  forecasts  coordinated by  the  OECD  for 
example  (see  below)  the  United Nations'  advice  was  hee~ed at first, 
then  temporarily abandoned,  and  returned  to  in  the  two  forecasts  more 
recently published,  in  a  slightly different  form  - that is,  by  applying 
'correctives'  to  the  forecasts  based  on  'the most  reasonable'  assumptions. - 3  - II.3. 
1!.3.5.  We  do  not  believe  that it is always  desirable  to  present the 
user with a  variety of  forecasts  based on  various  assumption  about  the 
development  of  the  demographic  components.  We  would advise  rather the 
publication of a  single  forecast  judged  •the most  reasonable',  acconl-
panied  by  explanation of the effect  a  modification of  the asswnptions 
would  have  on  the  demographic  trajectory, via subsidiary projections. 
This  single  forecast would still have  to  be  frequently  revised.  If one 
opts  nevertheless  for  several  forecasts,  it is necessary to stipulate 
clearly the  assumptions  used  for  each  one,  so  as  to allow  the  user to 
choose  from  among  them  the assumption which  he  regards  as  best suited to 
his  purpose. 
Demographic  forecasts  and  data  requirements 
!!.3.6.  The  aim of  this  section is  to  show  what  methods  are currently 
being used,  and  to  point out  the  problems  they  pose  in the  sphere  of 
data  gathering.  Only  the  component  approach,  which is used almost 
universally in the industrial countries, will be  considered here. 
1!.3.7.  As  we  have  seen,  this approach is based on  the  knowledge,  at a 
given moment,  of the  population  (of a  country,  region etc.)  broken 
down  according to certain characteristics,  generally age  and  sex,  some-
times marriage status.  These  data are provided  by  the  census,  the  date 
of which usually  detennines  the  forecasts'  point of departure.  A ~ro­
jection matrix'  is applied to  this  original  population,  made  up  of 
indices expressing the  'likelihood•  of bearing a  live child>  of surviving, 
of migrating etc.,  during the  stage of projection selected.  The  projection 
is generally made  stage by  stage:  the original population is usually  pro-
jected over one  or five  years,  then a  projection matrix,  identical to or 
different  from  the first one,  is applied  to this population  (depending 
on whether  the  components  are constant or not),  and  the operation is 
begun all over again.  In extrapolating past trends,  care is taken  to 
make  a  retrospective analysis  of  the  demographic  situation by  means  of 
the appropriate  demographic  indices;  these are usually  obtained by  com-
bining the  data  provided by  the  records  of  registry offices with  those 
provided by  the  census.  These  indices will then be  projected into  the 
future,  and will  go  to make  up  the  projection matrix at  each  stage of  the 
forecast. 
1!.3.8.  The  basic data are  provided by official sources,  both as  far as  the 
original  population and  the initial projection matrix are  concerned,  because 
only  the State has  the  right to  take  a  census  or to  record the basic  facts 
of  a  person's  existence  (birth, marriage,  change  of  residence,  death). - 4  - 11.3. 
11.3.9.  Forecasts of mortality are based  on  an assessment  of ·the  trends  of  pro-
bability of  survival,according to  the age  and  sex group.  This  assessment  can 
be  made  by  keeping  the  probabilities constant,  by  extrapolating the  indices 
observed in the  past  through  graphic  or mathematical  graduation,  by  fixing  a 
target  level  of  future mortality and  by  interpolation between  the current  level 
and  the  target  level  during  each  stage of  the  projection.  Contrary  to  expect-
ations,  there has  been a  growth  in the probability of death  for men  in certain 
age  groups  during the  last two  decades  in industrialised countries.  This  novel 
situation has  led  some  countries  (such as  the  Netherlands)  to  draw  up  their 
mortality  forecasts  according not  only  to age  and  sex,  but also  according to 
the causes  of death.  Despite  the difficulties of this approach  (determination 
of  the main  cause  of death,  modifications in the  taxonomy  of mortal  illness) 
it is probably better than simple  forecasting of mortality by  age  and sex.  The 
question is not very important,  since a  mistaken assessment  of mortality usually 
does  not  have  such  serious  consequences  for  the validity of  the overall  fore-
casts as mistaken assessments  of fertility and  of migration trends. 
1!.3.10.  Correct prediction of fertility  remains  a  critical factor in demo-
graphic  forecasts.  In the past,  forecasting was  based essentially on  the extra-
polation of the fertility trends  by  calendar years  according to  the age  of  the 
women.  The  failure  of  these  forecasts  led  demographers  to  question this 
approach;  the fertility indices  had been  so  much  influenced during and after 
the war by  postponements  and catching-up of marriages  and of births.  They 
therefore  provided an  inaccurate  expression of  the basic  tendendes  of pro-
creative behaviour.  To  remedy  this  fault,  two  new  approaches  were  introduced: 
firstly,  the indices were made  more  specific,  so as  to  take  into account not 
only age,  but also the  duration of the marriage and  number  of  ~hildren 
already  born  (Bourgeois-Pichat,  Henry,  Grabill)  (l);  secondly, 
separate  forecasts .were  made  for  groups  (cohorts)  who  were  born or 
married within the course  of  the  same  year  (Whelpton)  <2>.  The 
two  ~ethods can be  combined,  and their  ~espective advantages  considered. 
(1)  J.Bourgeoi~Pichat:  Mesure  de  la f:condit: des  populations.  Paris,  Cahier 
!NED  no.  12,  1950. 
(2) 
L.  Henry:  F{condit' des  mariages:nouve11e  m~thode de mesure., Paris,  Cahier 
!NED  no.  16,  1953. 
w.  H.  Grabill:  Derivation of age-specific first marriage  rates  and  of birth 
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There  is  some  diversity  in  the  approaches  adopted  by  the  member  countries 
of  OECD.  In  the  last series  of  forecasts  it published,  fertility was 
projected,  according  to  the  country,  in  terms  of  the  age  of women  (some-
times  by  cohorts  and  sometimes not),  in  terms  of age  and matrimonial  status, 
and  in  terms  of  age  at marriage  and  duration of marriage. 
11.·3.11.  The  problem  is  to  forecast correctly not only  the  final  number  of children 
of  each  woman  or couple,  but also  the  changes  in  the  spacing of  the  births.  It 
was  thought  that  this  problem  could  be  solved  by  questioning married women, 
using  a  special  survey  to  discover  their expectations  about  the  size  of  their 
own  families;  but  this  proved vain.  The  family  size  expected  does  not  remain 
constant,  and  furthermore  the  future  birth rate will  be  largely  the  responsibility 
of women  not yet married  (and  even not yet born).  Again,  couples'  expectations 
about  the  spacing of births  are  somewhat  va6Le,  and  statements  about  the  expected 
size of a  family  seem  to  be  a  matter of  fashion.  The  recent fall  in fertility 
was  not reflected  in  the  level of expectations,  which  puts  their usefulness, 
as  far as  forecasting  is  concerned,  seriously in doubt. 
11.3.12.  It does  not  seem  to  us  that forecasting would  be  improved  by  further 
increasing  the  specificity of  the  relevant  indices;  in any  case,  it is hard 
to  imagine  how  the official statistics of  the  industrial  countries  could 
collect more  information  on  the  characteristics of births  and  parents  without 
wearying  the  public  and  thus  endangering  the  quality of  th~ replies.  There 
are  two  possible new  approaches.  One  would  be  further  to  elucidate  theoretical 
relations  between measurements  by  calendar year  and measurements  by  cohorts. 
The  other,  more  important,  would  be  to  find  out more  about what  determines 
procreative behaviour,  and  to  go  beyond  the  somewhat naive  approach of  simply 
asking women  about  the  kind  of  family  they  desire  and  expect;  different methods 
of  research can  be  used  to measure  individual aspirations  and  expectations 
about fertility which  have  recourse mainly  to projective  tests,  utility functions 
of  the  family  size,  variable  schemes  of  family  size  formation  incorporating  the 
differential  use  of  contraceptive methods,  etc. 
basic  research  into fertility  and  social values. 
Here  forecasting merges  into 
11.3.13.  Migration  forecasting  remains  the  most delicate  sector of  demographic  fore-
casting,  for  several  reasons.  First,  data  on migration,both  internal  and  external 6  II.3 
are  far  from  sa~isfactory;  indeed  few  countries  even  require  a  declaration 
of  residence.  Second, clandestine  immigration  is  common  and,  again, 
emigrants'  departures often escape  the  statistical net.  Lastly, 
migrations  (particularly external  ones)  are  influenced more  than other 
demographic  phenomena  by  economic  and  political considerations,  so  that 
simple  extrapolation of past  trends  may  be  more  misleading  than  usual. 
So  predictions  about  this  factor  are  bound  to  be  unreliable;  many 
countries project only  the migratory balance  (immigration minus 
emigration or vice  versa)  which  is  then  broken  down  by  age  and  added 
to  the  foreca$t.  Others  use  a  model  estimate  (a  somewhat arbitrary round 
figure)  of  the migratory balance.  Others  again attempt  to  forecast  the 
flow of  immigration  amd  emigration on  the  basis  of more  or  less plausible 
assumptions.  But all distinguish  two  types  of  forecast:  one  with 
migration and  one  without.  The  characteristics  of emigrants  being 
generally different  from  those  of  immigrants,  we  feel it preferable  to 
assess  the  two  flows  separately;  the migratory balance also has  the 
disadvantage  of  representing  a  difference  between  two  quantities  and  may 
therefore  fluctuate  quite erratically.  But  the main  problem  is  to  learn 
more  about  the  causes  of migration,  the  better  to  be  able  to  forecast it; 
these  causes  are  complex,  depending not only  on  economic  conditions  but also 
upon  the  individual characters  of  the  migrants.  Various  econometric works 
have  attempted  to  pinpoint  them,  but  their usual  defect is  that  they are 
based  on  aggregate variables which  do  not really explain  individual behaviour. 
A more  hopeful  approach might  be  to  incorporate  into a  singl~ model  the 
individual variables,  and  some  contextual variables  as  indicators of socio-
economic  conditions.  One  would  also  have  to  include political factors, 
since  one  may  expect  the  political powers  (national or supranational)  to 
intervene more.  Once  again,  it would  be  difficult to  separate  demographic 
forecasting  from  basic  research,  this  time  into  the  causes  of population 
movement. 
Assessment  of  demographic  forecasting 
11.3.14.  When  the  forecast  is  a  projection,  there  is no  need  to  assess it 
(except  in  the  sense  of  checking  the  calculations).  When  the  forecast 
is  a  prediction,  one  may  and  most certainly must  compare  it with reality 
when  the  time  comes.  One  can also  compare  an older prediction with a  more 
recent one.  Experience  shows  that  long-term  demographic  predictions 
have not  on  the  whole  been  very accurate;  estimates  of  th~ course  of 
fertility and  of spatial mobility have  often been very  faulty.  Still, - 7  - 11.3. 
we  are  sure  that  demographic  forecasts  remain  indispensable.  Firstly, 
one  can  quite easily forecast  the  size of  the  population presently 
alive, if migration is not  too  important,  which  at once  makes  it pos-
sible to  forecast,  for example,the  development  of  the  school-age  or 
working-age  population,  in the short and medium  teuns.  At  the national 
level  the external migration balance isusually fairly  limited;  thus  in 
this  case one  can make  forecasts  based  essentially on  the natural  trend 
of  the population,  which is  less  subject  to  the hazards  of  the  economic 
and political situation than is migration.  Lastly,  although  the  future 
is as  obscure  to  him  as  to  everyone  else,  the  demographer  is  probably 
better than others at avoiding  obvious mistakes,  such as neglecting the 
effect of  the  age  structure on  the  trend,  or forecasting fertility  on 
the basis of transitory behaviour.  And  population  fore~asts may 
certainly serve as  a  basis  for action,  even if they only  draw  the 
attention of the politician to  the  consequence~ that  the  realisation of 
the basic assumptions  of the  forecast would have. 
International  programmes from the  European viewpoint 
11.3.15.  Various  programmes  for the  coordination of and  research in  demo-
graphic  forecasting have  been set up,  particularly by  OECD  and  the United 
Nations. 
About  every  five  years  since  1957,  the  OECD  has  published a  report 
on  the  population  forecasts  of its member  countries.  The  OECD  does  not 
make  these  forecasts  itself, but  coordinates  those  produced by  the 
statistical agencies  of  the member  governments.  The  member  governments 
have all agreed in OECD  to  take  a  single starting point  (l~t January  1970, 
for the  last forecasts  published),  and to  produce  the  results according 
to a  common  pattern, with  the  same  stages  of projections,  same  tenns  of 
projection,  and  same  presentation.  They  have  not  agreed on  any  parti-
cular methodology,  but  they have  agreed  that  two  projections, with and 
without migration,  should be  drawn  up,  that the  'most  reasonable' 
assumptions  should  be  adopted  for fertility, mortality and migration, 
and that possible variants  should  be clarified.  The  OECD  also coordinates 
projections  of households  and working  population made  by  the members  on 
the basis of populationForecasts.  The material is collected on  a  question-
naire devised by  the  OECD  for  the member  countries. - 8  - 11.3. 
11.3.16  The  United Nations'  programme  is very  similar.  Forecasts  on  a 
worldwide,  regional  and national  scale were  published in 1952,  1955,  1958, 
1966  and  1973.  Here  too  the member  countries,  or at least the industrial 
ones,  were  asked  to  provide  forecasts  about  their respective  populations. 
As  far as  Europe  was  concerned,  the  project was  answerable  to  the  •Confer-
ence  of European Statisticians'  convened  by the U.N.  Statistical Commission 
and  the U.N.  Economic  Commission  for Europe.  As  with OECD,the  United 
Nations  did not  standardise any methodology,  but  aimed at unifying the 
starting dates  and  results  of  the  forecasts. 
11.3.17.  Besides  these  two  general  programmes,  there are  several inter-
national  undertakings  more  specifically concerned with international 
migration.  The  OECD  recently set up  a  1Pennanent  System of Migration 
Observation'  (SOPEM1),whose  aim is to  note  the movement  of workers  from 
one  European  country  to another: 
correspondents  chosen  personally. 
the  system is based  on  the  reports  of 
The  United Nations  has  just set up  a 
new  project  for  the  exchange  of data  on  international migration,  which 
should enable  a  country to know  more  about  the size of its emigration 
indirectly through  the  immigration statistics of other countries.  Lastly, 
the Council  of  Europe  has  passed a  resolution inviting the  'Intergovern-
mental  Council  for  European Migration'  (CIME)  to  consider implementing a 
joint project  for the  elaboration of medium  and  long-tenn forecasts  of 
migration within Europe,  also  taking into account  the  countries  of  emig-
ration of  the  non-European  Mediterranean.  The  CIME  has  expressed  the 
wish  to work  together with  the  other organisations active in this  field. 
The  role of  the  European Communities 
1!.3.18  At  present  the  European  Communities  do  not make  or coordinate 
population  forecasts(though they do  eollect available  forecasts made  by 
the member  countries).  Their only  existing programmes  aim at coordinating 
the  censuses  of  the member  countries,  and at drawing  up migration 
statistics on  a  common  basis,  the  latter being still under discussion.  But  the 
Community  Statistical Office has  recently  proposed  to approach member  states 
for information about  current and  future  population projections  on  the 
national  and  regional  levels,  and  to  discuss  a  system  o~ projections  on  a 
uniform basis  for member  countries. 
!!.3.19  It is obvious  that in its policy-making the  Community  cannot  ignore 
demographic  forecasts,  since its own  policies may  influence  the  demographic - 9  - 11.3. 
variables  (for instance,  labour policy will  influence spatial mobility) 
and  conversely  changes  in demographic variables  could affect  the 
Community's  policies  (for example,  a  very  low  fertility would  make  for 
yet  older populations,  and would influence  labour and health policies 
among  others).  In particular, methods  of  fertility control  have  changed 
radically in  the  last ten years  and it is  to  be  expected  that  they will 
become  even safer and more  certain in the next  ten years.  A method  of 
preventing conception after intercourse or of  terminating pregnancy very 
early may  become  available.  Women  may  then be able  freely  to  determine 
for  themselves  how  many  children they will bear.  Ferti!ity could be 
reduced to  a  level which  could halt  population  growth or even  lead  to  an 
eventual  decline of population in developed countries.  The  outcome  cannot 
be  known  yet,  but  the  possibility of considerable changes  in the age 
distribution of  the population must  be  remembered  in forecasting social, 
health,  education,  housing and  employment  requirements. 
II.3.20.  The  Community  could also monitor the effects of possible national 
population policies  (none actually exist at present in the Community)  and 
in  some  cases  - such  as migration  - establish its own  pclicy in this  field. 
The  Community  might also in time  be  led to make  its own  forecasts,  its own 
estimates  and  projections,  particularly since in Europe many  natural 
socio-economic  regions  straddle national  frontiers,  and are  commonly 
neglected in national  forecasting. 
We  think the  Community  might well  also  encourage more  basic  research 
into what  determines mortality, 'fertility and spatial mobility,  largely by 
following  the main  lines  of  research outlined above. 
But  above all,  of course,  we  are  sure  the Community  must  include 
demographic  inputs  in any  general work of social,  economic  and  tech-
nological  forecasting it may  undertake.  If you  don1t  know  how  many 
people  you  are  forecasting  things  for,  and people of what  sort,  then 
your  forecasting is so  much  wind.  Demography  is a  necessary condition 
of all forecasting. 
Recommendations 
II.3.21  Practically speaking,  therefore,  we  think  tha~ whatever Community 
forecasting unit is set up, it should  ensure  these inputs.  It should 
obtain  from  the c.s.o.,  from  the member  governments'  statistical departments, 
and  from  OECD  and  the United Nations whatever material it needs,  some  of - 10  - II.3. 
which would  of course  be  published in any  case.  Its next task would  be 
to-forecast  future  inter-relations between  Commu~ity population and 
Community  poljcy,  particularly when  the  repercussions  transcend national 
frontiers  or when  the Community  is involved as  such,  for  example  spatial 
mobility within  the  Community  following  the  freedom  of movement,  or the 
demographic  and  economic  effects  of  a  Community  policy on  immigration 
from  outside  the  Common  Market.  Its third,  and most  important,  task 
would  be  to  provide  the  demographic  data  needed by  the  specialists in 
economic  and  social  affairs  to work  out  the  general  forecasts  and assess-
ments  which will be  the main part  of its work.  It is precisely in the 
inter-relations between human  activities that demographic  forecasting 
should increasingly be  active.  Lastly,  Europe  Plus  Thirty should,  we 
think,  advise  the  European Commission  on  any basic  programme  of  research 
which it may  wish  to  sponsor through Community  contracts or financed 
nationally in universities  and  learned institutions,  into  those aspects 
of human  behaviour which  determine  population  levels  and structures.  This, 
as we  have  stated above,  seems  to  us  the next  step in the necessary deve-
lopment  of  the  science of  demography  its~lf. 
II.3.22.  As  with climatology,  we  think that  Europe  Plus  Thirty should be 
able  to call  on  the  part-time services  of  one  or two  highly skilled 
demographers.  The  main work is already  done  elsewhere,  and it will be 
enough if Europe  Plus  Thirty is assured of access  to it, and of the 
best  possible specialist help in selecting and handling  the  data 
necessary  for its own  work.  As  with climatology and with education (see 
below)  it should  from  time  to  time  call conferences or seminars  on  the 
subject,  and  commission special  studies. PARr  II 
4.  AGRICULTURE,  FISHERIES  AND  FORES'IRY 
General  background 
11.4.1.  The  rapid  technical  development  in agriculture in the Western 
countries  in the  last hundred years  has  been  largely stimulated by 
government  research which  has  not  only made  it possible  for  production 
to keep  pace with  the  growing  population,  but  also  for  a 
steadily shrinking fraction  of the working  population to  be  engaged in it. 
Because  of the  low  price elasticity of both  supply  and  demand,  the 
largely uncontrollable yield fluctuations,  and  the  related instability 
of agricultural markets,  in practically all the  industrialised countries 
the  prices  of agricultural  raw  materials  on  the  domestic market are 
subject  to  government  intervention,  to  protect either the  consumer or 
the  producer against  the  uncertainties of  free market  forces. 
II.4.2.  With  fisheries,  the  situation is different.  Outside certain narrow 
national  limits  (whichare  likely to be  changed  by  the third U.N.  Conference 
m  the Law  of the Sea),  fish are.a common  resource~ to which  access  is 
open.  The  industry  increasingly uses  techniques  of industrialised 
hunting,  and  governments  subsidise  fishing  fleets not  only to protect 
consumer and  producer against market  forces  and natural  fluctuations 
in the  stock  of  fish,  but  also to protect the national "take"  of the 
coummn  resource against  other,  competitively subsidised,  national 
efforts.  Fisheries are  now  heavily over-capitalised;  the  same  catch 
could often be  obtained  for half the effort.  Until  recently it was 
widely believed that the world  catch could be  doubled or trebled without 
more  than  local  damage  to  stocks  from  overfishing,  but  this view  no 
longer prevails.  The  world  fish catch,  measured  by weight,  nearly 
doubled between  1958  and  1968;  but  since  1968,  despite  a  continued 
increase  in fishing effort, it has  failed to  increase,  and  in some  seas 
has  fallen.  Only  costs  have  continued to  rise.  Effective  fishery 
management,  including  the  regulation of access,  could still improve 
prospects  for another increase  in the availability of  fish protein,  and 
a  reduction in the  cost  of obtaining it. - 2  - II.4. 
11.4.3.  In agriculture,  major structural  changes  have  occurred both 
in  consumption  and  in the  production,  processing and  distribution 
of vegetable  and  animal  products.  The  calorific value  of  food  con-
sumption  per head  in the  countries  of  the West  is very high  (c.  3000  kcal); 
it is  now  at  a  stand-still or barely  increasing,  but  the volume  of 
agricultural  production is still going up.  This  is  due  to  the  replace-
ment  of vegetable  by  animal  products,  which  requires  an  increasing 
conversion of vegetable material  into meat,  with  a  substantial  loss  of 
calories;  e.g.,  in order to  produce  100  calories in the  fona  of  pork 
an  intake  of  approximately  400  calories in the  form  of  fodder is needed. 
1I.4.4.  Some  of  the  feed  intake is waste  as  regards  human  consumption; 
some  is not.  Take  tor instance  fish used  for  feed  (and  sometimes  for 
fertilizer).  There  are  three distinct cases,  namely:  a)  fish which 
cannot  be  usPrl  directly as  food  (e.g.  anchoveta,  fish waste),  b)  fish 
which,though  originally suitable  for human  food~is processed as  meal 
(or fertiliser)  because  it is  damaged  or stale,  and  c)  fish which, 
though  suitable  for  human  food,  is processed into mea{  or fertilizer 
for  economic  reasons  (e.g.  North  Sea  herring).  Obviously  the  intrinsic 
soundness  of the  operation is different  in the  three cases. 
11.4.5.  Urbanisation and  regional  specialisation within agriculture, 
fishing,  and  food  processing have  (within Europe)  widened  the  average 
distance  between  production and  final  consumption.  Thus  the  supply  and 
distribution of  foo~ has  become  increasingly  dependent  upon  the  trade 
and  transport  system. 
1I.4.6.  In  agriculture~  the  trendwise  increase in yield per ha.  (e.  Z7o 
annually)  is accompanied  by  an  increasing use  of fertilizers  and  crop 
protection agents.  In  the member  countries  of the  EEC  the  use  of 
fertilizers  has  increased  fourfold  since  1950. 
11.4.7.  In  farming,  the  general  increase in prosperity has  led to  the  large-
scale  replacement  vf manual  workers  by machinery,  which  is a  way  of 
replacing solar energy  by  fossil  en~rgy.  In the  last  20  years  the 
number  of agricultural workers  fell  by  about  half in  the  EEC  countries, 
the  decrease  in animal  power was  even greater,  and  the use  of tractors 
and  other engines  and  the use  of  energy  (oil,  gas,  electricity)  has 
increased  four times. - 3  - II  .4  .. 
Mechanisation and automation  require  larger  farms,  and  fewer 
fanners.  Despite  the  decrease  in the  number  of  farms  - 2~% per annum 
in the  EEC  since  1960  - the  small  family  fann  is still characteristic 
of West  European agriculture.  Within the Community  about  80%  of  farms 
are  smaller than  20  ha.  (45%  in the UK,  but  95%  in Italy).  Since  1960 
the  average  size of  farms  bigger than  1  ha.  has  only  increased  from 
1 2~ to  15~ ha. 
I1.4.8.  Parallel  processes  have  operated in fishing.  Recent  increases 
in the  total  catch of  the nine  EEC  countries  have  been modest  (1948: 
c.  3  m tonnes;  1958:  c.  3.6 m tonnes;  1968:  c.  4.8 m tonnes; 
1973:  4.76  m tonnes)  but  there  has  been a  parallel  reduction in manpower, 
and  a  parallel  increase in the average  size and  capacity of vessels  and 
equipment,  and  in the  average  consumption of energy  expended  per unit  of 
food  obtained.  Equally,  there are  communities  of  small  inshore  fisher-
men,  using traditional,  small-scale,  low-energy methods,whose way  of 
life has  changed as  little as  that  of  some  small  farmers. 
I1.4.9.  In the  growing  sector of  food  processing,  on  the other hand, 
pronounced  tendencies  towards  concentration are afoot.  The  food 
processing il!dustry is  expanding its influence  on  the  raw materials 
market  (contract  farming)  and  on  the distribution of the end-product. 
The  advent  of  supermarkets  etc.  has  also  caused  change  in the distribution 
pattern of  foodstuffs,  which  increases  the  need  for  food  processing 
(standardisation,  packaging,  etc.). 
All  this has  been made  possible  by  cheap  fossil  fuels. 
11.4.10.  For the most  part,  the  Community  eats  home-grown  food.  The  follow-
ing figure  shows  the  relation between  home  supply  and  home  consumption 
(breakeven point= 100)  of  important  food  items  (av.  1972). 
TABLE  1 
Whole  France  West  Italy  UK  Nether- Belgium  Den-
EEC  Germany  lands  & Luxbg  mark 
Grains*  90  168  79  67  28  43  97 
Sugar*  92  162  96  72  32  111  217  125 
Potatoes*  101  102  96  90  98  134  97  108 
Meat  92  94  82  69  67  174  123  345 
Butter  106  122  114  74  23  388  121  323 
Cheese  102  116  85  80  61  224  48  246 
Vegetables  94  97  39  111  74  198  119  82 
Fruit  76  96  40  128  32  63  60  56 
Oils & Fats  45  33  57  29  29 
*Data  for  1972/73 
Ire-
land 
63 
108 
103 
244 
203 
522 
117 
25 - 4  - II.4. 
The  United  Kingdom,  West  Germany  and Italy are  predominantly 
importers  of agricultural  products;  France,  the Netherlands,  Ireland 
and  Denmatrk  have  for many  products  an  export  surplus.  These  differences 
nrc  co~tlpensated for by  intra-EEC  trade  (as  the  first  column  shows). 
Trade with third countries is increaBtng.  In  1972  the values(in units 
of account)  of  impor~ and  exports of:agricultural  raw  materials and 
mod  from  third countries were as  follows: 
Imports 
Bxports 
13.1  (bill.units of account) 
3.8  (  "  ) 
Balance  -9.3  (  " 
The  balance  of  trade with the  four main blocs  of  partners was  as 
follows: 
u.s.A.  -1.6 
Other Developed countries  -2.2 
Developing  "  -4.5 
Communist  "  -1.0  -
-9.3 
For the most  part the  imports  of  thP.  Community  are  tropical 
agricultural  products  and  raw  material  for  fodder. 
[I.4.11.  Among  the member  countries  there are considerable  differences  in 
food  consumption habits,  partly traditional,  partly as  a  consequence 
of  different prosperity  levels.  The  following  table  shows  the average 
individual  consumption  (in kg  per head)  of  important  food  items  in the 
tue111ber  countries  (av.  197 2): 
TABLE  2  (1) 
Wheat 
) 
---
flour*  Potatoes*  Sugar*  Meat  Fish*  Butter  Margarine 
France  73  94  35  97  14.4  8.6 
West  Getmany  67  94  34  87  9.1  7.1 
Italy  129  39  30  62  11.1  1.9 
United  Kingdom  99  78  16.4  7.2 
Netherlands  62  83  45  67  8.6  2.0 
Belgium/Luxb.  77  111  28  85  5.4  8.2 
Deruuark  66  69  48  64  31.8  8.6 
Ireland  83  117  46  86  8.2  12.4 
*  Data  for  1972/73 
The  consumption  of meat,  vegetables  and  fruit  has  grown 
regularly  during  recent  decades,  whilst  the consumption of bread and 
potatoes  has  decreased. 
(1)  Source  for Tables  1  and  2  EUROSTAT 
3.3 
9.2 
0.7 
6.3 
17.9 
12.8 
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11.4.12.  As  regards  agriculture,  the European Communities  already possess 
wide  powers  and  instruments via  the  eommon  Agricultural  Policy (CAP); 
it is in  fact  the  only  field in which the Community  has  real  supra-
national  authority.  As  regards  fisheries,  its authority and  functions 
have  been comparatively  slow  to  develop.  This will  change  in the 
likely event  of  UNCLOS  III  pe~itting coastal states  to establish,either 
individually or grouped  in  regional  bodies,  an  Exclusive  Economic  Zone 
(EEZ)  of  up  to  200  nautical miles,  within which  exclusively to exploit 
the  natural  resources  (and  perhaps  also to control  pollution and 
scientific research). 
II.4.13.  In the  longer  te~ the  Community's  responsibility,  and  the 
need  for  knowledge  and  insight  deriving  from it, may  extend  to  the 
following  fields: 
!1.4.14. 
ensuring the  food  supply within the  EEC  quantitatively and 
qualitatively,  including safety  from  biological,  chemical,  or 
radiatibn contamination. 
the  efficiency of  food  production within the  socio-economic  frame-
work  of the EEC,  both  on  land,  in coastal waters,  and within the 
EEZ  of member  states; 
the contribution that the  EEC  should make  to  the  improvement  of 
the world  food  supply; 
the  distribution of  income  between  the agricultural,  fishery, 
and  the other sectors,  and  the  quality of  life in rural  regions  and 
fishing  communities; 
the  dependence  of  food  supply  on  energy  and  raw  materials,  and 
energy budgeting within agriculture and  the  fishing  industry; 
the  ecological aspects  of modern  agriculture and  fisheries; 
substitution between vegetable and  animal  products  (food,  timber, 
fibres,  fodder,  fertilizer,  etc.)  and  synthetic  raw  materials; 
sea-use planning,  or the priorities to  be  observed between 
different uses  of a  given area of sea. 
All  these may  conflict with one  another. 
Agriculture 
Objectives  and  instruments  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
The  establishment  of a  common  market  for agricultural  produce 
required a  supranational agricultural  policy to take over the  function 
of the  fo~er national  policies  for price stabilisation and  income support. - 6  - II .4. 
The  goal  of  the  CAP  is  to  guarantee  a  reasonable  income  for the 
farming  population,  and its main  instrument is a  price  policy.  Within 
the  EC  a  price  level  is  laid  down  for  a  number  of  important  agricultural 
products  which  offers  a  reasonable  remuneration  for  the  producers. 
Via  a  complicated  system of market  regulation,  the  domestic market  is 
therefore  detached  from  erratic price movements  on  the  international 
markets.  Variable  levies  and  subsidies  on  imports  and  exports are 
an  essential  part  of  the CAP,  and  so  are  intervention measures  (support 
buying,  stcck  financing,  encouragement  of  consumption).  Insofar as 
internal  production differs  from  internal  demand,  equilibrium on  the 
internal market  is  pursued  by  influencing  foreign  trade.  Disequilibria 
on  the  internal market  are  thus  passed  on  to  the  international markets. 
II.4.15.  The  manner  in which  the  CAP  supports  the  incomes  of agricultural 
producers means  that  consumers  of  foodstuffs  have  to  pay  a  price  regarded 
as  reasonable  reimbursement  for agricultural  production within the 
Conununity.  When  production differs  from  domestic  consumption,  the costs 
of  import  or export  subsidies  (dependent  on  the  price  level  outside 
the  Common  Market)  and  of possible interventions  on  the internal market 
are  borne  by  the  European  Guidance  and  Guarantee  Fund.  The  yield of 
levies  on  imports  or exports  constitute  the  revenues  of the Fund.  In 
past  years it has  become  clear how  sensitive the  Fund's  budget  is to 
disequilibria  on  the  home  market  and  to  price movements  on  the inter-
national markets.  Butter and meat  "mountains"  have  caused  the  outgoings 
from  the  Fund  to  reach alarming proportions,  and  have  led to politically 
highly  damaging  sales  of meat  and butter to  the  Soviet Union at prices 
much  lower than  t:hose  paid by  the  consumer within the  Community.  If 
charitable subsidies are to  be  paid to Eastern Europe,  we  take it for 
granted the Cornmunity  would wish  as  soon  as  possible to obtain  forecasting 
good  enough  to  ensure that that is  done  by political decision,  and  not 
by  economic  accident. 
II.4.16.  If agricultural  production in the  EEC  continues  to  increase  faster 
than  consumption,  the budgetary  burdens  of the  CAP  could continue  to 
grow  apace,  depending  on  price  levels outside.  The  CAP  can exert only 
little influence  on  the  long-term developments  of  supply  and  demand  with 
respect  to  food  products within the  EEC.  In fact  it does  not  do  much 
more  than tinker with  the  problem in the  short  term,  by  comparing  a  given 
internal  supply  and  a  given internal  demand  and  by  using  foreign  trade - 7  - II.4. 
as  a  manipulable  balancing quantity.  Only  when  this  remedy  threatens 
to  become  too  expensive,  as with butter and meat,  is an  attempt made 
to  influence  domestic  production  uy  changes  in relative  prices or by 
incidental  measures  such  as  bonuses  for  switching to  a  different  type 
of  farming,  slaughtering grants,  etc.  Little is known  about  the effect 
of  such measures,  but,  in its Memorandum  on  adjustment  of the  common 
agricultural  policy  (October  1973)  the Commission  recognises 
the  need  for  a  better "grip"  on  the  volume  and  composition  of  production 
to  prevent  too  great  a  call  on  the  Fund. 
II.4.17.  It is also an  object  of the  CAP  to  encourage  structural 
adjustments  in production.  In this  field  responsibility is still vested 
primarily in the  Member  States.  The  EEC  is trying to  coordinate  these 
activities and  to  key  them  to  common  interests.  The  structural  changes 
in agriculture  (increase in  farm  size,  retrenchment  of  labour,  forms 
of cooperation,  contractual  ties with  trade  and  industry)  have  been 
caused by  rapid overall  economic  growth  and  technical  development,  and 
the  present  structural policy  aims  further to  reduce  the  number  of  farmers 
and  farmworkers  (alternative  employment,  retraining,  schemes  for  farm 
amalgamation), to  improve  the  infrastructure  (opening  up  of  remote  areas, 
re-allocation of holdings,  water control),  and  to modernise  farm  equip-
ment  (interest  subsidies  for certain investments).  In this connection 
"efficiency"  has  so  far been interpreted above all as  lower costs per 
unit  of  product  for the  individual agricultural  entrepreneur. 
Widening  the  objectives  and  the need  for policy-oriented forecasting 
11.4.18.  Even within the  limited objectives  of  the  present  CAP  there is 
a  great  need  for  research into  the  long-term  development  of  supply  and 
demand.  Forecasting in this  field has  confined  itself too  much  to 
an  extrapolation of historical  trends,  and,  as  we  argued in our General 
Introduction,  this alone  is never much  use. 
II.4.19.  On  the basis  of its permanent  supranational  responsibility  for 
food  and  agriculture,  the  EEC  will  have  to widen  and  deepen its  pot~cy. 
It will  not  be  able  to  confine itself simply to  reacting to more  or 
less  autonomous  developments  in production and  consumption.  .The 
increasing interweaving of  these  developments with other social  interests 
(both  inside and  outside  the  Community)  will make  it necessary  to 
formulate  explicit  longer-term objectives with  respect  to volume,  com-
position,  and  technical  and  economic  organisation of  food  product1on. 
The  need  for policy-oriented  forecasting will  become  more  urgent. - 8  - 1!.4. 
11.4.20.  The  great world  food  shortage  since  1972,  which  harms  most 
those  least able  to  help  themselves,  spotlights  the  role that the 
agricultural  policy  of  the  rich countries  (and  therefore of the  EEC) 
should  play  in improving  the  world  food  situation.  In the  short term 
the  wealthy  countries,  with  their agricultural  technology,  may  be 
called upon  to  face  acute  emergency  situations  by  increasing  food  aid 
and  by  building up  and  financing  strategic  food  stocks.  But  in the 
longer term  a  solution to  the world  problem  can  be  attained only  by 
stepping up  agricultural  production in the  poor countries  themselves, 
for which  financial  and  technical assistance will  have  to  be  inereased. 
Moreover,  the agricultural  policy by  which  the  rich countries  protect 
their own  farmers  will  have  to  be  amended,  in order to achieve  stable 
prices  in world markets.  The  wealthy  countries  will  be  able  to achieve 
these  conditions  by  controlling their own  production  (and if necessary 
their own  consuntption  too)  so  as  to avoid  disrupting the international 
markets  both by  price-cutting and  by  price-raising.  This  would call 
for  policies  capable  of  influencing the  development  of agricultural 
production and  food  consumption much  more  effectively than  the present 
market-regulating measures,  and  devising and  comparing alternative 
policies would call  for substantial  forecasting.  In this,  EEC  policy 
will  need  the  backing of  research into  long-term developments  in  food 
on  a  world-wide  scale.  This  research  should be  carried out  in close 
cooperation with  FAO  and  OECD.  It  requires  a  multidisciplinary 
approach in agriculture,  economics,  demography,  sociology,  oceanography, 
climatology,  etc. 
11.4.21.  The  energy  and  raw lliaterials  shortage  has  made  us  aware  of the 
vulnerability of our  food  supplies.  Recent  studies  of  the consumption 
of  fossil  energy will  have  to extend to  the whole  chain of the  food 
supply,  the  transportation and  processing of  foodstuffs,  and their 
physical  location.  The merits  of alternative  production  systems  must 
also  be  evaluated with  reference  to  our  long-term expectation about 
the  price of  energy  and  raw materials  for  food  production  (more  or 
less  regional  specialisation in agricultural  production and  food-
processing;  alternative degrees  of mechanisation and  of fertilizer use). 
The  agricultural  sector is not  only  a  consumer of  fossil  energy;  it 
can  also bring forth  products which are useful  as  fuel  (straw,  wood, 
alcohol). 9  - II  .4 
II.4.22.  As  we  noted  above,  there is increasing concern about  the  environ-
mental  impacts  of modern agriculture,  particularly pollution,  ecological 
disturbance,  and  the  spoiling of beautiful  landscapes  by asbestos  barns, 
by  the  grubbing  up  of orchards  and  hedges,  and  by  the  destruction of 
fine  old  farm  buildings.  Forecasting could help assess  alternative 
ways  of meeting  this  concern. 
II.  4. 23.  Whether  or not  battery-reared and  fish-fed  veal,  bacon,  or chicken 
is as  good  for  you  as  the  natural variety, it is certainly not as nice, 
and  everywhere  people  are  ready  to  pay  more  for the natural  taste.  In 
an  industry which  stood more  or less  on its own  feet,  that would  not 
be  a  reason  for  forecasting.  But  agriculture is, in the Community, 
highly  dependent  on  public  power,  and that means  the  forecasting  done 
for  the  public  power  should include this matter. 
II.4.24.  Present agricultural policy bears  obvious  traces of the "growth 
philosophy"  of  the Fifties and Sixties.  Price  support  as  the  principal 
instrument  of  income  policy  perpetuates  the  prevailing income  differ-
entials  due  to  differences  in  farm  size.  The  resulting economic 
situation led to  an  increase in  farm  size and  socially undesirable side-
effects,  such  as  depopulation of the  countryside,  turning  rural  areas 
into business centres,  demand  for more  jobs  in non-agricultural  sectors 
etc.  Now  that  increase  in productivity has  become  a  highly conditional 
objective in our society,  there is  every  reason  fundamentally  to 
rethink  the  part that the agricultural  sector should play.  This  rethinking 
makes  forward-looking  research  desirable  into  the  effects  that alterna-
tive  forms  of production might  have  on  income  distribution,  population 
density in rural  regions,  competition within the  EEC  and with  non-member 
countries,  burdens  on  the  Fund,  etc.,  and  above  all  an  employment 
outside agriculture. 
Fisheries 
II.4.25.  The  period  during which  exclusive  economic  zones  (EEZ's)  are likely 
to  be  established in the U.N.  coincides with  that during which  the 
Council  of Ministers  of  the  Community,  according to  the  1973  Act  of 
Accession,  "shall  examine  the provisions which  could follow  the 
derogation,  in  force  until December 31st  1982",  from  normal  Cormnunity 
rules  concerning non-discrimination towards  other member  states' - 10  - 11.4 
citizens  and enterprises.  At  present  this  derogation merely  allows 
protection  to  local  inshore  fisheunen  to  certain specified waters  off 
Britain,  Denmark,  and  Ireland.  But,  because  the  establishment  of  EEZ 1s 
will  permit  the  regulation of access  to what  are  now  High  Seas  Fisheries, 
the  examination  could well  embrace  the whole  subject  of  the  Community's 
functions  and  policy  relating to  offshore  development  and  sea  use  planning 
within the new  zones.  Productive  European  fisheries are only  one  aspect 
of this. 
II.4.26.  Sea  use  planning as  a  concept,  which we  discuss  in II.l2 below,  is 
scarcely  beyond  the  embryonic  stage,  and  fishery management,  which must 
now  be  developed  as  a  function  of  government,  is still in. its infancy. 
Under  international  law  access  to all  fisheries  beyond  12  nautical 
1nile3  (n.m.)  from  the  shore  has  up  to  now  been  open,  and state member-
ship  of International  Fishery Commissions,  and  observance  of the 
restrictions  the Commissions  propose,  has  been,  in effect, voluntary. 
11.4.27.  Fast moving  and  powerfully  equipped distant water  fishing  fleets 
are  now  ubiquitous;  they are  able  to  engage  in  ''pulse-fishin~',  to 
clear one  area  and  swiftly move  on  to  the next.  The  Russian  and  the 
Japanese  fleets are  by  far the  largest.  Between  them,  according  to 
FAO  figures,  the  Soviet Union  and Japan in 1973  landed nearly  30%  of the 
world catch;  in  1968  it had  been  23%  and in 1958,  21%.  Flag-of-
convenience  fishing vessels  are also  now  operating  vessels,  that is, 
registered in states which  do  not  observe  or enforce  international  norms 
of  crewing,  safety,  pollution control,  etc.  These  developments will 
face  the  EEC  with  quite unfamiliar problerns  of physical  enforcement. 
Indeed,  the  establishment  of  EEZ 1s  will  for  the  first  time  enable 
coastal  governments,  singly or preferably  in regional  groupings, 
effectively to manage  the  fisheries  off their shores.  Fisheries  in 
the North East Atlantic,  and  particularly in the North  Sea,  are  some  of 
the  most  prolific in the world;  while  those  in the Mediterranean, 
though  less  prolific,  are,  in money  terms,  particularly valuable.  In 
each area  there are  non-EEC  countries  conducting important  fisheries, 
and  Community  fishery management  policies will  need,  from  the beginning, 
to  be  coordinated with  the  governments,  fishing industries,  and  research 
organisations  of  these neighbour countries. - 11  - !!.4 
II.4.28.  Although  fishery  statistics are notoriously uncertain,  and  the 
dynamics  of  individual  fish  stocks still obscure,  considerable  informa-
Li<'n  is available  from  national,  regional  and  international  sources. 
The  International  Council  for  the  Exploration of  the  Seas  (ICES)  at 
Copenhagen,  OECD,  FAO,  and certain other bodies all conduct  research 
and  collect and  publish information.  None  of it is policy-oriented, 
in  the way  that will  be  required when  the  regulation and management 
of all off-shore  resources  falls,  by  international agreement,  to  the 
coastal  state,  and,  thereby in turn,  to  the  European  Communities. 
Fo.rest ry 
Developments  in the world 
II.4.29.  Demand  for timber is strongly  dependent  on  technical  development. 
In  the U.S.  the  annual consumption  comes  to about  2000  m3  per  1000 
inhabitants,  of which  nearly  50%  is in the  form  of  pulpwood  (raw material 
for  the  paper industry);  the  level  in the  Community  is about  800m3 
per 1000  inhabitants,  with  the  same  percentage  for  pulpwood.  In  developing 
countries  the volume  of accessible  forests  is the  determining  factor; 
wood  is mainly  used as  fuel.  FAO  projections  show  a  rapid increase of 
world  demand  for timber,  especially  given  the  growing need  of the  paper 
industry.  (We  do  not  need  to  rep?.at  our view  of projection.) 
II.4.30.  The  average  annual  growth  of  timber in existing forests  limits 
production if reserves  are  to  be maintained.  In many  areas  this  limit 
has  not  yet  been  reached.  Nevertheless,  large areas  of natural 
forests  in tropical  regions  are  being  lost by  injudicious  unplanned 
felling,  or by  turning  forests  into  farm  land. 
On  continuation of  present  trends it must  be  feared  that eventually 
a  structural world  deficiency of  timber may  arise.  There  are also 
climatogenic  implications.  The  threatening scarcity might  be  countered 
by  enlarging  the  forest  areas.  Because  of the  long time  of maturing 
(15  to  50  years,  according  to  the sort of  tree)  early planning is 
imperative.  Forestry,  therefore,  is a  subject  that  stringently requires 
long-term  forecasting. - 12-
11.4.31.  The  EEC  is not  rich in forests.  For each  1000  inhabitants 
there  are  110  ha.  against  1450  in the U.S.  or 3100  ha.  in the  Soviet 
Union.  The  Community  has  to  import  about  50%  of its wood  (for the  UK 
and  for  the Netherlands  this percentage  is still higher).  The  annual 
value  of  these  imports  is more  than  5  billion units  of account.  Most 
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of  the  imports  are  pulpwood;  the  paper industry in the  EEC  is 80% 
dependent  on  imports  from  third countries.  But  the  export  surplus  of 
the  traditional  suppliers  (Canada,  Northern and Eastern Europe)  is 
diminishing  fast  as  home  demand  increases,  and  there is a  tendency there 
to manufacture  paper  for  export  rathr than  to  export  the  raw material. 
This  adds  to  the vulnerability of  the  EEC  timber supply. 
11.4.32.  The  European  Commission  encourages afforestation in areas  less 
suited  forfarm production.  The  Commission's main  purpose  is to 
improve  the  farm  land structure,  e.g.  by  protection against  sto~s, 
and  better equilibrium between soil and water.  But  the production of 
timber is also  promoted because of  the  growing  demand  and because  of 
the  favourable  labour aspects  for  the agricultural  population.  Forestry 
does  not  need  daily attention;  it can neatly be  scheduled in the  yearly 
pattern of  farm  work,  it provides  a  welcome  supplementary  employment, 
especially in mountainous  and  remote  areas,  and many  people  from  outside 
agriculture  like to  lend a  hand.  It is enjoyable work  for the healthy. 
Need  for  long-term  forecasting 
11.4.33  All  this will  require  a  thorough analysis  of the  future  supply  of 
and  demand  for  timber,  both in the Community  and in third countries. 
Cooperation with  FAO  and  OECD  in the  research work is desirable. 
The  necessary  research  should cover all  the possibilities which 
might  contribute  to  a  less vulnerable  position for the Community. 
This  involves  the  substitution of wood  by man-made  materials,  particularly 
in the  packaging industry,  economising  on wood  consumption  by  cutting 
down  w~ste (e.g.  sawing,  production of cellulose),  and  the  effect on 
paper use  of  introducing modern  telecommunications  _systems. 
11.4.34.  The  research  should evaluate  the possibilities of a  larger timber 
production within the  Community,  observing all the consequences  on 
other fields,  e.g.  food  production.  Higher yields  from  the existing 
forests  through better exploitation and the introduction of fast-- 13  - II.  4 
growing varieties may  be  attainable.  In the  long  run,  however,  a 
reduced  dependence  on  imports  - if that is desirable  - can  only 
be  realised by  an  enlargement  of  the  forest  area. 
1I.4.35.  Forests  not  only  provide wood;  they also  stabilise and 
enrich the  environment,  afford  space  for  recreation,  and differentia-
tion of the  inland  scenery.  A consistent  long-term  forest~r policy  should 
take  into account all the manifold aspects  involved.  The  same  goes, 
of course,  for policy-oriented forecasting  in forestry. 
Character of  policy-oriented  forecasting 
Object  of  forecasting 
11.4.36.  The  wany  interests mentioned  in the  preceding sections  are 
closely  interwoven and  often  competitive.  Forecasting will  therefore 
have  to  be  of an overall  nature.  It will  have  to  try to  indicate  the 
influence  of alternative  future  developments  on all  relevant  subfields 
(e.g.  the  internal  food  supply,  the world  food  situation,  envirorunent, 
the  call  on  raw  materials,  the uses  made  of the  seas,  income  and 
employment  distribution etc.).  This  overall  forecasting must  therefore 
be  of  a  multidisciplinary nature.  It will  clearly have  to  be  geared 
to  the  problems  facing  policy-making agencies,  which  means  that  policy 
variables  should be  explicitly introduced into a  forecasting model  so 
that  the  policy-maker can weigh  the  effect of alternative measures. 
11.4.37.  If forecasting is to  llleet  this  requirement,  research  should try 
to  identify the  causal  relations  in the  socio-economic  process.  For 
the  food  supply  systea1,  for instance,  in addition to  quantitative 
infonuation on  the  technical  input-output  relations in the various  links  in 
the  production chain,  insight is  needed  into  the  conduct  of  the "actors", 
i.e.  the  producers  and  consumers  of  food,  in order to assist the  policy-
tuaker  in the  fonnulation  of objectives,  which  must  often be  pursued  by 
influencing behaviour  (via  prices,  taxes,  restrictions,  etc.) 
Practical considerations 
11.4.38.  Iwportant  preliminary work  has  already  been  done  in this  field 
by  a  working  party which  has  reported  on  forecasts  for agriculture  on 
the  instructions  of  the  European Cownissionl).  P~rtly as  a  result of 
1)  "Landwi rtscha ftli che  Voraussch•atzungen",  Haus1ai ttei  lung  en  Uber Land-
wirtschaft Nr.  48  (Sept.  1969)  and  Nr.  63  (October  1970),  EEC  Commission, 
birectorate-General  for Agriculture. - 14  -
this  report,  the European Commission  (Directorate-General  for 
Agriculture)  has  made  a  forecast  of production and consumption of 
agricultural  products  in 1977  in the  EEC.  The  results  have  been 
published.(l)  This  study was  carried out in cooperation by  six 
institutes  from  different Member  States,  and  the  forecast  for the  EEC 
is the  sum  of  the  forecasts made  for the  separate Member  States. 
Differences  in the statistical base material  imposed  restrictions on 
the methods  used,  which are not identical  for the various countries. 
The  forecasts make  common  assumptions  regarding developments  outside 
the agricultural sector (incomes,  prices,  unchanged policy).  The 
forecast  of  future  production is based mainly  on  trend extrapolation; 
owing  to  shortage  of  data and  time,  advanced  techniques  could not be 
employed. 
Recommendations 
II.4. 
II.4.39  Policy-oriented  research will have  the best chance of success if 
it can  take  place within a  central  instrument at Community  level which 
also does  forecasting in other fields.  The  research  team which within 
Europe  Plus Thirty will  be  charged with  forecasting in the agriculture, 
fisheries  and  forestry sector should consist of about  7  persons, 
viz:  2  agricultural scientists,  1  expert in fisheries,  2  agricultural 
economists  and  2  econometricians.  Looking  outwards, it should keep in 
close  touch not  only with  FAO,  but also with the  proposed International 
Food  Policy  Research Institute in Washington,  if the  latter comes  into 
being.  Looking  inwards, it should maintain close contacts with experts 
in  research institutes at national  level  for technical  and  economic 
know-how  in subfields  and  regional  statistical infoDnation.  But  the main 
emphasis  of  the  research will have  to fall  on  the central  team.  This 
set-up is also  the best  guarantee of close interaction between  research 
workers  and those who  hope  to make  use  of the  results,  in order to 
achieve  policy objectives.  Up  to now  the  gap  between  the  two  parties 
has  often been  too  great,  to the detriment of both  research and  policy. 
As  far as  fisheries  is concerned,  the  research has  not  been  done at all. 
"  (1)  "Projektionen uber Erzeugung und VerRrauch  landwirtschaftlicher 
Erzeugnisse  1977",  Hausmitteilungen uber Landwirtschaft Nr.  129 
(April  1974). PART  II  II.S. 
s.  HEALTH 
Present pattern 
II.S.  1.  The  countries of  the  Community  have  health patterns which  are 
broadly similar.  The  differences  derive at least in part  from 
differences  in  the  environment  and  in  the national  services  for  the 
protection or  promotion of health.  Professional health services  are 
available in all countries at approximately  the  same  level of  sophis-
tication,  though  there  are wide  differences  in their organisation and 
accessibility  to  the  public.  These  factors  affect  the practicability 
of  long  term  forecasting  for  the  Community  as  a  whole. 
II.S.  2.  It is possible  to  define  in general  terms  the  factors  which 
influence health and  from  recentttends  to  suggest what  kind of develop-
ment  may  be  expected  in  the  future.  But  the  like~y progress) in 
science  relevant  to medicine  cannot  be  projected  from  present knowledge 
beyond  some  cautious  estimates  for  the  next  decade.  Scientific advances 
could make  possible major  changes  in our ability  to  prevent or  delay 
the  onset of  chronic  disease,  including cancer,  or arrest or control 
its course.  Social  and  environme~tal factors  could affect  the 
incidence  and  severity of accidents which  are  a  principal  cause  of 
disability and  death.  The  great advances  in control of acute and 
curable diseases,  apart  from mental  illness,  have mostly  been achieved 
already. 
II.S.  3.  Progress  in developing  the  health services  has  been  by  a  series of 
short steps with occasional  longer strides at  times  propitious  for 
change,  such  as  the  combination of  circumstances  social, material  and 
political,  in Britain at  the  end  of  the World War  II.  The  pressures 
for  orderly development  and  the  rising cost are  causing  a  general 
drift in all countries  toward  greater centralisation,  using  regional 
and  local  planning within national policies.  The  method  of  financing 
services  differs considerably within  the  nine  countries:  the  use  of 
insurance  and  of payment  by  fee  per  service on  the  one  hand,  or central 
taxation and  salary or capitation on  the other,  has  an effect on  the - 2  -
form  of  the  service  to  patients.  It does  not  seem  likeiy  that  the 
pressures  for  change will  lead all countries  to  an almost  identical 
pattern,  as  has  happened  in Eastern Europe,  but  there may  well  be  far 
greater similarities  in  the  future  than exist now.  Certainly  there 
are opportunities within  the  Community  for other members  to  make  sub-
stantial  improvements  by  applying methods  proven  by  individual 
countries  in an  idiom suitable  to  themselves. 
The  changing  cost 
II.S.4.  All  member  countries  spend  between 5.0  and  7.0  per cent of  their 
rr.s. 
GNP  on health.  All  have  broadly similar statistical indices  of health, 
with marginal  differences  in favour  of  the  Netherlands  and  Denmark. 
These  indices  do  not  suggest  that  the  amount  spent on health correlates 
closely with  the  result achieved,  but rather  that  some  systems  may 
operate more  economically  than others  for much  the  same  result.  We 
discussed  this  phenomenon  in I.4 above. 
rr.s.s.  The  cost of health care has  been escalating rapidly during  the 
last 15  years  - more  in  some  countries  than in others  - so  that it has 
become  clear  that selection of priorities will  be  necessary in future. 
No  country will  be  able  to  provide all  the  services  that would  be 
technically practicable,  given .the  resources.  The  total  demand  that 
such  services would make  on  trained manpower  and  on money  would  become 
prohibitive.  Such  selection as  is  practised now  is intuitive rather 
than rational,  and all our  countries  urgently need  to  devise  improved 
methods  of  choice  and  of application of  choices. 
The  precursors  of  current changes 
II.5.6.  A recent report  ~y the  Canadian Department of Health(l)  identifies 
four  main  components  which will affect health in  the  future  as:  human 
biology,  environment,  lifestyle,  and  health care organisation.  These 
are  componentsthat  have  not  been clearly evaluated in  the  past,  perhap~ 
because  the  preoccupation has  been mainly medical,  and  thus  disposed 
to attribute more  of  the  demonstrable health  improvement  to  technical 
medical  intervention  than  can  be  justified in a  dispassionate  assess-
ment. 
II.5.7.  Life  expectancy has  greatly increased in all our countries  during 
this  century,  but  that process  began  in  the  18th century when  the  rapid 
( 1)  Lalonde  M.:  "A  New  Perspective  on  the  Health of  Canadians'~ 1974, Canadian 
Ministry of National Health  and  Welfare. - 3  - II.S. 
increase  in population,  first in France  and  later in Britain,  began. 
Similar increases  occurred  in other countries,  though  not  on  exactly 
the  same  time  scale.  They  were  probably mainly attributable  to  better 
nutrition,  to  improved  sanitation and  housing,  and  to  better public 
understanding of  the  contribution  these  general  factors  make  to  health. 
The  direct contribution of medicine  through  therapy was  limited until 
the  last forty years  or so. 
11.5.  8.  Mortality in infancy is now  little more  than one  tenth of  that of 
a  century ago.  The  present  low infant mortality rate of  12  to  20  per 
1000  may  be  expected  to  fall  further  in all  the  nine  countries,  perhaps 
to  a  figure  as  low  as  10;  but  even  this  cannot  produce  a  large effect 
on overall  life expectancy.  Drugs  effective against a  wide  range  of 
infections  and  vaccines which  give specific protection against many 
common  epidemic  diseases mainly affecting children have  been  developed 
and  made  widely available  in  the  last forty years  and  have  produced 
further  improvement. 
11.5.  9.  There  is  now  a  radical  change of emphasis  in health care  from 
preoccupation with acute,  potentially lethal,  but often  ~ompletely 
curable,  disease  to  simple  specific preventive  programmes,  and  supportive 
and  ameliorative  treatment of chronic illness with  the object of 
retardation rather  than cure.  The  chief  problems  of  the  developing 
countries are still those  of  controlling infection and  a  large  research 
effort is still needed  in  the  Community  directed against diseases  that 
are  now  rare  in our  group  of countries  but still common  in theirs,  if 
we  are  to  help  them. 
11.5.10.  It is  the  experience of all  the  countries of  the  Community  that  the 
number  of  people  over  the  age  of  65  in  the  population has  increased 
rapidly in  the  last 25  years  and it is  certain that  this  increase will 
continue  during  the  next  decade.  Moreover  during  that  time  and  in  the 
following  decade  the  number  aged  over  75  will  increase proportionately 
even more.  Since  the  very old make  disproportionately  large calls 
upon health services  and  institutions,  the  total  load  on  the  social 
budget,  including  the health budget,  must  increase. 
11.5.11.  All· those  who  are  born must  eventually die;  the  great change  during 
this  century has  been  that most  of us  have  grown or will  grow old  in our 
way  to  our  deaths.  Disease  processes  of various  kinds  develop  more  or - 4  -
less  insidiously as  ageing  proceeds.  One  or more  of  these morbid 
processes will  finally  be  determined  as  the  cause of  death and  one  or 
more  of  them  is  likely  to  produce  disability before  - often long 
before  - death.  The  great health problem of  the  future  is  thus  the 
prevention or postponement of  the  clinical  emergence  of  chronic 
degenerative  disease  and  the  disability which  accompanies  it.  In  al~ 
our  countries  by  far  the  largest component  is cardiovascular disease, 
especially of  the  coronary arteries.  Accidents,  poisoning  and  violence, 
the  various  forms  of cancer,  and  chronic  respiratory disease are  the 
other main  causes  of  death.  In all  the  countries  the  age  specific 
rates  for women  are  less  than for  men,  excluding  cancer.  Some 
relevant  figures  are  given in Table  1  and  show  that an  important  factor 
in future  health and  social organisation will  be  the  predominance  of 
women  in  the  older  age  groups. 
TABLE  1 
Life  Mortalit~ Eer million 
ExEectancl:  Perinatal  Males 
Males  Females 
Mortalit~  35-'4445-54 
Belgium  68.3  74.3  25.1  2757 
Denmark  71.1  75.7  18.9  2311 
France  68.5  75.9  25.4  3650 
Irish Republic  69.  3-1~  72.7•k  26.1  2612 
Italy  69.9*  75.2*  32.4  2802 
Luxembourg  67.4  73.8  24.7*  3468 
Netherlands  71.1  76.5  19.6  2086 
West  Germany  68.5  74.4  25.2  3051 
United Kingdom: 
England & Wales  69.1  75.1  23.7  2298 
Northern Ireland  69.3  74.0  29.2  2801 
Scotland  67.5  73.4  25.6  3195 
Source:  WHO  Health Statistics  - quoted  by Maxwell ( 1) 
Year  1969  except* 
(1)  Maxwell,  R.  "Health Gare:  The  Growing  Dilemma" 
Pubo  McKinsey & Co. 
7722 
5994 
8050 
7393 
7046 
8901 
6100 
7372 
7242 
8263 
8757 
Females 
35-44  45-54 
1615  4240 
1886  4241 
1773  4135 
1818  5181 
1587  3796 
1784  5000 
1473  3418 
1919  4368 
1737  4379 
1882  4720 
2098  5646 
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The  possibility of  reducing morbidity  and  mortality 
11.5.12.  Forecasting  in various  fields will  be  affected  by  changes  in 
morbidity  and mortality.  We  are  in much  the  same  position as  our 
forebears  a  hundred  years  ago  who  were  able  to  initiate changes  in  the 
sanitary condition of  the  population which were  highly  successful  in 
the  long  run without  knowing  the scientific rationale of  what  they  did. 
Once  the  nature of  infective agents  was  known,  the measures  were  made 
far more  effective.  The  nature of  the  underlying  degenerative pro-
cesses may  not  be  known,  but  some  empirical measures  undoubtedly would 
be  successful  now  if the  public  could  be  persuaded  to  apply  them.  It 
is probable  that identifiable external  factors  are  responsible  ior  the 
incidence of at least half of  the  cases  of  cancer,  and  cancer of  some 
sites is  almost wholly  due  to  a  known  external  cause.  In Britain over 
a  quarter of all deaths  from  cancer are  due  to  cigarette  smoking,  and 
over  one  third of  those  in men;  in  the  other countries  the  proportion, 
though  not yet as  high,  is  rising  in both men  and  women.  Some 
probably most  - changes which would  have  a  beneficial effect on health 
require  changes  of habit or  lifestyle by  systematic  individual  effort, 
and those changes would  be  more  likely if,  for  one  thing,  the  commercial 
promotion and  public facilitation of cigarette smoking were  forbidden. 
II.5.13.  It is certain that  some  of  the  causative  factors  in degenerative 
and  malignant  disease will  be  more  clearly understood within  the next 
30  years.  It is  to  be  expected  that  some  of  these  factors will  be  chemical 
or physical,  and  present in circumstances  which make  it possible  to 
remove  or  reduce  them  without calling upon  a  change  in human  behaviour. 
II.5.14.  Exposure  to  various  chemical  or physical agents  in  the work situation 
can  be  reduced  or  removed  by statutory.requirement.  Some  methods  of 
working  which  produce  damaging  trauma  over  a  long period can  be  modified. 
Otl.er exposures  which affect  the  unborn  foetus  will also  be  identified 
and  modified  in ways  which will  reduce  the  occurrence  of prematurity and 
congenital  defect,  e.g.  maternal  smoking.  Atmospheric  pollution  in 
general  and  exposure  to  dust  and  fume  in  the  work situation will  be 
modifiable.  Some  factors  naturally present in  food  or added  to. it in 
processing may  be  incriminated.  Abuse  of alcohol  and  some  psychotropic 
drugs  are  common  socio-medical  problems.  Some  potent  therapeutic  drugs 
may  be  shown  to  be  toxic  to  some  patients  through  idiosyncrasy or pro-
longed exposure  and  some  may  even  be  effective  in  the  short  term but 
associated with  increase  in malignant disease after prolonged  use. II.S.lS. 
II.S.l6. 
- 6  - II.S. 
An  association of softness  in drinking water  and  raised mortality 
from  cardiovascular disease has  been  shown  in  some  countries,  and  a 
causal  relationship if demonstrated would  require  substantial  changes 
in  the water  and  in  the  means  of its distribution.  It is  probable 
also  that  the possibility of  improving health by  the  addition of  some 
factors  to  generally used  food  or water will  be  established.  If so, 
better means  of obtaining public  and  professional understanding  will 
be  needed if their use  is not  to  be  frustrated  by  uninformed  oppositiop, 
like  that  to  the  fluoridation of  drinking water. 
It is probable  that better understanding of diet and  nutrition 
will  be  used  to  promote  changes  in dietary habits,  which will  affect 
agriculture.  It is  to  be  expected  that  the  use  of  tobacco  in  the 
world will decline  - perhaps  to  a  large extent  - as  understanding 
spreads.  The  land used  to  grow it can  then  be  used  for  food  production 
(but a  reduction in  tobacco consumption would  also  increase  the  popula-
tion).  The  consumption of  sucrose may  decline  as  a  measure  to  reduce 
obesity and  indirectly  the occurrence of  diabetes  and  perhaps  heart 
disease.  The  use  of  animal  fats  may  be  reduced,  and  the  choice of 
alternative vegetable  fats may  require  changes  in  the  type of  rape 
seed  used.  If human  wastes  come  to  be  used  as  fertilizer in Western 
agriculture  as  they  commonly  are in some  Eastern countries,  new  pre-
cautions  against  the  transmission of  enteric infections will  be  needed. 
11.5.17.  Mental  illness and handicaphave  been making increasing  demands  on 
health services  for  the  last twenty yeats, but  during  that  time methods 
used  in  those  services  have  greatly  improved.  The  Danish  and  Dutch 
services provide  good  examples.  This  has  been mainly  due  to  better 
medico-social management,  assisted  by  the  new  drugs  that have  become 
available.  The  former  high mortality  from  intercurrent infections  in 
hospital populations  of  the mentally ill.or handicapped has  been 
reduced,  and  as  a  result  those  populations  now  include many  older and 
more  dependent persons.  It is  to  be  expected  that  improved  pharmacological 
treatment of  the mentally ill will  become  available,  but more  social 
support will  then  be  needed  for  the  larger population of older mentally 
enfeebled persons  in the  community  or in hostels.  For  these,  and  for 
the mentally  robust elderly,  energy policies will need  to  take  account 
of  the necessity of  adequate  space heating in homes. 7  II.5. 
II.5.18.  The  study of human  genetics has  advanced  rapidly ih recent years 
but it is still at a  fairly primitive stage.  Popular fears  about  the 
possibility of "genetic engineering"  probably go  much  too  far,  but 
genetic mechanisms  will certainly have  been elucidated and  more  precise 
prognoses will  be  available  to  intending parents,  and  in  some  societies 
artificial insemination by  donor  (AID)  as  well.  Early prenatal  di_agnosis 
of  some  congenital handicaps will probably be  possible  so  that such 
pregnancies  can be  terminated where  the  law permits.  As  we  mentioned  in 
II.3., methods  of controlling pregnancy and parturition may  become  so 
safe  and  precise  that  they will  largely be  in  the  hands  of women  themselves. 
II.5.19.  Accidents  are  the  cause of  a  large proportion of  the  deaths  of 
younger men,  and  therefore contribute  largely  to  the  total years  of 
life lost before  the  age  of  65.  If a  substantial proportion of  these 
years  of productive  life could  be  saved,  the  contribution  to  society 
would  be  greater  than  from  a  small  average  extension of  the  life span. 
II.5.20.  The  problem of  the  increase  invenereal disease  is closely related 
to  changes  in sexual mores,  and  has  only  been controlled  by  social 
measures  successfully in  the  Peoples'  Republic of  China.  Vaccines 
could  become  available  should  their use  be  acceptable. 
II.5.21.  Modification of  life-style could make  a  far greater contribution  to 
the  improvement  of health and  the  prolongation of active life  than 
more  technical medical activities are  likely  to  do  by  the  year  2005. 
If such  results are  to  be  auhieved,  governments  and  the health 
professions will have  to  devise more  effective measures  of health 
education  than  they have  yet deployed.  To  persuade  the  individual 
that his  enjoyment  and  expectation of  life would  be  enhanced  by 
abstention  from  fast driving,  smoking  cigarettes,  drin,king more  than 
small  amounts  of alcohol,  over-eating,  and  lapsing  into physical 
idleness at an early age,  has  not  been  seriously attempted.  Intrusion 
into  the  social  choices of  the public and  the profitability of certain 
industries would  be  necessary if governments  were  to  take  these 
possibilities seriously.  The  gain would  be measured  in years  added 
to healthier  lives  - more  than might  be  expected  from  intervention of 
any other kind.  Since  no  country has  been successful  in any  of  this, 
the  results of  such meagre  steps  as  have  been  taken  should  be  exchanged 
amongst  them.  The  work of Europe+ 30  could not  but  show  the  benefits 
to  be  achieved. 8 
11.5.22.  Much  highly  sophisticated medical  work  is  already  undertaken 
for  gains  which  may  be  problematical  for  the  individual  and  even 
less certain  for  society.  Pressure  of  financial  constraints 
on  the  one  hand  and  of  emergence  of new  scientific possibilities 
on  the  other will certainly ensure  that a  deliberate selection of 
priorities within health services  becomes  normal  practice. 
A forecasting  unit  can  project  the  trends  of  such  studies 
and  examine  interactions with other  trends. 
11.5.23.  This  discussion has  been mainly  concerned with  the  scientific 
progress  to  be  expected.  The  changing pattern of  illness,  the  ageing 
of  the  population  and  the  increasing potency  of  the  drugs  available 
11.5. 
for medical  use  will make  the  provision of satisfactory primary  and 
continuing health care  even more  important.  The  means  used  to  secure 
this  vary  somewhat,  and  in  some  countries it has  become  increasingly 
difficult  to maintain  a  satisfactory health care  team  to  work  outside 
hospital.  Changes  in medical  education and  the  organisation of medical 
practice  are  likely  to  be  required  as  best fits  the  organisation of 
health  and  social security services  in each  country,  but each  can  learn 
from  the  others.  Hospitals may  become  more  expensive  concentrations  of 
scientific facilities  on  one  side  but may  also have  increasing  long  stay 
components  on  the  other.  They will  only  be  economically  feasible  and 
medically effective  insofar as  they  are  orientated  towards  the  support 
of  community  care. 
11.5.24.  The  main  need  of  the  countries  of  the  Community  is  fuller exchange 
of  information  rather  than  adjustment  to  a  single pattern.  This  can 
be  developed  from existing  liaison arrangements.  Long  range  forecasting 
on health prospects  or bio-medical  advance  is hazardous  and  must  be 
imprecise.  The  application of new  bio-medical  progress  to  organised 
health care  could  be  greatly  improved,  but by  national  rather  than 
international effort. 
Recommendations 
11.5.25.  Europe  Plus  Thirty will need  continuing medical  input because 
health is affected by climate,  environment,  and  energy,  and  both 9 
affects  and  is affected by  the  shape  of our populations,  our  institutions, 
economy,  industry,  food  supply,  education,  and  society  in general.  In 
all  these  Europe  Plus  Thirty should  be  doing  forecasting,and medical 
inputs  based  on  wide  medical  and  allied scientific contacts  are 
necessary.  "Medical"  is  taken here  to  comprehend  the  health professions 
and  related science. 
rr.s. 
I.5.26.The  simplest way  for Europe  Plus  Thirty  to make  some  general  prognostication 
about potential  development  in  the  bio-medical  field will  be  to  look at 
progress  already being made  but not yet generally applied,  and  we  have 
given  some  examples  of  this  above.  It will  therefore need  continuing 
medical  participation and  a  source  of medical  advice.  On  the  other hand, 
it will not  require  a  substantial medical  section  w:in  house".  Even  a 
whole  time  team member  would  probably not be  a  suitable  solution because 
the  kind  of  broad-based knowledge  of  the  bio-medical  field and  practical 
association with health service  required would  diminish  rapidly  in an 
individual  recruited  for whole  time  work.  A medical  participant would 
need  both  a  knowledge  base  to  which  expert associates  continually 
contribute,  and  practical  links with services.  The  best solution would 
be  the  part-time  involvement  of  a  senior medical  member  of  an  active 
university department  or special  institute such  as  might  be  found  in 
several countries  in  the  Community.  Such  a  base  department or institute 
might need  strengthening  so  that  the  senior member  would  in effect lead 
a  part-time  team of other members  of  the  staff.  This  would  give  a  wider 
range  of expertise  and  outside  information sources.  The  leader of  this 
group  would  need  to  work  in close  liaison with  the  Chief Medical 
Officers  or equivalents  in all nine  countries,  with  the  heads  of national 
medical  research agencies,  and  with WHO.  The  effect would  be  to  give 
Europe  Plus  Thirty  the  equivalent of more  than  one  whole  time medical 
staff. 
II.5.27. In short,  we  recommend  broadly  the  same  pattern here  as  we  recommend 
for  climatology,  demography,  and  education:  that Europe  Plus  Thirty should 
be  able  to  cru.l  on  the  part-time services of  the  right people,  and  should 
call seminars  as  needed. PART  I I  I I • 6. 
6.  SOCIAL  STRUCTURES  AND  VALUES 
II.6.1.  The  vastness  and variety of society,  which  makes  forecasting 
about it so  important,  also makes  it hard to  forecast  about.  Unlike  other 
sectoral  forecasting  (technological,  demographic,  economic,  etc.)  social 
forecasting is concerned with  the  system  - society  - that controls,  and 
contains  the behaviour of all  the others.  At  the outset,  therefore,  we 
have  to stress  the  difference of  forecasting in this area  from  forecasting 
in all others.  Society is the  fabric itself within which all  the  other 
sectors we  talk about  are  threads.  All  other variables and  systems 
assume  a  context,  and it is society. 
11.6.2.  In this chapter we  shall  not  discuss  the possibility of forecasting 
about  this whole  fabric,  only  forecasting about  certain threads  in it 
which we  corrunonly  call "social",  and which are not  included in other 
chapters  of our  report.  We  have  in mind  such  threads  as  religious belief 
and  organisation.  the administration of  justice and  order,  the  family, 
trade unions,  consumer associations,  social work and  public welfare,  racial 
and  other  minorities,  the arts and  culture in general,  recreation and 
leisure.  Even  to talk about all these would  swamp  our report;  so  we 
shall  only take  e·xamples. 
11.6.3.  But  first,  a  general  caution to which we  attach the very greatest 
importance.  All  the other chapters  of Part  II  concern  forecasting about 
matters which may,  and  indeed should,  be  planned in a  democracy 
technology,  the  economy,  energy,  etc.  And  the  same  is true of much  of 
this chapter;  the administration of justice,  public welfare,  etc.  may 
and  should be  planned.  But  there is an  exception;  it is contained in 
the word "values" at the  head  of the  chapter.  By  values we  mean  simply 
what  people  think about  things,  what  they  think important,  what  they 
want.  One  may  legitimately forecast  about value  changes,  about  the 
"transvaluation of values";  indeed it is most  useful  to  do  so.  But  one 
may  on  no  account  plan  them,  in the  sense  of  seeking to bring  them 
about  or prevent  them.  To  do  so would  be  to manipulate  the very 
identity of people,  and  our experience and abhorrence  of that is one II.6.4. 
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of  the  reasons  why  we  have  been able  to  fo~ a  Western  European 
Cornmunity  at all.  It is not  so  everywhere,  but  our states exist 
II.6. 
to  serve  the values  and wishes  of  individuals,  and  the  European 
Communities  are an  emanation  of  our states.  This  chapter therefore 
treats,  in part,  of things  which~  never be  planned,  and  forecast-
ing about  which  must  therefore never  tend  towards  the  choice of goals. 
There  is no  such  thing as  a  social expert;  nobody  can know 
society as,  for instance,  the  technologist  knows  technology.  There is 
no  body  of  social  theory which allows  us  to  define the structure or 
properties  of  the  social  system as  such.  One  has  to approach the  subject 
pragmatically;  i.e.  choose  the best method  for  the  procurement  of the 
set of  facts  required.  It might  be  repeated  public  opinion surveys;  it 
might  be  the identification of opinion-founing groups,  who  we  assume 
think today  as  others will  think  tomorrow;  it might  be  official  surveys 
and  public  records,  it might  be "participant observation",  (a  technique 
of  anthropology,  whereby  a  specialist actually lives  and works with a 
group  under study), it might  be  "analysis by  precursive  events"  as we 
described it in I.3.  A vast  amount  of all of  these  already  exists at 
national  level. 
I1.6.5.  Our expectations  and  forecasts  of  social  change,  as  in other fields, 
1I.6.6. 
must  depend  on  our knowledge  of  past changes.  This  knowledge  alone 
gives  us  some  concept  of  general,  systematic change,  as  opposed  to  random 
and  contingent  changes.  As  we  remarked in I.3.  above,  you  need either 
historical  data  series  or theories,  and  a  theory not  based  on  the  founer 
is not  much  use. 
Theories  abound  in this  field.  Perhaps  society is mainly  changed 
by  economic  factors,  as  Marx  said,  or by  changing values  and beliefs, 
as  de  Tocqueville and Weber  said.  De  Tocqueville's analysis  of  the 
transfonning  force  of  the "passion for equality "  in Democracy  in America 
remains  one  of  the  finest  exercises  in "social  forecasting".  So  also 
Max  Weber  and Tawney  on  the  role of  the "protestant ethic"  in bringing 
about  capitalist development  in Western Europe,  and  - at the other 
end,  as it were  - the  force  of scientific and  technical  rationality 3  II.6 
(or bureaucracy)  as  the  overriding  impulse  in  the  future  development of 
industrial  society. 
Or  perhaps  it is mainly  changed  by  technology,  with all other 
social  changes  seen  as  the effects of adjustment  to  technological 
change.  New  technologies,  such  as  railways,  force  society  to  adapt. 
Thus  technology  shapes  our mental  map  of  society.  This  model  is 
particularly popular with certain contemporary  futurologists,  e.g. 
Alvin  Tofler.  "Technology,  the  great growling  engine  of change." 
Or  perhaps  there  is  an  ineluctable  cycle  about  everything 
as,  in  their different ways,  Spengler  and  Toynbee  maintained. 
11.6.7.  All  these  thories  have  their consequences  tor social  forecasting, 
but,  since  they  are mostly contradictory,  we  recommend  that Europe  Plus 
Thirty should not allow its work  to  be  too  much  influenced  by  any  one  of 
them.  It woulG  be  better  to  seek  to  apply  each  or any of  them  - or 
others  - to  various  situations  as  hypotheses  which may,  or may  not,  suggest 
useful  tools  for  social analysis  and  thus,  deriving  therefrom,  for 
forecasting. 
II.6.8.  Putting various  theories  and  preconceptions  together with  the 
empirical  data which will  come  its way,  Europe  Plus  Thirty can  ask of 
each:  What  sort of politics  does  this model  imply  1  To  what  extent 
under  this hypothesis  do  technical possibilities  limit  the  political 
options  1  What  range  of  life-styles  is possible  if society really 
~  orks  as  this  theory  says it does  1  Can  this  theory be  used  to  fore-
shadow  demands  which may  in future  be  made  by  society  on  technology  and 
on  the  economy  1  And  so  on. 
11.6.9.  For  instance,  Daniel Bell's contention about  the  increasing 
"technification" of  institutions  in  decision-making  is shared by many 
others  of more  radical  disposition  like Alain Touraine  and  Jllrgen Habermas. 
His  model  - like Marcuse's  and  many  radical  ones  - comes  out of  a  period 
of  economic  growth;  it would  therefore  be  instructive  for  the  fore-
casting  team  as  a  whole  to  compare  it with models  that accept  slow or 
zero  growth,  such  as  Robert Heilbronner's  Enguir~ into  the  Human  Pros2ec t ( 1) 
(1)  Pub.  by  Norton,  New  York,  1974. 11.6.10. 
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and  Schumacher's  Small  is  Beautiful~!)  The  latter is particularly 
instructive in emphasising the  importance  of  local control  and  a 
human  scale with  an appropriate  technology  to match.  These tracts 
were  both written before  the  energy  crisis. 
The values,  structures,  and  life styles,  the  rise or fall  of 
1!.6. 
which would  be  fit subjects  of speculation  for  Europe  Plus Thirty,  could 
be  extremely  numerous.  What  follows  is to be  taken as illustration, 
not  precept. 
Substantive areas  that need  exploring 
An  ageing  population 
11.6.11.  The  increasing average  age  of  our populations is one certain 
11.6  .. 12. 
demographic  trend which will  certainly affect predominant  social 
values  and attitudes;  it will  promote  those which  are  commoner 
among  older people  than  younger,  and may  well  yet  further increase 
the  tension between old and  young.  It is harder to  dete~ine what  the 
older people  of  tomorrow  will actually want;  probably stability and 
order,  but  to  say  that is not  to  imply  right-wing politics.  The  demand 
could well  be  for stability and  order within a  more,  not  less,  collec-
tivist frame.  Such  questions  deserve  speculation. 
The  problem of  commitment 
The  rational management  of  production implied in most  pro-
jections of modern  industrial  society  depends  for its working  on  a 
strong commitment  on  the  part of  the workforce,  especially the  technical, 
professional,  and white collar workers.  What  if - as  some  evidence 
suggests  - this declines?  There  has  recently been  some  reaction amongst 
younger professionals against  involvement  in conventional  professional 
practices;  some  lawyers,  architects,  social workers,  teachers,  have 
not wanted to  push  the  familiar career pattern.  Status has  become  less 
important.  Some  have  simply withdrawn,  as  casual "freelances" or 
social  security clients.  Others,  more  interestingly,  have  gone  into or 
set  up  new  agencies  and  practices,  using their skills and  experience 
(1)  E.  Schumacher.  Pub.  by  Blond,  London  1973. II.6.13. 
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ln a  111anner  which  they  consider more  truly in accordance with the 
principles  of their vocation.  Examples  are:  neighbourhood  law 
centres,  couununity  centres,  local action  groups,  environmentalist 
groups,  etc.  These  trends  point  to  a  weakening  of  comrnitrnent  to  the 
existing social  structure,  and  a  commitment  to  something else,  more 
local,  more  grassroots,  more  capillary.  The  shift has  been  made 
easier by  the  dispersal  of skills and  knowledge,  which were hitherto 
concentrated in  large cities,  into  small  towns  and  suburbs  as  the 
metropolitan population declines. 
II.  6. 
The  trend  iLnplies  a  disillusionment with  the nation state and 
its centralising tendencies.  But  another  reaction is also noticeable, 
and  is of more  interest to  the  Community:  the  one  which  looks  beyond 
the nation state to  the  international.  For  some  time  now  it has  mainly 
been  the  economic  and  scientific elites which  have  tried to  push inter-
national  aggregation  - and  this is very much  the  knowledge  class. 
Is  there an up-valuation of service,  loyalty and  responsibility, 
because  people at  the  local,  smaller level  hope  to have  more  control 
over what  happens?  If so,  it might  apply also to  industry,where  perhaps 
a  radical  change within industries  - especially the  secondary  - might 
resolve  the  problems  of  boredom,  voluntary absenteeism,  strikes,  and 
industrial  sabotage.  Some  managements  are  redesigning  the  organisation 
of work  to  make  it more  involving.  Already  some  firms  have  started to 
break up  the  assembly  line  organisation,  in the direction of more 
autonomous  working  units  responsible  for  a  diversity  of  tasks  and more 
complete  components. 
11.6.14.  These  trends  and  the  problems  associated with  them  are  so  far 
rather new  and they  deserve  close  study in so  far as  they  have  implica-
'  tions  for  the  future  of  European  societies.  It is,  perhaps,  worth 
considering whether  these  trends  among  European  youth may  be  a  product  of 
the  undist~~bed full-employment,  economic-growth,  period of the  last  two 
decades.  Recent  changes  in study and  career preferences  observed  among 
university  students  in several  European  countries  (and in the U.S.) 
suggest  that  doubts  as  to  economic  stability and  employn1ent  possibilities 
may  now  be  tending to  reestablish a  more  traditional  relation-
ship  to work,  and  to  reawaken interest in a  stable and  orderly society. 
What  is  the  dividing  line between  a  trend and  a  fad? - 6  - II.6. 
Beliefs  and values 
II.6.15.  What  are  the  limits of  tolera~ce in a  society with  highly 
articulated, if not  always  rational,  political and organisational 
structures?  Is it possible  to  say  anything about  the "value stretch"  that 
can  co-exist with basic  efficiency and  coordination?  Expectations  on  the 
future  of  industrial  society mostly  assume  the scientific view  of  the 
world.  It was  commonly  expected  that industrial  society would bring in 
the  secular society;  it would  be  a  society in which  people  thought  more 
and  more  of nature  and  reality as  science dispelled the  force  of the 
supernatural,  the  unobservable,  the  undemonstrable.  But  these  expecta-
tions  have  not  been  fulfilled.  Even if institutional  religion has 
declined,  there  has  been  no  lack of  secular ideologies  and "scientific" 
faiths  for  industrial man  to  espouse.  To  add to this,  in latter years  in 
the West,  we  have  seen  a  great burgeoning  of cults and  sects of  a  quasi 
or explicitly religious  character,  which are  now  reaching back into  the 
established churches.  Society still needs  emotional  bonds,  which are 
not  found  in the  realm of politics and  economics.  Difficult as it must 
be,  we  need  to  get  some  ~nkling of the  likely character of  thought  and 
feeling in the  late twentieth century,  of the  everyday assumptions, 
beliefs and working hypotheses  by  which  people will wish to  guide 
their lives,  of  the aspirations  they will  have  for themselves  and 
their children.  How  likely,  for instance,  is a  revival  of mass  religion 
within  the  established churches?  What  of the "therapeutic corranunities", 
of  sects,  cults,  and other expressions  of exclusiveness  and  retreat? 
What  is the  future  of deliberate unreason? 
II.6.16.  In thinking about  the  future  Europe  Plus  Thirty should  speculate 
about  the  compatibility of  a  pluralism of values with the  functioning 
of  a  science-based economy  and  society.  Forecasting about values  -
difficult as it may  be,  - has  to be  done,  since values are  the inner 
bloodstream of any  social  system.  And  this  forecasting,  as  we  argued 
above,  must  be  of  a  different kind  from most  that we  recommend,  since 
freedom  itself is at stake. - 7  - 11.6. 
The  family 
11.6.17.  The  family  is wort~of separate  investigation.  How  are its day-
to-day  and  intimate structures  likely to  develop?  What  might  be  the 
effect on  family  structure of  the  detennined movement  by women  to get  a 
uniform equality with men?  What  might  be  required  to offset  the 
problems  of household management  and  child  rearing,  and what  would  be 
the  effect  on  the  children,  if the mothers  of  young  children increasingly 
seek  fulfilment  outside  the  home?  For instance,  can  one  envisage that 
old people  could  be  "brought back"  to play a  major role in the  upbringing 
of their grandchildren?  Or,  conversely,  that women  would  come  to  demand 
a  basic  right  to  part-time work?  Can  one  assume  that the nuclear family 
will  for  ever  remain  untrammelled  and  free  floating,  as  the sole  relevant 
family  unit  - relevant,  that is, both  for its members  and  in the eyes  of 
the  social institutions outside it? 
11.6.18.  Significant  changes  in the  family  size and  structure and  in its 
life cycle already are  under way  in most  European countries.  The  number 
of children in average  families  has  fallen  sharply,  with the consequence 
that the child-rearing period in a  typical  family  is now  shorter than  a 
generation ago.  Because  of higher living standards  and  improvements  in 
the  housing situation,  families  and  even  single  young  people  live alone. 
The  time  needed  for  cooking and  cleaning has  fallen  thanks  to better 
equipment  and  changes  in consumption patterns  (more  ready-made  food, 
etc.).  All  in all,  family  structures have  changed,  the activities in 
the  family  have  changed  too,  and  the  length  - and .content  - of  the 
different stages  of  the  typical  life cycle of European  families  have 
changed  accordingly. 
11.6.19.  The  commune,  and  even  the  extended  family,  are here  and  there 
superseding the nuclear family  as  the  closest  framework  for  the  indi-
vidual,  though  usually in a  transient way.  If the  trend solidifies, 
it would  have  implications  for new  housing.  Even  the nuclear family 
itself has  become  surrounded by  a  host  of other institutions, advising, 
giving,  cajoling,  remedying,  threatening.  Far  from  taking the  pressure 
off families,  these many  points  of contact make  life more  complicated. - 8  - II.6. 
Families  have  had  to  become  small  archives  of infonnation and expertise 
to  cope  successfully with  the welter of institutional  demands  made 
on  them,  instead of  the  other way  round.  These  demands  come  along-
side  of  a  parallel  process which  has  been making it more  difficult 
for  family  members  to  live near each other,  to help  and  support  each 
other,  and at the  same  time  abolishing or diminishing  the  info~al 
sources  of  support  and advice  once  available in neighbourhood communities. 
All  these  changes  interact. 
Minorities 
II.6.20.  We  care  pretty well  for the minorities we  can  see:  most  member 
countries  devote  ever increasing resources  of money  and skills to 
making  life decent  for  the  immigrant workers  in our industrial cities, 
and  the  same  applies  to  disabled people,  the old,  one-parent  families, 
and  so  on.  But  it would  be worth  forecasting about what may  happen  to 
a  minority "we"  hardly  ever see,  the very poorest citizens of the 
Community,  the islanders  of Italy and Scotland,  and  the  Eskimo  tribes-
men  of  Greenland.  Here  the  argument  shades  off into  regional  policy of 
the  familiar sort, but it behoves  democratic  and would-be  compassionate 
societies to  pay  special attention to the poorest of all.  The  same 
applies  to  gypsies,  who  are increasingly suffering from  the erosion of 
their traditional territory,  the  roadside verge. 
Values  again:  What  are  people  supposed  to  do  all  day? 
1!.6.21.  For a  century now,  it has  been  taken  for  granted by all but 
the arts and crafts movements  that the pride of science and  the  duty 
of  technology is to allow people  to work  less.  If three  small  farms 
are united and  their hedges  and walls are erased  so  that bigger 
tractors  can be  used,  that is progress  and productivity,  and  the 
peasant  can  go  to  the city and earn more.  If an industrial process 
can be  automated,  that is progress  and  productivity  too,  and if the 
former  peasant is thrown  out  of work again that is a  short-term 
structural shake-out,  and  he will  soon  be "re-absorbed"  elsewhere. 
If he  learns  to  be  a  bus  conductor,  he  is caught  by "ovennanning" - 9  -
and  the  one-man  bus  crew.  And  if he  has  a  natural gift for 
juggling or acrobacy,  who  wants  that when  they  can  see  the Russians 
on  M 
Moreover,  a  certain taint of unmanliness still, in  some 
Community  countries,  hangs  over the whole  service sector:  it used 
to be  punished by  selective taxes in order to  get  people  into the 
production sector, which  seemed much  more virile.  And  so  the vicious 
circle begins  again. 
II.6.22.  It is  largely  recognised now  that the best technology we  can 
1!.6. 
export  to Asia  and Africa is labour-intensive,  or "intennediate" or 
"alternative"  technology.  May  the  day  be  coming  when  our values  shift 
so  that we  begin  to  think the  same  about  ourselves?  Will  the  present 
deep  ambiguity  in our values  about  leisure  (good)  and  unemployment 
(bad)  be  resolved and,  if so,  which way? 
The  whole  subject has  deep  and  so  far unexplored interdependencies 
not  only with social values,  but also with politics,  resource use and 
depletion,  technology,  demography,  education,  and  economics  (including 
for this  purpose industry and agriculture). 
Mitbestimmungsrecht 
II.6.23.  The  countries  of  the  Community  are at very different stages  on 
the  road to the establishment  of worker participation in the  control 
of  productive  and  other enterprises.  Gennany  was  the pioneer,  Den-
mark  is also well  ahead.  The  acceptability of the pattern depends  on 
the  general  history and  psychology  of industrial  relations in the 
countries  concerned,  and is closely  linked  (though which is chicken 
and which is  egg is hard to  detennine)  with  the  degree  of material 
prosperity.  Italy and Britain,  the  poorest of  the industrial member 
countries,  still tend  to  pursue  untrammelled confrontation between 
managementand  labour. - 10  -
11.6.24.  The  possibility of a  Community  policy in this matter has  b 
under discussion  for  some  time.  Such  a  policy might  be  linked with 
the articles or constitution which  could be  declared necessary if a 
company  were  to  qualify  as  a  "European  company",  or it might  be  devised 
some  other way.  Forecasting about  the  possible  long-term social, 
industrial and  economic  results,  and  educational  requirements,  of 
different ways  of  doing it could  be  a  part of Europe  Plus Thirty's 
work. 
Recommendations 
II.6.25.  As  we  said,there are  as  yet  no  experts  in social  forecasting in 
11.6 
the  sense that there are experts  in technological,  economic,  or demo-
graphic  forecasting.  Therefore we  think Europe  Plus Thirty should 
include  a  number of social scientists whose  function would  be threefold. 
First,  to  ensure,  with and  through the Community  Statistical Office 
and the national  statistical offices,  a  supply of  social  data  to  Europe 
Plus  Thirty which is  relevant  to its needs,  remembering that it will exist 
to speculate and  forecast  about  the  future  of the European Community  as 
a  whole  and  to  do  technology  assessment  for it.  Second,  to  take part in 
the  general  development  of  the  nascent  practice  (we  cannot  yet  say  science 
or art)  of  social  forecasting.  And  third,  to work  in and with all the 
forecasting which is done  in Europe  Plus Thirty to  ensure  that  knowledge 
about  society and  social  trends,  and the probability of  social "surprises", 
are never overlooked.  In this work,  it will  need  to  keep  closely in 
touch with  the Foundation  for the  Improvement  of Living and Working 
Conditions which it has  recently been  decided to establish in Dublin: 
the work  of the  two  bodies must  be  complementary. 
II.6.26.  The  importance  of  social  forecasting as  such  cannot at present be 
assessed but it seems  to  us  potentially so  great  that we  would not here 
recommend,  as we  do  for  some  other sectors,  that  Europe  Plus Thirty 
should  rely  on  the  part-time  presence  of outside people.  We  recommend 
that  there  should  be  6  - 8  people  in the central  team;  and  that  the 
skills of  those  chosen  should  reflect  the  pattern of work  to  be  under-
taken.  Seminars,  out-house  contracts  and  short attachments  should  be 
used  in  the  usual  way. PART  II  II.7. 
7.  EDUCATION 
II.7.1.  Nearly  all Western  European  countries  have  had broadly similar 
educational  experiences  since  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War.  There 
has  been  an  enrolment  explosion  caused  partly by  population increase  and 
partly by  increased participation rates,  first at primary  and  secondary 
and  then  at  the  higher  levels  of  education.  The  period of  rapid  expan-
sion was  accompanied  by  severe  shortages  of many  kinds  of  teachers. 
Subsequently,  in about  1970,  educational  growth  slowed  down 
in many  countries,  again partly as  a  result  of  slower population growth 
and  partly because  young  people  are  showing  less  enthusiasm for upper 
secondary  and higher  education  than  seemed  likely only  a  few  years  ago. 
This  slower  rate of growth has  been  accompanied  by  a  tendency  to  teacher 
surplus,  and  indeed unemployment. 
II.7.2.  Other  developments  have  been  similar in many  European  countries. 
A  few may  be  listed almost  at  random.  There  is  the movement  away  from 
rigid selection at  the  beginning  of  secondary  school;  the  tendency 
towards  child-centred rather  than  teacher-centred,  subject-centred,  or 
state requirement-centred  models  of  instruction,  and  towards  the 
growth  of non-traditional  subjects,  such  as  social  sciences,  and  of 
vocational  subjects  in secondary  and higher education;  there have  been 
attempts  to  use  the  educational  system  as  an  instrument  of  social 
engineering,  as  a  means  of promoting  a  more  equal  society  and  a  more 
"advanced"  economy;  there has  been  the  introduction of new methods  like 
television,  radio,  film,  magnetic  tape;  there has  been  student militancy 
in nearly all European  countries;  and  latterly there has  been  the  grow-
ing  preoccupation with  the costs  of,  and  the  returns  on,  education. 
II.7.3.  Education has  a  very  long-term effect.  Most  people  leave  school 
before  they  are  twenty  and  live for  another half century.  Information, 
ideas,  and modes  of  thought  learned in primary  school  influence 
behaviour sixty years  later,  and  some  effects  can  be  even  longer-lived 
than that.  A teacher in training may  teach  for  another  forty  years. 
The  pupils  he  teaches  at the  end  of his  career will still be  directly 
influenced a  century  from  now,  and of  course it -only  tails off  slowly; 
even  after that.  School  building also  casts its  shadow  forward. 
Building  a  particular type  of  school  has  a  strong  influence  for  a  long - 2  -
period ahead  on what  kind of  teaching  takes  place  in it,  although wonders 
can  be  done  in using buildings  otherwise than  they  were  intended. 
Four Alternative Scenarios 
11.7.4.  Education has  a  central role in shaping  the  society of the  future, 
but must  also  be  the  servant  of  that  society. 
II.7. 
The  past  two  centuries have  seen  the industrial  and  then  the 
scientific revolution,  and  they  exercised  a  profound  influence  on  the 
structure  and  content  of  our  educational  system.  The  school  as  we  know 
it today  has  been  shaped  largely by  the  industrial  revolutio~in which 
the  family  was  split up  as  a  production unit  and both parents worked  long 
hours  in factories  and workshops.  The  scientific revolution of  the 
Twentieth  Century  has  demanded  scientific and  technical professional 
training,  so  that  secondary  schools  and universities have  been  places 
where  students  go  to  learn how  to  do  things  and to  accumulate  factual 
information,  rather than  to  discover  themselves  and  learn how  to think. 
Here  are  four  alternative scenarios' 
11.7.5.  The  next  thirty years may  see  a  continuation of this  economic 
growth after the  pause  of  the  early 1970s.  Some  commentators  claim 
that if it does  our societies will become  increasingly  dehumanised: 
technocratic  and  economic  interactions will  continue  to  replace relation-
ships  between people,  the "protestant work  ethic" and  competitiveness 
will become  even more  pervasive  than  they  are now,  and  the role of  edu-
cation will  increasingly be  that  of providing credentials  for  a  care-
fully  selected meritocratic elite. 
11.7.6.  A more  optimistic view is that it is  only the  freedom  from 
want  brought  about  by  economic  growth  that will permit mankind  the 
luxury  of  improved  human  relationships  freed  from  the pressures  of 
economic necessity.  The  education  system of  such  a  genuinely affluent 
society  could concentrate  on  the personal  development  of its pupils  and 
students,  and  on  preparing  them  for  lives of constructive leisure  and 
satisfying work  experience,  rather than having  to  provide  them with  the 
intellectual weapons  needed  for  success  in the rat race.  It could 
also  afford to provide opportunities  for  "recharging the  intellectual 
batteries" through periods  of  study  and  reflection by  adults  at inter-
vals  throughout  their working  lives. - 3  - II.7. 
11.7.7.  An  alternative view,  common  at present,  is that  the Western 
world  is  about  to  experience  several  decades  of  slower  economic  growth 
slower at  any  rate than that experienced since World  War  II.  People  who 
welcome  the  prospect  of  "zero  economic  growth"  claim that it would  en-
gender other social values  than  those  which  predominate  today.  They 
speak  of  a  growing  tendency  "to  do  one's  own  thing",  to  relate to  people 
in small  groups  rather than  large  impersonal  work places,  and to pursue 
self-fulfilment  in cooperation with  others  instead of  through  competition 
to  reach  the  "top" of  a  career structure.  Protagonists  of  this  school 
of thought  expect  to  see  increasing participation by  workers  in the 
organisation of their work,  so  that work  itself becomes  an  intrinsically 
satisfying experience  rather than  an  instrument  for producing  at  once 
goods  and  the  income  to purchase  other goods.  Education  in  such  a 
society might  correspond  to  the vision of  the  de-schoolers,  and  become 
much  more  closely integrated with  work  and  leisure activities.  Like 
work  itself,  the  aim  of  education would  become  self-fulfilment  and  not 
preparation for  a  life external  to  the  educational  system. 
II.7.8.  But  an  opposite view of  the  likely social effects of  zero 
economic  growth  is equally possible.  It may  lead not  to a  more  har-
monious  society but  to  one  in which  competition  for  resources  is inten-
sified.  Individuals may  struggle all the harder  to  reach  the  tops  of 
fewer  and  smaller  economic  trees; it may  become  impossible  to make 
further progress  towards  equal  educational  opportunities  for all as 
education has  to  compete  for  resources  with  everything else,  with 
health,  transport,  social  security,  private  consumption  and  so  on. 
Within  education,  the  competition  for  resources  between  the various 
sectors  - primary,  secondary,  higher,  adult  - already  shows  signs  of 
intensifying.  The  reduced  education budgets  of recent years may  be  a 
portent  of  things  to  come.  The  graduate  unemployment  of the  early 
1970s  in many  countries illustrates another danger:  reduced  job  oppor-
tunities  for  those with high  educational  qualifications  can  lead to 
considerable hardship  and might  result  in frustration  and  anger being 
turned  against  existing social structures. 
either constructive or destructive. 
This  in turn might  prove - 4  - 11.7. 
11.7.9.  Europe  Plus Thirty  could  perform  a  useful  function  by  consider-
ing  the  likelihood of  each  of  the  four  scenarios  outlined  above  and  by 
exploring  the  implications  of  each  for  education  and  for  society  as  a 
whole.  In  particular,  it could  examine  ways  in which  the  educational 
system  could  be  used  as  an  instrument  for  promoting  what  may  be  called 
the  optimistic alternative,  whether  the general  rate  of  economic  growth 
be  fast  or  slow. 
Economics  of  Education 
11.7.10.  A  common  assumption  underlying all these  scenarios  of the  future 
of  education is  that  the  growth  of public expenditure  cannot  go  on  "ad 
infinitum".  Therefore,  if its  forecasting is  to  be useful,  Europe  Plus 
Thirty will  have  to have  a  close  look  at  cost-development. 
11.7.11.  From  the  1950s  to  the  end  of  the  1960s  education  expenditures 
increased their share  of  GNP  from  2-3%  to  some  6-9%.  This  growth  in the 
total  share  could  only  take place  at  the  cost  of  other sectors,  and  at 
some  point  firm  financial  priorities,  which  would  become  even more  firm 
in  an  era  of  "steady  state",  will have  to  be  established.  In  the  1970s, 
and  for  the  foreseeable  future,  the  four  sectors  of  education will  have 
to  compete  keenly  for  public  resources  after  a  period of  rapid overall 
expansion:  (a)  pre-school  education;  (b)  school  education;  (c)  higher 
education;  (d)  adult or "life-long" education. 
11.7.12.  There  exists  now  a  branch  of  economics- the  economics  of 
education  - which  relates  expenditures  on  education in  a  wide  sense  to 
economic  development  and  growth.  This  is  an  important  area  of  study 
which  arose  at  the  end  of  the  1950s  when  traditional  input  factors, 
such  as  capital  in terms  of natural  resources  and  numerical measures  of 
labour,  could not  account  for  the whole  of  the  economic  growth,  and  one 
was  thereby  left with  a  "  residual"  factor,  sometimes  estimated  to  account 
for  as  much  as  50%  of  economic  growth.  Considering that  educational 
expenditure  increased  from  1950  to  1965  twice  as  fast  as  national  income, 
it was  natural  to  assume  some  kind  of relationship  between  the  educa-
tional  growth  and  knowledge  explosion  on  the  one  hand  and  economic 
growth  on  the  other.  What  will  be  the  implications  of reassessing  the 
utilisation of  resources  when  the  limits  to  educational  expenditure  are 
reached? 5 
Some  recent Developments  in Thinking about 
Educational  Policy 
II.7.13.  In general,  education  ranks  lower  in public  esteem  than it did 
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ten years  ago.  The  massive  expansion of  secondary  and  higher education 
of  the  1960s  has  resulted neither in  a  more  equal  society nor  a  more 
rapid or intellectual growth.  Instead it has  given  us  unemployment 
of  graduates,  student unrest,  and  a  feeling  that our  schools  and 
universities are  growing apart  from  the  rest of society. 
There  have  been  three  recent claimants  for  special attention in 
education policy,  all deriving  to  some  extent from  the disillusion with 
the  effects of earlier expansion. 
II.7.14.  First is a  growing  concern with nursery and  pre-primary 
education.  The  mainspring of  this  is  the  increasing evidence  that 
the  roots  of educational inequali~  lie far back  in early childhood  ,  and 
that by  the  time  some  children start their primary  schools it is  too 
late  for  them  ever  to  catch up  with  their more  fortunate  fellows. 
Europe  Plus  Thirty could usefully devote  some  effort to  a  comparison 
and  projection of what  the  education services  and health services 
of different countries do  for children  from birth (and  even before 
it in  the  form  of ante-natal classes  for parents)  to  ensure  that all 
children at least start life with  equal  educational  advantages,  and 
to  derive  forward  studies  from  that comparison.  It goes  without 
saying  that any  such  study  in  ~·~estern Europe  would  take  as  a 
starting point  the  very high  value  that is put on  democracy  and 
individual  freedom.  It would  for  example  be  no  solution  to  take 
children away  from  their mothers  at birth in order  to minimise  the 
effects of  family  background,  any more  than it was  When  Plato first 
urged it. 
11.7.15.  The  second new  claimant  for  attention in  thinking  about 
educational  policy is at  the  other end  of  the  educational 
spectrum - the  continued education and  training of adults.  There 
appear  to  be at least  two  separate  reasons  for  promoting adult 
education.  The  first is  summarised  in  the  often made  remark  that 
"the half life of  an  engineer is six years"  - in other words  that at 
the  end  of six years half  the  knowledge  acquired  by an  engineer is 
obsolete.  Thus  engineers  - and  doctors,  teachers,  lawyers,  managers, 
and  almost all other skilled workers  - need  frequent  retraining  in 
order  to  bring  them  up  to  date.  The  second  source  of interest in 6  II.7. 
continuing adult education is equality.  It is claimed  that given  the 
diversity of human  abilities,  interests,  and  rates of  development,  an 
increase  in economic  and  social equality would  be  possible if ev.erybody 
had  the  opportunity of attending education and  training courses  at all 
stages  of  their working  life. 
II.7.16.  As  with pre-school  education  there  could  be  a  role  for Europe 
Plus Thirty in exploring  the  extent and nature  of  the  potential  demand 
for  "recurrent" education.  Critics claim that such practical matters 
as  house  purchase  and  family  commitments  will ensure  that it never 
affects more  than  a  minority of adults.  Supporters  aver  that  there 
is a  vast  latent demand  for  the  right kind of recurrent education 
properly  integrated with  the  rest of society.  An  international 
study of  the  demand,  actual  and  latent,  present and  future,  among 
adults  for  education and  training could be  valuable  to  those  concerned 
with policy  in. this area. 
II.7.17.  The  third new  development  is the  growing  clamour  for a  closer 
integration between  schools  and  society;  here  the  growth  of  parent/ 
teacher associations  lies at one  end  of  the  spectrum,  and  the  'de-
schooling'  movement  on  the other.  Europe  Plus Thirty could  consider 
the  extent  to which  institutionalised schooling may  cease  to  be 
judged an adequate  instrument  for  "socialising" young  people  and  for 
inculcating  the  competences  they  need  in the  society of  today and 
tomorrow.  The  immersion of all teenagers  in institutionalised 
schooling has  occurred  in an era when  there have  been fundamental 
changes  in the  role of  the  school  as  an  institution,  in the  society 
in which  it is  embedded,  and  in such previously  powerful alternative 
institutions as  the churches  and various  youth movements.  The  school 
does  not  possess  a  monopoly  of  information or of teaching.  There 
are  many  agents  in society that are as  "information-rich" as  the 
school;  television,  radio,  record  players,  the  press, 
libraries,  and various  leisure activities. 
II.7.18.  Europe  Plus  Thirty could  con~i_der  the  likelihood and  implications  of 
schools  becoming  less "institutionalised" and  having  a  less  formal 
contact with  society at  large;  it could  focus  upon  the  possible 
crisis points at which  institutionalised education may  be  dysfunctional 
with  respect  to  the  rest of  society,  resulting,  for  example,  in 
university graduates with  job aspirations  that are unrealistic in 
relation to  the  jobs available,  or on  the other hand  in needs  for 
trained  people which  the universities fail  to  satisfy.  Another 7 
possibility that  a  forecasting  body  could  explore would  be 
implications  of  giving  teachers  the opportunity  to alternate 
between  the  classroom and  the outside world,  and  conversely giving 
other workers  a  chance  to  become  part-time or  temporary  teachers. 
There  is  the  basis  for  a  "de  facto" social  experiment  here  (see  I .3) 
in  a  comparison with  the  system which  has  applied  for  many  decades 
in Chile. 
International Aspects  of  Education 
II.7. 
11.7.19.  So  far we  have  been considering educational  developments  that are 
occurring more  or  less  simultaneously  in many  European countries; 
since many  countries  are  facing  common  problems,  all are  likely  t~ 
find  that  they have  something  to  learn from  each  other.  Certainly 
much  of  education must  remain a  national  responsibility  - many 
people  in Britain and  Germany  would  claim a  local  responsibility. 
But  no  European  country  nowadays  is  likely to  pursue  an  educational 
policy completely  uninfluenced  by  the  experience  of  its neighbours. 
Apart  from  anything else,  international  comparisons  are  one  of  the 
favourite  weapons  of  those who  are  proposing or opposing  a  particular 
educational  development.  It is useful  if such  comparisons  are made 
on  as  reliable a  basis as  possible.  rlut  there  are  also  a  number  of 
areas  in which  education is  becoming  inherently more  international, 
and  in which  an  international approach  to  the  issue  is  not merely  an 
adjunct  to national policies but essentially is  the  policy of  the 
countries  concerned. 
II.7.20.  The  first of  these arises  from  the  international market  for 
qualified  manpower.  It has  long  been  realised that  true  internat-
ional mobility of manpower will be  possible only when all 
educational  qualifications have  international acceptability.  In 
certain high  level occupations  international agreements  have 
already  been  reached  or are very near on  the  international currency 
of  qualifications.  Further detailed  study is needed  before more  than 
the  surface of  this  problem is  scratched.  Europe  Plus  Thirty could 
sponsor  forward-looking  studies  in particular occupational  areas  and 
thus  help to  promote  a  situation in which all the workers  of Europe 
can  find  employment  where  their particular qualifications are most 
in demand.  Such  studies  should also  take account  of  the  general 
tendency, tersely known  as  the  Brain Drain,  for  the best  educated 
people  in any  country  to  emigrate  to  another if they  can get  better 8 
pay  and  conditions  there.  This  affects not only movement  internal 
to  the  Community,  but also movement  into  the  Community  from  less 
developed countries  and  out of it to  the  USA. 
The  flow of engineers,  scientists,  and  doctors  into  the  USA 
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(about half of  them  from  Western Europe)  tripled between  1955  and  1967. 
One  way  for  "down  gradient"  societies  to  slow  their own  brain  drain might 
be  the  encouragement  in  them  of centres  of  excellence  transcending 
national  frontiers,  to which  we  turn below.  The  Community  has  a 
duty not only  to  itself in  this matter,  but also  to  those  down 
gradient of it,  the  developing  countries.  To  this  also  we  turn below. 
II.7.21.  A related  issue  is  the  international mobility of students.  This 
has  three  aspects.  a)  One  is  the  acceptability of entry qualifications 
for universities  and  similar institutions.  What  is needed  in  the 
long  run  is  a  European  accreditation agency  so  that any  institution in 
any  country can  immediately evaluate  the  entry qualifications of  any 
aspiring entrant  to  that institution.  The  establishment of  such  an 
agency  would  require considerable  research  into  the  vast number  of 
educational  qualifications provided  in  the  various  European countries. 
b)  The  second  aspect  is  financial.  European countries  finance  their 
higher education  institutions  in different ways.  In  some,  students 
pay  fees  and  are  subsidised.  In others,  all facilities  are  free  but 
students  receive  no  grant.  In others  again,  students  can obtain  loans 
to help  finance  themselves  during  their studies.  If there  is  to 
develop  any  substantial  interchange  of  students  between countries, 
arrangements  must  be  developed  to  ensure  that such  financial 
mechanisms  do  not distort  the  flows  of  students.  c)  The  third 
aspect is  the  existence  in  some  countries  and  some  universities  of 
the  numerus  clausus,  which  leads,  and might  lead  increasingly,  to 
an  outflow of  students  to neighbouring countries. 
II.7.22.  Another  factor which makes  education inherently international 
is  the  high capital  intensity of much  scientific research.  Many 
research projects  require  such  expensive  equipment  that it is beyond 
the  reach  of  any  one  European  country  to  undertake  more  than  a  few 
of  them.  And  yet if a  country does  not undertake  the  research it 
has  no  way  of ensuring  that its young  scientists and  technologists 
can keep  up  with  developments  in  that branch  of science.  This  is 
clearly an  area  for European  cooperation,  and  a  forecasting  body 
could  attempt  to  identify  the  areas  in which it is likely to  become 
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Moreover,  the  argument  for  European  centres of excellence  is 
not confined  only  to  "big science".  It applies  also  to  a  certain 
concentration of  training facilities,  and  this  can  only be  made 
efficient if it ignores national boundaries.  Again,  it would  be 
useful  to  identify  in  advance  areas  where  international centres 
of excellence  of  this  sort are  likely to  become  desirable. 
II.7.23.  Another area  for  international cooperation  in educational 
policy is  that of new  educational  technologies  using  programmed 
texts,  magnetic  tape,  and  film.  This means  that whole  courses 
can  be  packaged,  and  bought and  sold.  Already  the  British Open 
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University has  a  flourishing  trade  in  such  pre-packaged courses, 
and  so  have  a  rapidly growing  number  of  commercial  enterprises. 
Perhaps  there  should be  a  Community  standards  institute  to  test the 
various  course materials offered for  sale  and  ensure  that  they are 
effective according  to various criteria,  and  that it is  reasonable 
to  claim  that  they  could be  used  in different countries.  An  even 
more  ambitious  idea would  be  the  establishment of  a  European centre 
for educational  technology which  could itself develop  new  course 
materials. 
II.7.24.  It may  be  that  the  Community  will  in  due  course wish,  as  part 
of its external relations policy,  to  further  types  of education in 
Europe  which will  be  specifically useful  to  the  developing world; 
to  stimulate  a  reverse brain drain as  part of  a  coherent drive 
to  overcome  the  problemsand  the  dangers  we  touched  on  in our General 
Introduction. 
An  essential preliminary for all  such  developments  would  be 
forward-looking  studies  that  reviewed  the possibilities and  likely 
developments  in curricula and  educational  technology  for  the next 
quarter of  a  century. 
General Recommendations  for  Forecasting in Education 
II.7.25.  Obviously,  recommendations  about  forecasting activities  in 
education  under Europe  Plus  Thirty auspices  have  to  take  identified 
areas  of common  concern as their point of departure.  The  Janne 
Report of  1973  on  Community  Policy in Education(l)  lists a  number 
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of  problems  which  should  be  recognised  by  the  Community  as  areas 
of responsibility.  In  the  present chapter,  we  have  outlined others. 
11.7.26.  We  recommend  that Europe  Plus  Thirty become  an  organ  initiating 
and  developing,  for  the  benefit of  the  Community,  a  better insight  into 
the  linkages  between education and  other social sectors,  and  that 
it be  capable  of policy analysis  and  comparison  in  this matter. 
This  means  continuously  looking  for  and  analysing  the  "educational 
dimension"  of  the  economic  and  social problems  which  the  Community 
has  to  face. 
II.7.27.  The  Commission  disposes  since  1974  of  an  important  instrument 
(D.G.  XII)  to  deal  with educational  problems.  Similarly,  the  Council 
of Ministers  has  created an Education  Committee  in order  to  develop 
educational policies  in a  certain number  of priority areas.  Several 
other departments  (probably most  of  them)  of  the  Commission,  and 
Committees  of  the  Council,  are  involved  in activities which  are 
directly relevant  to  the  future  of education. 
Coordination between  these  departments  and  committees  is already 
taking place  but,  for  reasons  due  mainly  to  the nature  of  large 
organisations  such  as  the  European Communities,  this  coordination 
is  limited.  It may  be  that an  independent body  such  as  Europe 
Plus Thirty,  devoted  to  interdisciplinary and  intersectoral 
forecasting,  can  provide  some  impetus  for  the  development  of  thi~ 
linkage. 
II.7.28.  We  recommend  that Europe  Plus Thirty address  itself  to  studies  of 
the  institutional development of educational  systems  with  the  aim 
of anticipatory identification of what  changes  in structure and 
content of education would  be  necessary  in order  to meet possible 
changes  in society and,  conversely,  what  changes  in society are 
likely  to  result  from  present or  foreseeable  structures  and 
contents  of education. 
II.7.29.  It should  also  conduct or sponsor  forecasting  studies,  on  the 
basis  of  systematic collection of statistical and  other information, 
(much  of which already exists  in UNESCO  and  OECD)  about  enrolment, 
trends  on  the  labour market,  and  changing preferences with  regard  to 
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11.7.30.  The  content of  the  curriculum,  where  changes  tend  to  be  even 
slower  than  in  the  structure of  the  system,  is  another area which 
might benefit  from  forecasting.  The  common  denominator,  as  far  as 
the  Community  is  concerned,  is  the  growing  internationalisation of 
the  national  systems  of education,  and  the  common  interest lies  in 
the  fact  that what happens  in Europe  in  the  future will  be  mainly 
the  result of what  its children and  students  are  taught  is  true or 
good  now. 
We  recommend  therefore  that studies  of  the  curricula at all 
levels of  the  education  systems  be  stimulated  in order  to  lay  the 
basis  for  forecasting  about  the  teaching of science,  civics, 
philosophy,  sociology,  history and  languages,  and  as  an  input for 
general  social  forecasting. 
11.7. 
11.7.31.  We  recommend  that statistical and  other  information about  student 
and  teacher  exchange,  as  well  as  information on  ongoing activities at 
the  various  university institutions  in  the  different countries,  be 
collated  under  Communities  auspices.  This  would  provide  a  basis  for 
forecasting  that would  facilitate  Community  planning  in  the  utilisation 
of  teaching  and  research  resources  in certain areas. 
Methods  Employed  in Education Forecasting 
11.7.32.  Forecasting methodology  in education  does  not differ essentially 
from  that employed  in other social areas.  Educational  changes  occur 
within general  socio-economic  change.  This  means  that educational 
forecasting must be  related  to  other areas  of  forecasting. 
Assessments  of  future  trends  and  developments  in education  should 
be  based  on  three  main activities: 
a)  Co~u~ secondary collection of basic statistics on: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
demographic  trends  and  population projections, 
with particular reference  to  the  age  range  5 
through  20.  (See  11.3.) 
enrolment at various  levels  of  the  formal 
educational  system. 
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b)  Continuous  collection of  information related  to  institutional 
changes  and  innovations  in  the  educational  systems,  such  as 
reforms  in structure,  content,  and  methods  of  instruction. 
c)  Forecasting studies making  regular use  of panels  of experts 
in  seminars  and  conferences,  to  obtain new  injections  of 
IT.7. 
ideas  and  vision,  and  to  review and  criticise  the  ongoing work. 
Staff Requirements 
II.7.33.  In order  to  do  this it is necessary,  as  a  minimu~,  to appoint  two 
professionals having  between  them  general  research  competence,  a 
broad socially oriented and  imaginative perspective  on  educational 
problems,  and  a  statistical  background  in educational  planning. 
We  also  recommend  that Europe  Plus  Thirty set up  a  panel  of experts 
in  this  field.  Such  a  panel  should meet  regularly with others 
involved  in all aspects  of education,  e.g.  personnel  from Ministries 
of  Employment,  Social  Services,  etc.,  for  stocktaking  and  for 
discussions  of  the  actual  trends  and  tendencies  on  the  basis of which 
the  forecasting of major aspects  of education  is conducted. (l) 
The  terms  of  service  should  be  3  to  5  years,  so  as  to make  successive 
replacement possible  and  at the  same  time  have  some  continuity. 
(1)  The  European Cultural  Foundation has  recently set up  an 
institute sponsored  among  others  by  the  European Communities  for  the 
study of  the  education aspects  of European  social  and  economic 
problems.  Its staff is envisaged  to  be  very  small  since  its annual 
basic budget will -be  only  $120,000.  Europe  Plus Thirty might well 
collaborate with it. PART  II.  II.8. 
11.8.1. 
!1.8.2. 
8.  SCIENCE  & TECHNOLOGY 
The  relationship between mind  on  the  one  hand  and  space,  time, 
matter and  energy  on  the other,  is the  subject of a  huge  licerature, 
in which  we  in the West  still largely use  the  thought  structures 
devised  in Greece  two  and  a  half thousand  years  ago.  Mind  subsists 
in space,  endures  in time,  and  consists  of or is a  function  of matter 
and  energy;  but still it is able  to  apply  something called understanding 
to  the very extensions it exists in and  the very "things" of which it 
is made,  and  there is  something  about  this understanding which  enables 
it to  go  further and "control"  them,  or get  them  to  do  things  they 
would apparently not  otherwise have  doneo  The  question whether the 
laws  of nature are "truly" the  laws  of nature  or on  the  other hand  only 
the  laws  of  science,  that is  to  say,  whether  they  inhere unconditionally 
in space,  time,  matter and  energy,  or whether their inherence  is 
conditional  on  the activity of that  part of those  things which we  call 
1nind,  and  thus  on  the ability of  one  mind  to  communicate  them  to 
others,  dubbing  them "laws":  this  question lies at the heart  of any 
attempt at  forecasting about  science. 
If ever we  could  describe with certainty the  part played in 
some  past  scientific discovery  respectively by  the grasp of an  individual 
rnind  and  by  the availability to  be  grasped of  s~me scientific  law which 
we  were  enabled,  by  that particular act  of grasping,  to describe  as  such, 
we  should  be  able  to  forecast  what  type  of  relationship between what 
type  of mind  and what  type  of  so  far unexplained  phenomena  would  be  most 
like~  to  produce "results" in the  future.  Unfortunately  the  subtlest 
book  yet written about  all this, Arthur Koestler's The  Sleepwalkers,  (1) 
tends  to  the  conclusion that,  far  from  public  policy being able to help 
the  right scientist to  the  right  place,  the greatest scientists have 
only made  their greatest  discoveries  as  by-products,  unrecognised by their 
very  authors,  of enquiries  into  something  else.  Forecasting about 
technology  does  not  pose  such  arduous  problems;  laws  and  propositions 
about  space,  time,  matter and  energy,  as  they are bandied about  between 
(1}  pub.  Hutchinson,  Londo~  1959 - 2  - 11.8. 
cnind  and mind,  sometimes  suggest  useful  things  to  do,  called inventions, 
applications  of  inventions,  technologies,  etc.,  and  sometimes  they  do 
not. 
II.8.3.  Forecasting both  about  science itself and  about  its application 
in  technology  must,  as  usual,  be  a  blend  of  theory,  experience,  and 
imagination.  This  field is  so vast that here,  perhaps  more  than any-
where,  the  forecasting  to  be  done  by  Europe  Plus Thirty must  be  related 
to  the  powers  and  functions  of  the  Co~nission of  the  European  Communities, 
the  European  Parliament,  and also  the  member  governments  which will  be 
its users. 
11.8.4.  The  Commission's  function  in scientific and  technological 
11.8.5. 
11.8.6. 
research is  limited.  The  greater part  of what  it does  is  done  through 
its Joint  Research Centre,  a  chain of  establishments  in Italy,  Germany, 
and  the Netherlands,  which  has  been  concerned mainly with  the vain 
attempt  (to which  we  return in the next  chapter)  to  develop  a  European 
reactor,  but  is now  diversifying. 
The  Commission  spends  at  present  only  0.8%  of  the  public money 
spent  in the  Community  on  scientific  research;  the  rest is spent nationally. 
An  assessment  of  the way  this  percentage  is  likely to  change  - whether 
to  increase  or to  decrease  to an  even tinier figure  - must  depend  on 
the  work  of  a  new  committee  called CREST:  the  European  Comn1ittee  on 
Scientific and Technological  Research.  We  have  seen  how  the  functions 
of  the  European  Community  are  divided between  the Council  and  the 
CocruHission.  CREST  is  a  unique  hybrid in that its members  are  the 
chief  research administrators  of  the  member  states  - in this it resembles 
any  other committee  of  the Council  of Ministers at official level  - but 
its chairman is  from  the  Commission;  he  is Director General  for Science, 
Research  and  Education  (DG  XII).  The  function  of  the  Committee  is 
broadly  to  find  ou~ first,what all the member  countries are  doing, 
second,to help  them  coordinate  their activities,  and,third,to fill  the 
gaps  by  launching  common  activities. 
The  Community  is  roughly  the  equal  of the  U.S.  and  the  Soviet 
Union  in population,  education,  and wealth.  Yet it lags  behind  them 
in scientific,and far behind in technologica4 innovation,  and this is 
all too  obviously  because  the member  countries are still competing - 3  -
against  one  another as  they  did a  hundred years  ago,  when all  the 
scientific research in the world was  done  in Western  Europe,  and 
none  of it was  too  expensive  to  be  done  on  a  population  base  of 
II.8. 
JO  - 40 udllion.  To  eliminate duplication of work,  and  to  obtain 
economy  of scale,  is  an  obviously  rational  goal.  Habit  and  pride 
impede  it, but  they  are  on  the  downgrade.  CREST  is there  as  the 
embryo  of the  organisation which will  be  needed if this  goal  is  to  be 
achieved. 
!!.8.7.  There  are  perhaps  four  general  objectives which  forecasting 
can help to achieve.  They  are: 
a)  To  open  new  options  and maintain an authoritative 
input  of  future-oriented  technical  advice  so  as 
to  allow decisions  to  be  more  broadly based. 
b)  To  identify areas  where  society's well-being 
might  suffer if decisions  were  allowed  to  be 
dominated  by  sectional interests or narrowly 
economic  criteria,  and  to  compare alternative 
policies  to  put  that right. 
c)  To  increase general  understanding of  the  way  ot 
thinking of  science  and  technology. 
d)  To  contribute  to  a  major  element  of  contemporary 
culture. 
!!.8.8.  Of  these,  the  first  two  suggest  themselves  especially  for  the 
forecasting which  ought  to  be  undertaken in this  field  by  Europe  Plus 
Thirty for  the  Community;  namely  to  facilitate  the  rational  and  bene-
ficial  exercise  of its existing powers  and  functions  and  the  formulation 
of  new  powers  and  functions  which it might  seek  to  obtain;  and  to 
provide  informed  conjecture  about  the  future  course  of  scientific 
and  technical  innovation in so  far as  that  may  affect  the  development  of 
society in general  and  thus  of industry  and  the  economy.  Over 
industry and  the  economy,  the  Communities  exercise  substantial  powers, 
and  the  kind of  forecasting we  outline here  could help them  to  exercise 
them  to  the  general  good  of society. 
!1.8.9.  On  the  first point,  forecasting  for  the  use  of existing and 
foreseeable  powers  in this very  field,  there must  be  a  close  link - 4  - II.8. 
be~~n Europe  Plus  Thirty and  CREST.  The  art of evaluating the 
results of  scientific research in tenus  of their direct utility to 
mankind,  and  of their indirect utility as  leading  to  the  next  necessary 
piece  of  research,  though  a  rapidly  developing  one,  is still rudimentary. 
The  work  done  so  far usually  assumes  a  single  society,  within which 
and  for  the  benefit  of which  the  research is  done;  the  society as  a 
whole  is  then  found  to  have  benefited  from it, or not.  The  very first 
work  on  the  differential benefiting of  different social classes with-
in national  societies is now  appearing;  much  of it is  far  from  dis-
passionate  (l)  but it is a  useful  corrective  to  decades  of blind 
incrementalism.  On  the  other hand  there is little work  indeed  on  the 
differential benefiting of national  societies within one  region  of  the 
world,  or indeed within the world as  a  whole. 
II.8.10.  There is  thus  a  clear role  for  Europe  Plus  Thirty,  working 
as  research  and  forecasting back-up  to  the  unique  body  called CREST. 
It should enquire  far enough  into  the  question what  sort  of  research 
has  benefited what  sort of  people  to  be  able  to  tackle  the  question: 
what  sort  of  research is likely in future  to  benefit what  sort of 
people?  It would  then  be  able  to  proceed  to  forecast  about  the 
likely effects  of  given  quanta  of  research being undertaken: 
a)  by  the  member  states of  the  Community  severally, 
b)  by  the  Cormnunity  as  such  because it is bigger,  and 
c)  by  neither  (because neither is big enough)  so  that 
it has  to  be  done  on  a  world  or Western-world basis. 
II.8.11  Research  is an  open-ended  commitment.  Some  sectors  - high-
energy  physics,  nuclear physics  and  engineering,  radio  astronomy  and 
aerospace are  obvious  examples  - have  already  become  extremely  expensive 
to maintain  product~vely.  Other sectors,  including oceanography  and 
even  some  branches  of biology,  are  threatening to  join the "big-science" 
club.  Independent  national  work?  Community  division of  labour? 
(1)  Should  the assertion that there is no  such thing as  dispassionate 
science  be  debated passionately or dispassionately? 5  II.8. 
World  division of  labour  ?  To  take  a  hypothetical  example:  geophysical 
forays  into  the  earth's crust could  be  valuable  to  Europe  from  several 
standpoints.  They could  show  the  way  to  geothermal  energy  reserves, 
especially for  the  least physically stable  regions  of southern Europe; 
they  could  advance  the  technology  of exploration  and  exploitation of 
fossil  fuels,  especially for nations with  large  continental  shelves; 
they  could  open  new  options  for  long-term disposal  of radioactive 
wastes,  of  interest  to  every nation with  a  nuclear  power  progrannne. 
A concerted multi-disciplinary effort in geophysics  might  thus  open 
new  options  no  single nation or sectional  interest would  consider 
warranted  the  necessary "critical size". 
11.8.12.  Attractive  targets  for  research,  considered  in  relation  to 
the  probable  time  span of Europe  Plus  Thirty,  are  now  so  numerous  that 
it is difficult  to  'lssemble  a  balanced "portfolio of objectives" within 
the  means  of  any  one  nation.  Valuable  options  may  thus  remain  closed 
to  Europe  unless  ways  can  be  found  to  share  the  expense.  The 
European  Science  Foundation  (which  goes  wider  than  the  Community)  has 
now  been  set up  to  deal  in part with  such  problems. 
11.8.13.  Some  objec.tives  {e.g.  in  defence)  and  some  commitments  (e.g. 
to  high-energy physics)  threaten  to distort  the  totality of scientific 
effort by monopolising  a  disproportionate  and  possibly  increasing 
amount  of  the  talent and  cash.  Political patronage  can also distort 
objectives.  Here  is  a  field where  future  changes  in social and  political 
structures  and  values  may  well  affect  the  development  of  science  itself. 
We  are  sc  used  to  thinking of  the  effects of  science  on  society  that it 
is  important  to  remember  things  happen  the  other way  around  as  well. 
11.8.14.  Besides  providing  the  social and  economic  forecasting necessary 
for  the  exercise  of Community  functions  in  regard  to  scientific and 
technical  research itself,  Europe  Plus  Thirty will have  to  provide 
h1puts  of  speculation and  forecasting  about  the  future  of  science  and 
technology  into  thE  general  social  and  economic  forecasting it does. 
It should  undertake  technological  forecasting  in  those  areas  where 
possible  technol0gical  developments  would  or might have  such  substantial 
effects on  the  economies  and  societies of  the  Connnunity  that  the  Community 
institutions would.  one  way  or another,  be  bound  to  be  concerned. 6  II.8. 
II.H. 11.  In  a  world  in which  energy costs  have  so  abruptly  increased  there 
is  I it tic question  that  the  most  socially and  economically  fruitful 
scI  <·n tl f ic  nch i<'vemen l  would  be  cheap  the  rmo-nuc le:t  r  fusion.  Cht'ap 
fusion  power  would  afford  Europe  independence  in energy  resources,  a 
freedom  it cannot now  contemplate until well  into  the  next century,  and 
then  only if high  efficiency fast breeder reactors  prove  a  success. 
Provided  fusion  reactor  technology  could  then  evolve  smoothly  from  the 
industrial base  now  being created  for  fission reactors  - by no  means  a 
certainty,  for  far greater engineering problems,temperatures  and 
neutron  fluxes  are  involved  - fusion  could mean  a  return  to  cheaper 
energy  and  the  exploitation of very  lean mineral  resources,  even  sea-
water. 
11.8.16.  A  technologically  less  demanding  way  of harnessing  fusion  power 
would  be  the  dis~overy of  an  efficient method  of converting solar 
energy  into electricity or  into  food  (where  a  mechanism  that merely 
doubled  the  present abysmally  low  conversion efficiency of photo-
synthesis  could,  if it were  found,  dramatically promote  growth  in crops). 
Another possibility for  a  great reduction  in energy costs would  be  the 
discovery of  a  simple,  low-temperature  chemical  reaction for splitting 
water molecules  to  release hydrogen  - a  clean  fuel.  An  encouragingly 
large  number  of  reactions  has  been  discovered  in  the  last few  years, 
although  none  is  simple  enough  to  promise  cheap  hydrogen yet. 
11.8.17.  New  ways  of  synthesising very  complex  substances  - food  is  the 
obvious  example  - at much  less  cost in energy  and  raw materials  would 
be  dramatically  important  to  Europe.  The  breakthrough could  come 
with  an  understanding of  the  subtleties of catalysis  (including  the 
mechanisms  of  the  living catalysts,  enzymes),  or  from  the  work  of 
molecular biologists.  Only  a  few years  ago  very  few  people  would  have 
predicted  that  the  new  science of molecular biology would  disclose  the 
opportunities  now  opening  in "genetic engineering,"  in  the  tailoring of 
genetic  templates  to  develop  desired characteristics  in a  living micro-
organism.  Opportunities within comparatively modest  research budgets 
seem  to  centre  on  radical  intervention with  the  behaviour of micro-
organisms  such  as  bacteria,  having prodigious  powers  of  reproduction. 
Such  nitrogen-fixing organisms  might  be  provided with  genetic  templates 
selected so  that  they  synthesise  the  optimum mixture  of proteins  to 
promote  growth  in animals  or plants.  It might prove  possible  to  transfer 
the  nitrogen-fixing ability of  such  organisms  to  higher plants,  giving, 7  II.8 
for  instance,  potatoes  and  wheat  the  ability  to  make  their own  fertiliser, 
n  prospect  which  has  been  described  as "a gift to mankind  almost as 
Vllluahl<•  as  fire.
11{l)  Other possibilities are  the  synthesis  of vaccines 
a~nLnst virus  diseases,  or  the  recovery of valuable  minerals  such  as 
gold  or  uranium  from  lean but  inexhaustible  resources  such  as  sea-
wa tcr.  Each  of  these  opportunities  - crop  growth  promotion especially 
- have  immense  implications  for  population distribution,  jobs.  transport, 
etc.  that Europe  Plus Thirty would  have  to  explore. 
II.8.1R.  Solid-state  physics may  open major new  options  in materials  science, 
where  the attraction of materials  perhaps  ten  times  as  strong as  they 
are  today  is  immense  in  terms  of husbanding natural  resources,  or  in 
sensor  technology where  the  implications  of,  say,  a  new  mechanism 
for  detecting and  locating submarines  at great distance  to  supersede 
sonar {just as  radio-location superseded  sound  location of aircraft) 
could  change  the  pattern of mutual  assured deterrence  between  America 
and  Russia,  by making  the nuclear submarine vulnerable.  If this  should 
happen,  the  entire political structure of mankind  would  be  called in 
question.  Even  a  sensory mechanism  that would  give  people night vision 
with  the  facility of  ordinary spectacles or contact  lenses  could have 
far-reaching  implications  in  the  civil as  well  as  the  defP.nce  sector. 
11.8.19.  There  is perhaps  no  better example  of an  invention whose  impact 
could  be  profound,  but  for  which  identifying  the  conseyuences  well 
in  advance  calls  for expertise  and  imagination of  a  high order,  than  the 
laser,  born  in  1960.  Its promise  lies  in  two  quite  different directions: 
as  a  unique  and  versatile  sensor and  as  a  unique  and  versatile energy 
source.  Some  of  the  most exciting possibilities  today,  including  laser 
fusion  (microfusion)  and  laser enrichment of uranium,  were  not anticipated 
in  the  early years  of its existence.  Lasers  of  increasing energy and 
diminishing wavelength,  including  the  "graser" or gamma-ray  laser,  are 
almost certain  to  open  fresh vistas,  if only indirectly as  research 
tools  of  unprecedented analytical power. 
II.8.20.  The  question how  to  forecast about  the  carrying  through  of scientific 
discovery  into  technological  innovation and  thence  into daily use  and 
{1)  Professor C.H.  Waddington:  "Genetic Engineering"  - the  1975  Trueman 
Wood  lecture  given at  the  Royal  Society of Arts,  London,  January  1975. 8 
wealth,  raises  once  again  the  difficult distinction,  which  we 
touched  on  in  the  Introduction,  between  forecasting  and  planning. 
This  carrying  forward  is being planned all  the  time  in  industry,  and 
"corporate  planning"  rests  on  forecasting  undertaken  for  the  benefit 
of  industry,  not of  society at large.  (We  return  to  this  point  in 
the  next chapter.)  Europe  Plus  Thirty could  undertake  systematic 
forecasting  about  the  costs  and  benefits  of  the  alternative  routes 
II.8. 
which might  be  taken  by  a  given scientific discovery  through  the  applied 
research phase,  the  development phase,  and  the  prototype  phase;  through 
alternative socio-industrial structures,  with  their different degrees  of 
public  answerability;  through  the  different expenditure  phases with 
their related alternative  fiscal  and  subsidy policies;  and  lastly, 
through  the  alternative mixes  of national  and  Community  law,  tax  and 
subsidy,  which  do  now  or might  in  the  future  apply  to  such alternative 
routes.  At  every  stage  careful distinctions would  have  to  be  made 
between  the  various  parties meeting  the  costs  (internal  - external,  etc.) 
and  the  various  parties  receiving  the benefits.  This  would  be  an 
immense  task,  and  one  which  would  only become  justifiable as  the 
Community  obtained,  or  saw  an  immediate  likelihood of obtaining,  a 
measure  of  power  to  change  or affect  those  routes  themselves. 
II.8.21.  Certainly one  can  dream,  indeed all of  us  who  contributed  to  this 
report have  probably  dreamed,  of  a  world,  or even  a  European  Community, 
capable  of  taking  our  prodigious  science  and  technology by  the  scruff 
of  the  neck  and  bending it by human  will  to  the  service  of  conscious 
human  aims.  We  dream  of  deliberately and  actively planning  their 
development  in  a  new  partnership  between  government,  research and 
industry,  so  that  the  needs  of  our battered race may  be  met  in  time,  so 
that we  may  command  our  future,  not  follow our past.  If it were  done, 
it would  be  necessary  to  survey and  investigate alternative  technological 
options well  in advance  and,  as  a  kind  of  sub-continental  insurance  policy, 
to  ensure  that many  of  them  are  pursued  as  far as  the  pilot plant or 
engineering prototype  stage,  so  as  to  be  capable  of  rapid exploitation 
if the  need  arose.  Diversity of  technological  development  like  this 
would,  of  course,  be  very costly and  it is  unthinkable  that all  the 
relevant options  could  be  followed  up  in each  industrialised country. 
If any  attempt were  made  to  grip  this matter,  and  to  grip it within  the 
world  of democracy,  it could not (in Western Europe)  be  made  by  any  one 
country alone;  it would  have  to  be  done  by  the  Community. 9  11.8. 
1!.8.22.  Nor  would it be  wise  to  attempt any  such  thing,  or ever1  a  tenth 
of it,  on  the  basis  of  knowledge  or opinion about what  society needs 
or wants  now;  it would  need  to  be  based  on  forecasting  about what 
society is  likely  to  want  of  science  and  technology  in  the  future,  and 
this  would  probably be  among  the  most fertile of  the  sectoral  inter-
actions  which  could  be  achieved  in a  closely integrated forecasting 
instrument~ 
11.8.23.  Much  light·  ls  thrown  on  how  this  could  be  done  by C.F.  von 
WeizsHcker's  tripartite division of  the  history of science(l). 
The  first phase  wa~  tne  creation by princes of  institutions where 
scientifically minded  barbers,  stonemasons,  and  sailors could  become 
something  new:  scientists.  The  second  phase  was  that of  the 
autonomy  of  science,  when  scientists  followed  their own  noses  and  always 
got  the  money  to  do  it.  This  was  the  phase  which  produced  the  laws  of 
science,  the  dignity of science,  and  the  power of scientists.  We  are 
now  in  the  third phase,  when  science  and  scientific education are  so 
expensive  that society has  to  ration  the  expenditure  and,  in doing  so, 
to  decide what  science  shall  be  done.  Times  have  changea since  the 
first phase;  it is  no  longer princes  now,  but  the  diffuse machinery 
of  democracy  which  h~s  to  produce  the  decisions. 
Recommendations 
1!.8.24.  As  in many  of our  fields,  we  think Europe Plus Thirty should  spend 
considerable effort on  finding  out what  the  present causal  linkages  are • 
How  are  social  demanrts  on  science  and  technology  expressed  ?  How  are 
they  transmitted,  and  to  whom  ?  What  structures  and  policies exist, 
and  what  results  do  they yield  ?  There  are  one  or  two  specialist 
institutes  in Community  countries  which  are well  qualified  in  this  field. 
11.8.25.  Then  Europe  Plus  Thirty must,  by  the  use  of  task forces,  brainstorming, 
and  scenarios,  work out alternative  future  European  structures  and  policies, 
for  comparison  by  the  decision-makers,  on  the basis  of  the  knowledge 
acquired. 
(1)  Vividly  expounded  by Ralf Dahrendorf  in Proceedings  of  the  Royal 
Irish Academy  75.C.2.,  Dublin,  1975. 10  II.8. 
~c must keep  scanning  in many  fields  of advanced  technology  for 
those  breakthroughs :  (we  gave  examples  above)  which,  if they happened, 
would  really change  people's  lives,  and  would  thus  demand  new  policies 
which might have  to  be  on  a  Community  scale. 
Lastly it should  scan current experience  of  the  effects of 
different subsidy and  fiscal policies  on  the  development of  innovations 
(that is,  development  as  opposed  to  research)  and  should  forecast  for 
the  Community  about alternatives  open  to it in  this matter. 
Technological  forecasting of  the kind  outlined  in  this chapter 
has  much  in common  with  the  process  of  technology assessment:  T.A. 
To  this  we  shall  return in Part III below. 
II.8.26  ..  To  carry out and  to  catalyse  the  functions  and  studies  sketched 
above,  we  think Europe  Plus Thirty.should  include not  less  than  five  to 
seven  specialists~  They  should be  headed,  or guided,  or should at 
least be  able  to call on  the  services of,  two  people,  one  each  in  the 
physical  and  the  life sciences,  who  by  their own  work  and  reputation 
have  access  to  th(:  p1aces  where  the  absolute  frontiers  of  ignorance 
are  being  pushed  back.  There  should be  extensive  use  of  task forces, 
short appoinenents,  and  contract work. PART  II  11.9. 
9.  INDUSTRY 
!!.9.1.  In dealing with social  forecasting  above,  we  pointed out that 
the  same  vastness  and variety of  the subject matter which made 
forecasting about it desirable also makes  it hard to  specify what 
should be  done.  The  same  applies  to  industry.  We  in Western Europe 
are an industrial  society;  industry is not what  we  are ~,  but it 
is what most  of us  do. 
1!.9.2.  The  arrangement  of this Part of our  report means  that we  have 
1!.9.3. 
already covered,  or will cover, many  things  separately  which could 
be  regarded as "running over into industry",  or even as being "part 
of industry".  Technology,  energy,  raw  materials,  transport,  even 
economics  and  finance,  all could  reasonably,  though  not  exhaustively, 
be  considered in this way.  Here  we  deal mainly with manufacturing 
industry. 
In a  field so vast, it is best to keep  finnly before us  the 
facts  that Europe  Plus  Thirty will be assisting the institutions of 
the Community,  and  that what  they require assistance in is the 
formation  of policy,  and that policy is simply  a  particular way 
of  exercising powers;  no  powers,  no  policy:  no  assistance needed. 
The  powers  the Community  now  has  and  those it might acquire must  set 
the boundaries  of Europe  Plus  Thirty's work in this field. 
1!.9.4.  It is  therefore useful  first to distinguish between  three sorts: 
of "industrial  forecasting":  forecasting about  industry  for  the 
benefit of industry,  forecasting about  society as  a  whole  for the 
benefit of industry,  and  forecasting about  industry  for the benefit 
of society.  It is clearly in the  last two  of these three activities 
that Europe  Plus  Thirty must  find its role.  We  are guided  through-
out by  the need  to devise  forecasting which is useful in identifying 
and  pursuing goals.  It is probably more  misleading than not  to 
think separately of social goals,  economic  goals,  and industrial 
goals;  there are  only  social  goals.  Economics  are a  means  of 
measurement  and  reasoning,  industry is a  means  of production,  and 
neither of  them  can in themselves  constitute or provide  a  goal  or goals. II.9.5. 
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Likewise with  technology.  It is not  enough  to watch  technology 
going  ahead  and  then  check to  see whether its results are  going  to 
be  hannful;  it is better,  having  chosen  our social goals,  to  see 
what  technological  developments  can and  should  be  applied to  their 
achievement.  We  should not  be  examining  so  much  the  social accepta-
bility of  new  technologies,  as  the  technological  possibility of 
achieving new  social  goals.  Above  all,  Europe  Plus Thirty should 
speculate  about  the  demands  which  society may  make  on  industry in 
11.9. 
the  future,  and  the  responses  which may  be  called for  from  the Community 
in both industrial and social  policy.  (See II.6.) 
Though  designed  for  the  good  of society,  such an  approach  could 
not  but  be  useful  to  industry itself.  In the  past West  European 
industry  pursued its aims  strictly according to  economic criteria.  It 
produced  goods  to  be  sold on  the market,  and it was  assumed or hoped 
that the "social  good",  whatever that was,  would automatically be 
furthered  by  finns  pursuing their individual goals.  These  goals  con-
sisted of maximising  the efficiency of the profit-invest.nent cycle, 
controlling and  defending market  positions,  and  devising and adjusting to 
changes  in the  product  cycle. 
It has  for  some  time  been clear that industrial activity in 
itself does  not  necessarily  produce  desirable  social  results.  Increased 
standards  of  living may  go  a  long way  to  satisfying needs,  but  needs 
are  not  only  for  goods;  this  becomes  clear when  the  trade-off is be-
tween  the  increased production of  goods  and  environmental  deterioration 
or other external  costs,  or between "economic"  efficiency and full 
employment  or satisfaction at work. 
II.9.6.  This  awareness  has  expressed itself in the  development  of govern-
ment  interventions,  of  technology  assessment,  of an  emphasis  on  qualita-
tive  rather than  quantitative  growth,  and in moves  towards  worker 
participation in decision-making.  People  have  also  become  aware that, 
at a  certain point,  technological  innovation began to  be  used not  only 
to  increase productivity and welfare,  but also as  an artificial means 1!.9.7. 
11.9.8. 
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to  increase  the market  by  shortening the  product  life cycle  and 
introducing "better"  new  products  in as  rapid a  succession as  possible. 
The  filtering through  and  resolution of  these  problems  are  long-term 
issues. 
In general,  this  change  in attitudes  has  made  it harder for 
firms  to  get  on with their own  business  as  they  see it, namely  that 
of  producing profitably.  The  firm is increasingly torn between its 
responsibilities  towards  its shareholders,  towards  the  society in which 
it operates,  and  towards  its own  employees.  As  a  consequence  of the 
confusion over these conflicting responsibilities,  industry sees  the 
increasing number  of pressure  groups  (local,  trade unions,  consumers, 
environmental)  more  or less  fostered and  coordinated by  governments, 
pushing it in different directions  and,  as it sees it, hampering it 
from  getting on.  The  resolution of these often contradictory demands 
makes  for  a  climate in which  public accountability is increasingly 
expected.  Formerly,  in a  period of  rapid  economic  growth,  these  demands, 
embodied  in pressures  on  the  firm,  could be  shrouded over by  distributing 
to all sides more  of an  ever-increasing cake.  In enabling this distri-
bution,  technology  played  the major part.  But when  the workings  of 
technology itself are called in question,  and  basic  resources  become 
scarce and  expensive,  the situation needs  new  solutions. 
The  adoption of  Keynesian  principles in the post-war period laid 
the basis,  in Europe  at  least,  for  the  rapid economic  growth  of  the 
1950s  and  1960s,  because it helped  to  cushion  out  downswings  of  the 
economy.  This  in turn caused  governments  to  take  on  the  responsibility 
of ensuring progressive  growth.  They  became  more  closely involved with 
industry,  because  they were  the  only  agencies with  the  authority to 
implement  the  demand  policies which could ensure  full  employment  and 
growth.  Three  further  factors  encouraged  government  involvement:  the 
recognition and  open  acceptance  of industrial  development  as  a  pre-
requisite of national  power and  independence,  the need  to  direct and 
regulate "natural" industrial  development  in order to  create a  regional 
and  social  balance,  and  the  need  to mobilise  resources which  lay beyond 
the capacity  of  the  individual  firm. - 4  - 11.9. 
11.9.9.  Hence  the  increasing  government  involvement at  the national  level, 
hence  also  the  Communities'  attempts  to make  these  involvements 
compatible  first with  the  ideal  of  fair competition,  and  now  with a 
groundwork  for possible  economic  and monetary  union.  Thus,  even 
though  the  Community  treaties  do  not  explicitly mention industrial or 
technology policy,  the  fulfilment  of  their overall  aims  make  just  such 
policies inevitable.  The  need  for close  cooperation of industry  and 
government  in  forecasting  has  long been evident,  because  of  the  increasing 
involvement  of  governments  in devising policies  for  the  reform of society 
as  a  whole  and  consequently in changing priorities on what  the  goods  and 
services  are  that society needs.  The  need  for close cooperation between 
member  governments  and  the institutions  of  the  Community  is in turn 
becoming  increasingly apparent  as  the  Community  pursues  both its 
established aims  and those  towards  the  definition and adoption of which 
it is struggling. 
rr.9.10.  The  European Communities,  and  especially the Commission,  are not 
starting from  scratch in all this.  The  earlier interventions in industrial 
policy,  the "partial conununities"  of  the  ECSC  and  Euratom,  have  yielded 
countless  lessons  of the highest value.  Coal  and  steel were  chosen,  back 
in the  fifties,  as  a  gauge  of  courage  and wholeheartedness;  they were  felt 
to  be  the  backbone  of European  industry.  Their "communitisation"  did 
not  yield the  results  hoped  for,  and  led in particular to the coal crisis 
of  1958  and  the  over-production of  steel  in 1969,  because  European coal 
and  steel were  not  considered,  or not  sufficiently considered,  as  part 
of  the  energy  sector as  a  whole,  or as  part of the  development  of  the 
world  economy.  Euratom  (as  a  "cormnunitisation"  of another part of 
energy  production and  the  R & D therefor)  also  failed  to yield the  hoped 
for  result,  this  time,  probably,  because  a  mistake was  made  about  how 
industrial innovation  can be  procured  and  diffused,  particularly in a 
field  so  intimately connected with military security.  One  cannot  create 
an  establishment,  order it to  innovate  and  then,  having innovated, 
secure  the  adoption of its innovations  on  the  shop  floor.  Life works 
more  independently,  more  inconveniently,  and  above  all it works  in a 
way  which  can better be  understood  by  forecasting about what may  happen 
and better influenced by  making  decisions  only after prolonged  fore-
casting and analysis of the  surrounding  landscape.  So  the  European - 5  -
innovations  in nuclear energy were made  where  they would  have  been 
made  anyhow,  that is nationally,  and  a  European nuclear industry did 
not materialise. 
11.9.11.  The  past  experience  of  the  Common  Market,  then,  has  shown  the 
difficulties of  se~king economic  union without  a  broader industrial 
policy.  The  general  aims  of  an  industrial  policy can  only  be  to 
11.9. 
ensure  a  suitable  framework  for industrial  development within the European 
1narket  and  for  the application of Community  regulations.  But  the  economic 
forecasts  which  should have  helped  industry  tended  to  become  ends  in 
themselves,  and not  instruments  to modify and  guide  decisions.  The 
three  programmes  prepared by  the Committee  on  Economic  Policy  (1966-70, 
1968-70,  1971-75)  were very general  attempts  in this direction,  but 
would  have  had  to  be more  precise  to  enable  them  to  be  translated into 
policies and  sectoral decisions. 
1!.9.12.  To  what  extent the  Community will  increase its involvement  in 
industrial  policy is itself a  matter of forecast.  Effective Community 
action in the industrial  field will  only  be  obtained when  it is possible 
to  fonnulate  a"Community  plan".  But,while waiting  for this eventuality, 
the  Community  will  no  doubt  continue  to  fix  general  goals  for industrial 
policy,  and  for  technology policy.  These might  include  the  easing of 
restraints  on  rationalising industry across  frontiers,  common  approaches 
to  fiscal  aud  taxation policy,  the  development  of  a  Community  approach 
towards  non-member  states,  concerted action  •. towards  foreign investment, 
and  the  development  of  regional  industrial policy. 
II.9.13.  The  Cornmunity  might  also wish in the  future  to  develop  a  greater 
role in the  exercise  of public control  over the multinational  corpora-
tions.  At  present  there is an  ambiguity in our attitude towards 
them;  on  the  one  hand,they are  obvious  generators  of wealth,  and very 
big generators  of innovation.  On  the  other,  they are by  their very 
multinationality able  to  play off against  each  other the  governments 
of the countries  in which  they operate.  As  long as it is national 
governments which,  in the  last resort,  take  decisions  on  labour 
conditions,  land-use  planning,  pollution controls,  safety standards, 
infrastructure investments,  regional  grants, water charges,  etc., - 6  -
etc.,  a  company  with  the  capital  and  the  organisation to create 
production capacity where  it likes is bound  to  seek  the  country 
where  these  decisions  are most  favourable  to it, and  national 
governments  are  bound  in turn  to  be  t'empted  to  compete  in offering 
favourable  decisions.  The  result is by  no  means  always  to  the  good 
of a  balanced West  European  economy,  especially  from  the  r~gional 
point  of view. 
II.9.14.  It is  true that standardisation and  coordination in these 
matters  would  leave  the  Community  as  a  whole  still in a  state of 
unregulated  cornpetition with  the  rest of  the world,  and  thus  liable 
to  be  "played off"  against,  say,  Japan or Eastern  Europe.  But  that 
II.9. 
is true of many  other things  as well,  and we  imagine  that  an  end  to 
investment  snatching as  between  the member  countries would  be  regarded 
as  progress,  and  that attempts  to achieve  this will  continue  and in the 
end  succeed. 
II.9.15.  So  what  should Europe  Plus  Thirty  forecast  about,  and  how,  in 
the  industrial  field?  To  begin with, it will not  be  alone.  There  is 
already  a  great deal  going  on:  technological  forecasting,  technology 
assessment,  techno-economic  forecasting.  Most  of it is done  by  firms 
and industrial  research  association~ for their own  purposes:  fore-
casting about  industry  for the benefit of industry.  Some  is done  by 
governments,including much  forecasting about  society  for the benefit of 
industry.  It is fortunate  that organisations  already exist which  can 
help  to  provide  the  inputs  for Europe  Plus Thirty's activities,  such as 
the  European Industrial  Research  Management  Association  (EIRMA)  and 
the  yet more  recently established Federation of  European  Industrial 
Cooperative  Research Organisations  (FEICRO).  Both  names  are self-
explanatory. 
Recommendations 
!!.9.16.  We  would hold it impossible,  or at least not cost-effective,  for 
Europe  Plus Thirty to  attempt  a  detailed comprehensive model,  whether 
conceptual  as  such or conceptualised onto  a  computer,  for European 
industry as  a  whole.  Its approach  should be  more  problem-oriented, - 7  - II.9. 
more  based  on  brainstorming  and  scenarios,  though  of course always 
in the  presence  of  the  biggest  data-base  practicable.  In what  follows 
by  "vertical" we  mean  single industries;  and  by "horizontal"  phenomena, 
information,  and  problems  which affect several  industries,  or all. 
!!.9.17. 
a) 
Europe  Plus  Thirty should: 
Produce  guidelines  (stemming  from  a  generally infonned view 
of  the  future  of  Europe  as well  as  from  the  present  long-
term  policies  of the Community),  and afford methodological 
control,  for "vertical" strategic forecasting  and assessment 
exercises  concerning certain industrial  sectors  or group  of 
sectors;  particularly those where  there  is~or is  likely to be 
a  Community  policy,  or which  are already  somewhat  integrated at 
Community  or higher level; 
b)  Organise task forces,  or repeated seminars,  for  such vertical 
exercises  and  take  part in them  to  ensure high  quality  of 
forecasting and  assessment work  from  the  professional  and 
methodological  point  of view; 
c)  Organise  and  direct  task forces  for dealing with horizontal 
issues.  The  issues  should be  carefully defined  (by  Europe 
Plus  Thirty)  and  should be  problem-oriented  rather than  sector-
oriented; 
d)  Finally,  the  general  forecasting  and  assessment  output  of 
Europe  Plus  Thirty,  the "teleonomies",  should include whatever 
material  can usefully be  put into  them  from  the  outputs  of  the 
studies mentioned above. 
!!.9.18.  The  "task forces"  should include  people  from  industry itself, 
who  are  concerned with TF  and  TA,  and  possibly  from  other bodies 
involved in the  same  activity.  Both in the verticalmd horizontal 
task forces,  there  should be  people  from  the  trade  unions  and,  whenever 
they exist,  from  consumer associations. 
come  much  mutual  education. 
From  their presence  could 
!1.9.19.  Among  the "vertical"  sectors  tackled (b)  should be  some  of  the 
high  technology  ones,  such as  electronics,  informatics,  and  drugs,  and - 8  -
also  some  sectors  from  our present mainline  industries  (e.g.  cars, 
chemicals,  machine  tools,  food  processing,  textiles). 
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:1.9.20.  But  the  bulk  of  the work would  probably fall  on  the "horizontal"· 
task forces  (c).  We  now  list several  issues  from which  some  could 
be  selected for analysis  and  forecasting in this way. 
a)  The  problems  of  regional  distribution of  industry; 
b)  Labour,  capital and  energy  intensiveness; 
c)  Technology  transfer,  particularly the  question of what  kind 
of  technology,  in view  of  the  role that  the  Community  can 
play in the  development  of  the Third World. 
d)  World "division of  labour".  What  are  the  present  trends  in 
the  distribution of industrial  innovation,  high-technology 
industry,  intermediate industry,  low-technology  industry, 
and menial  drudgery,  as  between  the u.s., Japan,  the  European 
Community,  Eastern Europe,  and various  sectors  of the 
"developing world"?  What  would  be  the  consequences  for West 
European  and world society of their continuation,  and of various 
alternative modifications?  Could  policies  be  adopted? 
e)  The  problem of  Mitbestiuunung;~  thus  bridging with social  fore-
casting. 
f)  The  relation between manufacturing industry and  the  service 
sector.  What  macro-economic  trends  are  emerging,  and what 
would  be  the  consequences  for  soc~ety of their continuation 
or modification? 
g)  Forecasting and  speculation about  the  dispersion of  power in 
our midst;  power  for  good or for ill, we  do  not  say.  The 
most  obvious  area is the  rise of the multinational  corporations. 
At  the  moment,  as  is very well  known,  some  of  them  have  bigger 
turnovers  than  the  state  revenues  of middle-sized nations,  and 
the  trend appears  to  be  continuing.  What  would  or might  be  the 
political and  social  consequences  for European  society and 
for our external  political and  economic  environment  of its 
continuation or its reversal? 
What  would  be  the  prerequisites  and effects,  social,  political, 
and  economic,  of alternative policies in this  field? - 9  -
h)  A perception well  worth  elucidating and  deepening would  be 
that which  holds  that it is enough  for a  government  (or for 
the  Couuuunity)  to  forecast,  plan,  and  regulate  only the 
development  of bigger finns,  since  the  smaller are  conditioned 
and  determined  by what  happens  to  the  big ones.  Is  this  true? 
If so,  what  are  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  for policy 
formation? 
i)  Again,what  is the  relative  role of  large and  small  firms  in 
innovation,  both  technological  and  social?  Do  small  firms 
have  a  special  role  in  jumping around  trying  out  new  things 
in the interstices between  the industrial giants?  What 
would  happen if they were  gradually  squeezed  out? 
k)  And,  lastly, what  might  the  future  hold  for the humanisation 
II.9. 
of industrial work?  We  are  talking here  of  the movement,  most 
advanced  so  far in Scandinavia,  away  from  the  inexorable  product-
ion belt and  towards  a  more  craftsmanly organisation by work 
teams,  and the  opportunity for the  individual worker  to identify 
himself in a  personal way  with his  product.  This  car was  made 
by John,  Henry,  and Mary  ••••••• 
II.9.21.  Here  are  the "horizontal" industrial  forecasting areas  on which 
we  think work might  be  useful.  Taken with  the "vertical" issues  and 
with  the contribution to  the  teleonomies,  this would  be  a  formidable 
work-load if everything were  started at  once.  Naturally,  that is not 
our suggestion;  we  offer this  list (like others  in this  report)  as 
description and  illustration,  not  as  a  concrete work  plan. 
11.9.22.  We  recon~end that industrial  forecasting,  partly through  the 
task  force  system outlined above,  should  be  carried out  in Europe  Plus 
Thirty by  about  10  people  having between  them  experience in the  following 
fields: 
European  Commission industrial  policy 
Government  research and  development  policy 
General  corporate management 
Industrial  research management - 10  -
Industrial  econom1cs 
Specialist study of  technology  transfer and  diffusion 
Work  in interdisciplinary "think-tanks" 
Trade  unions,  preferably international 
Consumer associations 
These  people,  or  some  of  ~hem,  should  expect  to  spend  some  of their 
time  on  the  technology assessment  function of  Europe  Plus  Thirty, 
which we  come  to  below,  since industrial  forecasting  and  technology 
assessment are  so  closely  related.  The  problem of  commercial  secrecy 
is  common  to  both  forms  of work,  and  can only  be  solved by  sensible 
handling each  time it comes  up. 
11.9. PART  II  II.lO. 
II.lO.l 
10.  ENERGY 
Introduction 
The  Community  lives  now  and will  live  for a  long while yet with 
permanent  energy difficulties, because of the  conjunction of three his-
torical  trends.  The  first is that industrial societies have  become 
addicted to high  levels  of energy use.  Industrialisation and the  rising 
material  standards  that  go  with it have  depended  on  the substitution of 
one  form  of capital  resource  - energy  - for other forms,  especially 
labour,  time  and  land.  This  process accelerated sharply during  1950-70 
on  the back of ultra-cheap and assured oil supplies, with the  result 
that most  production and  consumption patterns  have  become  'locked in' 
to  patterns  of high  energy use  that will not  be at all easy to  undo. 
Good  examples  are  transport and  settlement patterns, mechanisation and 
automationof both  the manufacturing and  service sectors,  and  the whole 
food  production chain  from  the  farmer  to  the urban house-wife with her 
desire  for  packaged  convenience  foods.  The  solidity of these  patterns 
is shown  by  the many  recent  estimates  that  energy consumption in most 
production and  consumption activities can be  lowered by only  10%  or so 
without making major structural changes  or reforming highly ingrained 
attitudes. 
11.10.2.  The  second  trend is the  growing difficulty of meeting this depen-
dence.  The  escape  from Middle  East oil while also maintaining high  levels 
of consumption inevitably calls  for  the massive  expansion of very  demanding 
technologies  such  as  offshore oil,  coal  conversion,  and nuclear power,  with 
their formidable  requirements  for capital, skilled manpower,  materials, 
public acceptance  of  risks  and  environmental  impact,  an~ in the. case  of 
nuclear power,  requirements  for infallible people  and unbreachable 
sec~rity measures.  Other less  demanding  technologies  such  as  natural  gas, 
geothermal,  solar and wind  power tend either to be  short  life resources 
or low  rate sources,  creating their own  set of difficulties.  It is now 
increasingly  recognised that the  real  limits  to the  level  of energy 
supply and/or to its possible rate of  increase will  be  set not  by 
purely geological  or technical  considerations but by  the  combination of 
an  extremely wide  range  of  social,  political, and  environmental  factors. 11.10.3. 
11.10.4. 
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The  third  trend is  the  growing  recognition of global  inequities 
and  the  consequent pressures  for  a  new  and  more  just: international 
economic  order.  The  energy profligacy of  the  North  and  the  crippling 
impact of higher  fuel  prices  on many  countries of  the  South are one 
major  cause of  these moves  to  forge  a  new  global  relationship.  Another 
is  the move  within  the  industrialised nations  themselves  towards  new 
paths of  development which are more  relevant  to  non-material  needs, 
and  which distribute material  requirements  more  fairly.  If these 
adjustments  are  to  be  realised,  the  present disparities in energy 
consumption  - approximately  7-fold  between  the  richest and poorest 
sectors  in  individual European  countries,  and  approximately  10-fold 
between  the  averages  for  the  EEC  and  the  Third  World  - may  have  to  be 
among  the  first fixtures  to  dissolve. 
Given  these  trends,  the wise management  of  energy will  in future 
require  an  extremely  broad  and  searching  outlook.  Clearly,  the  energy 
future  is peculiarly uncertain.  Both  the  constraints,  and  the  oppor-
tunities over  the  longer  term  to  escape  those constraints  by  choosing 
other paths,  are very  large.  The  general management  process  involves 
many  judgements  between  risks  and  benefits,  costs  and  advantages  of 
many  different kinds  - some  quantifiable,  others not.  Energy policy 
also  has  innumerable  interactions with nearly all other social areas 
and  issues,  including  fundamental  questions  of ethics,  preferences 
and  ultimate goals.  At  this  level of  complexity,  any  process  becomes 
political as well  as,  or more  than,  economic  or  technical. 
At  the  deepest  level,  energy calls up  far-reaching  questions  about 
the  nature of industrial societies  and  their future  directions of 
change:  indeed,  the  radical  transformations  of  the world  energy/ 
economic  scene  since  the winter of  1973/74  have  prompted widespread 
heart-seachings of  this kind. 
Priorities for  Energy Forecasting 
11.10.5.  These  introductory remarks  point  to  the  extreme difficulty of 
energy  forecasting  - at least of forecasting over  a  reasonably  broad 
front with  realism and  credibility.  Yet  the  attempt must  be  made: 
the  energy  future is  too  important  to  be  left to  trend  extrapolation, 
as  in  the  past.  The  rest of  this  chapter  therefore  reaches  into 
this  thicket of difficulties  to  pick outkey-priorities  for  energy 
forecasting.  When  these have  been  reviewed,  the  chapter  ends  by 3 
drawing out  their implications  for Europe  Plus Thirty,  and  for  the 
place of  the  latter among  other European energy  initiatives. 
A Total  Approach 
I I. 10. 
II.10.6.  Since  energy  forecasts  which  cover a  reasonably broad  field must 
include  a  very wide  range  of social  factors,  they  should  be  intimately 
related  to  large-scale  social  forecasts.  Indeed,  to  an  important 
extent energy  forecasts  are  themselves  social  forecasts.  For example, 
any projection which  shows  a  large  increase  in electricity production 
implicitly assumes,  because  of economies  of scale,  the  building of 
large  power  stations.  If it assumes  that power  station waste heat 
will  be  used  for  industrial or  domestic  purposes,  then it also 
supposes  the  development  of  large  industrial-urban clusters around 
the  power  units,  or  the  location of  the  latter in existing clusters. 
With  5-10,000  MW  per unit,  or more  in  the  case  of  'nuclear parks',  this 
assumes  an  extreme  degree  of centralisation.  (Conceivably  the 
development  of  small-scale nuclear fusion  stations could  reverse  this 
situation,  but such  stations are  now  merely conjectural.)  Meanwhile, 
low  energy  demand  scenarios,  or  those  based  on  large-scale use  of  'income 
energy'  (solar,  wind etc.)  immediately  lead  to massive  changes  in 
settlement patterns,  the  organisation of work,  and  so  forth  - and  are 
in  fact  usually based  on  the desirability of  such  changes  for  social 
rather  than  energy  reasons. 
11.10.7.  This  point may  seem  obvious  but  is normally  ignored.  The  great 
bulk of energy projections  and  forecasts  are  (a)  based  on  and  confined  to 
rather narrow  technical  and  economic  considerations,  and  (b)  are extra-
polatory rather  than normative.  For both  reasons  they  tend  to  assume 
that  the  future will be  much  like  the  present,  with  some  sectors 
'bigger'  and  others  'smaller',  and  therefore  see  no  reason  for  question-
ing  the  social  assumptions  behind either  the  present energy pattern or 
the  future  projection~ 
11.10.8.  A first priority,  then,  is  to  relate energy  forecasting  to all other 
social considerations  and  sectors;  to  attempt fully  integrated  forecasting. 
This  is easier said  than  done,  but it is precisely because  hardly anyone 
is  taking  this all-sector, multi-disciplinary approach  to  the  longer-term 
future  that the  Europe  Plus  Thirty study was  conceived. II.l0.9. 
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A European Approach 
One  of  the  most  striking facts  about  the  European  energy  scene  is 
the  large  differences  between  EEC  nations  of  some  rather  basic  para-
meters.  Some  of  these  are  shown  for  the  year  1970  in Table  1: 
TABLE  l 
Energy  Energy  growth  Ratio  GNP  Import 
per  capita  per  capita  to  energy  dependence 
tee*  % p.a.**  ***  % ,n~** 
France  4.2  4.9  678  71 
w.  Germany  5.6  4.3  557  48 
Italy  3.0  8.6  580  82 
UK  5.5  1.0  396  45 
Source:  EUROSTAT 
*  tonnes  coal  equivalent~  1  tee  =  28.8  x  109  J 
**  average  annual  % growth  1960-70 
***  1970  US  dollars per  tonne  coal  equivalent 
*m~*  fuel  imports  minus  exports  as  % of  total  consumption 
These  differences  raise many  important questions  for  the  Community 
as  a  political entity,  not  least of which  is  the  pxospect  of  sharp 
divergencies  in  the  energy  policies  and  priorities of  member  countries 
with all  that  these  imply  for  corrmvn  standards,  common  research efforts, 
trading relations,  and  so  forth.  To  reduce  the  risk of  this  a 
Community  energy  strategy  - and  hence  Community  energy  forecasting  -
is  a  necessity. 
Understanding  the  Past  and  Present 
II.lO.lO.  Useful  forecasts  and models  of  the  energy  sector must  clearly be 
based  on  a  proper understanding of past  developments  and  the  present 
patterns of  energy usage.  Yet  such  an understanding hardly exists  for 
many  important factors.  For  example  there  is  no  satisfactory causal  explan-
ation of  the  disparities  in  the  first  3  columns  of  Table  1.  There  is  no 
satisfactory causal  explanation of past energy  growth  patterns.  Why,  for 
example,  did  total  energy  consumption  increase  by  only  30%  between 
1900  and  1947  in  the  UK?  On  a  per  capita basis,  the  increase  in  the 
half  century  was  a  mere  2%- from  4.08  to  4.15  tons  coal  equivalent 
per year.  The  Ufual  explanation  - that coal  was  progressively used - 5  - 11.10. 
more  efficiently while other  inherently more  efficient fuels  such  as 
oil were  substituted for  coal  - is  not  sufficient1since it ignores 
important factors  such  as  the  large-scale substitution of horses  (and 
hence  land)  by  machines.  Without  information of  this kind,  trends 
and  saturation effects are not easy  to  estimate.  Lacking  information 
of  this  sort,  extrapolations are usually  based  on  correlations  rather 
than causes:  notably  the correlation between  GOP  and  available or net 
energy  consumption.  This  relationship varies  very widely  for 
different countries,  even at  the  same  level of  development  (see Table  1). 
Very  little has  been  done  to  explain this variation. 
11.10.11.  Similar doubts  apply  to  changes  in this  relationship:  that is,  the 
percentage  increase in net energy  use  for  each percentage  increase of 
GNP.  This  coefficient has  been close  to  1  for many  years  for  nearly 
all  developed  countries  and  is  therefore widely used  as  a  basis  for 
forecasting.  Such  a  grossly aggregated  figure,  based  on  correlations 
and  not  on causes,  is hardly an adequate  basis  for  forecasting or 
planning.  It is anyway  li~ely to  change  considerably(!).  Little is 
known  about  the  relationships (elasticities)  between  energy prices 
and  both  supply and  demand.  Much  work on  these  factors  is now  under 
way,  especially on monitoring  the effects of  the  recent and  dramatic 
price changes.  And  very little is known  about precisely where,  and 
~~y,  energy is used when  by  'use'  one  means  both direct and  indirect 
consumption.  The  indirect consumption  (eg  the  requirements  for making 
(1)  In several  countries  the  coefficient has  fluctuated  quite widely 
since  the  late 1960s.  The  sudden rise in oil prices has  produced marked 
and  probably  permanent  changes.  Even without, this intervention the 
coefficient could have  been about  to  decline.  This  has  been  shown  for 
the  UK  by  an analysis  of  the  total  energy content of all purchases  by 
households within  11  income  ranges:  energy  per average£  spent fell  from 
92.3  kWh  in  the  poorest sector  to  55.7 kWh  in the wealthiest group, 
suggesting  that if energy intensities and  spending patterns  remain 
constant,  as  national wealth increases  the  coefficient will  fall  from 
about  1  to  around 0.65  (P.C.  Roberts  and  V E Outram,  A Method  of 
Projecting Energy Demand  in the  UK:  Department  of  the Environment, 
London  1974).  However,  this  conclusion has  been  challenged on  the 
grounds  that  the  energy  intensity of manufacturing  industries must 
increase in order  to  release  labour  to  the  expanding  service sectors, 
which  have  relatively  low  or very  low  energy intensities  and  which 
account  for much  of  the  expenditure  by  the wealthiest sectors 
(L  G Brookes,  UK  Atomic  Energy Authority,  personal  communication).  The 
existence of  this  as  yet unresolved  dispute  further  supports  the main 
argument  that forecasts  should  be  based  on  causes  and  not on  correla-
tions. - 6  - I I. 10. 
machinery,  or providing materials)  is often a  very  large fraction  o~ 
and  sometimes  greatly exceeds,  the  direct consumption.  Without  this 
information it is  impossible  to  evaluat~ the  true  energy costs  of  any 
good  or  service,  any  production or  consumption activity,  or  any move-
ment  of  these  energy  costs  through  technological  changes,  conservation 
measures,  and  so  forth. 
II.l0.12.  Fortunately,  many  of  these  important gaps  are  likely  to  be  filled 
during  the  next  year or  so  following  the  recent  and  phenomenal  upsurge 
in energy  studies,  including  energy analysis.  How  soon or fully  this 
information can  be  incorporated  into  energy  forecasting  is another 
matter.  An  important  role  for  an  independent  'centre of excellence', 
such  as  Europe Plus  Thirty, will  be  to  see that it is fully used, 
whether by  in-house or in contracted-qut studies. 
Resolving Present Conflicts 
11.10.13.  The  energy  scene  is full of critical issues  that are  shrouded with 
uncertainty or are highly controversial,  or both.  In some  cases 
expert opinion is sharply polarised,  even  inflamed.  Among  the  more 
important of  these  conflict areas  are  several nuclear  issues  (safety, 
waste  storage,  plutonium containment,  etc);  the  size of  fuel  reserves 
(including North  Sea oil and  gas);  potentials  for  energy  savings  and 
the  degree  of  disruption likely  to  be  caused  by vigorous  conservation 
measures;  and  costs  and  timings  of  new  supply  technologies. 
11.10.14.  An  early step  in any  forecasting  programme  must  be  to  mount  a 
systematic  and  aggressive assault on  these  disputed  issues,  starting 
with  those  of  immediate  relevance  to  policy makers.  Means  must  be 
found  to  help  experts  resolve more  clearly what  they agree  upon,  where 
they  differ,  and  what  further research is needed  to  narrow areas  of 
disagreement.  Until  this is  done  a  large  forecasting  programme  hardly 
seems  possible,  since it demands  some  kind of mutual  agreement  about 
constraints  and  other  inputs,  or at least about  the  range  of contin-
gencies which  should  be  allowed  for. 
11.10.15.  Nor  is it possible  in  the meantime  to  begin a  meaningful  and 
informed  debate  on  energy  issues  between non-experts,  including  con-
cerned citizens,  politicians,  a~d even ministers  and  Commissioners.  If 
the  experts  are  fighting it out in the  dark,  what  chance  is  there  for 
the  rest?  Yet,  as  we  saw  above,  energy  digs  so  deep  into  society as  a - 7  - II. I 0. 
whole  and  raises  such  fundamental  questions  of  ethic~ preferences  and 
goals,  that a  widespread  and  informed  debate  on  'energy futures'  is 
entirely necessary  ~  at least for societies with any  pretence at being 
democratic. 
II.l0.16.  Mounting  such an assault requires  a  concerted effort simply  to 
speed  up  and  facilitate communication between experts,  who  possess 
much  valuable  information which  now  circulates  slowly and erratically 
(or not at all).  But  an even more  valuable  and  practical  approach 
would  be  to  initiate a  series of  task  forces  or intensive  seminars  on 
critical issues,  using experts with widely varying opinions,  providing 
ample  library,  research assistant and  computational  back-up,  and,  as 
it were,  locking  them  up  until results are achieved.  Previous 
experiences with  this  technique  have  proved  remarkably effective both 
in establishing  the  areas of  consensus  and  differences  among  experts 
and  later in communicating  these  findings  to  the public at large(l). 
Fore casts  from  the Present 
II.l0.17.  With  energy,  the main  strategic problems  to  be  solved are  (1)  how 
to  conserve  energy,  (2)  how  to  increase  indigenous  supplies,  (3)  how 
to  develop  new  supply  technologies,  (4)  how  to  keep  today's  supply 
patterns  going without  economic  collapse,  and,  more  controversially, 
(5)  how  to  make  a  strategic withdrawal  from  high energy  dependence, 
perhaps at relatively short notice. 
While  each of  these  problems  demands  its own  forecasting  approach, 
most of what  needs  to  be  done  falls  under  three ma±n  headings: 
a)  Supply Developments:  identification and  timing of  fuel  reserve 
appreciation/depletion and  of global  export/import patterns; 
identification,  costs  and  timing of  supply  technologies,  both 
new  and  existing;  prices. 
b)  Demand  Developments:  by  sectors  and  overall in response  to  changes 
in technologies,  costs  and  prices,  energy  availabil~ty,  deliberate 
energy-saving measures  from  simple  technical,  fiscal,  or  legislative 
(1)  Man's  Impact  on  the Global  Environment:  Report of  the  Study of Critical 
Environmental  Problems  (MIT  Press,  1970).  And  Inadvertent Climate 
Modification:  Report  on  the Study of Man's  Impact  on  Climate  (MIT  Press, 
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'fixes',  to  deeper  structural  changes.  Study  of wants,  needs, 
necessities  and  unwanted  consumption  (eg  planned obsolescence of 
goods,  some  private  transport). 
c)  Interactions:  changes  in supply  and  their  impact  on other  sectors 
(capital,  balance of  payments,  skills, materials,  land  use,  environ-
ment,  safety,  etc.  etc).  Impacts  of  demand  changes  on other 
sectors  (labour,  manufacturing  output,  capital,  balance of  payments, 
need  for  anticipatory planning,  etc.  etc).  Identify feedback  loops 
between all energy  and  social  sectors,  time  delays,  critical phases 
and  'gaps'  (eg,  over- or under- supply at future  dates).  Broader 
consequences  of alternative  supply  technologies  and  demand  patterns. 
Even  this  incomplete  list of  target areas  adds  up  to  a  formidable 
forecasting  commitment.  Nevertheless,  while necessary,  it is very  far 
from  being  sufficient.  The  innumerable uncertainties of  the  energy 
future,  the  extreme  openness  of  this  future  to  change,  and  the  tight 
connections  between  energy  and all other social  sectors,  add  up  to  a 
severe  problem of credibility for  any  attempt  to  forecast  from  the present 
more  than,  say,  10  to  20  years  ahead.  Yet,  as  stated above,  forecasts 
of  this  time  scale or  longer are urgently required  now. 
Scenarios  of  the  Future 
II.l0.18.  Here  as  elsewhere,  extrapolation can only  be  the  handmaid  of  fore-
casting.  For  the  longer-term view we  require  leaps iD1Q  the  future. 
Here  scenario  techniques  are  supreme.  Energy  scenarios are easily 
quantified and  hence  can  be  'back  tracked'  to  the  present.  This  allows 
trends  and  decision points  for  getting  'from here  to  there'  to  be 
identified.  With  energy  demand  scenarios  one  can distinguish futures 
requiring mere  technical  'fixes'  (with little or  no  change  in life 
styles)  through  the  spectrum  to  full-scale  changes  in social  structures 
and  attitudes.  This  helps  to  bring political  judgement  to  bear  on 
desirability,  feasibility etc. 
II.l0.19.  Implications  for  non-energy  factors  are normally  easy  to  identify 
since  they  are often  the  starting point  for  constructing  the  energy 
scenario itself.  Fo~ example,  in  transport,  measures  that  save  energy 
also  advance  many  other social  benefits  c~.g.  a  switch  from  private 
cars  to  public  transport  in cities  can  reduce  energy  consumption  and, 
by  clearing  the  roads  for  public vehicles,  help  improve  public  services 
so  that most  people  have  access  to  a  swift,  flexible  and  convenient - 9  -
transport service).  Scenarios  are  much  easier for non-experts  to 
understand  and  to  question,  and  less  easily misintf'rpreted,  than  are 
complex  dynamLc  models.  This  i.s  especially  important  in  the  energy 
f i('ld  wher('  the  wide-ranging  debate  has  already  begun. 
II. 10. 
II.l0.20.  Though  much  used,  scenarios  in  the  energy field mostly  focus  on  the 
consequences  of  single  'events':  for  example,  the  impact of major 
technological  developments  (eg,  a  breakthrough  in cheap  solar or  fusion 
power) ;  the  impact of major  public or  government actions  (eg,  heavy  fuel 
taxation,  a  ban  on nuclear breeders);  or  the  impacts  of extraneous  forces 
(eg,  an oil cut-off). 
"Broader"  ones  are  needea.  For  example,  the  'extreme ecological' 
scenario of  the  Energy Policy Project of  the  Ford Foundation  (USA) 
postulated a  possible halving of  energy  use  in the year  2000  from 
( 1) 
present  levels  •  Imaginative  proposals  for  individual use-sectors 
(urban  transport,  food  production,  domestic  heat,  light and  power)  show 
potentials  for  savings  of  the  same  order.  Such  ideas  need  to  be 
explored systematically and  thoroughly,  even  though  some  may  now  seem 
eccentric,  uneconomic,  unlikely,  or plain impossible  - academic 
fantasies.  The  fact  is  that one  cannot  judge  their value until  they 
have  been  explored properly.  Some  possibilities may  not  seem  at all 
uneconomic  under  broader  cost-benefit accounting or different economic 
conditions.  A full  appreciation of all alternative options  and  their 
implications  change  our  perceptions  of what  is realistic and  de~irable. 
11.10.21.  Above  all, it seems  premature  to  judge  these alternative future 
possibilities until  they have  been matched with  the  deeper undercurrents 
of  social  change,  motivation and  behaviour  now  at work  in all industrial 
societies,  or,  equally important,  until they have  been  tested  by 
exposure  to  public opinion - something  that has  never  been  done  in a 
systematic way.  It is  very  significant that many  'utopian'  proposals 
for  energy  futures  match rather closely  some  major undercurrents  now 
(1)  This  scenario was  abandoned  in  the  final  publications of  the Project 
(eg,  A Time  to  Choose:  America's  Energy Future,  Ballinger Publishing Co., 
Cambridge,  Mass.,  1974).  A less  extreme  'zero energy  growth'  scenario 
nevertheless  gave  a  50%  reduction in energy  use  in the  year  2000  compared 
to  a'historical  growth'  or  'business  as  usual'  projection,  and  involved 
only minor  changes  in consumption patterns,  life styles,  etc. - 10  - II. to. 
being  revealed  by  future-oriented  social  studies:  for  example,  the 
Swcdish'To  Choose  a  Future'  programme.(l)These  include  the  expectation 
of or  desire  for  a  greater integration of education,  work  and  leisure; 
a  dissolving of  the  tie between  income  from  work  and  standard of  living; 
substantial decentralisation of  living patterns,  organisation and 
decision-making  processes;  a  stronger  'sense of  community';  greater 
income  redistribution combined with  a  slow-down of  growth  in  the  con-
sumption of  goods;  greater solidarity with  the  poor world. 
Econom~c Fundamentals 
11.10.22.  Some  economic  problems,  pertinent  to  the  energy  and  r~w material 
sectors,  will  also have  to  be  examined.  Particularly: 
a)  When  mineral  resources  are  exploited  down  a  decreasing quality 
gradient,  outputs  of residuals  and  inputs  of  capital~  labour, 
energy  and  other resources  normally  rise.  It is usually assumed 
that higher prices will  cover  these  higher  costs.  Yet  as  all 
finite  resource  stocks  are  depleted,  their scarcity value  and market 
price also  rises.  At  what  point  do  these effects  combine  to 
produce  rapid  'resource price inflation'?  What  are  the  implications 
for  resource allocation over  time;  ie between  the  present and  the 
future?  What  are  the  implications  for  poorer countries,  where 
higher prices  are already  imposing  intolerable strains? 
b)  Economists  often answer  these  questions  by  saying  that new  techno-
logies will  increase  'efficiency of  resource  stock conversion and 
use  (eg,  breeder reactors  rather  than uranium burner  reactors), 
enlarge  the  stocks  by  new  finds,  or discover  how  to  use  new  stocks 
(eg  fusion reactors).  The  critical uncertainty is,  of course,  the 
rate at which  these  can  be  introduced  successfully.  But  technical  pro-
gress  is not  a  free  good:  in fact it is very costly when  one  includes 
all  components  of  research,  all required  substitutions of  technology 
and  capital,  and all  changes  required  by  consumers.  Very  few  of 
these  costs  are  reflected in the  accounting,  though  they  do  appear 
as  an  increase of  GNP.  What  are  the  true  costs?  And  what  implica-
tions  do  they  have  for  the main  argument? 
c)  Economists  are  sharply divided  on  the  'optimum'  rate for  depleting 
a  resource  in  the  ground.  Some  have  used  theoretical  arguments  to 
(l)  "To  choose  a  future  - a  basis  for  discussion  and  deliberations 
on  future  studies  in  S~,.;reden"  Royal  Minis try for  Foreign Affairs  in 
cooperation with  the  Secretariat for  Future  Studies  (1972) 11  II.lO. 
show  that present extraction rates  are  below  the  optimum:  we  are 
using  resources,  including oil,  too  slowly. (l)  Others  produce  a 
strong  theoretical case  for  conservation.  Much  depends  on  the 
number  of  factors  considered  (boundary conditions),  the  future 
discount rate,  how  one  values  present capital  stocks  of  goods, 
knowledge  etc.  Can  economists  sort this out  ?  Should depletion 
strategies,  which  depend  ultimately on  the  value  placed on  the 
options  left open for  future  generations,  be  decided by  economic 
means,  or by political (ethical)  judgements  ? 
The  Task for Europe  Plus Thirty 
II.l0.23.  A vast amount  of energy  forecasting  and modelling  is now  being 
done  in Europe  and  around  the world  by  commercial  and  industrial 
interests,  by energy  industries  and  institutions,  by universities  and 
by  governments.  The  European  Commission  itself has  major proposals 
('  ')(2)  for  an  energy  research and  development  programme  Energy  for Europe  • 
These  proposals  include  a  fairly ambitious  scheme  for energy modelling/ 
forecasting which  covers many,  though not all,  of  the  priorities set 
out in  this  chapter. 
11.10.24.  Most  of  this work  is inevitably rather  rough  and  tentative. 
Conditions  have  changed  so  abruptly since  the winter  of  1973/4  that 
old assumptions  and  methodologies,  such  as  the  former  and  never 
remotely  justifiable reliance  on  single  trend analysis,  have  had  to 
be  scrapped.  Forecasting has  had virtually  to  start afresh.  At 
the  same  time  there has  been  a  wide  recognition  that  the  data base 
for  forecasting is  inadequate. 
(1)  J.A.  Kay  and  J.A.  Mirlees,  The  Desirability of Natural  Resource 
Depletion,  paper  to Environmental  Economic  Study Group/Institute 
of Environmental  Science Joint Conference  on  Natural  Resource 
Depletion  (Royal  Institution,  London,  January  1974). 
(2)  Energy  for Europe:  Research  and  Development  (Lindner Report  -SEC 
(74)  2592  final,  17  July  74);  and  Draft Proposals  for  a  Common 
Research  and  Development  Programme  in  the  Fields of Solar Energy, 
Geothermal  Energy,  Hydrogen  as  a  New  Energy Vector,  Systems 
Modelling  on  Energy  (European  Commission  DG  XII).  The  reports 
identify eight strategic areas,  namely:  (1)  Collection and 
standardisation of basic  data;  inventory of energy R & D; 
(2)  Conservation;  (3)  Fossil  energy  (coal,  natural gas,  oil); 
(4)  Nuclear  energy  (fission and  fusion);  (5)  Hydrogen  economy; 
(6)  New  and  renewable  sources  (solar,  geothermal);  (7)  Environmental 
protection;  (8)  Systems modelling. - 12  - 11.10. 
Nevertheless,  one  can expect  a  fairly rapid  build  up  of  competent 
forecasts  and models  on  narrow fronts  (sectors  and  sub-sector modelling 
etc)  as  the  iterative process  of model  building,  identification of 
weak  data,  improvement of  data,  and  building  of better models  gets 
under way.  Progress  on  wider  fronts  - as  discussed in this  chapter 
- is  likely  to  be  slower,  but  one  might  expect  the  emerge..tce  of  some 
valuable models  and  scenarios  and  a  rather more  rapid  emergence  of 
important  ideas  and  data  for  incorporation into  them. 
11.10.25.  It is in this  'wider'  work  that a  Europe Plus  Thirty  instrument has 
an  extremely valuable  - indeed,  unique  - role  to  play.  It will  have 
no  need  to  get  involved with narrowly  technical  research or  forecasting; 
it should concentrate  on  broader  techno-economic  forecasting  about 
alternative energy patterns  and  policies,  and  above all on  forecasting 
about  the  possible relations  between  those alternative patterns  and 
alternative patterns of  change  in  the  society,  economy,  and  external 
relations of  the  Community  as  a  whole.  It goes  without  saying  that 
the  systems modelling work of  the  Commission's  "Energy  for  Europe" 
programme  should,  in so  far  as it consists of  long-term  techno-economic 
analysis,  be  part of  the  work of  Europe  Plus Thirty. 
11.10.26.  The  major  contribution of  Europe  Plus  Thirty  to  enPrgy  problems  can 
perhaps  best be  summed  up  by  three  characteristics:  integration,  vision,and 
emphasis  on longer  term goals  and  alternatives.  A major  role  should  be 
to  apply multi-disciplinary and  generalist  'excellence'  to  checking, 
questioning,  balancing,  integrating  and  enlarging  on  longer-term and 
wide-ranging  forecasts  from  an  energy point of view.  In other words, 
to  concentrate  on  exploring  the  bridges  between specialised sectors 
as  they  relate  to  energy:  for  example,  by  looking at  the  energy  impli-
cations  of  forecasts  and  alternatives  in  transport or urban  design on 
the  one  hand,  and at  the  impact of existing energy  forecasts  on 
particular sectors of  society,  such  as  the  poor.  The  work would  partly 
involve  the  sjfting and  synthesis of  studies  produced outside,  partly 
in-house  studies  to  fill important  gaps  or  to  combine  existing 
studies  in fresh ways,  partly  through contracting work out  to other 
institutions.  The  general  aim  should  be  to  apply  a  specifically West 
European angle  to  the  exploration of alternative options  and  goals: 
for  example,  to  improve,  to  re"mrk  for  Europe,  and  to  extend,  the - 13  - II.lO. 
"first cut" alternative strategies  of  the kind  that  were  produced  for  the 
USA  by  the Ford Foundation  Energy  Policy  Programme  and  are  now  being 
developed  for  a  rangt  of  countries  by  the Workshops  on Alternative Energy 
Strategies  (sponsored  by  the  International Federation of  Institutes  for 
Advanced  Study).  It is here,  in the  design  and verification of  broad 
and  long-term goals  rather than  in yet more  detailed analysis  of  short-
range  problems,  that  energy  forecasting is weakest,  and  that the policy-
makers  and  people  of  Europe most  require help. 
Manpower  Reguirements 
II.lO. 27.  The  "energy  section" of Europe  Plus  Thirty would  require  6-8 
professional  staff:  say  one  highly  experienced  team  leader,  three  ex-
perienced  "energy generalists",  and  three  research  assistants  at post-
graduate  level.  Bearing  in mind  the  inevitable spread of interests 
within the  te~  and  of  expertise needed  for  the wide-ranging  tasks it 
faces,  this  number  is by  no  means  excessive.  It should be  regarded  as 
a  minimum  viable size  for  the  team. PART  II  II.ll. 
11.  MATERIAL  RESOURCES 
Introduction 
II.ll.l.  There  can  be  no  doubt  about  the necessity  for  forecasting in the 
materials  sector (l) nor about  the need  for a  common  European  fore-
casting effort. 
I1.11.2.  In the  broadest  sense,  the materials  situation of  the Community 
is similar to  that  for  energy.  Like  other major  consuming  regions,  the 
Community  is perilously immersed,  through its great  dependence  on  many 
strategic materials,  in a  worldwide  shift in the balance  of who  controls 
raw materials  and  reaps  the benefit of  ownership.  This  shift has  deep 
historical  roots  and is  likely to  intensify  rather than diminish. 
I1.11.3.  At  the  same  time,  the Community  is caught  up  in a  second unfor-
giving historical  trend:  that  of  progressive  resource  depletion at a 
time  of unprecedentedly high  rates  of consumption  and  dependence  on 
these  high  rates.  Regardless  of who  owns  resources,  the adequacy  of 
many  materials  and  the various  costs  of  getting most materials  from 
the  ground  and  into useful  products  (including financial,  energy, 
environmental  and  land-use costs)  are  likely to be  constraining or 
disruptive  forces  of major and  increasing magnitude. 
11.11.4.  There are,  of  course,  substantial possibilities of  damping  these 
trends  by  reducing  consumption  of critical materials.  Policies  range 
from  giving greater help and  technical  collaboration to  developing 
(producer)  countries,  to  increasing domestic  production and applying a 
host  of material-saving measures.  However,  many  of  these moves  will 
cost money,  take  time,  involve massive  research and  development  programmes, 
(1)  The  materials  considered in this  chapter exclude water,  energy and 
agricultural commodities.  They  include all metals;  constructional 
materials  such  as  stone,  sand and  gravel;  and mineral  fertilisers 
(phosphates  and  potash).  Owing  to  shortage  of  space  none  of these 
materials  can be  considered individually in any  depth but  are used 
only  as  examples  of more  general  issues. - 2  - 11.11. 
and in many  cases will  lead to  deep conflicts  of interest.  They 
certainly call  for more  purposive action  than  a  mere  reliance  on  auto-
matic market  price adjustments. 
11.11.5.  While  it has  not recently erupted with quite  the  violence 
of  the  'energy crisis',  the materials  challenge nevertheless 
amounts  to  a  major  discontinuity and  points  to  a  new  era of 
considerable  instability and  uncertainty.  This  alone  is 
sufficient reason  for  intensive  forecasting efforts and  for 
these  to  be  on  a  common  European  basis.  But  this  argument  gains 
extra  force  when  one  considers  the  Community's  response  to  the 
challenge  so  far.  Unlike  other highly  industrial  and  import-dependent 
regions  such  as  the  USA  and  Japan,  the  Community  has  not yet 
developed  an  overall strategy  to  cover  immediate  problems  for  its 
intcrn~l ~3tcri~ls system or its relations  to external  suppliers. 
(No  region has  developed  en  adequate  long-term strategy).  Instead, 
member  nations  have  acted alone  - making  their own  investment 
decisions  and  agreements  with  producer countries  - ~ith all  the 
known  risks of distorting prices,  international relations,  and 
world  trade  generally. 
Priorities  for  Forecasting 
11.11.6.  In most  respects,  the  priorities  for materials  forecasting 
are  the  same  as  those  for  energy  discussed  in  the  previous 
chapter.  \o.7e  will  recapitulate  these  later.  In  the  meantime, 
we  will  stress here  the  differences  between  the  energy  and 
materials  sectors  and  the  consequent  forecasting  requirements. 
General  Points 
II.ll.  7.  In  the  most  general  sense,  forecasting  in  the materials sector 
is more  difficult  than  for  energy.  There  are many  more  materials 
to  consider  than  there  are  fuels.  They  have  very different 
'criticalities',  dependencies,  possibilities for  substitution 
a~d recycling,  and  consumption  growth  rates.  There  are many  more 
actors  in  the  game,  including producer countries  and  their 
'monopolistic'  organisations,  mining  and  processing organisations, 
manufacturing  and  other corporate  interests.  Market  speculation 
often plays  havoc  with prices,  creating great instabilities. 
Compared  with energy,  there  is  a  much  more  complex structure of 
manufacturing  and  end-uses,  with subtle balances  of  supply  and - 3  -
demand,  prices,  technical  suitability in both manufacture  and 
·use,  consumer  preferences,  marketing,  lobbying,and  legislation 
controlling why  some  materials are  favoured  over alternatives, 
all having  innumerable  impacts  within  and without  the materials 
sector.  Finally,  much  forecasting work  is already  done  by 
industrial  and  corporate  interests  and  by  institutions  responsible 
for particular materials or groups  of materials:  collection, 
validation and  integration of data  from  this motley  crowd  of 
interested and  sometimes  antagonistic parties is both more 
difficult and  more  necessary  than it is  for  energy. 
II.ll.8.  As  a  result of all  this,  it is perhaps  as  difficult  to  make 
a  credible  and  comprehensive  model  for~  material,  such  as  lead 
or zinc,  as  it is  for  any major  fuel,  such  as  oil or coal.  A 
generalpriority, then,  is  to  begin with  intensive  studies  of 
small  sectors  and  intersectoral  areas,  building  to  a  better 
understanding  of  the  existing materials  system,  rather  than attempt 
immediately  large-scale,  long-term  dynamic  modelling. 
Reserves 
II.ll.9.  For most minerals  the  spectre  of  geological  exhaustion 
on  a  global  scale  seems  fairly  remote.  One  can  reasonably  suppose 
that,  for  the  next  few  decades  at least,  technological  improvements 
II.ll. 
and  price effects will  continue  to  upgrade  presently  unknown  or 
unproved  or  uneconomic  resources  into  the  proved,  economic  and 
workable-category at a  rate  to  match  'reasonable'  increases  in 
consumption.  This  cornucopia  theory  is almost certainly valid  for 
iron,  aluminium,  magnesium  (from  sea water),  chrome,  nickel,  limestone, 
sands,  gr8vel,  phosph~tes and  potash.  It is more  disputable  for 
other key  materials  - notably  lead,  zinc  and  copper  - since  reserve 
estimates  of  these  'igneous  emplacement'  metals  are  hard  to make, 
and  vary considerably. 
II.ll.lO.But acute  shortages  wfthin  20  to  40  years  can  be  foreseen  for 
some  materials,  notably helium,  mercury,  silver and  perhaps  tungsten. 
It is  an  open  and  much  argued  question whether  these  impending  scarcities 
can  be  avoided  (e.g.  by  substitution),  at what  cost,  and  with what 
impact  on  other sectors.  In  the  longer-term  there  could  be  some  very 
serious scarcities  indeed,  which  would  lead  to  vast  upheavals  (or  the 
intervention of as  yet  unknown  technological  innovations).  A good 
example  is phosphates,  on  which  all high  yi~ld_agriculture critically 
depends.  World  phosphate  consumption  is  some  20  million  tonnes,  rising - 4- 11.11. 
at 8  percent annually,  and  must  increase about  2.7  times  faster  than 
agricultural yields  due  to  inefficiency of uptake.  In  largely urban 
societies,  it is  progressively lost and,  unlike nitrate,  can  be  recovered 
only by  very  expensive  tertiary sewage  treatment,  with  a  theoretical maximum 
efficiency of 90%.  Assuming  a  future  population of  10  billion is  to  be 
fed  at adequate  standards,  annual  phosphate  consumption could  be  in  the 
region of  100  million  tonnes.  Total  known  and  potential world  reserves 
are  put by  the  U.S.Bureau  of Mines  at 45  billion  tons,  giving  a  450  year 
supply.  But most  of  these  ~eserves are  thought  to  be  very  low  grade; 
known  reserves  are highly concentrated  in  the  USA,  Morocco  and  the  USSR. 
II.ll.ll. Apart  from  the  need  for more  systematic  and  integrated studies  of 
resource  inventories,  a  major priority here  is  to  respect  the  Law  of  the 
Minimum.  This  Law  (which  does  not  ~pply to  energy,  where  ell sources  arc 
theoretically substitutable)  says  that if you  have  less  than  the  minimum 
amount  needed  of  any  essential,  it does  you  no  good  whatever  to  have 
surpluses  of every other essential.  What  essential will  '\ole  run  short 
of first?  And  what materials  are  'essential'  ? 
Supplies 
11.11.12. There  is  a  world  of difference  between material  reserves  and  available 
supplies.  First and most  obviously,  many  reserves  are  concentrated  in only 
a  few  nations.  Availability and  price are  therefore  dominated  by  political 
and  socio-economic  considerations  and  hence  by  the  extent  to  which  producer 
countries  can  and  will exert monopolistic pressure  in  the  manner  of  the  OPEC 
oil producers.  This  has  already occurred or is occurring with  several 
corrrnodities  (notably phosphates,  copper  and  bauxite)  while  producer cartels 
or  loos~r associations  have  been  formed  for silver,  mercury,  and  tin,  and 
are  expected  for  iron ore.  Others  may  follow. 
11.11.13. The  outcomes  of  these  forces  are  extremely hard  to  forecast.  They 
depend  on  many  complex  and  interacting factors  to  do  with political 
detenmination  and  cohesion  among  producers,  degree  of monopoly  supply 
and  consumer  dependence,  possibilities for and  time  required  for 
consumers  to  substitute or otherwise  reduce  consumption,  stockpiling 
questions,  dependence  of producers  on  the  consumer's  advanced 
technologies,  and  so  forth.  Pressures may  also  take many  forms, 
from  a  price or  tax  increase  to nationalisation of  foreign mining 
faciiities  and  upgrading of ores  in  the  producer countries  (with 
heavy  price penalties  for  consumers). - 5  - II.ll. 
11.11.14.  In  this situation,  the  most valuable policy strategy and  foretasting 
approach  is  the  one  already proposed  to the  Co~ission of  the  European 
Communities  by  the  Science  Policy Research  Unit,  Sussex University(!). 
This  is  the  application of risk analysis  to  identify critical dependencies. 
Risk analysis  is specially designed  to  help  choose  the  best out of 
several  complex alternatives  through estimates  of  the  costs  and 
probabilities of various  events  occurring.  Critical dependencies  are 
commodities  for  which  the  impact of scarcity or price  disruption  is 
sufficiently high  to warrant  an  'insurance  strategy'  that is,  a  package 
of policies  to  cushion  consumer  countries against later disruptions  by 
paying  a  penalty  immediately.  Examples  of penalties are  a  rapid  intro-
duction of substitute  technologies  at otherwise  uneconomic  levels,  or 
dealing with  several  suppliers  even  if this means  paying higher prices. 
11.11.15.  Hardly  less  important  than  these  geopolitical  supply  questions  are 
a  wide  range  of other possible  constraints  and  uncertainties  on  the 
supply  side.  The  mining  and  production of materials,  especially at lower 
and  lower  ore  grades,  can  involve  heavy costs  in  terms  of pollution;  land 
degradation  (including wilderness;  scenic areas;  competition  for  recreation 
space  and  building  land near cities,  especially in  the  case  of  sand,  stone~ 
brickclays  and  gravel  extraction);  energy  consumption(2);  and  the  disruption 
of communities  and  creation of  depressed  regions  when  short-lived mining 
operations  arc  abandoned.  Factors  of  this  kind  already create  fierce 
conflicts  in parts  of Europe  and  could  loom  larger as  basic value  systems 
and  perceptions  change. 
(1) 
(2) 
Implications  of  Some  External  Dependencies  of Europe  for  Science  and 
Technology Policy:  final  report on  Phase  1  of Project EEC-SPRU 
Contract No.  058-73-?EClUK. 
Energy  costs  rise  sharply at lower  grades:  e.g.  from  20,000  to  120,000 
kwh  per  tonne  of copper when  going  from  1.0  to  0.2%  ore  grade  (P.F. 
Chapman,  'Energy Costs  of Producing Copper  and  Aluminium  from  Primary 
and  Secondary  Sources'  in Proceedings  of  lhe  Conference  on  th~  Con-
servation of Materials,  Harwell,  U.K.  March  1974).  Energy  costs  appear 
to  'rule out'  most ultra  low  grade  sources,  such  as  mining  'whole  rock' 
or extraction  from  the  sea  (with  the  exception of  magnesiu~).  Tech-
nological  innovations  such  as  chemical  leaching of metals  may  offset 
these  costs  somewhat. 6 
II.ll.l6. While  these  factors  are  important,  three  others  of  a  more 
general  kind  also  deserve  emphasis: 
n)  Costs.  By  and  large,  technological  development  and  economies  of 
II.ll. 
scale  have  held  constant the  real costs  of mineral  production despite  an 
overall  trend  toward  the  working  of  lower  grade  ores.  It is  is not at 
all clear - indeed,  it is hotly disputed  - how  far  this will  apply  in 
future.  Some  estimates  show  a  very  sharp  cost  increase with  decreasing 
ore  grade:  for  example,  a  rise  from  £1,000  to  £7,000  per  tonne  of metal 
as  one  goes  from  1.0  to  0.1%  average  ore  grade  for non-ferrous metals(l). 
Total  accounting  to  include  the  social  and  environmental  costs mentioned 
above  might  sharpen  this  trend  appreciably.  To  make  matters  worse,  it 
is not clear what  effect  such  increases  would  have  on  our  economies. 
One  opinion  is  that  they would  be  slight,  since  the  cost of  raw materials 
is a  small  percentage  of  GNP  and  of  the  price  of most  finished  goods. 
Another  view is  that  they  can  induce massive  inflationary effects( 2) 
b)  Rate  and  Magnitude  Problems.  Even  with  'low growth'  demand 
forecasts  - that is,  assuming  an  approach  to  saturation of per capita 
consumption  in  the  developed world  but  increasing  consumption  in  the 
developing  world  - annual  production  figures  nevertheless  rise  steeply. 
These  can  lead  to  remarkable  figures fur  the  rates at which metals  "must" 
be  found,  mined  and  processed,  and  the  magnitude  of  these  operations. 
For  example,  one  such  forecast  for  lead points  to  the  need  for  a  discovery 
rate  rising  from  9.5 million  to  54  million  tons  per year  between  1970  and  2020 
and  the  need  to  find  by  the  latter date  800  million  tons  in excess  of 
present known  reserves  of  90  million  tons(3). 
(1)  B.F.  Roberts  'Management Policies  for  Non-Renewable  Material 
Resources',  in Proceedings  of  the  Conference  on  the  Conservation 
of Materials,  Harwell,  U.K.  March  1974. 
(2)  Given  that wages  and  salaries account  typically for  80  percent 
or more  of  GNP,  that manufacturers  tend  to  pass  on  price  increases 
rather  than  to  absorb  them  by  extra efficiency,  and  that employees 
have  the  power  to  match  wages  and  salaries  to  retail prices,  a  5 
percent  increase  in retail prices  resulting  from  a  50  percent 
increase  in  raw material  costs  can  theoretically produce  an 
inflation of  25  percent. 
(3)  Loc.Cit.  in Footnote  (1)  above. 7  II.ll. 
c)  International  Income  Distribution.  The  present economic  and 
political struggle  for materials  may  benefit producers  in  the  short-
to  medium-run  but will  continue  to hit hard  the  many  poor countries 
without  raw materials  to  sell:  the  so-called Fourth World.  If 
technologies  are  developed  which  allow mining  of much  lower quality 
(and  hence  more  common)  ores,  these  would  give  great advantages  to 
the  rich,  industrial countries,  since  they  are  likely both  to  control 
the  technologies  and  to  have  plentiful  low  grade  ores  for  their own 
uses.  All  poorer countries,  including  today's  producers,  could  be 
hit hard.  If  this  does  not happen,  then  the  rich countries may  well 
use  more  or  less  subtle  economic measures  to  dominate  the  producers  -
or may  even  be  tempted  to  revert  to  cruder military adventures.  Even 
if  they  are not  so  tempted,  they may  well  be  believed by  the  producers 
to  be  about  to  do  it, with political  results which  are not hard  to 
foresee.  A very  wide  range  of  scenarios  can  be  built on  arguments 
of  this kind  and with  considerable utility to political and  general 
forecasting,  both  as  regards  the  adoption of  optimum  policies  and  as 
regards  the  avoidance  of  pessimum  ones. 
Consumption 
II. 11. 17.  Even  if one  neglects  the  vagaries  of  supply constraints,  the 
growth  of  demand  for materials  is  an  exceedingly exacting  and  uncertain 
area  of  study.  For  example,  the most  comprehensive  recent set of mineral 
demand  forecasts  (published  by  the  U.S.  Bureau  of Mines(l))shows  a 
consistent upward  trend  for all non-energy minerals  with world  growth 
rates  ranging  from  3.8  to  5.6  percent per  annum,  but has  high,  medium 
II .11.18. 
and  low  estimates  for  the  USA  in  the  year  2000  spread  by  factors  of  up 
to  three.  Allowing  for  the  developmP.nt  (or non-development)  of  the  rest 
of  the  world  gives  a  much  greater  range  of uncertainties. 
Similar problems  afflict  the  study  of  other demand/growth  parameters. 
As  with  energy,  the  consumption  per capita of many  metals  varies widely 
even  between  countries at similar stages  of  development.  It can also 
progress  very erratically:  for  example,  the  former  levelling off of per 
capita copper  consumption  in  the  USA  2nd  Germany  has  recently given way 
( 1)  Mineral  }<'acts  a:td  Problems,  1970  (Government Printing Office) 
Washington  D.C.  1970. II.ll.l9. 
II.ll.20. 
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to  sharp  increases.  Another  important measure  - the  quantity of 
metal  used  per unit of  GNP  - also  reveals  wide  variations  between 
countries  and  over  time.  While  intensity-of-use  studies of  this 
kind  show  a  strong  tendency  as  total  GNP  rises  for  consumption  to 
slow  down  and  flatten out per unit of  GNP,  longer-term forecasts 
of  GNP  are  so  uncertain  that  they·are  little help  beyond  the  10 
year horizon.  Nevertheless,  these  studies  do  show  that many 
simple  trend extrapolations  are  probably giving  inflated  figures 
for  future  demand(l). 
Ideally,  forecasts  of  demand  should of  course  not be  based  on 
correlations  of  this kind but on  causes;  that is,  on  detailed 
scrutiny of where  and why  metals  are  used within particular production-
consumption sectors.  But  even  this  is of little help  in  longer-term 
forecasting  owing  to  uncertainties  about  future  growth  rates  of 
sectors,  possible  substitutions,  and  other  technology  - or price-
related effects. 
Reducing  Consumption 
In principle,  as  we  noted,  there  is  large  scope  for  reducing  the 
consumption of materials  or consumption  growth  rates.  Among  the 
chief approaches,  which  range  from  the  technical  to  the  broadly social, 
are: 
More  efficient use:  e.g.  less material  per unit product; 
smaller products;  better materials  specification (corrosion 
resistance etc.);  design  for tasier eventual  recycling. 
More  efficient manufacturing processes:  e.g.  precision 
casting and  forging  instead of machining. 
Longer  product  lifetime:  design  for greater durability, 
easier repair and maintenance  to  reduce  'throw away' 
syndrome;  reduce  cosmetic materials  use  and  'deliberate' 
obsolescence. 
Increased  re-use  of products;  e.g.  through more  efficient 
second-hand  goods  markets. 
Increased  recycling:  that is,  of materials now  not  recycled 
but disposed  of  'finally'  (dumping  of domestic  and  trade 
rubbish,  chemical  wastes,  phosphates  and  potash  in  sewage). 
(l)  D.B.  Brooks  and  P.W.  Andrews,  'Mineral Resources,  Economic  Growth, 
and  World  Population',  Science  185,  13-19  (July  1974). 9 
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Substiluli(m  hy  less  critica]  m,)t~?rials:  e.g.  in  U.K.  produ~tion 
about  l.Sm  tons  of metal  are  replaced  each  year  by  O.Sm 
tons  of plastics. 
Reduce  non-essential  uses:  e.g.  packaging. 
Reduce  number  of  useful  products:  e.g.  through  greater 
sharing or  conununity  ownership  (launderettes,  public  rather 
tnfln  private  transport,  communal  living patterns,  etc.) 
In practice,  all  this  might  be  hard.  By  and  large,  the  more 
technical  design  and  reclamation measures  are  already  used  vigorously 
whenever  they  are  profitable and/or  do  not  undermine  engineering 
standards.  If  they  are  not  used,  there  are normally  good  reasons. 
These  reasons  arc  themselvescompounded from  very many  complex  factors, 
including  the  availability and  costs  of  labour,  alternative materials, 
capital  equipment,  sites  for  waste  disposal,  energy,  and  the  like; 
and,  not  least,  by  consumer  preferences. 
11.11.21.  How  these  will alter naturally under  new  conditions,  or what effects 
deliberate  policies would  have,  are  both  extremely intractable but extremely 
important  questions.  This  is partly because  the  basic  data  and  the  general 
understandingcl·  the  materials  system and  its ramifications  are still inadequate. 
For  example: 
- Extending  product  lifetimes  clearly has  enormous  direct and 
indirect implications  for  employment  and  for  the  structure of 
manufacturing  and  service  industries.  Conversely,  the  'throw 
away'  syndrome  is not merely  an  expression  of  senseless  consumer 
prodigality but  reflects  perceptions  about  the  value  of  time, 
'convenience',  novelty,  desire  for  genuine  product  improvements, 
and  the  high  cost  and  unreliability of  equipment  repair services. 
Interactions  of  these  kinds  are  extremely hard  to  evaluate now, 
let alone  forecast  about. 
- Recycling_  can  obviously  occur  only  when  an  artefact is  finished 
with.  Hence  the  level  of  recycling  is mainly  a  function  of 
previous  consumption  levels  and  the  lifetimes  of  goods.  For most 
mater1a1s  anci  nation5:,  t:ime  series  on  sal.e:::.,  Li:te  averdge  allU  raue;e 
for  product  lifetimcs,  penetration of  the  potential  market,  materials 
content  of  products,  c:md  the  like  are  so  poor  that  one  cannot  even 
s3y  hm.;  efficient pn.·.scnt  recycling  is,  let along  forecast  about 
future  efficiencies,  or quantities  of  recycled materials  available. 10  II.ll. 
It is  even  less clear what  effect recycling  and  longer 
product  life will  have  in holding  down  resource  consumption 
because  of  the  unknown  effects  that will  be  exerted  by 
'first time'  owner.Jconsumers  entering  the  materials 
acquisition-use-disposal-recycle  chain. 
II.ll.22.  But  perhaps  the  largest area  for  uncertainty  in materials 
forecasting  or management  lies at more  fundamental  levels.  While 
all  these  techniques  can  clearly buy  time  in  the  face  of  a  resource 
challenge,  studying  them  does  nothing  to  answer  many  deep,  underlying 
questions.  For  exa~ple:  if existing  economic  forces  have  led  to 
"wrong"  answers  on materials  by not providing  incentives  for 
conservation,  what  forces  can  ?  Will  they  arise naturally 
(through  price  pressures etc.)  ?  And  if not,  by  how  much  can, 
and  may,  they  be  deliberately engineered  ?  Whether natural  or 
engineered,  can  they  provide  sufficient anticipation of  future 
events,  bearing  in mind  the  long  lead  times  and  high  inertia of  the 
materials  system  ?  More  fundamentally  still, given  that Western 
economies  and  individual  organisations within  them  have  so  far 
depended  for  stability on  continued  expansion  (because  of  demands 
for  profit,  investment  to meet  competition,  etc.)  is it possible 
to  make  the  transition  to  a  resource-conservative  economy  without 
a  major  change  in present economic  systems  and  value  structures  ? 
How  and  when  could  these  come  about  ?  As  a  sharp  example  of  this 
point,  one  might  instance  the  'throw away'  syndrome.  Many  would  say 
that eliminating it is  impossible  because  of  the  dire  employment 
implications.  Many  others  would  reply  that it is  dehumanising 
and  dangerous  to  base  a  society  on  the  premise  that human  effort 
should  be  used  increasingly  to  produce  things  designed  to  be  thrown 
away.  How  might  external  events  or  changing  value  structures affect 
these  arguments  - say  over  30  years  ? 
The  Task  for  Europe  Plus  Thirty 
II.ll.23.  As  with  energy,  forecasting  in  the  material  sector demands  an 
extremely  broad  attack.  On  one  flank,  one  finds  that  the  most  basic 
technical  data  are  inadequate  or  inappropriate.  On  the  other  flank 
loom  persistent questions  about  the  ultimate  goals  and  very  survival 
of  industrial  societies.  In  the  centre,  there  are  great complexity 
and  uncertainty,  and  few  ground  rules  either  for  forecastjng or 
making  sensible policies  under  these  conditions.  What  one  can  hope 11  II.ll. 
to  do  in  the  present  turmoil  of  events  is  to  assess  the  options 
for,  and  the  implications  of,  immediate  strategies  in  a  long-term 
'options  open'  context,  and  reassess  these  longer-term options 
regularly,  hoping  for  new  trends  and  patterns  to  emerge  following 
the  recent discontinuity.  Exploratory work  on  longer-term 
scenarios  is  also vital,  as  and  when  adequate  data  and  broad 
agreement  on  assumptions  is  forthcoming. 
11.11.24.  The  priorities  for  a  forecasting  unit  such  as  Europe  Plus 
11.11.25. 
Thirty are  broadly similar  to  those  set out for  energy  in  the 
previous  chapter,  and  indeed  to  those  set out  in  several  others. 
There  is  a  poor  understanding of  the  present materials  system 
(materials  accounting,  etc.).  Many  pressing conflicts  among 
experts  need  to  be  resolved  (e.g.  size  of  economic  reserves,  costs 
and  timing  of  reserve  exploitation).  Bearing  in mind  the  remarks 
above  about  starting small,  there  is  a  need  both  for  system  fore-
casting  and  for  scenarios  of  alternative possible  futures.  Many 
fundamental  economic  and  social  factors  have  to  be  examined. 
Finally,  it is  important  to  have  a  specialist materials  section  in 
the  unit not only  to  forecast  about materials,  but also  to watch 
the  implications  for particular resources  of  forecasts  in other 
sectors  - for  example,  metals  and  road  aggregates  in  the  trans-
portation sectors  - and  to  watch  the  implication for  those  sectors 
of  forecasts  in  their own:  the  usual  integration. 
For  these  reasons,  the  unique  value  of  Europe  Plus Thirty and 
its methods  of work  could  be  much  the  same  for material  resources  as 
it would  be  for  energy  (see Chapter 11.10.).  The  major  difference 
is  one  of  time  scales  for  longer-term  forecasting.  While  there  is 
almost  enough material  now  for  constructing  in  the  energy  field  the 
wide-ranging,  integrative  forecasts  that are  so  urgently needed,  in 
the  materials  sector  this  task might  have  to  wait  upon  adequate  sector 
and  sub-sector analyses.  Europe  Plus  Thirty could play  a  leading 
role  in  identifying what  work  of  this kind  is being  done  and  in 
coordinating further  work,  so  as  to  cut  the  delay.  As  soon  as 
possible,  it should  feed  the  data which  are  'adequate'  into  its 
general  forecasting  programme. 12  11.11. 
Manpower  requirements 
11.11.26.  Because  the  materials  system  is  rather more  complex  than  the 
energy  system,  it might  seem  that more  people  are  required  for  the 
former  than  for  the  latter.  However,  as  we  also  remarked  above, 
a  great deal  of  data  is already assembled,  and  forecasts  made, 
on  particular_ resources  by  a  wide  variety of  institutions.  It 
therefore  seems  reasonable  to  envisage  the materials  sector acting 
rather more  than  for  energy  as  a  listening post  and  contractor-out 
of studies. 
We  therefore  suggest  that within  a  unit of  75  professionals 
there  should  be  4-5  people  in  the  material  resources  sector:  a 
highly experienced  team  leader,  backed  by  2  experienced professionals 
with  the  same  number  of postgraduate  level  researchers. PART  II.  II.l2. 
12.  THE  ENVIRONMENT 
Introduction 
11.12.1.  Of  all  the  sectors  treated  in  this part of our  report,  "the 
II.l2.2. 
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environment"  is  undoubtedly  the most heterogeneous.  The  word 
itself,  used  in  the  way  we  now  use  it,  is of  recent adoption.  In 
the  European  languages  it only  came  to  this  immensely  broad  sense 
in  the  late  1960's,  and  reached  administrative consecration in  the 
Ministries of  the  Environment  in several  of our countries. 
·We  divide  the  subject into  four  parts:  (a)  the  physical 
environmen~ both  land  and  sea,  including pollution,  (b)  the 
biosphere  including wildlife  and  flora,  (c)  the  man-made 
environmen~particularly cities,  and  land-use  planning,  anJ 
(d)  society's  'response'  to  the  challenge of  the  environmental 
change. 
All  these  concern allthe member  states of  the  Community,  but 
the  Community  has  become  concerned with  them  only gradually and 
pragmatically.  Thus  the  ECSC  Treaty produced  legislation  to 
protect workers  against  the  emission of dangerous  dust and  gases. 
The  Euratom Treaty devoted  the  whole  of its Chapter III  to  the 
protection of population and  workers  against  the  dangers  of 
ionizing  radiation.  Subsequently,  action was  taken  to  overcome 
the  problems  arising  from  the  different  laws  controlling harmful 
and  polluting substances,  so  as  to minimise  their effects  on 
exchanges  and  conditions  of competition  (for instanct:  lead  limits 
in petrol,  carbon monoxide  in vehicle  exhaust,  biodegradability 
of detergents). 
II.l2.4~  The  need  to protect  the  environment and  improve  the  quality of 
life increased with  the  rapid  development  of Europe's  standard of 
living.  It emerged with particular clarity in  the  Third Medium-
Term  Programme  adopted  in March  1971.  The  Community  'cannot simply 
pursue  the  join~aims of growth  and  stability~ it said:  because 
this  gxowth  'makes  sense  only as  a  contribution  to better conditiOns 
in general  •••  by  raising  the  standard of  living and  improving  the 
quality of life.' II.12.5. 
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It finally  took real  shape  with  the  adoption,  in July  1973, 
of  the  Programme  of Action  for  the  Environment.  This  made  it 
possible  to  seek common  policies,  since  the  Community  w~s emerging 
as  a  suitable  geographical  unit for  resolving  these  problems. 
We  shall now  briefly review  some  of  the matters  that could  be 
the  object of  Community  policies,  leaving aside  the matters which, 
while  they  occur with varying  degrees  of  importance  in each  of  the 
states, seem  to  lend  themselves  to  treatment  on  a  national,  regional 
or  local  level,  rather  than  a  Community  one.  Clearly forecasting 
would  be  useful  in both cases,  but it will  only be  t~e concern of 
Europe  Plus  Thirty in  the  first. 
II.l2.6.  We  turn now  to Categories a- d  above,  and  list in each  case 
II.l2.7. 
matters  about which  we  think forecasting might  be  useful.  As  usual, 
our  listing is  illustrative,  not definitive. 
a) 
The  Physical Environment 
Forecasting about  the  impact of new  technologfcal  developments 
on  the  physical  environment.  This  is closely related  to  the 
TA  which  should  always  accompany  any major  innovation,  and  to 
the  elaboration of  the  schemes  of  technological  development  on 
the  basis  of which  research  decisions  are  taken  in big  industry 
and  in public  bodies. 
b)  Forecasting about  the  impact  on  the  physical  environment of 
the  spread  of productive  techniques  that are not new,  but have 
been hitherto little applied,  or not applied  in  this  or  that 
specific area. 
c)  Forecasting about  the  impact  on  the  physical  environment  of 
the  spread of new  products  or new  habits  of consumption 
(public  or private,  of  goods  and  services)  which  sometimes 
derive  from  a  technological  innovation,  but are  in many  cases 
based  on  traditional  techniques. 
d)  Forecasting about  the  effects of new  administrative  arrangements, 
new  laws,  and  new  regulations,  whether  they  are  intended  to 
affect  the  environment,  or  something else. 11.12.8. 
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The  Biosphere 
Forecasting  about  the  impact  on  the  biosphere  (wildlife  and 
vegetation)  of  the  increasing "rationalisation" of agriculture, 
b)  the  impact  on  the  living environment  and  on  the  system of 
watercourses  of  the  drift from  the  land  and  the  abandonment 
of areas  formerly  used  for agricultural  purpose~.  Where 
this  happens,  the  effects may  be  contrary  to  those  of  the 
changes  taking place  in  the  areas  of modern  and  intensive 
agriculture;  the  depopulation of  rural areas  leads  to  an 
increase  in  formerly  threatened  animal  species,  while 
agricultural  rationalisation  leads  to  the  disappearance  of 
species,  though  the  species  affected are not  the  same  in  the 
two  cases.  Similarly  the  hydrogeological  confusion brought 
about  in many  Mediterranean  regions  by  the  abandoning  of 
agriculture  leads  to  diverse  and  sometimes  opposite effects. 
In  these  fields  forecasting must  obviously concentrate  on  the 
effects of  land  use  on  the  biosphere  and  on  the  drainage  system. 
In  the  former  field,  the  Council  of  Europe  has  so  far  been 
pre-eminent  in Europe. 
The  Man-Made  Environment 
In  the  third  group  of problems,  forecasting  mu~t cover  the  quality 
of  life  in  the man-made  environment:  that is,  it must  seek  to 
introduce  an  element of  foreknowledge  into  the  management  of 
urban  and  regional  planning.  Forecasting about  urban  planning 
is not a  job  for  Europe  Plus Thirty;  it is best done  nationally, 
and  city by city.  Forecasting  about  regional  land-use  patterns 
and  especially regional  infrastructure  investment  could  be  a  job 
for  Europe  Plus  Thirty when  the  region  in question crosses 
national  frontiers. 
The  mobility of  the  European  population will probably be  extremely 
high  in  the  next  thirty years,  and  the  growth  of urban  zones  and 
changes  in  land  use  very  rapid.  Two  problems  exist here  about 
which  forecasting might  usefully be  done  at Community  level. 11.12.10. 
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a)  The  impact of  the  redistribution of population densities 
and  of  land  use  on  the  physical  environment destined  to 
house  new  urban  developments  (air pollution,  weather,  sea 
coast,  noise  pollution etc.). 
b)  The  impact  on  people!s  lives  of the  shape  and  size of the various 
alternative  urban  infrastructures  (e.g.  the  ghettoi~ation of 
a) 
the  elderly,  women  etc.;  school  choice  in poor  ~reas, etc.) 
touches  Transport(11.13.)  and  .'he  Social Chapter 11.6. 
Society's Response  to Environmental  Change 
Forecasting  the  socio-political  impact of environmental  change. 
Naturally,  given  that in  this  case  we  are  talking about  changes 
in society,  this  is really part of social  and  political fore-
casting,  because it talks  about  the  relationships  between  the 
balance  of society and  the  balance  of  the natural  environment. 
b)  Forecasting  the  impact  on  production and  consu~ption(and thus 
again  on  ways  of life)  of  changes  in environmental conditions: 
This  type  of  forecasting has  so  far  always  ended  by  showing 
the  political and  psychological bias of its author.  When  we 
are  faced  with  the possibility of  a  given  change  in environmental 
conditions,  we  have  to  choose  ~priori between  two  hypotheses 
that can  be  made  about society's way  of  reactin5.  The  first 
assumes  that  the  capacity for  reaction  is  unable  to  go  beyond 
what might  be  called  the  'patching  up'  of an  increasingly 
threatened environment.  The  second  assumes  society has  some 
capacity  to  confront  the  risks  and  the  cost of radical  trans-
formations  in a  timely and  organic manner.  The  span of  these 
hypotheses  is naturally wide.  But  the  idea  that society 1! 
capable  of rising  to  the  challenge  posed  by  environmental  change 
can  give  rise  to  very different forecasts  of  the  impact of  the 
latter on  the  production and  consumption  system3  and  on  ways  of 
life. 
Environmental  Forecasting  and  Community  policies  in general 
The  already established  long-term policies of  the  Communities 
may  bring about  changes  in  the  way  of life which  influence  land-use 
and  sea-use,  as  well  as  the  quality of  the  environment  throughout 11.12.12. 
11.12.13. 
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the  Community.  There  is no  doubt,  for  instance,  that  the  Community 
would  be  inte·rested  in advance  knowledge  of  the  probable  environmental 
impact of directives  of  the  Commission  of  the  European Communities 
about agriculture,  about  the  free  movement  of workers,  about  regional 
development,  and  about  the mobility of  labour. 
Some  e~vironmental changes  have,  in  turn,  a  social  impact which 
affects Community  objectives  favourably  or unfavourably.  The  most 
obvious  example  is  the  efforts of  the  various member  countries  to  update 
their national  legislation on  water pollution by  industrial waste. 
The  lack of  uniformity  in controls,  standards  anJ  rates  of 
application of anti-pollution legislation bids  fair  to  bring about 
not only distortion in international  trade  but also  a  threat  that it 
may  be  exploited by  one  or other of  the  member  states  to  produce 
'pollution paradises',  more  or  less  camouflaged  by  the  justification 
of  regional  development,  which  are  already common  enough  in  the 
"Third World".  This  lack of uniformity  in Europe  could  lend  itself 
to protectionist manoeuvres  which  run  counter  to  Community  aims,  and 
the  Community  has  therefore  a  strong  interest in  the  present  tendency 
towards  the  development of  transnational  rights where  transfrontier 
pollution is concerned,  of  the  concept of "additiaality" where 
pollution havens  are  established,  and  of  the  principle  that developing 
countries must  be  compensated  if they are  required  to  take  environmental 
measures  which put  up  the  price of  their exports. 
In all  these  cases,  it is  the  Community's  interest not only  to 
study  the  problems,  but also  to  look  into  the  future  1evelopment of 
those  which  lend  themselves  to nationalistic exploitation. 
Sometimes  the  Community  has  the  opportunity  to  react  to 
environmental  change  and  the  ensuing  transformation  in  the  modes  of 
production,  consumption or life in general,  in a  way  different  from 
that in which  the  single state might  react,  that is  to  say,  in  a  more 
timely and  organic way.  When  this  happens  (and here political 
judgement  comes  into play)  the  Community  could  intervene  promptly 
with  initiatives of its own.  The  following  paragraphs  are,  once 
again,  illustrative,  not exhaustive or  prescriptive  • 1!.12.14. 
!1.12.15. 
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The  Great River  Basins 
The  control of  inland waters  aims  at protecting  them  against 
pollution,  and  at their regeneration  so  as  to  satisfy or reconcile 
the  needs: 
of  the  conservation and  flow of  the  water itselfj 
of drinking water  for  the  population at large; 
of river transport; 
of  the  biological life of  the  rivers,  particularly fish; 
of recreation,  sport and  protection of natural beauty. 
The  uses  of water are  thus  numerous  and  irreplaceable.  Indeed, 
so crucial  is water  that any map  of population or  industry  is mainly 
a  map  of river valleys;  that is where  people  live.  The  inter-
dependence  of all elements of a  river basin is its main  feature. 
Optimal  control  cannot be  achieved without an overall policy extending 
from  upstream storage,  for  reserves  and  flow regulation,  to 
purification downstream of built up  areas  or  industries,  passing 
through  the  distribution networks  and  discharge  of waste water  in 
the  intermediate  zones. 
This  interdependenc~,  recognised  by all states, naturally applies 
equally  to  the  great river basins  that cross  frontiers,  like  the  Rhine, 
and  it is  impossible  for partial and  national  solutions  to  achieve 
proper control  of  these  huge  systems,  whose  banks  house  the  greatest 
concentrations  of population not only of  the  European  Community,  but 
also  the  whole  of  the  European continent.  They constitute a 
fundamental  resource,  as  fundamental  as  coal  and  iron onLe  were,  when 
the  Community  was  in its infancy. 
The  stakes  for  the  future  consist  in  forecasting  the  population of 
these  basins,  their economic  development,  and,  from  that,  what 
developments  are needed  for  the  water  to  render maximum  service  to  the 
peoples  along  its banks,  and  what  form  of  regula  tio.n  can  be  devised 
to  share  the  costs of  these  developments  justly arr.ong  the  countries 
which  derive  different benefits  from  the water. 11.12.17. 
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The  effects of energy  on environment 
The  effects of energy production,  transport  and  use,  pose 
problems  for  the  environment;  among  them  are  the  pollution of 
the  seas  by oil,  of  the air by  industry and  domestic  heating,  and 
of  both air and  inland waters  by water-cooling  in power  stations. 
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As  far  as  pollution control  is concerned,  the most  urgent problems 
are  probably  those  caused  by  the  peaceful  use  of  atomic  energy;  that 
is  the  heating of  fresh  and  sea water,  and  the  stockpiling of 
radioactive waste  in conditions  which must  be  totally safe  even  in 
the  extremely  long  term  (up  to  40,000  years).  These,  and  the 
problems  of  ionizing  radiation and  accident risk,  are  obviously more 
justly and  expediently solved  on  the  Community  level  than nationally. 
And  of  course  research  into new  forms  of energy  and  new  techniques 
of utilising energy  (geothermal,  wind,  and  above  all solar)  necessitates 
forecasting  about  their possible environmental  effects  (See  11.10). 
Use  and  management  of  the  mar~ne environment 
In  the  last twenty years,  there  has  been  a  revolution and  a 
boom  in  the  exploitation of  the  sea.  It is now  not only a  means  of 
communication but also  an  increasing source  of biological  and  non-
biological  resources  for  the  life of man.  From  the  exploitation and 
organisation of  the  water surface,  we  proceeded  to  that  ~f  the water 
mass,  and  now  to  that of  the  resources  on  and  under  the  seabed itself. 
11.12.19.  Moreover,  the  rapid  development  of  technology has  lessened  and 
11.12.20 
blurred  the  distinction between  zones  above  and  below sea  level. 
This  phenomenon  can  be  seen not only  in  the  identification  of a 
'continental shelf',  a  'continental rise'  and  a  'continental slope' 
- zones  of  t~ansition between  land  above  sea  level  and  the  deep  sea 
bed  - but also  in  the  extension of political organisation  typical  of 
dry  land  to  the  sea  and  its bed,  with  the  consequent crisis in  the  law 
of  the  sea. 
Today,  the  concept of ~  (defined as  that  zone  above  sea 
level  whose  organisation and  use  is  influenced  by  proximity  to  the 
sea,  plus  that part of  the  land  below sea  level,  and  its superjacent 
water,  whose  organisation and  use  is  influenced  by  the  nearby  land) 11.12.21. 
11.12.22. 
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has  become  a  geographical  reality in a  state of dynamic  balance. 
On  the  one  hand  the  possible modes  of exploitation of  the  submerged 
zone  increase  further,  and  faster,  than  do  those  of  the  land  above 
sea  level  (thus making  the  marine  influence  on  the  organisation of 
space  above  sea  level  broader,  more  changeable  and  more  complex) 
and  on  the  other  the  'frontier'  between  land  and  sea  is blurred,  and 
at  the  same  time  charged with  increasing political and  economic 
tension. 
The  coastal  zone  below sea  level,  some  few  of whose  possibilities 
are  only just being glimpsed,  will  probably be  organised  and  exploit~d 
in  the  future  not so  much  by  the  use  of new  technologi=al  developments, 
as  by  a  new  knowledge  about  the marine  environment.  Indeed,  our 
knowledge  of  the  lunar environment is more  complete  and  systematic 
than  our knowledge  of  the  submerged  portion of our  own  planet. 
We  have  considered  commercial  fishing  in 11.4 above,  and will not 
repeat ourselves.  It interacts with everything else  whi~h may  be 
done  at sea.  The  desalination of sea water is  today  the main  extractive 
activity which utilises  the mass  of  the  body  of sea water,  having  long 
overtaken  the  traditional extraction of salt.  The  ~hortage of 
fresh water  in dry Mediterranean countries makes  it foreseeable  that 
desalination will  increase.  It will probably  be  flanked  by  other 
exploitations  like  that of magnesium;  the  U.S.  derives most  of its 
magnesium  from  the  sea water. 
Mining  as  intense as  that on  dry  land  is conceivable  on  the  sea 
bed  (where  vast reserves of certain minerals  lie about,  particularly 
manganese  nodules)  or below it.  There  is no  reason  to believe  that 
the  marine  subsoil  is  any  less  rich  than  the  dry  land's subsoil. 
Although extraction promises  to  be  costly,  several  large  firms  and 
governments  are  planning  to  start as  soon as  they can obtain  some 
security of  tenure  in  the  international sea bed.  Techniques  of 
off-shore mineral  extraction have  so  far been  developed  ~ainly for 
oil or for particularly valuable minerals;  in South Africa  there 
has  been  some  extraction of off-shore  diamonds.  The  resources  under 
the  sea bed  can be  exploited down  to  several  thousand mecres  (  in  the 
case  of oil).  The  technology  for  deep-sea oil drilling and  extraction II.12.23. 
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i·s  at  the  very  limits of materials' strengths  and  of human  endurance. 
It was  developed  in  the  Gulf  of Mexico,  refined  in  the  Persian Gulf, 
and  is now  forced  to  take  a  quantum  leap  to withstand  the  howling 
gales  and  towering  seas  of  the  European  North.  The  results are still 
far  from  clear.  Sand  and  gravel,  which  have  long been worked  in 
the  beds  of rivers  and  in  land  that was  once  covered  by  water,  are 
now  being worked  out  to  sea  and  causing coastal  erosion. 
Sea  transport is no  longer just a  surface activity,  but  tends 
to  be  organised along  'traffic corridors'  situated on  the  sea-bed, 
not only  in  the  case  of  the  transport of energy  (  or  information} 
along cables,  but also  in  the  case  of  transport by  pipeline. 
The  planning of  submarine  space must  therefore  take  into account 
this new  network of  submarine  energy-ducts  and  systems  of pipelines 
in general which  carry not only natural gas  (sometimes  liquid}  or 
other fluids  but can  transport several  fluids without mixing  them, 
or pumpable  substance,  like grain,  or even  solids  like coal or iron 
ore mixed  with a  fluid (slurry}.  Despite  some  experiments,  the 
possibility of  the  submarine  transport of  substances  lighter  than 
water contained  in plastic bags  with ballast and  pulled by  submarines 
still seems  remote.  In  the  near  future  it is  therefore  likely 
that  transport will  remain  concentrated on  the  surfac~ and  on  the 
sea-bed.  On  the  surface,  it is likely that  the  network of  routes 
will  become  increasingly dense  and  intricate,  while  on  the  sea bed, 
which  today  is criss-crossed in all directions  by  transmission cables, 
an  equally complex network of p.ipes  may  rapidly be  formect,  to  the 
potential detriment of  trawling.  This will  lead  to  a  very high 
demand  for access  to  the  coast.  Even  today it is obvious  that  the 
coastal areas  arec  the  real bottlenecks  in  the  transport and 
communication network of surface  and  sea-bed,  to  the  point where  the 
movement  of  ships,  and  particularly of  fishing  and pleasure craft, 
is obstructed  in various  ways. 
In  the  future  it is likely that  the  demand  for  fvnns  of recreation 
which  use  the  sea surface will  increase more  rapidly,  putting further 
pressure  on  the  navigable  zones  nearest  the  coast,  as well  as  on  ports 
whose  size,  frequency  along  the  coast,  physical  structure and 
organisation will  gradual!~ have  to  change  fundamentally  given  that, 11.12.25. 
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unlike  commercial  shipping whose  harbour  time  is  low,  pleasure  craft, 
lying  idle  for most  of  the  time,  require  enormous  mooring  areas. 
All  this  competes  with  the  use  of  the  sea  for  refuse  disposal. 
Both  organic  and  inorganic  liquid  refuse  is discharged  from  the 
sewage  systems  in  the  intensely populated  and  industrial  zones 
surrounding Western  Europe,  except for  a  part of  the  French Atlantic 
coast,  and  for Britain,  where  it is mainly  treated  first.  Some 
solid and  liquid waste,  because  of  its  toxicity,  is  soilletimes 
transported  in  lighters  to  very  deep  parts  of  the  sea  far  from  the 
coast.  Oil  is  discharged  from  ships  and  from  land;  it amounts,  in 
the  Mediterranean alone,  to  between  a  million and  a  million  and  a 
half  tons  a  year,  of which more  than  two  thirds  are  deposited  in  the 
open  sea  from  tankers  or other ships.  Lastly,  particularly between 
the  mouth  of  the  Seine  and  the  Baltic,  waste  is carried  down  the 
rivers. 
The  sea  is  used not only  to  discharge heat,  but also  to  dump 
dangerous  substances.  At  present it still appears  necessary, 
especially for high population-density countries  like England  and 
Wales,  the  Netherlands  and  Belgium,  (which  are  the  highest four 
in  the  world)  to  use  the  sea  to  get  rid of part of  the  radioactive 
waste  from  nuclear  power  stations.  It is still also  the  safest 
graveyard  for  surplus  war  stores  that cannot  be  deloused.  Floating 
or  fixed oil storage  tanks  are  beginning  to  appear,  ~quipped with 
moorings,  helipads,  footballpitches,  etc.  Sea  space  has  already 
been  used  and  may  increasingly be  used  in future,  for noisy airports 
and  for  burning  refuse.  Equally,  civil aircraft only  fly  supersonic 
over  the  sea.  Lastly,  it is  once  again  the  sea which  is already 
beginning  to  provide  the  space  for  tomorrow's  gigantic  power  stations, 
especially where  the  coastline  is already over-used,  as  it is  in 
Italy for  instance. 
Naturally,  in  the  face  of all  these  demands  on  the  sea,  the 
need  to  protect  the  systems  which  permit  animal  life  in water,  and 
thus  in  the  entire planet,  has  grown  and  will  grow  enormously.  It 
is  reflected  in  the  demand  now  so  clearly expressed  in  UNCLOS  III  for 
each coastal state  to  have  an  exclusive  economic  zone  going out  200 
nautical miles,  as  we  discussed  in II.4.  above,  under  Fisheries. 11.12.28. 
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There  will obviously be  conflicts.  They  pose  p~ob1ems of 
choice  for  regional  planning,  for  the  organisation of  the  surface, 
the  water mass  and  the  sea-bed,  which must  be  solved,  in a  way 
conceptually  like,  even  if technically unlike,  the  way  problems  of 
the  dry part of  the  European  continent are  solved.  The  day  of 
sea-use  planning,  of  am{nagement  des  mers,  of  Seeraumordnung,  is 
already  upon  us.  Like  all planning,  it will  rely on,  and  be 
symbiotic with,  forecasting. 
The  field  is vast,  pregnant with  great  gains  and  great  losses, 
even great disasters,  and  the  study of it is,  in  comparison with 
those  potentialities, still derisory.  That  is why  we  have  chosen 
to write  about it at some  length.  The  European  Communities  could 
move  into  this new  policy field  before,  or as  soon as,  their member 
states. 
We  have  now  shortly  reviewed  some  of  the  likely future  developments 
and  interactions  in  the  division between  Community and national 
environmental  control,  in river basin control,  in  the  effects of energy 
production and  transfer on  the  environment,  and at greater  length,  the 
need  for  sea-use  planning.  We  started by  saying what  a  huge  field 
this was,  and  we  have  striven  to  be  comprehensible  about  a  few  things 
rather  than present a  dry  list of many. 
Recommendations 
The  choice  of  the  areas  of environmental  forecasting  in which 
Europe  Plus Thirty  should  work,  at least at first,  is,  by  the  same 
token,  extremely difficult.  The  effects of different energy policies 
and  patterns  on  urban  form  would  straddle  this  and  the  energy  section 
of Europe  Plus Thirty's work.  Forecasting  for  regional  development 
policy would,we  suppos~ be  more  often  to  do  with  transport,  industry, 
and  the  economy  than with  the content of this  chapter.  And  many 
environmental  fields,  for  instance housing  form  itseli,  and  the 
development  of  land-use  law  and  procedures,  we  regard  as better 
tackled at the  national  level. 
1!.12.31.  The  Council  Resolution  under  which  our  study was  set up  stated 
that "the  study of  the  relevant problems"  by  Europe  Plus  Thirty "will 
be  carried out  in cooperation with  the  European  FounQation  for  the 
Improvement  of Living  and  Working  Conditions  which it is proposed  to 
set up".  The  work  we  have  been  discussing in  this  c~apter is one 11.12.32 
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field  - there  are  several others  in  this  report  - where  such 
cooperation could  be  established.  It should  be  guided  by 
the  time-span principle which  we  recommended  at  the  ~nd oi 
Chapter 1.1.  above. 
Bearing  this  in  min~we would  pick out  two  fields  for  the 
starting point for  the  work  of  Europe  Plus Thirty.  They  are 
pollution control mechanisms,  and  sea-use;  both  these  are 
11.12. 
clearly of  interest to  the  Community  as  such.  We  suggest  that 
Europe  Plus  Thirty should  forecast  about  the  economic  and  environ-
mental  effects of alternative  systems  of pollution regulation, 
since  they will  directly affect  the  economic  competition among 
member  states which  lies so  close  to  the  heart of  the  Communities' 
purposes.  For  inland waters,  for  the air,  and  for  land,  what  would 
be  the  economic,  social  and  environmental effects of  the  genera~ 
adoption of alternative  systems  based  on  1)  single  emis~ion-point 
or  dumping-point  licensing,  2)  generally applicable  body-standards, 
and  3)  pollution charging  ?  And  what  would  be  the  effects of 
different methods  of enforcing and  supervising  their application  ? 
For sea-use,  what would  be  the  effects of alternative Community 
policies  for  the  regulation of conflicting interests among  economic 
sectors  and  among  Member  States,  and  how  could  such alternative 
Community  policies  be  related  to  those  likely  to  be  followed  by 
other nations  and  groups  of nations  in  the  world after UNCLOS  III ? 
For  these  two  programmes,  we  suggest five  people  would  be 
necessary;  one  expert each  in pollution control structures  for water, 
air and  land,  and  two  experts  in  the  nascent discipline of sea-use 
planning. 
11.12.34  Naturally Europe  Plus Thirty should  be  ready  to  start work  in 
other fields  as  they  appeared appropriate,  or might  be  demanded  by 
the  development  of Community  policy. PART  II.  II.13. 
13.  TRANSPORT 
Introduction 
II.l3.1.  Transport,  in all its  forms,  directly and  indirectly,  absorbs 
about one-fifth of  the  economic  resources  and  roughly one-quarter of 
the  energy  expended  annually  in  the  Community.  The  economic  importance 
of its future  development  is  therefore  immense.  But  unlike  some  other 
industries,  transport also has  enormous  consequences  of  a  non-economic 
nature.  It occupies  a  large,  and  increasing,  part of people's  spare 
time.  It is  the  greatest menace  to  the  environment,  both in urban 
areas  and  in  the  countryside.  It exercises  a  profound  influence  on 
the  distribution of population and  industry within cities  (urban  form), 
within countries  (regional  structure)  and,  to  a  lesser extent,  within 
Europe  as  a  whole.  (See  II.l2.)  In many  subtle ways  it dictates  the 
style of life and  the  opportunities  open  to  different social classes. 
It is one  of  the  greatest causes  of premature  death  (60,000  per year 
in  the  Community)  and  of serious  injury. 
During  the  last hundred years,  and  especially  the  last thirty 
years,  the  use  of  transport has  grown  at an  extraordinary rate  and  has 
radically changed  the  life of Europe  in many  ways,  both  for  the better 
and  for  the  worse. 
II.l3.2.  In  this  chapter we  consider first the  needs  for  long-term forecasting 
in  the  transport sector,  then  the  forecasting methods  which  are or might 
be  used;  we  then  survey  the  way  in which  the  forecasting effort in  the 
sector is presently organised  and,  finally,  we  suggest what Europe  Plus 
Thirty should  do. 
The  Need  for Long-term Forecasting  in  the Transport Sector 
11.13.3.  All  industries need  to  look ahead,  but usually not  thirty years 
ahead.  It is not necessary  to  look  further  than you  think events will 
be  affected by  decisions  which must  be  taken now.  The  long-acting 
decisions  are  usually  investment decisions;  even  so,  much  investment 
has  a  life of  less  than  ten years,  or alternatively consists of equipment 
which  can be  readily disinvested if it becomes  no  longer required. - 2  -
Of  course,  a  thirty year forecast  may  be  useful  to an  industry 
whose  horizon of interest is limited to  twenty-five or twenty 
years;  and  even to  those with shorter horizons  the first half of 
the  forecast may  be valuable if it gives  the greater detail and 
accuracy  that are nonnally  required of short-tenn forecasts. 
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11.13.4.  Unlike other industries,  transport investment consists  of  two 
totally dissimilar parts:  infrastructure and vehicles.  No  important 
vehicle has  yet  been invented that can operate without either major 
additional  fixed  plant  such as  roads,  railways,  canals,  stations,  locks, 
docks,  airports,  tunnels,  and bridges.  All  these are  extremely costly, 
long-lasting and inflexible, i.e.  they can hardly ever be  used  for any 
purpose  but that  for which  they were  intended.  Investment decisions  in 
infrastructure are therefore very  long-acting.  The  "lead time"  in infra-
structure investment,  the  time between  the decision to build and  the 
opening  ceremony,  is normally at least seven years,  after which  the  new 
facility is likely  to  be  a  pennanency.  There are  few  examples  of trans-
port infrastructure being  scrapped,  and certainly not within thirty years. 
The  nonnal  time  horizon  for a  major transport planning study is therefore 
twenty-five  to thirty years,  and it ought  to  be  longer. 
11.13.5.  For  the makers,  buyers,  and  operators  of vehicles  the position 
is quite different.  The  life of most  road vehicles and aircraft is 
rather short,  ten years  or less;  the life of a  ship is typically 
thirty years;  the life of  trams  and  railway  rolling stock  should be 
about  twenty-five  years  but in practice is often much  longer.  But 
the main  difference between vehicle and infrastructure is that vehicles, 
being mobile,  are easily disposable  on  the  second-hand market,  which 
infrastructure is not.  Vehicle  operators, whether they  be  road hauliers, 
bus  companies,  airlines or shipping finns,  consider at the moment  that 
they  have  little economic interest - as  distinct  from  academic interest -
in  long-tenn forecasting.  Five years  is their likely horizon,  or ten 
at  the  outside.  And  their main interest will  be,  not  the  smooth  trends 
during that period,  but the cyclical  fluctuations which are not  the 
main interest of  long-tenn forecasting. 
11.13.6.  Lastly,  there are  the  suppliers of equipment,  the motor,  aircraft 
and  shipbuilding industries  and other engineering industries which 
manufacture  rolling stock,  new  types  of transport,  earth moving, 
concrete,  steel girders,  road  rollers and  so  on.  (We  do  not  consider 3 
the  energy  industry in  this chapter.)  Some  of  the  specialised 
activities of  this  great ramification of  supporting  industry need 
long-term  forecasting:  for  instance,  the  construction of  a  new 
shipyard,  or  the  appro~al of  an  aircraft prototype  development. 
t 
But most of it - including  the  motor  industry - considers  that 
it does  not. 
Forecasting methods 
II.l3.7.  Greater  long-term  forecasting  resources  probably have  been 
committed  in  the  transport sector  than  anywhere  else.  The  reason 
for  this  is  simple.  Transport planning  in  the  last thirty years 
has  been  predominantly  road  planning,  both  in  towns  and  between 
towns,  and  huge  amounts  of money  have  been  available  for  road-
building.  The  lead was  set by  the  United  States where  motor 
revenues  were  hypothecated  by  law  for  road  construction.  In 
1962  the  Federal  Highway  Act made  Federal  grants  for  highway 
construction conditional  upon  elaborate "land use  and  transport 
studies" which  consisted  largely of  long-term demand  forecasting 
models.  The  first of  these  "scientific" studies were  made  in 
Detroit and  Chicago  in  the  late  1950s,  since when  every major 
city inthe  U.S.  has  followed  suit.  Studies  of  this kind were 
strongly encouraged  by  the  U.K.  Government  (which  in  1963  offered 
to  pay half  the  cost)  and  also  spread  to  other European  countries. 
Normally  these  studies have  been based  on  extensive  surveys 
II.l3. 
followed  by  computer  analysis  and  projection,  requiring about  three 
years  and  the  expenditure  of one  or  two  million dollars.  The 
London  Transportation  Survey,  completed  in  19691  was  the  biggest up 
to  that  time,  taking  seven years  and  costing about  4  million dollars, 
but it has  probably been  exceeded  since  by  New  York. 
II.13.8.  There  are  few  major cities  in  the  non-communist world,  including 
the  developing world,  which  have  not by now  indulged  in a  large, 
long-term  transport planning  study of  this kind.  Similar methods  have 
also  been  applied  - with modifications  - to  regional  transport planning, 
and  to  such well-known  cases  as  the  u.s.  North  East Corridor,  London-
Glasgow,  Paris-Lyon and,  currently,  the  European Intercity Transport 
Study which  is being carried out by  the  OECD  at the  instigation of 
the  European  Commission.  The  unprecedented efforts put into  this 
field have  led  to  a  highly sophisticated forecasting  technology supported 4 
by  a  large variety of computer  programmes. 
transport planning  technicians has  grown  up. 
II.l3. 
A new  profession of 
11.13.9.  In  common  with  forecasters  in other sectors,  transport planners 
and  policy makers  have  to  base  their forecasts  upon  forecasts  about 
population,  employment,  trade  and  income.  They have  to  know,  for 
instance,  not just the  overall  gorwth  rate of population but its 
distribution,  age  and  household  structure;  they have  to  know  the 
type  of  employment,  the  reduction  in working hours,  the  growth  in 
holidays,  the  types  of  commodity  traded,  the  distribution of  income, 
and  so  on,  just as  forecasters  in all  those  fields  have  to know 
something  about  transport.  With  international studies,  there 
are difficult problems  in defining  and  establishing real  income  as 
distinct from monetary  income;  varying costs of  living and  styles of 
living,  and  exchange  rates  that bear little relationship with purchasing 
power,  make  the measurement  of real  income  a  difficult task.  On  all 
these  questions,  which  are  fundamental  to  the  demand  for  transport, 
the  transport planner  looks  for help  from  outside  the  transport field. 
But  he  can  seldom  find  it, even  for  the  short-term,  and  practically 
never  for  the  30  year horizon.  A major  requirement  for all  long-term 
transport planning,  therefore,  is a  reliable  source  from  which  the  best 
possible  forecasts  about  these non-transport variables  can  be  obtained. 
II.l3.10.  Special mention whould  be made  of car ownership.  The  future 
growth  of car ownership  and  car purchase  is obviously of crucial 
importance  to  transport planners  and  to  the motor  industry;  it is 
also of  interest to  many  other bodies.  Many  forecasting methods 
have  been  devised  and  innumerable  forecasts  made,  both  long  and  short-
term.  In  the  past  the  growth of car ownership  was  often grossly 
underestimated,  but modern methods  are more  reliable.  They  are based 
on greater disaggregation of  the market,  requiring extensive  survey 
work,  as  well  as  a  more  refined use  of  the  aggregate methods  formerly 
relied  upon.  Nevertheless  there  is still great uncertainty about 
the  levels at which  various markets  will become  saturated  and  car 
ownership will  level off.  Saturation will probably be  reached  in 
some  parts  of Europe  within  the  next  thirty years.  The  possible 
impact of  transport policy on  these  saturation levels  is also 
uncertain. 
II.13.11.  The  lion's share of  transport forecasting has  been  given  to 
inland  transport,  and  especially  to  urban  transport.  Quite  a  lot 5 
has  also been  done  in  the aircraft and  aviation industries but 
the  depth of  the  research has  been  less  and  the  results  are  of 
dubious  quality. 
are. 
Nor  should  inland waterways  be  forgotten,  as  they  so  often 
According  to  a  study by  TNO  in  1974~l)  the  comparative 
figures  for  energy consumption  per kilometre/ton  are:  pipeline 
60,  waterway  75,  rail  100,  road  300.  The  additional advantages 
of  inland waterway  transport in safety and  quietness  are  obvious. 
II.l3. 
In  the  shipping  and  shipbuilding  industries  the  forecasting 
effort has  been very much  smaller.  The  methods  appear  to  be 
limited  to broad analysis of  time  series within a  ten-year horizon. 
In shipping,  and  also  in aviation  to  a  large extent,  one  is  involved 
with  intercontinental  transport,  not confined  to Europe,  even  less 
to  the  Community. 
II.l3.12.  The  main  way  in which  the  efforts of different organisations 
are  brought  together is  through  the  consultancy profession.  Much 
of  the  recent progress  in transport forecasting  is  due  to  the  research 
efforts of  large  firms  of consultants,  particularly in  the u.s.,  and 
the  U.K.  and  Canada.  Important work has  also been  done  in Germany, 
France,  Switzerland  and  Holland.  In  these  latter countries  the 
Anglo-Saxon work  is well  known  but unfortunately,  due  to  language 
difficulties,  the  flow of knowledge  from  the  Continent  to  England 
and  America  is weak,  especially from  Germany. 
II.l3.13.  Most major  transport planning studies have  been  commissioned 
from  consultants  by  government authorities,  local  or central. 
Usually  they have  been  regarded  as  single,  ad  hoc  efforts  ~equiring 
time  and  expertise not available within  the  department.  But  the 
need  for  continuing study with  regular monitoring of  trends,  updating 
of forecasts  and modification of plans,  is  increasingly recognised. 
Consultants  are  extremely expensive,  and  the  trend  is  for major 
planning authorities  to  do  the  work  in-house. 
Community  transport policy 
II.l3.14.  We  turn now  to  the  particular needs  of  the  Community.  One  of 
the  original  goals  of  the  Community  was  to  produce  a  common  transport 
(1)  The  Energy Consumption of Means  of Transport  - A comparative  survey. 
Institute for Road  Vehicles- TNO  (Ref.7776/74)  June  1974. 6 
policy,  but  so  far  there  is little to  show  for it, perhaps  partly 
because  the  original Six countries  did not constitute a  very 
coherent area for  transport planning.  The  absence  of  Switzerland 
and  Austria was  (and still is)  one  major  gap.  The  presence  of 
major  corridors  into  the  external areas  of England  and  Spain was 
another.  The  absence  of Europe's  premier airport,  LondoiJ.,  was,_ 
another,  and  differences  of viewpoint have  undoubtedly held  up 
progress. 
11.13. 
II.l3.15.  With  the  accession of  the  U.K.,  Ireland and  Denmark  the  position 
is more  favourable  but still not satisfactory.  The  area which makes 
best sense  for  a  common  transpo~  policy is  the  whole  of Western 
Europe  bounded  by  the  Arctic  snows  to  the  north,  the  Atlantic Ocean 
to  the  west,  the Mediterranean  to  the  south  and  the  Iron Curtain  to 
the  east:  this  is  the natural  transport area  from  which  the  physical 
links  and  the  traffic  flows  with  outside areas  are minimal.  The 
desirability of  coordinating  transport over  this  larger area was 
recognised nearly  twenty years  ago  by  the  establishment of  the 
permanent  European  Conference  of Ministers  of Transport,  (E.C.M.T.) 
but  this,  too,  did not  lead  to  a  European  transport policy. 
Organisation of  transport forecasting 
II.l3.16.  At present many  branches  of  the  transport industry  engage  in 
forecasting,  according  to  their needs,  either through  their own  staff 
or  through  consultants.  In a  few  countries official forecasts  of car 
ownership,  i.e.  forecasts  adopted  by  government  departments,  are 
published  and  are widely  used within  the  industry.  But  this  seems 
to  be  the  only way  in which official forecasting  is  regularly made 
generally available.  Nearly all other forecasting  is carried out 
in a  piecemeal  way  by  small  groups  or individuals working  independently 
and  with  little cooperation  from  others. 
II.l3.17.  Hitherto  the  initiatives of  the  Community  and  the  ECMT  have  been 
limited  to matters  of organisation and  regulation,  e.g.  pricing policy, 
weight  limits,  standardisation,  working  conditions,  etc.  They  have 
not entered  into  the  planning of  the  infrastructure except by mutual 
consultation.  But  the  joint establishment in  1973  of  the  European 
Intercity Passenger Transport  Study  (being carried out by  the  OECD 
for  the  EEC,  the  ECMT  and  twelve  Member  countries  of  OECD  itself) 7  II.l3. 
suggests  that a  more  active  policy may  be  followed  in future. 
II.l3.18.  The  Commission  is at present seeking  to work  progressively 
towards  a  "Community  transport system"  which  would  have  the  following 
essential characteristics:  Community-level  concertation on  the 
provision of major  transport infrastructure  to meet  foreseen needs 
coherently,  taking  account inter alia of environmental,  regional 
development  and  energy  requirements;  and  a  much  freer organisation 
of  the  transport services market,  especially for  goods  transport 
between member  states,  with  the  public authorities  intervening only 
to correct serious persistent disequilibria or lack of  competition 
or  to  ensure  the  provision of essential public  services.  The 
system would  be  designed  to  encourage efficient transport at the 
lowest  total  cost  to  the  Gommunity.  Effective  forecasting  of 
transport  demand  would  be  expected  to make  a  major  contribution 
towards  good  infrastructure decisions  and  sensible operating rules 
for  the  transport market,  and  ensuring  that"lowest  total cost  to 
the  Community'always  includes external costs. 
II.l3.19.  Year  by year,  transport in Europe  is becoming  more  international. 
Trade,  tourism and  personal  travel  are  growing  faster across  frontiers 
than within  them.  As  the national barriers  to  movement  gradually come 
down,  the  flows  of people  and  goods  across  frontiers will  continue  to 
increase.  As  the  efficiency of  transport  improves,  and  people's 
incomes  grow,  average  travel distances will  increase,  adding  further 
to  the  international character of  the  system.  In  thirty years, 
assuming  that Europe  continues  on  the  path  towards  greater unification 
and  prosperity,  the  need  for  a  common  transport policy will  be  greater 
than it is  today. 
The  need  for  a  Community  or European policy grows  out of  the  need 
for national  transport policies.  The  growth  of interregional movement 
within a  country makes  a  national  transport policy increasingly 
desirable;  and  the  growth  of  international movement  similarly calls 
for  an  international  transport policy. 
II.l3.20.  It is  likely that if any  such policy were  adopted,  it would 
adopt goals  something  like  these:-8  11.13. 
(a)  to  connect  the  national  road,  rail, air and  waterway networks 
efficiently and  to  plan their future  development  in cooperation. 
(This  is specially relevant  to  the  creation of new  systems  of 
high-speed  ground  transport,  if  they  emerge,  and  to  the 
reorganisation of  the  European air network.) 
(b)  to  facilitate  the  easy movement  of passengers,  goods  and 
vehicles  between  the  various national parts of  the 
coordinated networks. 
(c)  to  avoid,  reduce  or overcome  the  many  undesirable  side effects 
of nearly all  transport systems,  e.g.  accidents,  noise, 
pollution. 
(d)  to  reduce  the  frustration and  delay which affect  the  users  of 
present  transport systems,  whether by better technology or 
better human  management. 
(e)  to  develop  and manage  the  transport system  in support of 
Community  policies  concerning  regional  aid  and  energy 
conservation. 
(f)  to  find,  by  international cooperation,  ways  of spreading 
peak  demands  for  transport  so  as  to  reduce  congestion on 
roads  and  at airports. 
(g)  to  coordinate  and  undertake  research and  development  towards 
the  foregoing  objectives,  especially (d). 
Community  objectives will  presumably relate  to  long-distance 
intercity transport,  and  not  to  urban  traffic,  country  roads,  village 
bus  services,  or railway branch lines. 
11.13.21.  One  may  conclude  simply  that a  need  for  a  Community  (or European) 
transport policy exists  and  has  long  been  recognised,  that this need 
relates  to  long-distance  transport or passengers  and  goods  by  road, 
rail, air,  and  water,  including ferry  links,  and  concerns not only 
the management  and  control of  the  system but also  the  development of 
infrastructure.  In all  these  areas  long-term forecasting could be 
useful,  and  in  the  last it is essential. 9  11.13. 
Community  policy  towards  transport research  and  development 
11.13.22.  In  the  preceding section we  suggested  that one  of  the  desirable 
objectives of  a  Community  transport policy was  to  coordinate  research 
and  development  in order  to  promote  the  other  transport policy 
objectives.  Large  resources  are  devoted  to  transport research and 
development,  both by  governments  and  by private  industry.  The 
field of study  is enormous,  ranging  from  hydrodynamics  to  traffic 
engineering,  from  supersonic aircraft  to  travelators,  from  hovertrains 
to  skid resistant road  surfaces.  The  high cost of aircraft development 
has  already  forced  European manufacturers  into international consortia 
for projects  like Concorde,Airbus,  and  Europlane.  In the  railway 
field  important new  developments  are  taking place  in at least five 
European  countries,  sometimes  with rival projects under way  within 
the  same  country.  In both  industries,  air and  rail,  numerous  and 
costly projects  have  been  abandoned  in recent years.  There  are  no 
doubt  some  advantages  in competitive  research  like  this,  but it can 
be  overdone. 
1I.13.23.  In  transport more  than  in most of  the  fields  we  are  considering, 
very costly research projects must be  directed  towards  chosen goals, 
and  this  requires  a  study of  long-term needs.  They must  be  designed 
to  overcome  not only current problems  but also  those  expected,  in 
the  light of  long-term forecasts,  to  be  important  in the  future. 
Recommendations 
II.l3.24.  Community  transport policy is not yet far  advanced,  and  long-term 
forecasting could  (among  other  things)  help it to  get off  the  ground. 
The  purpose here,  as  in  the  other fields  where  Europe  Plus  Thirty 
would  be  working,  should  be  to  indicate  the magnitude  of  future  problems 
and  the  likely impact of policies  (and  new  technologies)  designed  to help 
solve  the  problems.  A secondary purpose  could be  to  provide  an official 
source  of  forecasting  for  the  many  small  forecasting units  working 
independently in different branches  of  this vast industry. 
11.13.25.  The  forecasting  should concentrate  on  long-distance  traffic  and 
main  line hauls,  i.e. air links,  intercity rail links,  national  and 
interregional highways,  principal waterways,  and  ferries.  The  area 
studies will have,  for  some  purposes,  to  include all "Western Europe" 
(including Yugoslavia,  Greece  and  European  Turkey)  regardless of which 10  11.13. 
countries  are  or are not members  of  the  Community. 
11.13.26.  A European  forecasting model  could not be  simply  the  ~urn of 
component national  forecasting models;  the  arguments  of I.4.  above  apply 
with  full  force  here.  National models  are not able  to  deal 
efficiently with  international movements:  the  only way  to  do  this 
would  be  to build  a  comprehensive  international model,  which would 
be  the  Community  role.  Hence  the  Community  model  would  provide  the 
external  data needed  by national models.  In  fact no national models 
yet exist,  although several countries  are moving  towards  them.  On 
the  European  scale  a  passenger model  now  exists as  a  result of  the 
European  Intercity Transport Study,  and  the  Commission  is currently 
considering  the  launching of  a  similar freight study.  This  work 
would  have  to  be  very carefully related  to Europe  Plus  Thirty;  it 
might even  become  part of it. 
Europe  Plus Thirty should also work closely with  the  inland 
waterway  forecasting  undertaken by  the  U.N.  Economic  Commission  for 
Europe  in Geneva. 
11.13.27.  Three  people  experienced  in  this work  should belong  to  Europe 
Plus  Thirty. PART  II  II .14. 
14.  COMMUNICATIONS 
11.14.1.  Europe,  like  every  other region of the  globe,  is criss-crossed  by 
the  flow  of world  information  and  permeated  by  the  ferment  of its  own. 
Despite  the  search  for  economic  and  political unity,  the  European 
Community will  try,  we  hope,  to  retain the  diversity of its cultures.  The 
maintenance  and  enjoyment  of this variety will  require  great efforts  of 
education  and  comprehension.  The  general  system  of  co~nunications between  the 
members  (individuals,  societies,  institutions)  of  the  Community  may  well  need 
to  be  even  denser  than in the  more  homogenous  culture of  the  American  1Inelting 
pot'.  We  have  already  talked about  this  under  the heading  of  education;  the 
electronic  demand  could be  large. 
11.14.2.  The  energy  crisis, which is  just one  aspect  of  our failure  so  far 
to  manage  planetary  resources  in the  necessary  double  solidarity  -
geographical  (all  the  cont~nents)  and  temporal  (including our descendants)-
may  force  us  to  limit  the  growth of  physical  movements  of  people  or 
objects  and  to  supplement  them  by  transfers without  the  movement  of 
matter,  which  is the  purest  form  of  communication.  Much  communication 
between  people  could take  place  by  the  intermediary  ,Jf  electronics, 
in  order to  economise  on  time,  money,  energy  and  raw  materials.  Urban 
congestion  points  in the  same  direction.  Why  .82.  to work?  Why  not 
work  at  home,  with electronic  crnrununication,  audial  or audio-visual, 
to  your  colleagues, and \-lith  the  papers  &  data~  The  advantages,  and the 
disadvantages,  are obvious. 
The  trends 
11.14.3.  The  development  of  cotnmunication is  prodigious:  the  numbers  of 
messages  transmitted,  economy  of  energy,  miniaturisation of  components 
and  lightening  of materials,  ease  of  dialogue  between  the  human  being 
and  the  technical  network;  all  that  is well-known.  \Jha t  is  l e s::,  well-
known  is  the  rapprochement  of  the  sectors  of  data  processing  and  of 
tele-communications,  the  techniques  having  increasingly numerous  points 
in  cornrnon,  and  industry  tending  to  \,;rork  in  the  t\..;ro  sectors  simultaneously. 11.14.4. 
11.14.5. 
2  II.l4. 
The  grm-Jing  use  of  corrununi cations  satellites  raises  the 
queslion whether  the  geostationary orbit may  become  overcrowded. 
On  the  other hand  the  number  of  channels  each satellite can carry 
will  increase  in  the  decades  to  come. 
Recently  acquired scientific knowledge  opens  the  way  to  future 
techniques  that  one  can already  imagine,  and whose  utilisation can 
be  programmed.  knong  them  are  transmissions  through highly  trans-
parent  optical  fibres,  use  of  phased  light  for  data  processing and 
telecommunications  (laser and  holograph  for instance);  and  possible 
roles  for  superconductivity. 
Current means  of  communications 
To  return  to  the  humdrum;  the  postal  service.  The  need  to 
transmit  documents  seems  lit~ely  to  persist and  to  develop,  despite 
the  development  of  new  techniques.  The written word is important, 
and  does  not  seem  likely  to  become  less  so  in  the  future.  But  the 
spectacular deterioration of Western Europe's  postal  service over 
the  last twenty  years  is cast-iron evidence  of incorrect  development 
planning,  and  thus  of bad  forecasting in the  past.  Speculation 
about  the  future  of  the mails  is  dominated  by  the  tension  between 
man  and  machine.  The  work is boring,  so  people  don't  like  to 
make  a  career of it.  But  magnetic  coding of addresses,  and  auto-
matic  sorting at  the  other end,  seems  in practice  to  give,  if 
anything,  worse  results.  An  area  of  study  to  open  up would  be 
research into what  sort of work  people will  be willing  to  do  without 
striking,  going  slow,  etc,  because it is  so  soul-destroying. 
Technological  fixes  could well  be  concentrated  on  the  phases  of  the 
work where  they  are  really needed. 
The  telephone 
It works  very badly  in  some  countries  but  this  fault  is not 
congenital as  its effectiveness  under other administrations  (especially 
the  US,  so  far)  shows.  The  main  R  and  D  effort must  therefore  go  into 
bringing the worst  parts  of  the  European network  up  to  the  standard of 
the American  one.  This  requires  no  forecasting.  But  two  possible 
future  applications  of  existing technology might  do  so. - 3  - II.l4 
Besides  sound,  the wire  can  transmit  an  image,  a  "facsimile"; 
there  seems  no  reason  why  letters  should not  be  sent visually by  wire, 
and  read  in  the  original handwriting.  Certainly  the  number  of bits of 
infonmation per  page  is  considerable  (in the  order of  a  million,  and  even 
four  times  as  much  if one  wants  to  transmit  the details of  a  drawing  or 
photograph).  This  is certainly a  limitation,  but it should not  prevent 
this elegant means  of instantaneously  transmitting  a  perfectly personal 
letter from  developing.  One  can  imagine  the  use  of  terminals  for  the 
sending  and  receiving  of  such letters in post  offices.  Not  only  is  the 
speed of  the  transmission  ensured,  but  also  the authenticity of  the  docu-
ment  received.  (Could  this mean  th~ end  of registered letters,  or  even 
of notification by  the  servants  of the  court?) 
There  also exists  a  simpler system,  well-known  and  requiring 
little information,  less  than  a  tenth of  what  the  previous  system 
requires:  the telex.  It still requires  considerable  improvement  but, 
if the  costs  of use  can be  reduced,  it might  well  spread  to  the use  of 
private individuals. 
11.14.6.  Hertzian.technology has  made  possible  the  TV  and  radio. 
It is also  used  in telephonic  transmissions,  but  the user  cares  little 
whether  the message  he  receives  is transmitted by wire,  a  carrier wave, 
or  a  satellite.  The  question  for  the  future  is  the way  the  sending  of 
messages  to  a  large number  of  receivers will  develop. 
are  emerging: 
Two  possibilities 
Firstly,  on  the  technical  level:  Hertzian  space  is near satu-
ration,  and  the  obstacles  to  radio  waves  in  towns  are  numerous.  Hence 
recourse  to  cable  distribution. 
Secondly,  on  the  social  level:  a  need  is emerging  for 
messages  sent  not  to  everyone,  but  to  a  more  or  less  restricted group 
interested in  a  single category  of messages.  It is clear that  one 
cannot  occupy  the  TV  screen,  which  is meant  for  everyone,  with  local  in-
formation  about  a  district or  a  town.  Hence,  also,  recourse  to  cable 
television. - 4  - 11.14 
Television also  lacks  one  important  function:  it is only  a 
receiver.  It is difficult  to  say  how  far  the  need  for  feedback  from 
Lhe  viewer  is  felt;  but  we  already  know  that it is urgent  for  educa-
tional  TV,  and  it is  easy  to  list cases  where  it would  be  convenient  or 
pleasant,  especially  in  the matter of  public participation in politics. 
11.14.7.  In  these  technical  areas,  there is much  forecasting  in  each 
country.  The  forecasters  often meet  at  international  conferences,  and 
there  seems  little reason  for  Europe  Plus Thirty to  become  involved  in 
this  technical  sector. 
II.l4.8.  Nevertheless,  we  cannot  but  remember  that  the  Community  has 
not  succeeded  in unifying its  own  TV  standards.  The  lack of  advance  con-
sideration here worries  us.  When  we  adopted  the  American  definition 
scale,  we  ignored  the  difference  in  the  frequencies  of  the  current:  50 
cycles  in  Europe,  60  in  the  US.  This  difference is  enough  to bring  the 
mechanical  interference vibrations  which  are  produced  in medium  quality 
receivers  into  the  spectrum of  audible  frequencies,  at  least  for  the 
young.  If Europe  Plus  Thirty  can  play  any  role in preventing that  sort 
of mistake arising  again,  it certainly  should,  though it would  involve  a 
dive  into detail which  would  normally  be  outside its sphere. 
II.l4.9.  The  Commission,  and  other relevant bodies,  are  now  working  on 
various  plans  for  European  information  and  data handling  networks. 
Furope  Plus Thirty would  have  an  interest in the  way  they  were  set up, 
since it  would  clearly be  among  the users.  It is possible,  though  we 
are  by  no  means  sure  about  this,  that  Europe  Plus  Thirty might  be  able 
to  undertake  some  useful  forecasting  about  the  alternative ways  these 
networks  might  develop.  We  make  no  recommendation  beyond  saying  that 
the possibility should  be  borne  in mind. 
All  in all,  we  would  enphasise  that  forecasting  in this  field 
is not  so  much  a  matter of  technology  forecasting,  as  of demand fore-
casting.  What  will  people want?  The  question itself shows  che  obvious 
interdependency  of this  field with  those  of  society,  industry,  education, 
transport  and,  on  the  data-handling  side,  health. - 5  - 11.14. 
11.14.10.  Conclusions 
11.14.11. 
a)  All  the  Conununity  countries  suffer or have  suffered congestion, 
sometimes  very  severe,  in their conu11unications  systems.  Fore-
casting is indispensable if we  are  to  avoid this  happening again 
with  tomorrow's  technologies. 
b)  Such  forecasting must  not  omit  to  consider the  probable working 
conditions  of  those  who  will  run  future  conununications  systems, 
in an attempt  to  foresee  social  or human  conflicts which  could 
degrade  or paralyse  them. 
c)  Forecasting dbout  means  of  communication  likely to  be  available 
in the  future  is well  developed in technical circles,  but  the 
same  cannot  be  said of  forecasting about  future  demand. 
d)  Europe  Plus  Thirty should  seek  to discover the  probable  impact  OL 
communication  needs  of different industrial and  con~ercial policies, 
data-processing and  documentary  policies,  cultural  and  educa-
tional  policies,  and,  not  least,  of different degrees  of  economic 
and  political integration within the  Community. 
Recommendation 
Communications  is the  last of  the  fields  (the others  having been 
climatology,  demography,  health,  and  education)  where  we  recommend 
Europe  Plus Thirty should  rely almost  entirely on  the  services of  one 
or two  outside  correspondents  or part-time members  of its team.  We 
think  so  much  is going  on  anyhow  that this will  be  the  best approach. 
As  in the other fields  mentioned above,  seminars  should  be  called 
from  time  to  time  and  the inputs  of technical  knowledge  (extensive) 
and numerical  data  (rather small)  should be  arranged and  secured on  a 
continuing basis  by  the  specialist correspondents  ot  the central  team. PART  II  II  .15 
11.15.1. 
15.  ECONOMY  AND  FINANCE 
llackground 
If we  want  to ask to what  extent  long-term  forecasting is 
possible  and  desirable in the  economic  and  financial  fields,  one way 
to  do  it - one  that is methodologically  tolerably  legitimate  - is to 
go  back  20  or 30  years  and  try to  see whether  the  economic  and 
financial  events  that have  since  taken place could  have  been  forecast. 
This  kind of  exercise is certainly not  optimal  as  a  test  for our 
puspose;  it might  very well  be  that  20  or 30  years  ago  enough  elements 
of  the  last  20  or 30  years were  already present  to allow us  to  predict 
their permanence  over that period.  To  borrow  a  mathematical  concept, 
we  might  already  have  had  a  base  to  span  the field constituted by 
those  20  or 30  years.  But it might  equally be  that, if we  place our-
selves at  the  beginning of  the  next  20  or 30  years,  i.e.  today,  we  do 
not  possess  enough  elements,  we  do  not  possess  a  base  to  span the next 
two  or three  decades.  If so,  it would  be  because  the present  does  not 
necessarily  always  contain the  fucure.  Discrete  changes  may  divide 
historical  periods:  two  twenty or thirty year periods,  for instance, 
may  have,  as  regards  economic  and  financial  structures,  an  equal  base 
of essential  features;  a  third such period,  immediately before or 
after them,  may  be  totally different  from  the other two. 
Extrapolation  of  previously evidenced trends would,  if we 
were  extrapolating the  third period  from  the preceding  two,  yield 
thoroughly  indefensible results, while  the  same  exercise, if used 
to  forecast  the  second period using trends  evidenced in the  course 
of  the  first,  would  be very successful. 
1I.15.2.  All  this  becomes  extremely  clear when  we  reflect on world 
economic  and  financial  events  over the  last fifty years.  The 
post-war years  are  radically different  from  the  pre-war ones, 
particularly in some  of  the  respects  that can  be  considered 
"essential".  Certainly  one  can detect  several  permanent  trends 
throughout:  the  decline of  the British economy,  and  the  rise of the 
American  economy,  were well  under way  more  than half a  century  ago. 
But  how  could  one  forecast  that  the  "economic  constitution" 11.15.3. 
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of  the western world,  dictated by  the US  in  1944 - 45, 
would  have  been  so  successfully  and  quickly  enforced in its vital 
parts,  like currency convertibility,  free  trade,  free  capital 
movements,  and the  international  division of  labour?  Had  we 
extrapolated what  had  passed in the  West  starting in  1929,  then 
autarky,rationing,  planning,  inconvertibility,  etc.  would  have 
been more  likely to  be  forecast. 
The  job would  have  been  radically easier,  and  tremendously 
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more  successful,  in the middle fifties.  Then,  a  simple extrapolation 
of the previous ten years  of  US  economic history  and  its projection 
I 
onto  Europe,  for  instance,  would  have missed very  little of what 
actually happened.  This  would  have  been  the  "analysis  by precursive  events" 
described in Chapter 1.3 above.  Future production  and consumption 
patterns could  have  been predicted very closely by  looking at  what 
they had  been  in the  US  in the  relevant  previous period;  once it 
was  proved that  the  "economic  constitution" dictated by  the  US  was 
enforceable,  the  phenomena  of trade  liberalisation,  international 
capital movements,  the  spread of multinational corporations,  could 
have all been correctly  forecast. 
11.15.4.  What  could not  have  been  forecast  were  the relative places 
in the economic  power  scale that  individual  European countries 
have  occupied.  An  ordinal  scale could  probably  have been  arrived 
at  with  respect,  for instance,  to  GNP  per capita,  but  not  a  cardinal 
one.  The  relative placing of  Great  Britain and  France  would  have 
been  an  impossible  job.  It would  have  been  equally difficult  to 
assess the relative position,  on  such  a  scale,  of countries  like 
Belgium,  Holland  and Austria,  even  as  late as  1958.  One  was  sure 
that  the  US  would  remain on top,  and  equally  sure that  traditionally 
fast-growing countries  like  Ger~many,  Japan  and Italy would carry  on 
growing  fast.  But  who  could have  guessed that  France,  Belgium,  the 
Netherlands,  Austria,  would  become  fast  growers? 
11.15.5.  On  the whole,  however,  forecasting world  economic  and 
financial trends would  have  been  a  successful  exercise, 
especially if the people  doing it had  focussed  on industries, 
products,  trade  flows,  economic  and  financial  institutions,  rather 
than  confined themselves  to  forecasting the relative  growth  rates 
of the various countries.  The  "automobile  economy",  with its 11.15.6. 
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accompaniment  of  related industrial  growth,  motorway building and 
suburban  sprawl,  could  have  been  forecast  extremely easily in  1955, 
for  the  whole  non-communist,  developed world.  That  forecast  would 
have  entailed forecasting also the relative decline  of  railways  and 
of the coal mining industry,  the  decadence  of  urban centres  and  the 
gradual  disappearance of  a  commercial  sector based on high  labour 
intensity. 
In general,  once  full  employment  and trade  liberalisation 
were  adopted  as  the  basic policy objective in most  developed 
countries, it was  pretty clear that this would  entail the gradual 
disappearance  of most  labour-intensive activities  from the 
industrial  sectors of those countries,  and their removal to  developing 
countries.  If we  interpret  recent  economic  history in this  light, 
most  of its features  appear to  follow  from  this  premise.  vlliat  could 
not  have  been  guessed was  the temporary  appearance,  around  1960,  of 
cheap  energy that  has  made  the replacement  of  labour  as  a  means  of 
production  so  much  easier in the western  economy.  One~ this  was 
assured,  however,  the pattern of the  last  15  years  o~ growth,  in 
Western countries,  could have  been  inferred.  We  knew  full 
employment  and high wages  were  the norm,  we  knew  low-cost  energy 
was  available;  other things  being equal,  an  economic  structure 
based on  substituting energy  for  labour  could have  been inferred. 
11.15.7.  If we  now  remove  low-cost  energy  and maintain hign wages 
I1.15.8. 
and  full  employment,  what  can  be  substituted for  what?  We  may  be 
near  a  turning point;  long-term  forecasting may  be  very difficult 
if we  start in one  year,  and much  easier if we  start  the  next year, 
if  the  corner  is  turned  between  these years,  and  the  interpretative key 
for  the  next  decade  or  two  appears.  This  is a  general  proposition. 
What  we  have  said  so  far  has  been  intended to  serve  as 
a  quick  reference  to illustrate some  of the issues that  are of 
greater relevance,  when  we  analyse  the subject of  long-range 
economic  and  financial  forecasting. 
Long-range  forecasting in these  fields is indeed possible. 
It can  score  a  high  percentage  of hits if it is restricted to those 
aspects that  can  be considered "safe".  With  the considerable 
lengthening of the  gestation period  of most  capital projects, 
both private and  public,  10  to  15-year  forecasts  are  becoming - 4  -
increasingly  possible.  For  instance,  when  a  big motorway  scheme 
or  railway  scheme  is  launched,  the transport  policy of  a  country 
is  determined  for the next  two  decades  at  least.  Similarly,  when 
capital projects  are started in fields  like chemicals,  steel, or 
automobile  production, fairly  reliable estimates can be made  of 
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a  country's  growth pattern for  at  least  a  decade,  and the probability 
of their being  upset  by  "extraneous" events  can  be  assessed.  And  the 
same  can be  said  about  important  institutional changes,  like  new 
legislation concerning the  financial  institutions or the fiscal 
structure of  a  country. 
1!.15.9.  Because of the vagaries  of  demand  management,  it is much 
more  difficult  to  give  appropriate  time  parameters  to these 
structural trends.  But,  although the  pace may  be  hard to  forecast, 
directicn is much  easier to  detect,  and,  fortunately,  long-range 
forecasting is more  about  direction  than  about  pace. 
1!.15.10.  In no  field  does  supranational  long-term forecasting have 
greater advantage over national forecasting  than in the  economic 
and  financial.  When  "supra-national" implies  a  forecasting  agency 
of the  EEC,  this is very true  indeed.  The  integrated economy  of 
the  EEC  is quite capable,  because of its sheer  size,  of making many 
of the  economic  variables,  which  a  national  economic  forecaster 
must  consider  independent,  dependent.  It is not  too much  to  say 
that  EEC  trade determines  world  trade  in manufactures,  EEC  agricultural 
policy has  a  heavy  influence  on  world agricultural production,  EEC  energy 
requirements  and  energy  policy strongly influence world trade in 
energy  products  and  even world  energy production  (the  EEC  countries  put 
together  are by  far the  largest importer of  energy products). 
11.15.11  ..  It is also more  and more  clear that  the  EEC  is the  economic 
partner the Third World  and the  Socialist  countries will most 
frequently  have  to  deal  with  for  political as  well  as  economic 
reasons.  Most  socialist countries  are in Europe,  and this  determines 
a  "geographical  premise" to  intense  economic  relationsc  As  to the 
Third World,  it is the  sheer  importing  power  of  the  EEC  that  induces 
them  to maximise  economic  relations with it. - 5  - II.l5. 
Forecasting in the  European  Cotnmunities  at present 
11.15.12.  But if we  look at the  economic  forecasting and,  more  generally, 
economic  research,  which  the  Communities  carry out at present, it 
strikes us  that it is not  conducted  on  the  assumption  (which would  be 
a  very  realistic one)  that the  EEC  is an integrated economy,  nor has it 
as its main  research target  the identification and  description of  the 
~  of integration followed  by  the  EEC  economies  since  their inception. 
II.l5.13  The  EEC  input -output matrix,  developed by  the  Community 
Statistical Office,  is  so  far only  a  rationalisation and  summation 
of the member  countries'  individual input-output tables.  This  is, 
of course,  a  necessary starting point,  but  a  lot more  must  be  done, 
in this  field,  in che  direction we  indicate in this  chapter. 
II.l5.14  The  European  Commission also  possesses  two  medium-tenn  fore-
casting models,  COMET  and  METEOR  (we  mentioned  them at I.l. above). 
METEOR  should in fact  be  a  short-tenn forecasting model  but,  since 
it uses  annual  data  as  input, it can hardly be  seen as  serving that 
purpose.  Both  these models  are based  on  the interaction of national 
models,  more  or less identically constructed along Keynesian  lines 
even though  price and  volume  developments  are  separately considered. 
The  interaction takes  place in only  one  dimension,  the  int~rnational 
trade  dimension.  In this  iashion,  che  individual  economies  of  the  EEC 
are handled  on  the  same  level as  other national  economies  like the US, 
Japan,  and  the Third World countries.  The  METEOR  model  consolidates  the 
EEC  countries into  one  block and  links  this block to other large  ones: 
North America,  Japan,  the Third World.  But  the  consolidation is obtained 
by  summation  of  import  demands  and  export  supplies  expressed by  the 
national  economies. 
II.l5.15.  Neither model,  because of its nature,  contains  a  built-in mech-
anism of structural modification that is capable of affecting the  rep-
resentation of  the  individual member  countries'  economies,  and  reshaping 
them  into a  representation of an integrated EEC  economy.  In both 
COMET  and  METEOR  the  EEC  countries interact all the  time  through  trade 
flows,  but  these  provide  only  a  limited means  of effecting changes  in the 
representation of the structure of their economies.  In addition,  one - 6  - 11.15. 
can  say  that,  although  interaction among  the  EEC  economies  is analysed 
in the  trade  dimension,  it is not  analysed in the  factors  of  production 
dimension.  But  even  the  trade  dimension  remains  in both models  at too 
aggregated a  level.  What  matters  in economic  integration is intra-
industry specialisation,  as  Verdoorn  proved in 1957  (l)  and  several 
other writers have  reiterated more  recently.  Of  intra-iitjustry trade 
there is no  analysis in either METEOR  or COMET.  But it would  be 
scientifically incorrect to  put  this  typeof  question to models  like 
COMET  and  METEOR.  We  have  dealt with  them  here  only  to  show  that entirely 
new  instruments are needed if the  Community  wants  to  engage  in  long-term 
economic  and  financial  forecasting. 
11.15.16.  Europe  Plus  Thirty,  being an  EEC  long-term  forecasting agency, 
with access  to data  collected by  the national  authorities  of the member 
countries  and  by  international organisations,  would  be  in a  unique 
position to  forecast  economic  and  financial  trends.  It would  be  based 
at  the heart  of  a  very  homogeneous  and  integrated productive  system, 
composed  of countries whose  economies  are "mixed"  and where  planning 
is a  respected tradition,  especially if we  consider this  concept  in 
"real"  rather than "nominal"  terms.  Europe  Plus  Thirty, if it were  to 
concern itself with  forecasting in as  many  fields  as  are  considered inthis 
Report,  would  enjoy  an  extremely wide  potential  for  economic  and 
financial  forecascing.  But,  in or1er to  do  so, it should equip itself 
with adequate  instruments. 
Cooperation with the Community  StaQistical Office 
11.15.17.  It should in particular work,  together with  the  Community 
Statistical Office  (CSO),  to  transform the  EEC  input-output matrix 
developed by  the  CSO  as  a  summation  of the member  countries'  indivi-
dual  input-output tables,  into  a  more  truly integrated European 
input-output matrix.  This  ought  to  be  done,  in our opinion,  by 
having  regard  to  the basic fact that,  because  of  the  process  of 
integration,  the  European  economy  has  already  become  divided into 
a  productive "centre" and  a  "periphery".  The  "centre" must  be 
geographically  located,  and  so must  the  "periphery",  so  that we 
obtain a  concept of "centre"  and "periphery"  that cuts  across national 
boundaries.  Moreover,  it must  be  a  concept  based  on  production 
and  exchange  relations in the  sense,  for  instance, 
(1)  See his contribution to  "The  Economic  Consequences  of the Size 
of Nations"  ed.  by  E.A.G.  Robinson,  London  1957. - 7  - II.l5. 
that  the "centre"  expresses  most  of the  demand  for,  and  supply of, 
invesLment  goods;  this means  that, if individual moderr  lndustrial 
activities are  located in geographically peripheral areas,  like Sicily 
or Scotland or Brittany,  these activities are still part  of our 
definition of "centre".  The  "periphery",  on the other hand,  is 
characterised by  the  fact  that it neither demands  nor supplies invest-
ment  goods.  It demands  finished  consumer  goods,  and it mostly  imports 
them  from  the "centre",  and  pays  for  them with  the  proceeds  of the 
sale of  primary  commodities  and agricultural  goods,  by  the  remittances 
of its emigrants,  and  by  the  proceeds  of  tourism. 
!!.15.18.  In addition,  the CSO,  in conjunction with European Central 
Banks  and  Finance  Ministries,should proceed to construct a  matrix of 
European  financial  flows. 
Priorities  for Forecasting 
!!.15.19.  We  are  aware  of  the difficulties that both  these  jobs present. 
Nevertheless,  if both  the economic  and the  financial matrices  became 
available,  the  economists  of Europe  Plus Thirty would  have at their 
disposal  an  enormous  quantity of material  to be  used  for  long-teDn  fore-
casting.  The  matrices would,  moreover,  provide  an  invaluable instrument 
to  be  used  in the  shaping of the  EEC  industrial,  financial,  energy, 
and  regional  policies,  and in progress  towards  economic  and monetary 
union.  All  the  inputs  to  the matrices would have,  in fact,  not only 
quantitative  and  qualitative dimensions,  but also a  locational  dimension. 
The  matrices would,  signally,  make  it possible  to  study the intersectoral 
shifts that have  taken  place  in the  EEC  economy  in the  last two  decades, 
and  the  changes  in the  inner structure of each sector,  and to  forecast 
the nature  and  the  breadth of  future  changes.  Moreover,  a  careful 
analysis  of the  information contained in those,matrices would greatly 
improve  our  knowledge  of the nature of technological  change  in the 
various  sectors  of the  EEC  economy. 
11.15.20.  Quite apart  from its forecasting merits,  which we  have  just 
indicated,  this activity, which  the  economists  of Europe  Plus Thirty 
should assist the  CSO  in conducting,  would  have  an  important  by-product: 
it would  show  the actual  levels which  European integration has  reached 
in the  economic  and  financial  fields,  which are very high but  perhaps - 8  -
not very well  known  by  the  public and  even  by  the  governments  of the 
member  countries.  ..~As  we  have  said, it is a  hard  job,  but it is  a 
pre-requisite  for  the  achievement  of  factually  based  forecasts  and 
realistic policy  decisions. 
11.15.21.  Thus  far,  the  Community  has  lacked a  complete view of its 
economic  life,  taken as  a  whole.  Its statistics are  the  summation 
of national  statistics,  often not  homogeneous.  What  is missing is 
a  structurally interdependent approach,  an interrelated analysis  of 
products,  markets,  inputs,  and  of the  financial activities that 
correspond to  economic activities. 
11.15. 
11.15.22.  If this  type  of activity were  to  be  initiated by  the  economic 
and  financial  section of the  proposed  Europe  Plus Thirty,  it would 
yield very interesting results without  great  delay  and without  engaging 
an  excessive  amount  of  human  and  financial  resources.  Most  of the 
"Census  and Assessment"  jobs  just outlined could be  done  by  competent 
"task forces".  The  construction of the  economic  and  financial matrices, 
and  the analysis  of  the  structure  of  trade within  the Community  and 
between  the  Corrununi ty  and other economic areas,  for instance,  ·could 
be  accomplished in a  relatively short  time  by  sub-groups  composed  of  no 
more  than  3  - 5  research workers  each,  who  had  computer  time  and 
computer experts at their disposal. 
11.15.23.  Similarly,  a  task  force  could study the basic  problems  of 
trends  in relative price  structures.  This  essential  field of analysis 
was  sadly  overlooked until macro-events  like the  recent  rise in 
raw material  prices  brought its more  lurid aspects  to everybody's 
attention.  A  spate of  research has  been initiated, but it does  not 
look as  if its results will  do  much  more  than  scratch the  surface  of 
the  relative price  problem. 
11.15.24.  Under this heading,  the  study  of  the inflationary process 
would  find an  appropriate and  theoretically  sound  location.  Studies 
of inflation have  tended to  lo$k,  at  least  recently,  at this 
phenomenon  as if it were  exclusively determined by monetary  causes, 
or by  wage  pressures,  or by  the  incontinence  of public  finance. - 9  -
We  therefore propose that inflation be  studied by  Europe  Pl~s 
Thirty mainly  in its proper relative price context.  Nor,conversely, 
must  it be  forgotten  that inflation is more  than  just an aspect  of 
relative  forces. 
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II.l5~25.  Equally  important  is the  study of  trends  in relative wages,  and 
of  the whole  subject of the modes  in which production is  organised, 
i.e.  of the  legal,  social  and  technological modalities  of the  organisa-
tion of production,  which  combine  to  change  the relative uses  and 
relative prices  of productive  forces.  Tendencies  toward  concentration 
as well  as  de-concentration can be  detected,  and must  be  studied  ~nd 
explained.  We  have  already mentioned this in Chapter !!.9.  above. 
II.l5.26.  The  study  of trends  in relative prices  and wages,  in the  struc-
ture  and  technology  of  production,  and in the concentration and 
diffusion of productive processes  in the EEC,  should be  accompanied  by 
a  related study  of the  trends  in the placing of the  EEC  economy  within 
the world  economy.  This would  involve  a  deep  enquiry  into the path of 
development  of  economic  relations between  the  EEC  and its associated 
countries,  the Socialist countries,  the  USA  and Canada,  Japan,  the  other 
developed  countries,  the oil producing  countries  and  the  ''poor countries". 
As  "economic  relations"  one  should understand not  only visible trade, 
but  also invisible trade and  investment  flows,  technology  transfers,  and 
the  administration of "aid".  It is  through  this  enquiry that Europe 
Plus Thirty  should make  its contribution,  which we  think  could be  con-
siderable, to  the  developn,ent  of Community aid policy. 
II .15. 27.  The modes  of  "international division of  labour",  should be 
closely analysed  so  that  the  formation  of  "hierarchies" and  dependence 
patterns  could be  detected  and  their future  developments  forecast. 
(We  touched  on  this  also  in !!.9.  above.)  Similarly,  the  process  of 
"internationalis.lition" of capital,  labour,  and  production should be  given 
detailed attention,  in order to see whether  any  "European" pattern 
becomes  evident  or,  if not,  to  enquire why.  The  same  type  of analysis 
should be  conducted  at  the  intra-Community  level,  in order to detect  the 
appearance  of centripetal or centrifugal forces,  and  intra-~egional 
specialisation and  dependence  patterns,  within the  EEC. - 10  -
11.15.28.  Europe  Plus  Thirty should also  seek  to  forecast  about  the 
mode  of  development  of  financial  and  monetary  structures.  This  would 
involve  a  study of  the  structural  development  of  European  financial 
institutions  and  policies.  Here,  a  straight  extrapolation of 
previous  US  financial history on  European  data would  have  yielded, 
throughout  the  post-war period,  extremely  poor results, while it 
is quite probable that  doing it the other way  round,  i.e. extrapolating 
previous  continental  European  trends  on  US  and  UK  data,  would 
have  proved more  successful.  This  is  simply  because the  continental 
Et  ~:opean financial  systems  had to  face  both before  and  after the 
Second  World  War  the  two  basic  problems  of capital  scarcity  and 
inflationary financing,  which the  US  and the  UK,  with their  low 
rates of inflation and  of real investment,  were  spared until the 
mid  sixties. 
11.15.29.  Unfortunately most  analyses of continental  European  financial 
11.15.30. 
systems  have  started from  the  premise that  the  US  and the  UK 
financial  systems  were  the models  that  should be imitated.  This  has 
condemned their results to irrelevance,  which  justifies a  reconsidera-
tion of the whole  problem of  the  style of  European integration in 
the  financial  and monetary  fields.  Especially important,  when  this 
exercise is taken  up  by  Europe  Plus Thirty,  will  be to make p'ublic 
finance the  lynchpin  of  financial  analysis;  and  this  is again  the 
opposite  of what Anglo-American  financial  analysis  has  traditionally 
done.  The  activities of  the  state  (in its widest  sense)  as  a 
financial  intermediary could well  be  the  point of departure  of  any 
European  financial  forecasting. 
If this point  of  departure  were  chosen,  the relevance of 
European  financial  forecasting would  be  tremendously  enhanced, 
especially to  forecasts  of the structure of  European monetary 
integration,  of the activities of non-European multinational 
corporations  in  Europe,  and  of  European multinational corporations 
in  Europe  and  elsewhere.  Moreover,  trends  in banking,  private and 
social insurance  and  pension  systems,  housing  finance,  consumer 
credit,and thus  consumption,  would  be much  easier to  forecast,  as 
well  as  the relative weight  and patterns of activity of nationalised 
industry within the  European  economy. - 11  -
A European Welfare Accounting System 
II.l5.31.  More  generally,  Europe  Plus  Thirty would  be well  advised to 
combine all its findings  in the  economic  and  financial  fields with 
the  findings  of its other  sections in an  attempt  to construct 
a  progressively  less naive  "Welfare  Accounting  System"  for  the 
Community  as.-a  whole  and  for its component  parts.  The  greatest 
difficulty to  be  faced,  when  constructing  such  a  system,  is that 
social indicators  (like  environmental  decay or rehabilitation,  the 
number  of pupils  in secondary  schools,  the extent of educational 
recycling,  crime  rates, wealth  and  income  distribution)  cannot 
without drastic  recourse  to  value  judgements  be  expressed  in 
a  common  standard of value  and  aggregated  to  form  a  sum  that 
can  be  added  to  or subtracted  from  the  money  GNP.  But it 
would  be  just as  useful  to  know,  for  instance,  that 
production of  such  and  such  goods  and  services  has  been,  in any  one 
year,  so  much,  and that  the  index  of  atmospheric  pollut:ion,  in the 
same  year,  was  so much  in such  and  such places,  and to compare  both 
figures  to  previous  years  or to other countries,  or  ~xtrapolate them 
into  the  future.  What  can usefully  be  done,  moreover,  is to 
calculate trade-offs, i.e. of the relative cost  to  a  community of 
reducing pollution,  increasing educaLion or raising health standards 
by  certain amounts. 
II.l5.32.  The  same  reasons  that militate against  putting excessive 
faith in the  GNP  indicator  also  advise  against  attempting to  pyramid 
all welfare indicators into  a  portmanteau  figure  for'~ross National 
Welfare;' or  some  such  phrase.  What  is of  paramount  importance is 
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to  convey  to  the  citizens of  the  Community  and  to  their representatives 
the  notion  that  the  socio-economic  system,  in its general  functioning, 
produces  this conglomerate of goods,  services,  processes,  social 
and  environmental  phenomena  as its output,  and that this production 
process  cannot  simply  be  reformed  by  eliminating its negative 
outputs  because,  if that is  done,  the positive outputs will be 
affected as well.  The  inner structure of this complex  production 
process must  therefore  be  elucidated,  so  that the mutual  relations 
between its components  can  be  identifiedw - 12  - II.l5 
11.15.33.  The  problems  involved in this  type  of social accounting 
are  eno~ous, but  once  again this  does  not  mean  that  the  job  cannot 
be  contemplated.  The  identification of  the variables that enter the 
system will  be  made  harder by differing national  standards,  and the 
weighting  problems  associated with those of  reducing  quality into  quantity 
do  not  decrease  because of the  fact  that the exercise is conducted on  a 
Community  basis.  But it is certain that only if an  attempt  i~ made  to 
construct this type  of accounting system can we  know  the direction the 
Community  is going,  understand what  rewards  national  and  CommuniCy 
efforts are  reaping,  and begin to assess  and  compare  the aims it might 
rationally  reach  for. 
Recommendations 
II.l5.34.  In chapter  1  above we  spoke  of the need  for coordination of all 
the  forecasting work,  and  research  relevant to  forecasting,  which is done 
by  and  for the Commission.  The  days  of partial analysis, if they ever 
existed, must  be  gone  forever.  Nowhere  is this truer than in the 
economic  field.  The  facets  of economic  and financial  forecasting we 
have  suggested in this chapter are,  in our opinion,  among  the most 
interesting and  fruitful.  But it  is clear that the  team of 10  to  15 
highly  qualified economists,  which we  recommend  Europe  Plus Thirty 
should  employ,  could not  reasonably take  up  all the  forecasting jobs we 
have  suggested at the  same  time.  In this last  section  we  stress the 
importance  of indicating a  list of  forecasting priorities.  If we  were 
asked to express  our own,  it should be  clear to the  reader of this chapter 
that it would  definitely be  the  forecast  of the constellation of relative 
prices that will  prevail in the  European  economy,  as  a  result of  the 
effects of the  energy crisis and of the crisis in the concept  of "growth 
for its own  sake".  This  aspect  of  long-te~ forecasting would be  the 
most  relevant,  in our opinion,  to  the other forecasting sections of 
Europe  Plus Thirty. 
I1.15.35.  Apart  from  in-house cross-fertilisation, we  must  stress that 
the  economists  of Europe  Plus Thirty would  be  able to accomplish little 
if they could not  rely  on  intense collaboration  from  the Community 
Statistical Office and the proposed European Institute for Economic 
Research and Analysis,  if it is set up.  Most  of the  forecasting - 13  - II.l5 
activities indicated in this chapter only make  sense if the processing 
of data is accomplished,  to  the  specification of  Europe  Plus  Thirty, 
by  the CSO.  This would  not  involve,  in the majority of cases,  more 
than processing in a  different way  data that the  CSO  already  possesses 
or regularly receives  from member  countries.  Where  we  have  spoken 
of "small  task  forces"  to accomplish certain forecasting  jobs,  we 
had in mind that our economists would "design" those  jobs  and  specify 
the data-processing modes  they  required;  they would  then ask the  CSO 
to  do  the  processing.  It is clear that  this would  involve  a  most 
intimate degree  of mutual  acquaintance and cooperation between  the  CSO 
and  Europe  Plus Thirty. 
II.l5.36.  Finally, we  think it is necessary to express  a  caveat against 
a  tendency that  frequently  develops  when  long-ter.m  research and  fore-
casting programmes  are discussed,  namely  the  tendency  to  spell out in 
minute detail the  scope and method  of  long-ter.m  research and  forecasting 
programmes.  A  long-ter.m  forecasting  programme  embraces  a  span of  4  to  30 
years.  In such  a  time  span things  change  profoundly,  new  problems  arise, 
corners  are  turned.  It is therefore most  unwise  to crystallise a  fore-
casting programme  from  the start.  We  have  suggested  some  starting points 
above,  but  those  are  only what  seem  right  to  us  at  the moment.  We 
want  Europe  Plus Thirty to be  capable  of  responding  quickly  (though not 
superficially)  to changing events  and insights. 
II.l5.37.  In this chapter we  have  been  perhaps  less specific about  what 
should be  done  than has  been the  case in some  others,  and we  are going 
to  be  less  specific also  about  the  qualifications  of  the  10  to  15 
economists  who""1we  recommend  should  do  it.  In the  economic  field, 
the  question of the division of work  between Europe  Plus  Thirty 
and other organisations will  be more  complicated than in some  others. 
There is  the  Economic  Policy Committee,  there is the  Community  Statis-
tical Office;  there may  be  the  European Institute for Economic  Research 
and Analysis;  there are METEOR  and  COMET;  there are  the  services of 
DG  II itself.  We  suggested at I.l. above  how  overlap and  ~onfusion 
could be  avoided by  the adoption of certain simple guidelines,  but  that - 14  -
will still leave much  t.o  be  settled.  For that  reason we  deliberately 
abstain here  from  anything  like  job  specifications.  We  confine 
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ourselves  to  saying that, whatever pattern of work is adopted,  staff 
should be  found with  the  skills and  experience  needed  for that pattern, 
and also  for the  economic  inputs which will be  needed  for the  other 
sectors of Europe  Plus Thirty's  forecasting and its technology assessment. PART  II  II .16. 
16.  DEFENCE  AND  DISARMAMENT 
II.l6.1.  As  the  European  Communities  are at  present constituted under  the 
Rome  Treaty,  defence  and  disannament  are not  among  its responsibilities. 
It would  therefore be  understandable if Europe  Plus Thirty were  to 
devote  no  more  than passing attention to  th~n.  But this would  not 
necessarily be  desirable.  Its  role will  be  to explore possible  futures, 
using  the  techniques  of  forecasting and  technology  assessment;  and it 
is certainly possible to consider a  future  in which the Community  could 
find itself more  directly concerned with defence;  indeed, it would be 
hard  to  look thirty years  ahead without  doing  so.  Nor would it be 
possible  for Europe  Plus Thirty to  forecast  about  the  European  economy 
or about  European  technology without  at  least being aware  of the  impact 
of  defence  or about  European politics and  external  relations without 
considering disannament. 
II.l6.2.  There  is no  way  of  decoupling defence,  deterrence  and  disaDmaruent 
from  the  other great issues of our time,  any more  than there was  in the 
past.  We  can  list them:  political and trade  relationships with our 
Eastern neighbours,  and with America;  the maintenance  of a  sound 
economic  base;  the  provision of  food  and other resources at a  time 
when  a  century of unprecedented  grow~h shows  every  sign of overstraining 
the world  economy;  our  relations with the Third and Fourth worlds 
nearer home;  the  growing  sense of disorientation,  the  lack of co-
hesion  and  purpose which  has  begun  to affect industrial society,  and 
the disbelief,  perhaps  growing,  in the  need  for any  defence at all; 
the  general  direction of  our technological  innovation,  and,  last and 
most  important,  the  relations  between  the member  states of the Community 
itself. 
II.l6.3.  We  do  not think Europe  Plus Thirty should  go  so  fer as 
studies  of  the mechanics  of  defence;  that ground belongs  to 
NATO  and  the national  defence  industries.  There  is no  point in 
redoing within  the Community  what is already being  done  elsewhere. 
We  can therefore  eliminate  such  large specialist fields  as: II.l6.4. 
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- weapons  specification and  developments  (as  opposed  to  the 
policy and  machinery  for  integrated defence production); 
- targeting  and  other operational  aspects  of strategic 
deterrence; 
- the  mechanisms  of  command  and  control; 
- "size  and  shape  of  armed  forces"; 
- intelligence; 
- logistics. 
II.l6. 
Occasionally,  of course,  even  in  this  NATO  territory,  points will 
be  found  which  are essential  to  the  understanding of wider political 
issues. 
But  there  are  other  important matters,  impinging  directly on  the 
growth  of  common  Community  policies  in  the  fields  of  foreign affairs, 
technology  and  economics,  which  cannot be  tucked  away  into  the 
defence  "black box",  and  which will have  to enter into Europe  Plus 
Thirty's general  forecasting  if it is  to  be  realistic.  They 
include: 
(a)  The  impact  on  national  economies  of  devoting different levels 
of  resources  to  defence,  including 
(i)  the  economic  and  technological  impact  of 
defence  technology  and  defence  production 
on  the  European  industrial base; 
(ii)  the  possibility of greater international 
sharing of  defence  industrial effort;  and 
the  form  such  sharing could  take. 
(b)  Possible  changes  of  the military - political pattern 
in Europe  and  the  rest of  the  world,  including 
(i)  the  general nature of  the  arguments  about 
disarmament,  nuclear proliferation,  and 
deterrence; 
(ii)  scenarios of European politics,  and  of 
moves  towards  East-West detente. II.l6.5. 
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(iii)  the political circumstances  in which  the 
Community  might begin  to  acquire  defence 
and  disarmament  responsibilities,  or at 
least  take  defence  and  disarmament more 
explicitly into account; 
(iv)  the effect of (ii)  and  (iii) on  the  future 
of NATO,  and  hence  on  the  Warsaw  Pact; 
(v)  the  problem of ensuring continuing supplies 
of essential  resources,  and  the  use  to  that 
end  of  defence expertise and  material  as 
bargaining counters  outside Europe. 
II.l6. 
A great deal  of  this  ground  can be  examined  in considerable  depth 
without  using classified information;  there  is no  shortage  of published 
data.  Defence  is  served now  - as it has  been  throughout history - by 
very strong intellectual forces,  drawn  in by  the  fascination of watching 
"real power"  at work,  or by  the  challenge of solving difficult problems, 
or simply by patriotism.  There  is also  a  substantial extra-governmental 
group  of specialists  - historians,  political commentators,  economists  -
who  contribute  serious  academic  studies,  and  who  help  in  this  way  to 
maintain  the  standards  and  objectivity of governmental  work.  But, 
as  always,  the  way  in which  the  arguments  are  assembled,  and  the weight 
given  to conflicting considerations,  depend  on  who  is writing,  and  who 
for.  Besides  being  a  necessary part of its general  forecasting,  work 
in  this  field  by  Europe  Plus Thirty would  help  develop  a  specifically 
European analysis  of  the  fields  we  are  discussing,  and  this we  think 
is  to  be  desired. 
II.l6.6.  Military-political scenario writing needs  to  be  undertaken  in order 
to  spell out  the  range  of possibilities which  could  confront  the 
Community.  To  be  useful,  scenarios need  to  be  in some  detail:  unless 
sufficient colour  is given  to  the  picture,  it will not stimulate 
thought,  and  so eventually action.  The  effort required  for  this kind 
of work  is not  large  but it needs  to  be  of high quality.  Those 
undertaking it will have  to  understand West  European,  Russian,  and - 4  - II.l6. 
American  political  realities,  trends  in strategic deterrents,  the 
use  of nuclear and  conventional weaponry  as  local  deterrents,  the  long-
term  political  economic  implications  of the "limits  to  growth"  debate, 
etc. 
II.l6.7.  The  time  at which  Europe  could become  more  responsible  for its 
own  defence  is obviously  relevant  to  any  future  defence  studies.  As 
already  noted,  the Treaty ignores  the  issue.  But  a  more  unified West 
Europe  (if one  is  eventually created)  which  consciously planned  on 
looking in perpetuity to another  power of  comparable  population and 
wealth  for its defence,  is not  among  the most  likely  future  developments. 
If the  Community  were  to  involve itself with defence,  that would  be 
bound  to  have  an  effect  on  the  future  of  NATO.  Already,  indeed,  some 
movement  in this direction can be  discerned,  through the creation and 
recent  extension of the  Euro-Group  of Defence  Ministers. 
II.l6.8.  The  existence of this  Group  is  relevant  to  the  forecasting about 
defence which  might  be  undertaken by  Europe  Plus Thirty.  It started in 
1968,  very  informally,  as  a  kind of  dining club  for  European  Ministers 
of Defence  when  they  happened  to  be  together for meetings  of the  NATO 
Council.  Its membership  is  srnaller than  that of  NATO;  the United States 
( 1) 
and  Canada  are not members,  and  nor are Iceland,  France  ,  and 
Portugal  (which  had  been  preoccupied with colonial  problems).  It also 
differs  from  that of  the  Community,  Ireland being neutral.  Norway, 
Greece  and Turkey are  in  NATO  but not  in the Community.  The  Euro-Group 
has  met  so  far in the  NATO  building in Brussels.  Germany  and Britain 
tend  to  take  the  lead~.ng roles.  The  chairmanship  rotates,  and Britain 
provides  a  small  secretariat. 
(l)  France  is not  a  rnemuer  of  the  Euro-Group,  though  she  remains  a 
member  of  NATO  Committee  of Armament  Directors.  In order to associate 
France  in some  way  with  a  European  defence  initiative,  the  idea  has 
been  floated of  reviving the Western  European Union,  WEU.  But its 
membership  is  even  more  limited than that of  the  Corrununity  (Britain, 
France,  Germany,  Netherlands,  Belgium,Luxembourg  and  Italy);  and 
Germany,  for well-known historical  reasons,  does  not  regard it as  the 
most  useful  organ  for policy decisions. II.l6.9. 
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The  Group  was  originally  intended  to  work  on  the  improvement  of 
the  European  end  of  NATO  in general.  In practice it was  concerned 
at first mainly with  armaments  and  the  defence  industry  (see  below), 
but it has  recently made  a  tentative start on  a  study of  longer-term 
issues.  This  involves  entering sensitive  territory which  cannot 
be  usefully explored without making  judgements  about  the  likely 
future  of European  defence  and  disarmament,  and  hence  about Atlantic 
relationships  and  progress  towards  detente. 
II.l6.10.  The  importance  of  the  Eurogroup  in relation  to  the work  of 
Europe  Plus  Thirty is,  clearly,  that a  great deal  of  defence  fore-
casting on  behalf of  Europe  could  develop naturally out of its 
efforts.  It is not  immediately obvious  that  there  would  then  be 
much  need  for  an  additional contribution  from  Europe  Plus Thirty. 
But  we  have  already mentioned  the  desirability of Europe  Plus Thirty 
undertaking  defence  studies  as  a  part of its own  integrated  forecasting. 
That  need  would not be  removed  by whatever  forecasting  was  undertaken 
by  the  Eurogroup  of  NATO  - it would  only be  made  easier  to meet, 
because  there  would  be  some  possibility of  shared effort. 
II.l6.11.  At  this  point it may  be  convenient if we  give  an  impressionistic 
account of  the  way  long-term defence  forecasting  is  done  in NATO  and 
in several  of  its member  countries. 
headings: 
It is  often done  under  four 
(a)  Firstly,  economic,  that is:  the  likely growth  in national 
resources,  both  absolutely and  compared  to  that of allies and 
potential enemies;  the  likely proportion of  those  resources 
which will be  available  in  the  public  sector;  and  the  share  of 
that sector which  defence  might get.  Realistic assumptions 
have  to  be  made  about  the  cost of equipment  and  manpower,  and 
such  things  as  the  likelihood of burden-sharing and  collaboration 
with allies.  The  economic  contribution of  the  defence  sector  to 
other sectors  can also  be  estimated;  e.g.,  the  training of airmen, 
engineers  and  craftsmen,  and  the  development  of  the  "non-economic" 
technologies,  like  exotic  fuels,  which  later have  a  civilian 
application ("Fall-out"). - 6  -
(b)  Secondly,  the  possible  future  political and military environment 
is  examined.  In doing so,  possible  developments  in international 
relationships which might  have  a  substantial effect on  the size, 
plans,  structure,  equipment,  deployment  and mobility of  the Armed 
Forces  are  identified:  in superpower  relationships,  the American 
commitrnent  to  Europe  and  the  possible  emergence  of a  more  integ-
rated Europe  in the  Western Alliance;  likely progress  on  arms 
control;  the  possible  development  of China  and Japan as military 
powers;  the stability or otherwise  of the Third World and of 
national  or European interests outside Europe;  and the threat 
of civil disturbance  in Europe  and  elsewhere. 
(c)  Thirdly,  forecasts  are made  about  demographic  and  educational 
developments  and  changes  in social attitudes which may  affect 
recruiting,  manpower  structure and manpower  costs  of the 
Armed  Forces,  and  perhaps  act as  a  major constraint  on  future 
defence  planning.  The  Armed  Services may  have  to  face  over the 
next  decade  or so  changes  in their social  environment  and in 
their own  social  function at least as  fundamental  as  have 
occurred in any  previous  period in history. 
(d)  Fourthly,  an analysis  of the  possible  longer-term trends  in 
technological  developments,  and their significance  for 
defence.  The  objectives  and  capabilities of  the  relevant 
areas  of Soviet  and Western  technology are  compared;  and 
trends  of  promising  research wherever these may  occur are 
identified.  In particular,  an attempt is made  to identify 
developments  which  could upset  or change  the  current 
offensive/defensive balance or which would offer wholly  new 
concepts  of weapons  systems  or military activity;  and 
those which would entail  the  elimination of particular classes 
of weapons  or military activity. 
II.l6. - 7  - II.l6. 
11.16.12.  The  issue of deterrence is nowhere  of  greater significance 
than  on  the  European mainland,  since only  there  do  the  two  super-
powers  face  each other in an embattled posture.  As  weapon  technology 
moves  ahead  (and  there is no  sign of its letting up)  the  theories 
underlying our concept of deterrence will  need periodical  re-examin-
ation.  The  history of  the  past  15  years  includes  a  number of examples 
of how  the  informed  commentaries  of persons  close to,  but not wholly 
engaged in, military matters  have  added  greatly to our understanding 
of what  needs  to  be  done,  and of the various  dangers  which  threaten, 
depending on which  options we  choose.  Since  there is no  reason to 
believe that the need  for such independent  thinking has  passed, 
Europe  Plus  Thirty  should aim  to master the arguments.  In the not 
very distant future it is possible that  the need  for political 
thinking on this issue may  be  sharply increased,  through  foreseeable 
developments  leading to  the increased proliferation of nuclear 
weaponry,  an  ever-increasing danger of nuclear war by accident, 
and  fresh  risks,  in this age of  subversion and guerilla organisations, 
of nuclear or other blackmail.  And  most  important  of all will  be 
the  possibilities of  disarmament  and  detente.  A future  containing 
an unrestricted arms  race  for  ever.more  would not  be  the  same  as  a 
future  containing even  limited disarmament,  and  the  difference would 
have  considerable consequences  for the  economy,  and major ones  for 
the  society and politics,  of Europe. 
11.16. 13.  The  points mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of  the  listing 
on  page  2  have  a  more  strongly economic  flavour:  the  impact  of defence 
technology  on  industry and  on  the  economy;  the  possibilities of economies 
through international collaboration;  and  the industrial  form  such colla-
boration should  take.  The  bill for European defence  - not  counting the 
American contribution - runs  at about 3.2%  of the  gross  domestic  products  of 
the  Nine  (excluding Eire).  In money  terms  this amounts  to around '35,000 million 
in total  (1974 prices).  Industrially the  significance is even  greater 
than this  already very  large  figure  would  suggest.  Defence  is  a - 8  - 11.16. 
major  consumer  of  the  Community's  technical  effort: it can  for  instance, 
account  for  25%  or more  of  a  country's industrial  technology.  It is, 
moreover,  the most  advanced  25%md  it captures  the  imagination and 
allegiance  of  some  of  the  best recruits  but makes  little direct contribution 
to  the  health of  the  civiuan  economy.  Some  such  lop-sidedness  is 
unavoidable  as  long  as  we  have  defence;  but  the  economic  SLde-effects 
need  to  be  assessed  and  brought out into  the  open,  for  the  Community 
just as  for  an  individual  country.  The  commitment  of  defence  technologists 
on  the  present  scale is more  than  a  peripheral  issue,  and  a  more  planned 
distribution of  defence  resources  might  be  expected  to  play  an  important 
role  in  the  future  economic  policies of  the  Community.  Quite  apart  from 
technological  implications,  defence  ties up,  in a  necessary but largely 
unproductive activity, many  of  the best of  each nation's  young  people, 
so  that  the opportunity cost of lest productive  employment  has  to  be 
added  to  the  direct cost if the  true effort is  to  be  fully appreciated. 
All  of  these  factors merit  regular  economic  appraisal  in  the  light of 
forecasts  of  'possible futures'. 
11.16.14.  The  formation  of  the  Eurogroup  bears witness  to  a  general  acceptance 
of  the  view  that  there is  room  for  economies  of all kinds  in  the 
organisation of  the  European  defence.  In  following  up  this  approach, 
the  Eurogroup  has  set up  a  number  of  sub-groups,  dealing with medical 
problems,  training,  logistics,  and  (potentially by  far  the most  important) 
armaments.  A June  1974  meeting of  Eurogroup  at ministerial level, 
"discussed  the  role of  European  industry in procuring  equipment  for  NATO 
forces,  and  agreed  that,  in  the  interests of  the Alliance,  there was  a 
need  to maintain  a  highly  developed  technological,  scientific and 
industrial  base in Europe,  while  also  seeking  to  achieve  the closest 
possible co-operation in arms  production and  procurement  between  the 
countries  of  North America  and  Europe".  Such  phrases  have  of  course 
been uttered often before.  So  have  principles  such  as  that which  states 
that  "no  development will  be  sanctioned  by national Ministries of Defence 
without  a  prior  check of  the possibilities of  international co-operation". 
Doubts  exist as  to whether  this will  be  sufficient  to  bring about  a  shift 
of  the  present balance  between  the  two  halves  of  the  NATO  alliance. - 9  -
11.16  •.  15.  The  more  European  joint production agreements  that  are set up, 
and  the more  trans-European  companies  that are  formed  to  carry  them  out, 
the more  natural will  the  process  of  European  collaborative  arms  produc-
tion  seem.  Already  there  are  a  dozen  or more  good  examples  of what  can 
be  achieved.  By,  say,  1990 it would  be  surprising if Western  Europe 
were not  physically  able  to  provide  the  industrial base  for  a  defence 
and  deterrent  effort of its own.  By  then it could certainly create its 
own  satellite reconnaissance  system,  and  so  avoid  remaining  dependent 
for  some  kinds  of  information  on  America,  as  was  the  case  during  the 
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1973  Israel-Arab  war,  information,  moreover,  which  would  be  of critical 
importance  in  any  disarmament  or  arms  control  process.  All  these 
possibilities would  be  proper  elements  of  scenario writing  in Europe  Plus 
Thirty. 
11.16.16.  For  such  reasons  we  believe that  Europe  Plus Thirty  should not 
arbitrarily exclude  anything  from  its purview  simply  because it has  to 
do  with  defence  or  disarmament,  and  because  these matters  do  not  figure 
in  the  Treaty of  Rome.  They  must  be  part of its forecasting  work 
because  they  are  part  of  European  life:  politically, industrially,  and  above all 
economically  part of it.  Nor,  on  the purely  formalistic  level,  do  we 
think  that  an  absence  of  specific mention  in the Treaty  should worry 
anyone.  Many  of  the  things  we  talk about  in this  report  are not  speci-
fically mentioned  in the Treaty.  Lack  of mention  in the Treaty has  not 
prevented  the  Community  at all levels,  up  to  and  including  summit  meet-
ings,  from  talking  about  this matter or that,  and  from  laying plans  for 
Community  action.  It should be  abundantly clear from  the whole  of this 
report that  the  inclusion of  a  given topic in the forecasting to be  done 
by  Europe  Plus  Thirty would  not mean  that  any particular development  is 
either more  or less  likely to happen. 
Recommendations 
11.16.17.  We  recommend  therefore  that  defence  and  disarmament  should be 
part  of  the  normal  work  of  Europe  Plus Thirty,  like anything  else,  and 
staffed accordingly,  with  an  allowance  of  perhaps  3  professionals. 
Data  and  scenarios  concerning  defence  and  disarmament  should be  integra-
ted with  the  normal  inputs  of  the  economic,  industrial,  technological, - 10  -
social,  environmental,  materials  and  educational  forecasting which 
Europe  Plus Thirty undertakes.  And  it goes  without  saying  that its 
technology  assessment  should not  create artificial frontiers  between 
the  defence  and  civil applications  of  a  given  technology,  product  or 
process. 
11.16  • PART  II.  II.l7. 
17.  POLITICS  AND  INSTITUTIONS 
The  nature  of Political Institutions 
II.l7.1.  Of  all  the  areas  dealt with  in Part II of  this  report,  the 
political and  institutional  is  the  least amenable  to  forecasting;  the 
nature  and  function  of political institutions  themselves  make  this  the 
case.  Every  social  system nourishes  a  number  of  institutions,  whose 
function it is authoritatively  to  regulate  the  demands  and  conflicts which 
arise within it and,  in  the  case  of national  systems,  to monopolise  the 
use  of  force.  These  institutions we  call political because it is  their 
purpose  sometimes  to  be,  and  sometimes  to  develop  and  provide,  decision-
making  mechanisms.  We  have  to distinguish  between  institutions  in  the 
economic  sphere  (e.g.  firms,  trade  unions),  the  socio-cultural  sphere 
(e.g.  churches,  mass  media,  etc.)  and  the  politico-administrative sphere 
(government  institutions  themselves).  Here  we  will  be  concentrating on 
institutions  in  the  politico-administrative  sphere; 
the  others  because  they  regulate  and  control  them. 
they  are  set above 
But  we  have  to  keep 
in mind  that political  institutions are  always  interdependent with  the 
other  spheres:  they  can never be  examined  outside  the  context of other 
institutions.  It is  the  purpose  of politico-administrative institutions 
to  prepare  and  bring  forth  decisions  which  are  important  to  the  order and 
shape  of  the  whole  of  the  social  system,  as well  as  to the  development  of 
individual  sub-systems. 
II.l7.2.  All political systems  have  to  solve  one  basic  problem,  namely  how 
to  adjust political order  to  changing  social  demands.  It is  typical  of 
political  institutions  in  the  West,  to  which  the  countries of  the 
European  Community  belong,  that  they  do  this  by balancing conflicting 
interests within  the  framework  of  regulated and  more  or  less  accepted 
procedures.  The  criteria by  which  we  judge  such  institutions are 
legitimacy and  efficiency.  By  legitimacy we  mean  consensus;  acceptance 
of  the  legality of  institutions,  and  a  consequent  readiness  to  submit 
oneself  to  their authority.  By  efficiency we  mean  the  ability of 
institutions adequately  to  fulfil  the  role  assigned  to  them. 
II.l7.3.  There  is  only a  limited  typology  of  political  institutions  in 
the  modern  history of  the  West;  institutional  innovation has not been 
especially noteworthy  in recent  times  ..  So,  while  the  basic  forms  of 
political institutions  have  remained  rather constant,  their relationship 2 
with  each  other  and  with  society  in general,  their  tasks  and  their 
internal  structure,  fluctuate  according  to  the  particular problems 
which  come  up,  when  the  need  for  order has  to  be  reconciled with 
changing  social  demands.  We  are  here  considering  institutions 
that either  influence  the  political "input",  by  which  we  mean 
the  demands  of  social  forces  which  arise  in problem situations, 
or are  on  the  other hand  concerned with handling  input  in order 
II. L7. 
to  create  legislative and  administrative  "output".  While  all 
political  systems  have  these  two  characteristics--input-oriented 
structures  (parties,  pressure-groups)  and  output-oriented  institutions 
(government,  civil service)  - the  relationship between  them  is 
constantly changing.  On  the  one  hand  there  can  be  quite  a  strong 
executive  and  administration  facing  a  "weak"  parliament  and  on 
the  other  a  "strong" parliament  facing  a  government  that is ner  - 1 ~· 
unable  to  act.  And  there  can  be  institutions  in  the  economL 
social  sphere  that have  such  a  dominating  influence  on  the  politi.-:o-
administrative  system  that it is  unable  to  make  decisions  which  woulr: 
go  against  their wishes. 
11.17.4.  The  above  is necessarily a  somewhat  schematic  and  simplified account 
of  the matter,  and  in practical experience  its outlines are  no  doubt 
often hard  to  perceive  through  the  dust  and  heat generated by  the 
conflicts  between  entrenched  power  systems.  This  is particularly  the 
case where  an  ins ti  tu tion (for  instance  among  grea.t companies,  or  trade 
unions,  or  in  the  press  and  television),having acquired  the  power 
necessary  for  the  exercise  of  a  function  to  which  there  is general 
consent,  uses it to  exercise  another  function,  to  which  general 
consent  is  lacking. 
Political Institutions  as  Variables 
11.17.5.  The  development  of political institutions  and  their capacity  to 
meet  the  demands  on  them  is  determined  less  by  the  logic of  their 
own  internal  development  than  by  the  tasks  and  problems  which  are 
imposed  upon  them  from  the  socio-economic  and  cultural  spheres.  An 
internal  dynamic  of political  institutions about which  we  might  forecast 
thus  exists only  to  a  very  limited degree;  we  cannot  say much  ~bout the 
future  development  of political institutions  "as  a  separate  subject". 
Forecasting institutional  change  presupposes  a  knowledge  of  the  problems 
and  developments  in other spheres  of  the  social  system,  to  which  the 
political  system always  has  to  react:  that is,  to  f.ind  an  adequate  response. 3  II.l7. 
11.17.6.  Let  us  take  an  example.  If critical developments  occur  in an  area 
which  is of  prime  importance  for  the  existence or further  development  of 
a  society  - energy scarcity,  high  unemployment,  a  lack of  skilled 
workers  - it is  the  duty  of  the  politico-administrative  institutions 
to  cope  with  the  matter.  They  must adapt  themselves  to  fresh exigencies. 
This  process  can  lead  to  the  internal  re-organisation of a  political 
institution (administrative  reforms).  Sometimes  an  institution  which 
serves  a  particular purpose  begins  to  serve  a  different one.  Sometimes 
it is itself supplanted  as  the  chief servant of its own  purpose. 
Institutional change  is  determined  partly by  the  nature of  the  problem, 
and  partly by  the will  of  those  in charge  of  the  institution. 
Institutions are partly secondary  phenomena  which  relate  to  primary 
causes,  so  that  their inten1al  logic or  inherent  laws  are  of secondary 
importance  compared  with  those  of  the  economy,  or  population dynamics, 
and  partly instruments  for  the  exercise of power  which  can  be  guided 
and  manoeuvred  by  each  succeeding generation of persons  in charge  of 
them.  It is  obvious  that  the  task of  forecasting  as  it attaches  to 
each of  these  two  aspects  of political  institutions  is different. 
Political  Fo~ecasting 
II.17.7.  Political predictions have mostly been wrong.  Some  sociologists 
and  philosophers at  the  turn of  the  19th and  20th Centuries  predicted 
new  forms  of government  based  on  the  domination of scientists and 
technocrats.  This  was  the  spectre  of  the  technocratic state,  which 
is still with  us  today,  and still only  a  spectre.  Marxists  predicted 
the  breakdown  of capitalism and with it the  bourgeois  state.  They 
denied  that capitalism in  the  course  of its development could  become 
flexible  enough  to  resolve most of  the  contradictions which  were 
supposed  to  bring it down.  In Germany  many  liberal intellectuals 
and  politicians didn't  give Hitler a  chance;  conversely  those  who 
be 1 ieved  in him  were unable  to  foresee  his early ruin.  Authors  such 
as  George  Orwell  foresaw,  against  the  background  of  contemporary 
experience,  a  totally  technological  society in  the  hands  of  un-
scrupulous  power  fanatics;  but  this was  less  a  prediction  than  a 
device  to  warn  humanity against a  frightening political possibility. 
Orwell  did not  repeat Cassandra's mistake;  his warning  of  doom  was 
believed  and  has,  so  far,  been  accordingly falsified.  At  the  beginning 
of  the  1950's many  social scientists and  even more  politicians  in Europe 
were  convinced  that a  federal  Europe  could  be  created within a  few  years. 4  II.l7. 
II.l7.H.  The  Treaty of  Rome  was  signed  in  the  hope  that a  European political 
community  would  come  about  as  a  by-product of  economic  integration. 
General  expectations  and  forecasts  always  tend  to  be  based  upon  an 
evaluation of present conditions; 
and  interpretation of  the  future. 
they  influence  one's  own  assessment 
Such  forecasts  often tell us  more 
about  the  present and  its appraisal  than  about  the  probable  future. 
"Every  forecast  is  the  projection  into  the  future  of  a  certain under-
standing of present reality.  This  shapes  its structure,  direction 
and  results".(l) 
Different  forms  of Political Forecasting 
11.17.9.  We  must  distinguish between  forecasting  the  development  of 
political events  and  institutions,  which  is not very  fruitful,  and 
the  postulation or drafting of new  political institutions  as part of 
hypothetical alternative  futures~  the  problems  of which may  require 
new  or adapted institutions as  tools  for  their solution.  Political 
theory  and  practice  are  full  of  examples  of how  to  construct new 
political institutions;  whenever  we  have  to  reorganise  things,  or 
feel  the  need  for new  political  forms,  there  is no  lack of  such  designs. 
In  this very  report,  we  sketch  the  outline  of  an  institution  to  cope 
with  the  tasks  we  have  been  asked  to  report on,  and  we  take  into account 
the  reality of  the  present political  scene.  In what  follows,  we 
are  talking about  the  construction of new institutions at Community  level. 
The  corresponding activity at national  level,  where  the  ground  is  thick 
with  instruments  of entrenched  power  grown  up  over centuries,  would  be 
different. 
11.17.10.  If you  want  to  achieve  a  political goal,  such  as  a  united Europe, 
or  a  European  economic  and monetary  union,  you  must necessarily pre-
suppose  the  establishment of certain institutions.  Their  function 
would  be  to  achieve  the  chosen  goals  through  institutional mechanisms. 
Theoretically,  it is  rather easy  to  answer  the  basic questions  when 
setting up  institutions;  you always  need  a  body  to  elect,  appoint, 
or delegate members  to  an  institution;  every  institution that has  powers 
of  decision needs  a  controlling institution;  every new  institution 
needs  to  be  sensibly integrated  into  the  network  of existing ones,  and 
so  on.  In  theory,  therefore,  it is not difficult  to  design  institutional 
structures.  But practical  questions  remain:  how  do  we  achieve desirable 
(1)  Klaus  Scholder  :  Grenzen  der  Zukunft,  Stuttgart 1973,  page  71. 5  11.17. 
institutions  ?  Has  historical experience  been  taken  into account  ? 
Has  the  relationship between existing institutions been correctly gauged  ? 
It is not very useful  to  sketch  an  institutional model  of,  for  instance, 
a  federal  Europe,  if it is not accompanied  by  a  realistic assessment 
of  the  present political situation from  which  one  can  deduce  whether 
within a  foreseeable  period it is  in fact possible  to  reach  that goal. 
Political  forecasting  in  this  sense,  namely,  dreaming  up  institutions 
and  constitutions,  must  be  accompanied  by  a  practical analysis  of 
the  real  power  relations which  would either facilitate or hinder  their 
location.  Quantitative methods  are of only  limited use  in political 
and  institutional forecasting.  In  this  area  the  "simple methods" 
and  "intuitive methods" mentioned  in Chapter I.3.  above  are of most 
use.  They  can  be  supplemented  by analytical methods  such  as  rough 
cost-benefit analysis,  so  that one  can estimate  quantitatively some 
of  the  advantages  of  a  particular political strategy.  But  above all, 
it is  important  that  the  people working  in  this area should  understand 
the  functioning  of political  institutions. 
Tasks  of  ~urope  P~us Thirty 
II.l7.11.  There  are  a  few  political problems  which  could usefully be  dealt 
with  by  a  forecasting  institution such  as  Europe  Plus Thirty.  It 
could  be  among  the  tasks  of  Europe  Plus Thirty  to ask what  institutions 
and  practices would  best respond  to  problems  and  developments  as  they 
appear  in  the  social  and  economic  sphere.  Thinking about  the 
formulation  of political strategies  involves  the  following: 
a)  Examining  the  extent  to  which political institutions within 
the  European  Community  are  capable  of  responding appropriately 
to  any  given problem,  considering  the  powers  and  information 
available  to  them. 
b)  Asking whether new  institutional arrangements  should  be  made, 
and  what  changes  might  be  initiated,  to meet  a  particular 
situation better  than existing arrangements  can,  and  comparing 
various  alternative changes. 
c)  If it should  be  found,  or  urged,  that we  do  need  new  institutional 
provisions,  asking what pre-conditions would  enable existing centres 
of political decision-making  to  produce  or permit an  institutional 
solution  to  the  problem  in question. 6  II.l7. 
!!.17.12.  One  can well  imagine  the  development of scenarios  in  the  field of 
political institutions.  Their purpose  would  be  to  canvass  alternative 
institutional  designs  for  appropriateness,  and  for ability to  solve 
problems.  In most  cases,  one  can  think of alternative  institu.tlional 
possibilities,  whose  advantages  and  disadvantages  can  be  discerned  by 
testing  them  against specific questions.  An  examination of  the 
conditions  under which  such possibilities have  a  chance  of success  is 
just as  important as  thinking  them  up  in  the  first place.  When  Frederick 
ttl  the  Great had  read  "Perpetual Peace"  by  the  Abbe  Castel  de  Saint-Pierre,  he 
wrote  in  a  letter to  Voltaire:  "The  thing  is most practicable;  all  that 
is  lacking  for  its success  is  the  consent of Europe,  and  a  few  similar 
trifles".(l) 
II.l7.13.  Designing  institutional arrangements  always  implies  a  realistic 
assessment of  the  chan~e of  success.  This  means  that  those  who  will  be 
working  on  this  for  Europe  Plus  Thirty should have  not only  a  fertile 
imagination,  but also  a  good  background  in history and  a  wide  knowledge 
of current affairs. 
T.T~  can  imagine  the  following  areas  of work:-
1!.17.14.  A general  and  diffuse  task for Europe  Plus Thirty could  be  to  canvass 
different pictures  and  institutional  forms  for possible political 
alternatives.  This  is  a  matter of  tangible  Utopias  (Konkrete  Utopien  in 
the  sense  of Ernst Bloch)(2);  tangible,  in  that  they align  themselves  on, 
and  arise  from,.existing  reality.  Tangible  Utopias  belong  to  identifiable 
moments  in  the  chain of possibi:ity.  By  starting from  given  technological, 
economic  and  political possibilities,  one  could offer specific scenarios 
for  future  European policies  in certain areas.  If one  has  a  picture of 
a  possible  future,  or  the  possible  future  development  of a  sector,  one 
can  try  to  sketch what  institutional conditions would  be  necessary  to 
reach  it,  what  institutional  shape  such  a  trajectory would  imply,  and  thus 
what  institutional changes  and  innovations  would  be  necessary. 
!1.17.15.  A particular  task of  this nature  could concentrate  on  the  problems 
of human  rights  and  freedoms.  lf this aspect is neglected or left out 
there  is  the  real  danger of  looking at politics  and  institutions  in 
the  European  framework  as  being  somehow  independent  from  the  basic 
(1)  Quoted  from  F.H.  Hinsley:  Power  and  the  Pursuit of Peace, 
Cambridge,  1963,  p.45. 
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liberal  and  democratic  values  to  which  they  should 
be  committed.  In  the  terms  of  this  report,  one  might  say  that 
our most  compelling  scenario  should  be  a  forecast  of  the  future 
of  Europe  in which all members  are  bound  by  the  same  laws  to 
respect  in  an  equal  manner  the  rights  and  freedoms  of  their 
citizens;  a  Community  human  rights  policy.  Realising  that we 
are at present very  far  from  that desirable state,  and  that 
present disparities would  place  a  real  obstacle  in  the  way  of 
advance  towards  any  form  of political  union,  it would  be  a 
worthwhile  activity of  Europe  Plus Thirty  to  stimulate  research 
relevant  to  the  fundamental  aim  of  securing human  rights  and 
freedoms  equally  to  all  the  peoples  of  the  Community. 
The  question of  human  rights  and  freedoms  also has  a  strong 
bearing  on  possible  future  enlargements  of  the  Community,  and 
speculation about  the  way  they might  develop  in various  countries 
which might  desire  to  join  the  Community  would  be  a  useful 
concomitant  to  political debate. 
II.  17 
II.17.16.  It is  an  important  task  ~o consider alternative  institutional 
II.l7.L'. 
responses  to  emerging  problems.  Take,  for  example,  education 
or  transport.  If we  want  to  bring about  a  particular line of 
development  in  Europe,  we  look first for  emerging  trends.  Then 
we  examine  the  present political situation,  and  then  think how  the 
institutions which  we  have  could best produce  the  necessary policies. 
If we  think  they  could not,  then  we  think of more  appropriate 
institutional structures.  Sea-use  planning,  as  we  argued  in 
II.12  above,  is  a  field where  institutions are  almost entirely 
lacking,  are  required,  and  should  be  devised. 
r~'l;~c~;.:~c  Plus  Thirty will  come  into  being,  if it does,  at  the  time 
of  r•::  r<'n:-:t  p:-0found  political change  in  the  institutions of  the 
Co:n;;n:nity  Sl.IlCI~  they  carne  into  existence.  We  refer  to  the 
decision  of  the  European  Parliament at  long  last  to  apply  the 
Treaty  of  Ror:1e  a11d  proceed  to  direct elections,  by  national 
electoral  law  in  1978,  and  by  a  single  Community electoral  law 
a  few  years  iat~T.  The  institutional  upheavals  caused  by  this 
decision will  (unless  the  decision  is  overridden by~ 
rnajeure,and  probably  even  so)  create  a  demand  for  fertile  and 
informed  speculation about  the  forms  and  effects of new  arrange-
ments  within  the  Community.  So  will  the  moves  towards  Economic II.l7.lK. 
II.l7.19. 
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and  Monetary  Union  and  even  a  "European Government"  which  are  now 
being canvassed  in  the  Tindemans  Report  and  elsewhere.  If it is 
ready  in  t~nc,  Europe  Plus  Thirty could meet  a  large  share  of  that demand. 
The  "political" people  in Europe  Plus  Thirty should  be  mainly 
responsible  for  keeping all  the  other work  in  touch  with 
political reality.  They  must  keep  a  sharp  look-out for  any 
postulated  development,  which may  be  held  to  be  physically or 
economically possible,  but which  would entail a  political 
impossibility;  for  instance,  the  prolonged  acceptance  of 
subjugation  by  a  population able  to  fight,  or  the  infinite 
prolongation of  the  inability of  a  population  to  fight. 
(This  concerns  the  world  outside  the  Community). 
The  political forecasting of Europe  Plus Thirty should  in 
general  by  no  means  be  confined  to  the  Community  as  such. 
We  think it should  look,  as  it were,  downwards,  to  the  member 
states, outwards  to  other international organisations,  and 
upwards  to  the  United Nations.  It would  obviously not 
be  appropriate  for  Europe  Plus  Thirty  to  develop  scenarios 
for  the  internal oolitical development  of  single member  countries; 
that would  be  politically counter-productive.  But  it will  be 
impossible  for it to  develop  scenarios  for  the  Community  as  a 
whole  without making  some  assumptions  about  the  internal 
development  of  single countries,  and  those  assumptions  must 
be  both well-informed  and  explicit.  This will  perhaps  be  the 
most politically tricky area of  its work,  and will  require  tact 
and  skill.  It will  be  necessary,  indeed  it will  be  the 
main-stream of its work,  for  Europe  Plus  Thirty  to  produce 
scenarios  for  the  Community  as  such  and,  as  we  have  said earlier, 
we  think  these  should  range  over  a  spectrum  the  width of which  is 
determined  only  by  political possibility,  not by political 
aspirations.  For  instance,  we  are  sure  that besides  "a little 
more,  a  little less"  scenarios  about European  integration,  the 
spectrum  should  encompass  extreme  ones  too,  from  a  unitary  federal 
state within  thirty years  (which  one  cannot  say  is  impossible)  to 
the  total  disappearance  of  the  Community  as  a  political  and 
economic  entity,  and  a  reversion  to  the  unmitigated  singularity of 
nine  sovereign states, within  less  time  than  that  (which  one  cannot 
say  is  impossible either).  Economic  and  other forecasting will 11.17.20. 
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also  be  needed  about  the addition of new  member  countries,  and 
the  departure  of  existing ones;  the  choice of  scenarios here  is 
a  poli.tical  one.  Scenarios will be  needed  in the political 
field,  no  less  than  in the  economic,  for  relations with  the  rest 
of  the world.  The  forecasting  imagination must  range  freely 
over possible  developments  in the  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern 
Europe,  in China,  in the u.s.,  in the  structure  and  role of 
OECD,  of OPEC,  of  an  international  ocean  regime,  in the use  of 
terrorism as  such,  and  so  on  and  so  on. 
Most  important  of all,  though  no  doubt  not most  immediate,  it 
must  range  over possible  developments  in the United Nations. 
We  touched  on  this in our  General  Introduction,  and  we  think 
chat  no  part of  the work  of  Europe  Plus Thirty is likely to 
be more  useful  than its speculations  about  how  the  European 
Community  will fit into  a  shrinking world. 
tt goes  without  saying  that  Europe  Plus Thirty  should also 
review  and  assess its own  political use  and  efficiency. 
Recommendations. 
11.17.21.  It is important  that  Europe  Plus Thirty,  in this area more 
than  any  other,  should never urge particular policies  on  the  Community 
as  such  or  on  its member  states. 
11.17.22.  Competence  in the  field of political forecasting is not  so much 
a  matter of handling scientific forecasting  techniques  as  a  skilful  com-
bination of knowledge  about  the nature  and  functioning  of political 
institutions,  and  about  history  as  the  background  of all  development, 
linked with practical experience  and mature political  judgement.  The 
small  number  of "political forecasters"  should  include people with  a 
high  degree  of practical political experience; 
b  1.  .  .  1"  .  1  .  1"  (l)  een  po  1t1c1ans,  or po  1t1ca  JOUrna  1sts. 
they  should be  or have 
The  "political" team 
of  Europe  Plus Thirty  should contain  a  minimum  staff of  three people, 
since the  complex  subject matter requires  the  combination of different 
forms  of  expertise  and  experience.  Five would be better.  Brainstorm-
ing  seminars  are  especially  indicated in this  field. 
(1)  At  Annex  2  we  append  an  account  of  an  interaction session between 
some  European parliamentarians  and  the Mesarovic-Pestel world model. 
It was  on  the whole  encouraging,  and  suggests  that direct  communication 
between  decision makers  and  forecasting models  and modellers  should be 
pursued. PART  III 
TA.l. 
TA. 2. 
TECHNOLOGY  ASSESSMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
In Part  II  above  we  considered  the various  fields  in 
which  forecasting will  have  to  be  undertaken or assessed if 
Europe  Plus  Thirty is to  achieve  the  integrated forecasting 
described in Part I.  Together,  they  provide  answers  to  the 
greater part of  the  first  question in the  Resolution of the 
Council  of  Ministers which  instituted our study,  the  question 
about  forecasting.  Before  continuing to  provide the answer to 
the  last  part concerning  the creation of a  new  forecasting 
instrument,  we  now  turn to  the  second  question in that  Resolu-
tion,  concerning  technology  assessment.  We  do  so  because 
we  think that  technology assessment  and  forecasting,  especially 
technological,  industrial,  social,  and  environmental  forecasting, 
are  so  closely  related that  they cannot  be  considered as  separate 
subjects. 
In  the  present part of  our Report,  therefore,  we  shall  say 
what  we  mean  by  technology  assessment,  and where  and  how  it is 
done  now,  and  how  we  think it ought  to  be  done  for the  European 
Communities.  The  section of  this  Part which  deals with  ex.isting 
capacity for technological  assessment  is  supplemented  by  Annex  3, 
which  stands  in the  same  relation to that section as  Annex  1 
stands  to  Chapter 1.2.,  on  forecasting  capacity. 
In  Part  IV  we  draw  together the  threads  of  forecasting and 
technology  assessment  in a  series of organisational  proposals 
designed  to  secure  the  fulfilment  of both  functions  at Community 
level. 
III - 2  - III 
1.  The  social  assessment  of  technology 
TA.3.  Science  and  technology  have  contributed greatly  to  the  shaping 
TA.4. 
of  the  kind  of world  in which we  now  live  - for better and  for 
worse.  The  last  few  decades  have  seen  a  tremendous  expansion in 
industrial  research and  development  in all industrialised countries 
and,  despite  the  fact  that the main  justifications  for  providing 
the  resources  have  been  defence,  national  prestige and  economic 
growth,  the  expansion  period has  been  one  of  somewhat  unquestioning 
euphoria  for  science.  This  has  now  come  to  an  end  and  both  legislators 
and  the  public at  large are  questioning not  only  the  costs and benefits 
of  technology  but  the very objectives which  have  induced its expansion. 
It is clear there  now  exists a  tension between  the uses  of  technology 
and  the  aims  of  society. 
The  concept  of  technology  assessment  (TA)  arose as  part of our 
generation's attempt  to  resolve  this tension.  It is not  an entirely 
new  idea,  nor is it one  which  struggles  for want  of written definitions. 
A  dozen  or so,  some  vague,  some  incoherent,  some  naive,  most  far too 
long,  are available.  To  define  emerging  ideas briefly is not  easyw 
For  the  purpose  of this  report,  however,  we  adopt  the  following  defini-
tion: 
"Technology  assessment  is the advance  evaluation of potential 
and  unintended social,  environmental  and  other effects of 
the  application of existing or  foreseen  technologies." 
Ideally,  the assessment  of  a  technology  should anticipate and  evaluate 
the  impacts  of  a  new  technology  on all sectors of society.  So  far, 
however,  only  a  few  such  full-fledged  technology  assessments  have 
been  conducted.  Instead,  there is a  long history of partial assessments, 
generally  limited to  impacts  on  the  economy  and,  more  recently,  the 
environment. 
TA.5.  Technology  assessment  emphasises  the  secondary or tertiary 
effects  of  new  technology  rather than  the  primary  (intended)  effects, 
because: 
in the  long  run,  the  unintended and  indirect effects may 
be  the most  significant; - 3  -
undesirable  secondary  consequences arc  often  unn<.'ccssnry 
and  may  be  prevented  by  proper planning; 
first-order  impacts are  usually  subject  to  extensive 
study  in  the  planning stage.  In building  a  bridge, 
dredging  a  canal,  introducing  enzyme  detergents,  or 
electrifying a  railroad,  the  first order effects  -
those  intended  as  the  primary goal  of  the  effort -
are  generally explici.tly planned  for,  and  costed out 
in  the  initial plan. 
Technology  Assessment  fo~uses on  the  question  of what  else may 
happen  when  the  technology is introduced. 
Technology  and  Society 
TA...6.  Technology  has  both positive  and  negative  effects,  usually 
at  the  same  time  and  in virtue  of  each  other. 
The  tension between  technology and  society can  be  divided 
into  three  headin~~= 
i.  side  effects 
ii.  increasing complexity,  and 
iii.  need  for  public  concern. 
i.  The  unwantea  and  often unforeseen  side  effects of  technology  are 
clearly manifest;  some  of  these  are  direct,  such  as  the  obvious 
pollution and  general  environmental  deterioration,  and  a  loss  of work 
satisfaction  in repetitive  industrial manufacture.  Others  are 
more  subtle  and  indirect,  including  the  increasing  frustrations  and 
difficulties·  of  urban  life,  increase  in  crime  and_violence  and  a 
growing  sense  of  irrelevance  in contemporary education.  All  of  them 
are  too  easily attributed  to  technology  or  to  the  type  of world 
which  technology has  built. 
At  the  fundamental  level,  and  that is  the  level  of definitions, 
technology was  until  recently  seen  as  the  method  by which  man  can 
diminish  the  hazards  and  uncertainties  of his  struggle with nature 
(the  view of  the  Age  of Reason).  Largely successful  in  the 
industrialised world  in  removing  these  uncertainties,  technology now 
III TA.7. 
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appears  to  be  rivalling nature,  its  former  adversary,  in  the 
range  of ills it imposes  upon  man.  What  is more,  many  of  these 
effects are  insidious  and not  immediately apparent  in  the  short 
or  even  the  medium-term.  The  impact of  these  "extra effects" 
(extra  to  the  ends  motivating  the  economic  exploitation of 
innovation)  is,  in addition,  unevenly  distributed across  SJciety. 
Since  the  future  must  always  be  unkRown,  risks have  to  be 
incurred  in  innovation;  the  problem  is  to  "calculate"  them,  and 
as  far as  possible distribute  them  equitably.  We  require,  if 
possible,  to  foresee  these  effects  and  to  reduce  the  damage  they 
can  do. 
greater. 
If  they may  be  irreversible,  the  need  is  that much 
ii.  The  ramifications  into other areas  of  choice  which  are made 
in  one  area of  technological  decision,  are  increasing.  No  longer 
can  the  introduction of  a  particular product,  process or  technique 
be  assumed  to  affect,  in a  simple  manner,  only  the  initially felt 
need  for it. 
iii.  All  this calls  for more  public control  and participation. 
Technology  is not "out of control".  What  is  true  is  that political 
institutions have  been  slower  to  advance  than  technology,  since  a 
certain inertia hampers  institutional  innovation.  The  public  is 
in  the  dark,  and it is rather afraid.  More  people  probably now 
fear what more  technology might  do  to  them,  than want more  technology 
to  do  things  for  them.  One  result has  been  the  rise of  the  TA 
movement,  and  official moves  to  institutionalise it. 
The  gist of what  we  have  been  saying  so  far  could  perhaps 
be  expressed  in economist's  language  as  follows:  TA  is  concerned 
with  identifying external costs  in advance,  so  that  the  public  power 
can  take whatever measures  are  open  to it to  see  that  they are  re~ 
internalised,  in  the  form  of on-cost expenditure necessary  for  the 
avoidance  of harm,  and  thus  fall  on  the  direct beneficiaries 
(producers  and  consumers)  of  the  goods  or service produced,  and not 
on  society at large.  If  the  external costs are  of  a  kind  that cannot 
be  reinternalised,  the  question of outright prohibition of  the 
venture  arises. 
III TA.8. 
TA.9. 
TA.lO. 
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What  can  be  done? 
Different groups,(i)  technologists,  (~l)  officials and politicians, 
and  (iii) the  public,  have  different  responses.  Their unification, if it 
can be  achieved,  will  represent a  solution of  the  problem. 
The  "rational scientific" approach  is  the  socially concerned 
technologist's  recipe. 
TA,  from  this viewpoint,  can  be  seen  to  be  the  latest in  the 
succession of attempts  to  systematise,  for  the  public  good,  decision-
making  in government  and  industry.  These  attempts  often 
have  a  large measure  of mathematical  reasoning  behind  them. 
derive  from  the natural scientist's view of  the world. 
They 
The  development  line  through  operations  research,  PPBS,  and 
cost-benefit analysis,  has  now  resulted  in TA.  But  TA  is not a 
single method  drawn  from  either  the  natural or  the  social  sciences; 
it uses  the  full  armoury of methods  discussed  in I.3 above,  but  uses 
them  to  concentrate  on  particular and  circumscribed problems.  To 
this it adds  a  concentration on  the  search  for  linkages  between 
sectoral forecasts.  The  macro-level  composite  forecast may  miss  the 
specific and  unintended  changes  produced at the micro-level. 
In an  ideal world  a  comprehensive  forecast of something  or 
other might  be  expected  to  take all its  impacts  into account.  For 
some  time  to  come,  however,  the  seenarios  produced will  be  less 
than perfect.  If  they were  to  become  "perfect",  they would  be 
comprehensive  "systems  analyses"  in  the  widest possible  sense; 
this  as  opposed  to"muddling  through"  or "piecemeal  social engineering". 
It is certainly not  true,  however,  that  the  systems  view at  the 
present  time  offers anything other  than  a  hope  that a  truly comprehensive 
view of  change  can be  developed.  Systems  experts  claim  that by  the 
time  systems  are  finally well  understood it will not  be  necessary  to 
separate  too  strictly primary  and  secondary effects.  It seems  likely 
that political decision-making  bodies will  for  the  moment  want  to 
look  to  TA  as  an  instrument  for more  immediate  use. 
What  then,  does  the  politician or decision-maker get  from  the 
use  of  the  TA  concept,  faced  on Monday  morning,  with  the  need  to act 1 - 6  -
It has  been  said often  enough  that any  organisation,  and 
this  includes  governments,  exists  as  an  effective unit only within 
limits set by  its communications.  TA  can  be  usefully  seen  as  a 
method  of  increasing  the  information available  to political 
decision-makers,  in a  logical  sequence. 
For  the  transmitter of  information,  the  technology  assessor, 
the  message  is all;  for  the  receiver,  for  the  decision-maker, 
it is but  one  part of his  input.  To  illustrate this,  we  quote  and en-
dorse  some  words  from  a  T.A.  report made  under the  auspices  of  the u.s. 
National  Academy  of Sciences  on  a  proposal  to extend  New  York's 
Kennedy  Airport  into Jamaica Bay.(l) 
"The  members  of  t'he  study  group  are not decision-makers; 
they  serve  only  in an  a6visory  role.  The  decision as  to 
the  disposition of  the  Bay  is necessarily in  the  hands 
of others. 
Scientists alone  cannot make  the  choices  concerning 
alternative  solu~ions  to  problems  of  this kind,  which 
must  ultimately depend  on  competing values  and  the 
weight  governments  assign  them  in arriving at a  decision. 
Scientists can,  however,  isolate and  consider objectively 
the  issues  invGl'veci,  lay out and  evaluate  the  effects  on 
the  physical  and  h«man  ecology  that  may  be  expected  to 
follow particular actiGns,  and  suggest and  examine  the 
various  alternatives  and  their implications.  However  we 
recognise  that scientists are  not value-free and  that 
their concerns  and  predispositions will have  some  effect 
on  their conclusions  and  re.commendations.  But,  whatever 
decision  is ultimately arrived at,  it will  be  a  public  one 
made  by  people  whose  actions must  be  acceptable  to  their 
constituencies." 
III 
TA. 11.  Will  TA  reassuTe  the  public  because  of  its claim  to  disinterestedness 
and neutrality 1  There  appears  to  be  a  confusion which  arises  in 
...... 
connection with public discussion of  the  TA  process.  This  is  that 
it somehow  ensures  sueh  ''ne·utrality" or "objectivity".  The  above 
quotation  shows  we  make  no  such  claim  for  it.  Some  more  extreme 
views  of  the  sociology of  science would  go  so  far as  to  deny  the 
objectivity of  any  seiQntific knowledge.  The  principal difficulties 
lm  the  way  of public knowledge  about and  influence  on  technological 
policy  formation  are morernundane.  They  arise  in  two  areas at least: 
(1)  Steven Ebbin:  Jamaica Bay/Kennedy Airport - Anatomy  of a  technology 
assessment.  Technology Assessment Vol. I. no.  1 
pages  23  - 40. TA.l2. 
- 7  -
economic  competition,  which may  prevent disclosure  of essential 
information,  and  politieal  relevance.  Experience  has  shown 
that where  the  outcome  of  a  TA  may  have  considerable  influence 
on  the  decisions  of  interest groups  (management,  unions,  pressure 
groups  etc.)  these  may  with~raw  from  the  discussion of  the 
technical  details  because  of  the  uncertainty of  outcome.  The 
outcome  could  tie their hands  later. 
Open  government  cannot  function  by  completely exposing all 
information;  but all TA's  must  aim at the widest  possible 
sharing of it.  One  canaot  jud~e the merits  of  a  techno1ogy except 
in  the  context of  the  alternative  technological options.  present 
and  future.  The  investigation of alternative  technological  responses 
to  a  given need  should  be  included  in  the  TA  process.  A strong  link 
is clearly visible here  between  forecasting  and  TA.  Sectoral 
forecasts  and  overall  scenarios will  reveal  potential needs  and 
demands.  Scanning  of  technological  forecasts may  match  need with 
possibility.  The  use  0f  TA  to  make  a  choice  of  technolGgies  to 
meet.a social need,  existing or emerging,  can  be  coupled with  the 
more  usual  and  routine  use  of  TA  to  assess  the  benefits  and  costs 
of  a  given new  technology. 
TA.l3.  The  maxintisation of benefits  and  minimisation of costs  in 
any  given application of  technology must  be  the  aim,  but it is still 
a  distant one.  The  control of deleterious effects  is more  readily 
attainable and  is clearly acceptable  to  the  public at large.  The 
history of control  legislation is relatively  long.  It 5.s,  however, 
rarely possible  to maximise  benefits  and  minimise  costs at  the  same 
time.  An  assessment  procedure  or institution which  concentrates 
on  the minimisation of  risk will  perhaps  in  the  first  instance  be 
more  easily  designed·~and accepted  than  one  which  attempts  too  soon 
the  comprehensive  approach,  and  this)  we  think,  should apply  to 
Europe  Plus Thirty. 
TA.14.  The  unique  advantage  of  a  Community  instrument of  TA  in the 
future could be  just this  linking of the  regulatory  fuuction with the 
anticipatory  function,  through  the  forecasting  funct~on. 
III 8  III 
2.  Technology Assessment  as it is  done  at present 
TA. 15. 
Where  is it done  ?  What  is  done  ?  How  is it done  ? 
TA  in  the  Legislature  The  idea of Technology  Assess-
ment  emanated  in  the  second half of  the  1960's  fro~ the  USA,  and 
it is  there  that  the  theory,methodology and  practice  of  TA  is 
most  developed.  The  USA  is also  the  only country  in which  the 
efforts  to  create  a  specific TA  institution within  the  Legislature 
have  so  far  been  successful.  After  5  years  discussion  in Congress, 
the  President of  the  United  States was  able  to  sign  theTechnology Assess-
ment  Act  in Oct:ober 1972,  by whicii_  an Office of Technology Assessment  (OTA) 
was  set up  under Congress,  with  a  governing  council  - the  TA  Board  -
made  up  half of Senators  and half of Representatives.  Its aim  is 
"to provide early indications  of  the  probable  beneficial  and  adverse 
impacts  of  the  applications  of  technology  and  to  develop  other 
coordinate  information which  may  assist Congress"  (frA  Act,  Section 3c). 
In  the  mean time,  the  JTA  has  star  ted  its activities  and  let 
its first TA  contracts.  Teething  troubles  are  not yet,  as  we 
write,  all overcome.  The  budget  requested  for  1974-75 was 
5  million dollars,  mostly  for contract work. 
TA.l6.  In various  countries,  e.g.  Sweden,  the  Netherlands  and  Germany, 
there  have  been  - so  far unsuccessful  - initiatives  to  imitate  the 
American  example.  In the Federal  Republic  of  Germany  a  proposal  put 
forward,in April  1975,  by  the  CDU/CSU  oppositiDn faction was  r-ejected 
by  the  government  majority in  the  research and  technology  committee. 
TA.17. 
TA  in  the u.s.A. 
Even  after  the  establishment of  the  OTA,  most  governmental 
TA  in  the  US  remains  in  the  executive.  Many  government  agencies 
undertake  or  finance  TA  and  TA-like  activities;  for  instance, 
the  Department of Transportation,  the  Departmertt of Commerce  and 
its National  Bureau  of  Standards,  the  Department of Health,  Education 
and Welfare  and  the  Public Health  Service,  the  Bepartment of Agriculture, 
and  the  National  Science  Foundation.  The  number  of  groups  and 
institutes with  contracts  is  increasing  inside  and  outside  the 
government. - 9  -
TA.l8.  The  National  Science Foundation  (NSF)  funds  much  TA  under its 
programme  "Research Applied  to  National  Needs" (RANN).  At  the beginning 
of  1973  the  TA  programme  of  the  NSF  consisted of  28  completed or running 
projects;  by  January  1974  the Office of Exploratory Research  and  Problem 
Assessment  of  the  NSF  had  let 10  more  TA  studies at a  total cost of 
$2.1 million.  By  dispersing contracts  as  widely  as  possible  the  NSF 
hopes  to  discover the suitability of institutions  for  given project 
areas.  So  far,  university  groups  have  been preferred.  Universities 
got  more  than half the contracts  let by  the beginning of  1974;  the  rest 
went  to  commercial  or non-profit organisations.  But  the  NSF's  prefer-
ence  for universities is not  the  rule in the USA. 
TA. 19.  According  to  the National  Environment  Policy Act  of  1969  all 
III 
federal  agencies  have  to  include  Environmental  Impact  Statements  in their 
own  proposals,  and  report.  on  those bills and other federal  measures  from 
which  significant environmental  effects are  expected.  They  should contain, 
among  other things,  information  on  the  environmental  impact  of  proposed 
actions,  on  any  adverse  environmental  effects which cannot  be  avoided 
should  the  proposal  be  implemented,  and  on  possible alternatives  to  the 
proposed measures;  t'hey  can be  regarded as  partial  TA  analyses.  They 
are  reviewed  by  the Council  of Environmental  Quality  (CEQ)  which monitors 
controversial  actions  and identifies  problem areas; 
several  thousands  of Environmental  Impact  Statements  have  been  received 
by  the  CEQ.  After environment,  energy and  transport are  the next most 
important  subjects  for TA. 
TA.20.  In  the  course  programmes  of many  American universities,  TA  and 
related subjects are  coming  to  be  recognised.  For  example,  the  George 
Washington University  has  offered a  master's  degree  programme  in "science, 
technology, and  public  policy"  since  1970,  and more  recently a  special  one-
year course  on  TA. 
TA  in other countries  outside  the  European Community 
TA. 21.  In Japan,  TA  has  developed in the  executive.  This  is mainly  due  to 
the  striking envircnmental  deterioration which  followed  the  forced  pace  of 
industrialisation.  The  main organisations supporting these efforts are  the 
Science & Technology  Agency  (STA),  a  coordinating  group  under the  Prime 
Minister and  the Ministry of  T~de & Industry (MITI).  Since  1971,  STA  has 
had  a  rapidly increasing budget  for TA.  By  1973  studies had been under-
taken  among  others  on  the  following  subjects;  agricultural chemicals,  high 
rise buildings,  computer aided instruction,  technical  systems - 10  -
in  a  r~.ew  town,  syr.thetic  paper,  off-shore atomic  power  piar.ts  and 
eart!-lquake  a lar.r.  sys  te::1s.  The  studies  on  technical  systems  in  a  new 
town  ac~.d  on  off-shore  ato~.ic  po·wer  plaflts,  as  well  as  the  cori1.pilation 
of  a  TA manual,  were  CDr(uT.:i.ssio·~.-.. ed  fror.1  the  private Nomura  Research 
I·r~.stitute  of Tech.-,ology  ar.d  Econor.-,ics. 
TA. 22.  M~TI announced its industrial  and  technology  policy  for  the 
1970s  ia May  l971  and  recorrt.ii.cnded  tile  inclusion of  TA  as  an  instrument 
of  goverr~.a.ent  policy  to  guicie  and watch  over industrial technologies. 
Also  in  1971  MITI  (through its Agency  of Induatrial  Science  and 
Tecr.r~.ology  - AIST)  itself  s~a:cted  a  TA  study  programme,  '•·ii1ich  was  to 
?.Covide  basic  information  for  the  application of  TA  to  technological 
de·Jeloprnent  in industry.  It includes  atoridc  powered  steel making, 
trte  fuel  cell,  tecrLnology  for  traffic control,  automatic vending  systems, 
ar,d  ruicro-wave  ove1,s.  Like  the  STA,  MITI  uaes  not  only  an  iL-house 
capacity but  also  outside contractors  and  consultants. 
TA.23.  In  Sweden,  the  iGea  of  TA  is  largely  deterruined  by  national 
At  the  beginning  of  1973  the Secretariat 
for  Future  Studies  ("{,..lhich  we  have rr.entioned  in I.  2  above)  was  created 
provisionally.  In July  1973  the  Secretariat published  a  report  on 
nine  studies with  a  TA  character,  that had  been  worked  out  according 
to  a  reco·.:.:..i,er~.C:ation  of  titt~  Advisory  Group  on  Con.trol  &  Macageu.ent  of 
Tech.Ltol.ogy  oi  ti.e  Cora.·c,::..tl:.ee  ior  Scie·t"1tif:i..c  .:md  Technological  Policy  of 
the  OEC:J.  Four  of  the  ni~e studies were  e~viro~~ental.  Typically 
the  st~dies were  L~~ertaken with  the  cooperat~on of  several,  mostly 
governmental,  insti  tut:.m1.s. 
TA  inside the  Eurooean  Community 
TA. 24.  In  t:ne  Federal  Republic  of Gennany,  the  research  and 
teci'.mology  pol.icy  aut~1.o:cities,  e.g.  the Ministry  for  Research  and 
T~dH,ology (BuA-1C:esrt"l.inisteriu.m  fUr  Forschu.ng  u:t1d  Technologie  - B'M.FT) 
III 
have  for years  forr::.ulated  recmur~.end.:ttions  af1d  perfontLed  tasks  which bear great 
resemo::.U.ce tuTA,  even  though  tl-,e  words  the.::1selves  are  rarely used. 
Fo:c  it1s ta·c,ce  it ::..s  goveJ.."Tuaen;:  policy  trt.:tt  projects  wnicn  are  competing 
for  goverr  ..  I  .. eflt  rr.o·..-.ey  sr.ould also be  compared  v.'~th  respect:  to  their 
prob~ble effects  on  society and  that  projects which  could profoundly 
cf.~nge  tr.~e  ectvi :co;,:u.ent  o:c  living  cor,di tions  should  be  exa.:r,ined and 
cor.t~nt..ously  asses.::;e.d  L:'o:.~ct'f  .. e  V·ie~;v-po::.:.:rt.·· of .soc:.:.al-. scier1ce 
if  r  ..  ~cessary  ,  be  suspe  .  .-,ded.  The  efforts of  t~:1e - 11  - III 
Opposition  to  create  a  parliamentary  TA  institution are not  supported 
by  the  Govern.'1lent.  But  the  BMFT  has  offered to  submit  its TA  studies 
to  the  Bundestag,  an~ also,  before  con~racting studies  out,  to give 
the  Bundestag  the  opportunity  of  expanding  the  subject  ~atter. 
TA. 25.  Certain  systems  studies  on  the  d.evelop'1lent  and  use  cf nuclear 
energy  can  be  seen  as  preliminaries  to  TA  activities.  These  were  en-
couraged  in the middle  of the  '60s  by  the Ministry,  then  called 
Education & Science.  They  were  car~ied out mainly  in  the nuclear 
research  centres  at Karlsruhe  and Jtllich.  These  studies  are  today 
being  continued within  the  programme  of  "Applied  Systems  Analysis''  of 
the Arbeitsgemeinschaft  der  Grossforschungszentren  (AGF).  They  c~­
prise  four  projects;  1.  Man  - energy  - environme11t;  2.  resource 
exploitation  and  resource safeguards;  3.  coiJlT'Ilunications  and  society; 
4.  transport  - the  economy  - living space. 
TA.26.  Transport  and  cornm1Jnications  have  also been  star~ing points 
for  TA  and  TA-type  activities  in Germany.  Among  the most  important 
research  and  development  institutions  in this  sphere  are  those  of 
certain major  industrial  firms  which maintain  a  large  systems  analysis 
capability.  Some  of  these  are increasingly  involved in the  develop-
ment  of  new  systems  for  city  and  intercity transport,  and  are under-
taking  studies which  are not  only  limited to  technical  and  econ0'1lic 
aspects,  although  the profit motive is still in the  foreground. 
TA.27.  In  the non-profit  sector the  Institut  fUr Systemtechnik  und 
Innovationsforschung  (ISI)  of  the Frauenhofer-Gesellschaft  for  the 
Promotion  of Applied Research  in Karlsruhe,  the  Studiengruppe  fUr 
Systernforschung  e.V.  (SfS)  in Heidelberg  and  the Battelle Institute 
e.v.  in Frankfurt  deserve mention.  The  lSI  is  doing  a  TA  of  a 
planned  refinery extension  in North  Baden.  The  SfS  has  prepared  a 
report,  commissioned  by  the  German  Bundestag,  on  problems  and methods 
of TA  and  on  possibilities of  institutionalising TA  in the  Bundestag. 
TA. 28.  In France,  in  connection with "Planification''  there has  been, 
for  quite  a  while,  intensive  government  activity in evaluating projects 
and  their  consequences.  Emphasis  has  been  upon  environmental 
protection  and  land-use.  As  far  as  environmental  protection is 
concerned  one  can mention,  for  instance,  the  Reports  of  the  Agences TA.29. 
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Financieres  de  Bassin,  which wer set  up  to  look after the  six great 
hydrographic  areas  of France;  we  can  regard  these  as  technology 
assessments  for water  supply  policies.  As  to  TA  in the stricter sense, 
it is dealt with  by  the working  group  "Evolution  des  Techniques  et 
Techniques  nouvelles  a  regard  de  l'Environnement"  (Group  D)  of  the 
Inter-Ministerial  Project  Group  for Environment  Problems,  founded  in 
1972  (Groupe  Interministeriel  d'Evaluation  de  l'Environnement).  In 
1973 it took  stock of  TA  activities in several  countries.  Among 
other things it found  out that,  out  of  the  490  French studies  reviewed 
(of which  only  a  very modest  number were "real"  TA  studies)  pollution 
was  the  topic in  18.4%,  followed  b~;  transport and  town  planning,  each 
with around  13%. 
TA  and TA-like activities  in  land-use  planning  (amenagement 
du  territoire)  are mainly  concentrated in the  Delegation  a  1 1Arnenage-
ment  du  Territoire et a  !'Action Regionale  (DATAR).  In  1968  DATAR 
founded  the  long-term project  "SESAME"  (Systeme  d 1Etude  pour 
!'Elaboration du  Schema  d 1Amenagernent  de  la France),  which was  to 
prepare  an  overall master  plan of  French  land-use  policy,  and  to which 
is attached a  sub-group  on  technological  forecasting.  This  techno-
logical  forecasting  group was  charged with  the  three-fold task:  to 
identify technological  innovation that could be  important  for 
"Amenagement  du Territoire,  to  study criteria to  judge  technological 
innovations  from  the angle  of  land-use,  and  lastly to make  detailed 
studies  on  some  specific innovations.  The  Centre  d'Etudes  et de 
Recherches  sur  l'Amenagement  Urbain  (CERAU),  the  Bureau  d'Informations 
et  de  Previsions  Economiques  (BIPE)  and  the  Bureau Central  d'Etudes 
pour  les  Equipements  d'Outre-Mer  (BCEOM)  have all made  contributions 
on  these  topics.  Particularly  remarkable  are  the  technical  papers 
(Fiches  Techniques)  drawn  up  by  the  BCEOM.  These  include  systematic 
evaluations  of  the  consequences  of  new  transport  and  communication 
systems  on  land and water,  and  of  new water supply  technologies. 
TA.30.  In Great Britain,  there is  a  TA  capacity in the  executive  -
the  Programmes  Analysis Unit  (PAU).  PAU,  which  has  existed since 
1967,  is  financed  jointly by  the  Department  of  Industry  and  the - 13  -
Atomic  Energy Authority.  It has  a  staff of  around  30  scientists and 
had  undertaken  by  the  end  of  1970  about  80  studies;  they  are 
generally confidential.  Some  Public Inquiries  can  be  termed British 
TAs  ~  generis;  these  have  been held since  the middle  of  the  1960's 
on  the initiative of  the  responsible ministries,  and  deal  with  techno-
logical  failures  (ex  post TA)  or,  more  often,  proposals  (ex ante TA). 
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Best  known  is the  Public Inquiry  on  the siting of  the  third London Airport. 
Its  recommendation was  not  accepted,  and  no  third London airport is now 
to  be  built in any  case. 
TA.31.  In  the  government  sector the  following institutions,  whose 
activities partly fall within TA  or at least  touch  upon it, are worthy 
of mention:  the Select Committee  on  Science  and Technology  of  the 
- the Select Committee  on  Science  and Technology  of the  House  of 
Commons:  This  Committee  formulates  opinions  on  current 
science  and  technology  policy.  In its work it frequently 
takes  outside advice. 
- the Central  Policy  Review  Staff  (CPRS)  under  the Cabinet, 
whose  tasks  embrace  the  study of central  political issues 
such as  the  energy  supply,  regional  policy etc.  Its  reports 
are  published. 
- the  National  Research  Development  Corporation  (NRDC),  a 
public institution  founded  in  1948,  which  deals with  the 
transfer of  research  results  of tpe  public sector to  the 
industrial  sector.  According  to its own  estimation, it is 
continually concerned with TA. 
TA.32.  Within  the  university sector,  the  Science  Policy  Research Unit 
(SPRU)  of  the University  of Sussex  and  the Technology Assessment 
Consumerism Centre  (TACC)  of  the University of Manchester  deserve mention. 
TACC  had  undertaken  a  TA  of  the British bread industry and  plans  further 
studies;  among  the  subject matters  are:  insect pest control  technology, 
recycling,  carcinogens  in the  factory  environment,  dietary fats,  and 
coronary heart  disease. TA.33. 
TA.34. 
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There  is not  much  infor-mation  on  the  - certainly  few  - TA 
studies  and  TA  capacities  in the  other European  Con~unity countries. 
The  TA  activities of  large  industrial  corporations  like Montedison  in 
Italy and  Novo  Industri  in Denmark  have  become  well  known.  Montedison 
has  a  special  department  of  technology  assessment which,  in  info~al 
cooperation with national  and  international  organisations  and working 
groups,  is concerned with  TA  activities in the  areas  of materials 
substitution,  non-conventional  protein sources,  resources  of  the  sea, 
and  chemicals  and health.  Novo  Industri has  set up  an  analysis  group, 
which  is undertaking TA  activities  in the  development  of  enzyme  products 
systems  and  processes.  In the  Netherlands it ~s  expected that TNO 
(Centrale Organisatie voor Toegepast  Na~uurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek) 
will  shortly have  funds  for  TA  analyses,  especially for off-shore 
developments. 
TA  approaches  and methods  in use 
From  the  methodological  viewpoint  two  levels  have  to  be  dis-
tinguished: 
The  work  plans  for  TA  itself.  They  divide  up  problems  into 
their parts,  and  suggest  a  certain temporal  sequence  (with 
iterations)  for  the  solution of  these  component  problems. 
TA.35.  Among  the best  known  TA  work  plans is that  developed  by  the 
American  MITRE  Corporation.(!)  It goes  as  follows: 
(1) 
The  MITRE  Corporation,  A  Technology Assessment  Methodology, 
project  summary  and  6  vols.,  Washington,  D.C.,  1971. STEP  1 
STEP  2 
STEP  3 
STEP  4 
STEP  5 
STEP  6 
STEP  7 
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SEVEN  MAJOR  STEPS  IN  MAKING  A TECHNOLOGY  ASSESSMENT 
DEFINE  THE  ASSESSMENT  'TASK 
Discuss  relevant  issues  and  any major  p~oblems 
Establish  scope  (breadth  and  depth)  of  inquiry 
Develop  project  ground  rules 
DESCRIBE  RELEV~~T TECHNOLOGIES 
Describe  major  technology being assessed 
Describe  ot~er technologies  supporting  the 
major  technology 
Describe  technologies  competitive  to  the major  and 
supporting  technologies 
DEVELOP  STATE-OF-SOCIETY  ASSUMPTIONS 
Identify  and  describe major  nontechnological  factors 
influ~ncing the  application of  the  relevant 
technologies 
IDENTIFY  IMPACT  AREAS 
Ascertain  those  societal characteristics  that will 
be  most  influenced  by  the  application of  the 
assessed  technology 
MAKE  PRELIMINARY  IMPACT  ANALYSIS 
Trace  and  integrate  the  process  by  which  the 
assessed  technology makes  its societal  influence  felt 
IDENTIFY  POSSIBLE  ACTION  OPTIONS 
Develop  and  analyze  various  programmes  for obtaining 
maximum  public  advantage  from  the  assessed 
technologies 
COMPLETE  IMPACT  ANALYSIS 
Analyze  the  degree  to  which  each  action option would 
alter  the  specific  societal  impacts  of  the  assessed 
technology  discussed  in  Step  5 
Some  of  these  steps  are  further  sub-divided  and  have  been 
supplemented  by  "checklists". 
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TA.36.  Techniques  should  clearly be built  into  TA  only according  to  their 
appropriateness.  In  the  TAs  which  have  been carried out  so  far  (since 
the  end  of  the  1960's)  a  whole  series of  methods  have  been  used,  for 
instance: 
TA.37. 
Cost  benefit analysis 
(Computer)  simulation 
Trend  projection 
Operational  research 
Group  consensus  procedures,  including Delphi 
Behavioural  experiments  and  observations 
Historical analogy 
Cross-impact analysis 
Morphology 
Scenario writing 
Relevance  tree  procedures,  and  analytic methods  of  evaluation 
based  on  the  relevance  tree 
Participation techniques;  for  in~tance,  procedures working 
with  the aid of  television and  computers. 
All  these  ar~ well  known  in the  social and  economic  sciences,  and 
are used  in  policy  planning;  they were  not  developed  for  TA,  and  it is 
unlikely  that  a  scandard  tool-kit will  ever  emerge. 
Most  of  these methods  have  already  been described  in Part 1.3. 
J.  TA  in Europe  Plus  Thirty 
TA.38. 
A.  International  Assess1nent 
The  impacts  of  technology often cross national borders. 
Thet.tn<:Et:Standi..ng  that one  nation's  technology may  affect another, 
and  that liabilities  flow  therefrom,  goes  back at least to  1941 
and  the  US-Canadian  case  of the  Trail Smelter,  where  gaseous 
effluent  from  Canada  caused  damage  to u.s.  fruit  trees.  The 
Canadians  were  held  legally responsible.  The  damming  or 
pollution of  international  rivers,  pollution of  the  seas,  cloud 
seeding  and weather modification in general;  all  these  exemplify TA.39. 
TA.40. 
TA.41. 
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international  effects.  Satellites and  supersonic  transport are 
vigorously  objected  to  for  different  reasons  by  neighbours  who  did 
not  ntake  them  and,  as  to agricultural  innovac.ion,  it has  already 
been  suggested  that  trade  patterns  are  being distorted by  the 
"green  revolution". 
the  exploitation of  resources  for  energy,  the  exploitation 
of  the  ocean  and  the  ocean  floor  (II.l2.),and of  the air and  space 
itself, are clearly enterprises where  the  indirect effects have  to 
be  examined  internationally. 
The  question of whether  the  European  Comrrtunity  as  a  whole 
should abstain  from,  or  regulate,  certain technological  developllients, 
will  require  consideration of the  secondary  effects  as  atteillpted  in 
TA  studies.  It is  a  subject  of  intense  scientific debate  now  whether 
the  increase  of the co2  content  of the  atmosphere will  alter the  bio-
sphere's  temperature.  (See  II.2.)  National  decisions  on  energy 
production may  be  affected  by  the  outcoille  of  these  studies. 
The  Function of TA  in Aiding  Coaununity  Decisions 
What  should be  the  function  of  Corruttunity  TA  in relation to 
nacional  TA,  and  to  the activities  of  the  other international 
organisations  in this  field?  If there  a  risk of  duplicating  the 
activities of national  systems  on  the  one  hand,  and  those  of world 
agencies  on  the  other? 
The  role  of  TA  in Europe  Plus Thirty  should be  creative,  as 
well  as  responsive,  but  it can  only  be  so  to  the  extent  that its 
work  is tied in with  the  decision-111aking  process  of  the  Communities. 
One  of  the most  important  purposes  of  the  social  assessment 
of  technology is to  examine  a  much  wider  range  of  options  than 
is usually  the  case  in the narrowly  defined  functional  framewerk 
of  present  national  and  Couuuunity  mechanisuts. 
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TA.42.  DevP.loping  such  a  function  at  Corrnnunity  level would  have 
several  advantages.  Thr most  obvious,  as  we  have  seen  above,  derives 
fro~ the  fact  that Many  technologies  are  simply  too  international  in 
impact  to  evaluate  only  from  the national  standpoint.  Another  is that 
since wemoer  countries  have  their present primary  commitment  to greater 
econoTUic  coope:r1.tion,  they might  benefit  froTil  the  use  of this 
cooperative  tool  to  produce  a  rnor.e  truly balanced social  development 
of  the  Conrnuni ty  as  a  TNhole.  And  a  third is that  there is  economy 
of  scale  and  avoic.ance  of  duplication in  doing  the work  once,  at 
CotTITllunity  level,  and  not  several  times  over,  at national  level. 
There  is no  danger  of  duplicating  the activities  of world-
III 
wide  organisations,  since  they  do  not  exist yet. 
in others,  liaison should  be maintained with  OECD. 
But~  in this matter  as 
The  Aims  of  the Treaty  of  Rome  and  TA 
TA.43.  The  question must  now  be  asked what  TA  Europe  Plus Thirty 
could  and  should  do. 
The  goals  of  the  Cormnunity  must  be  the  starting point.  For 
example,  the  Connnunity  aims  to  develop  its  OTNn  poor regions. 
Technological  initiatives in particular sectors might  adversely  affect 
the  balance  between  regions,  and  that  should be  avoided.  It is par-
ti.cularly  in this  context  that  we  have  examined  the  role  of  the 
European  Investment  Bank.  It is  described  by  Article  129  and  130  of 
the Treaty  of  Rome.  Article  130  reads: 
"The  task of the  European  Investment  Bank  shall be  to 
contribute,  by  having  recourse  to  the capital market 
and utilising its  O'W'n  resources,to  the balanced and 
steady  development  of  the  common  market  in  the  interest 
of  the  Community.  For this purpose  the  Bank  shall, 
operating on·a  non-profit-making basis,  grant  loans 
and  give guarantees  which  facilitate  the  financing  of 
the  following  projects  in all  sectors  of  the  economy: 
a)  projects  for  developing  less  developed  regions; TA.44. 
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b)  projects  for ffiodernising  or  co~verting undertakings 
or for  developing  fresh activities called  for  by 
the  progressive  establish1uent of  the  common  market 
where  these  projects  are  of  such a·size or nature 
that  they  cannot be  entirely financed  by  the  various 
means  available  in  the  individual  Me~ber States; 
c)  projects  of  common  inte·cest  to  several Me<tlber  States 
which  are  of  such  a  size or  r~ature  that  tt.ey  can.not 
&e  entirely financed  by  the  various  means  available 
in  the  individual Member  States." 
To  evaluate  applications  for  loans,  the majority of which 
in  the  technological  areas  are  for  "infrastructure" - transport, 
power  distribution,  civil works  etc.,  - the  Bank  has  an  internal 
staff including  seven engineers  with  support staff,  as  well  as 
bankers  and  economists.  The  project evall.Jations,  in nu:ilber 
perhaps  eighty major  and  some  two  hu.t:tdred  minor  ones  per annum 
for  a  total  loan value  of around  1000  ffiillion  UAs,  are  in many 
cases minor  or partial TAs.  They  rr1ay  be  perforr11ed  to  a  greater 
or lesser degree  by  the  Bank  or  by  the  applicant,  and  the  amount 
of  assessment  done  by  the  Bank  itself will also vary depending 
on  whether  a  merr.ber  nation or an  associated country is  irLVolved. 
A wide  range  of activities  is  supported,  from  rubber  plantation 
in  the  Ivory Coast  to  the  prodLtction of synthetic  rubber  in 
Turkey,  hotel building  in Gabon  to  large-scale  support of  e~ectrical 
production  and  transmission,  and  transport and  infrastructl.Jre  in 
general,within  the  Nine  themselves.  Not many  of  the~ are  in  the 
advanced  technology  sphere;  perhaps  the  most  advanced  was  a 
synthetic protein plant  in  Sardinia>  but even  that -w·as  tt,e  seco.L~d 
of its kind. 
TA.45.  As  with  the  World  Bank,  fhe  impacts  rr~ost often considered  in 
the  assessment  process  (other  than  t~e economic)  are  envirolli~ental. 
Irnproveri.ent  of  the  physical  en.viror  .... -t".ent  is  di-r-ectly  supported,  for 
example,  in depollution p-cojects  for  the  m·  .. irle.  Assessfuent  often 
takes  the  tonn of  corrn-ct~nt and  answer,  techr  .. ical rr1odifica ti01·1s  tr4en 
being agreed.  In contrast  to  the  World  Bartk,  however,  the 
assessriLen t  staff does  not  include  sociologists,  or  techno log is ts 
other  than engineers. 
TA.46.  The  evaluation  pro~ess may  take  as  much  as  18  months  to  2 
years  to  complete  for  a  ffiajor  proposal,  but on  average  2-6  ~onths 
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suffices.  One  engineer  and  one  assistant are  assigned  to  each 
project.  The  assessment probably  always  stops  short of  a  full 
'technology  assessment,  but it contains  an  element of  continuous 
monitoring.  During  the  loan  pay-back period  the  engineer  is 
involved  in  the  continuing evaluation. 
because  of  unacceptable  impacts. 
Projects may  be  rejected 
TA.47.  The  search  for alternative  technological  solutions  to 
particular problems  is not  a  function  of  the  Bank,  nor  is  research 
and  development  funded  on  any major  scale.  The  period of first 
application of  advanced  technologies  is  the  stage where  Bank  support 
will  be  most  frequently  sought.  Of  late,  energy  saving has  become 
a  more  important  element  in project evaluation.  This  responsiveness 
to  policy changes  within  the  EC  suggests  that,  with  a  wider  concern 
for all aspects  of  the  impact of  technical  change,  there will  come  a 
greater need  for  fully  comprehensive  TAs  within or  for  the  benefit 
of  the  Bank. 
TA.48.  Accordingly we  recommend  that Europe  Plus Thirty be  able  to 
offer a  TA  service  to  the  European  Investment Bank.  It could  be 
offered either direct  to  the  Bank,  especially in areas  where  there 
is no  Commission  policy,  or it could  be  offered  to  the  Commission, 
which  has  to  approve  all EIB  projects  over  2m  UAs,  including credit 
lines  to  intermediate  institutions  for  the  financing  of  smaller 
projects  down  line. 
TA.49.  Another  Community  institution which  could  possibly make  use 
of  TA  is  the  European Court of Justice. 
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If  the  Court  becomes  more  involved  in  industrial  and  commercial 
litigation with  a  high  technological  content,  it is  conceivable  that cases 
might arise where  the  issues  of fact  to  be  determined  could  involve  a 
consideration of  the  long-term effects of  a  particular application of 
technology.  In such  cases  the  parties,  or failing  them  the  Court, 
might  seek an_.expert  report  from  or  through  Europe  Plus Thirty. - 21  -
TA.50.  We  now  give  a  list of  some  of  the  other Community  aims  and 
powers  which  might  be  furthered  by  the  comparative  examination of 
technological  initiatives and  their  indirect effects.  The 
Directorates  of  the  Commission  have  expertise  and  supporting  data 
in  fairly narrowly defined  areas,  and  are  inevitably concerned with 
nearer  rather  than  further horizons •  They  often  lack  the  means, 
more  than  the will,  to  perform broadly based "horizontal"  technological 
assessments.  There  are  indeed  places within  the  Commission where 
parts of  the  assessment  process  have  been  fairly well  developed,  but 
a  focus  would  certainly help. 
TA.51.  Harmonisation of national  regulations  is pursued  for  the  promotion 
of  trade,  but  the  function might also  be  interpreted as  covering  the 
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incidental  disbenefits  of  industry and  trade.  In  the  context of  the  full 
social assessment of  technology,  both aspects  are  relevant.  Community 
haunonisation of  the axle  loading of  lorries and of  the  level  of 
noxious  exhaust  emissions,  has,  after considerable  public  discussion, 
been  proposed  by  the  Commission  and is awaiting approval  by  the 
Council.  Both  these could with advantage  have  been  the  object of 
advance  TA. 
TA. 52.  The  increasing public  and political demand  for  environmental 
protection in recent years  has  given  rise  to national  regulations  which 
risk,  unless  they are  "harmonised"  out of it, distorting  trade  by  the 
imposition of higher burdens  on  industry  in some  countries  than  in 
others.  The  main  purpose  of  the  Common  Market  being  to  avoid  such 
distortions  of  trade,  it is clear  the  Commission will need  increasing 
research and  analysis  in fulfilling its harmonisation  function.  This 
research and  analysis will  be,  in effect,  TA.  Article  92  of  the Treaty 
of  Rome  is  no  doubt  the  main provision governing  this  case,  but  Article 
36  also bears  on it.  This  allows  exceptions  to  be  made  to  the  aim of 
promoting  reduction of quantitative restrictions  on  trade  flow  (as  set 
out  in Articles  30  to  34). 
Article  36  states: 
"The  provisions  of Articles 30  to  34  shall not preclude 
prohibitions or restrictions  on  imports,  exports  or  goods 
in transit justified on  grounds  of public morality,  public 
policy and  public  security;  the  protection of health and 
life of humans,  animals  or plants;  the  protection of TA.53. 
TA.54. 
TA.55 
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natioLal  treasures  possessing artistic,  historic or 
archaeological  value;  or  the  protection of  industrial 
and  comnercial  property.  Such  prohibitions  or 
restrictions  shall  not,  however,  constitute  a  means  of 
arbitrary discrimination or  a  disguised  restriction on 
trade  between Member  States." 
In  deciding  whet~er a  claim by  a  member  country  that  a  certain 
prohibit:::..on  or restriction is  or  is not pennitted  under  this 
article,  the  Con~ission is  already  in fact  undertaking  some  sort 
of  rudimentary  TA.  The  systematisation and  development  of  the 
necessary  artalysis  could  be  useful. 
Artic:::..e  L .. 8  on  social  cooperation is another where 
i~pleffientatioa  co~ld be  assisted by  TA.  In  this  field,  since 
it largely  co~cerns working  conditions,  Europe  Plus  Thirty should 
work  closely with  tte proposed  Foundation  for  the  Improvement of 
L~vinz and  Working Conditions. 
B.  TA  and  Fo~ecasting 
Refere~ce has  been made  above  to  tte advantages  of  coupling 
forecasting  a~d  assess~ent within  the  sa~e institution.  Here  we 
expand  t~e  idea,  as  the  linkage will  be  vital  in obtaining  the 
ntaximum  utility of  the  Europe  Plus  Thirty instrument  for  decision-
mai<ers. 
Tech~ology Assessments  should  be  carried out by  the Director 
ar1d  staff of Europe  Plt~s  T·nirty.  They  will  be  producing  forecasts 
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in  sectors  &uch  as  economics,  education,  health,  etc.  and  in  technology 
itsei..f.  Meai~whi::..e,  new  techr1ologies will  be  en.erging,  e.g.  computer 
aicled  ir  ... s true tion,  cable  teievis ion,  phanr.aceu ticals,  health deli  very 
systems.  It would  be  the  tasK  of  the  assessors  to  derive  from  the 
forecasts,  ~he  technological  trends,  afrd  from  pol1cy considerations, 
comparisons  and  conclusions  which  can  be  useful  for  policy.  A 
possi..b::..e  ex~mple can  be  used tere;  that is,  the  already  iorecast 
possib~:!..ity of  producin6  chea~ and  acceptable  synthetic p·rotein. 
If it hap~ened, it wou::..d  alter farming,  transport,  and  world 
popul..a tion  through  Ln~roved nutrition.  Such  impacts  on  agriculture 
ar1d  possib::..y  J?Ot>ulati..on  distribution would  have  consequeat  impacts 
a~d  i~p~icatin~ for  agricu!tural  (aLd  education,  regional  and  transport) 
polic~es,  both  in ffiecber  and  in associated countries. TA.56. 
TA  57. 
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This  example  is apt as  illustrating at  least two  Collununity-
relevant  'fA  characteristics  - iutplication in several  areas  of 
EC  policy-lllaking,  and  the  relatively  long  titue  span  over which  the 
effe(..ts  might  develop. 
In  the initial stages,  until  assessment  becomes  more  accepted 
and widely  used,  fA  can  be  based to  a  considerable  extent  on  a 
careful  and  chorough  documentation  and  evaluation  (as  to  relevancy, 
authenticity,  acceptability,  and  the  like)  of  daLa  presently 
available.  The  intent would  be  not  only  to  supply  a  greater amount 
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of  information to  policy-makers,  but also  to  iutprove  the  quality, 
pertinence  and  completeness  of what  they  get.  In many  cases,  a 
painstaking analysis  of  existing information  sources would  be  adequate 
for spelling out  incipient  dangers  and  drawbacks  posed  by  emerging 
technological  developments.  But it is also clear that if technology 
assessment  is to  probe  the  future  in order to  fulfil many  of the wider 
objectives  - if it is  to act not  just as  a  screening  device  for 
eliminating potential  hazards,  but also  as  an early warning  system and 
as  a  means  for systematically evaluating  secondary  and  indirect con-
sequences  and allocating  limited technological  resources  with  minimum 
waste  - then  the act  of assessment  demands  tuore  than  just a  documenta-
tion of  existing information  dealing  only with present  technology. 
Here  we  come  back  to  the  starting point  of  this section.  Study 
will  be  required,  too,  of where  emerging  technological  developments 
are  likely to  lead,  and  of their possible  impact  on  other areas  of 
technology,  as  well  as  on  society as  a  whole,  and  its environment. 
Hence  the  forecasting of  technology is essential,  both  to  uncover 
otherwise  unexpected  or unforeseen  problems  and  to  disclose un-
appreciated or unexpected opportunities,  options,  and alternatives. 
This  is especially true because  assessment,  if it is to  be  effective, 
should be  triggered as  early as  possible,  before  a  new  technology 
has  become  well  entrenched or has  developed  a  momentum  of its own. TA.59. 
TA.60 
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Who  and  What 
Arguments  have  been  advanced  for  the necessity of an  assessment 
function within Europe  Plus Thirty,  and  Conununity  institutions, 
powers,  and  functions  that  :an benefit  from its use  have  been mentioned. 
We  now  turn  to  the  question  how  to  choose what  TA  to  do. 
Appropriate  parties  to  reque~t TA  studies would  include  the 
Conuni ssion and  the  European  Parliament,  and  we  have  also mentioned 
the Court  of Justice and  the  European  Investment  Bank.  A choice 
would  then  have  to  be  made  among  the  candidates  proposed,  according 
to  some  criteria. 
The  successful  completion  and  the  reception of a  TA  will  be 
influenced by  both extrinsic  (why  does  this  need assessing?)  and 
intrinsic  (why  us?)  considerations.  It is apparent  that  since 
these  factors  are  themselves  the  subject of policy decisions,  there 
must  be  flexibility in setting up  criteria.  For  example,  initial 
investigation of a  problem may  reveal  the absence or the abundance 
of  information,  and  may  show  that it is  relevant  or irrelevant  to 
the  powers  of  the Conununity.  This will affect the choice. 
TA.62.  Flexibility will  be  important.  Community  policies will  be 
evolving over the years,  so will  technology.  Groups  affected by 
this  technology  or that will alter in their composition and  their 
size.  Public opinion and  public  reactions  are usually volatile with 
respect  to  technology,  but  they are highly pertinent  to  the  choice 
of assessment  subjects,  and  to  the way  the  assessment  is done.  It 
is therefore  important  to  frame  the  selection criteria in such a 
way  as  to  allow adaptation to  take  place,  and not  to  set  up  too 
rigid a  sieve. 
C.  TA  and  Industry 
TA.63.  From  the international  discussion on  TA  we  can  learn that many 
business  people  fear that TA  will stifle innovation.  In American  pole-
mics,  the  letters TA  have  been alleged to stand  for "technology arrest-
ment".  Recently,  however,  there is a  growing  consensus  in business 
circles that higher priority must  be  given to social  problems  and  the 
broad effects  of  technology. 4. 
TA.64. 
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Although  legislation usually  lags  behind  technical  developments, 
various  branches  of  industry are  already  required by  national  law  to 
investigate  the  external  effects  of  their activities  and  products. 
Recent  court  decisions  (e.g.  in Germany)  indicate  that  producers  carry 
the  responsibility  for  their products  and  have  to  show  proof  that their 
products  are "harmless".  Such  decisions will  lead to more  careful 
analysis  of  production  processes  and  products  and this might  stimulate 
the  use  of  TA  in industry.  There  is  a  clear possibility that a  company 
that assesses  its own  business  goals  and  technology  not  only  in  terms 
of  traditional  economic  cost-benefit and market  analysis,  but also in 
terms  of  social  costs  and  environmental  consequences,  in a  word;  of 
externalities,  might  even  get  an advantage  in the  market  place. 
Choosing  the  assessment  subjects 
TA.65.  The  discussion of  TA  above  has  had  a  strong  (and intentional) 
bias  towards  the measurement,  or at least  the  delineation,  of  the 
environmental  and  social ~  of innovations. 
TA.66.  The  characteristics  relevant to  choice  for assessment  of  a 
particular technology,  product  or process  and its impacts  are  relatively 
easy  to  enumerate  but  difficult to  define  precisely in terms  of  limits 
and  thresholds.  Criteria  for  choice  related both to  forecasting  and 
to  relevance  to  Comnunity  objectives,  can  be  derived  from  the  following 
questions: 
i)  Is  the  subject  proposed  for  TA  being  research~d, 
being developed,  being applied  •  on  the  point  of 
submerging  us  all?  Another way  of putting the  question 
would  be:  How  much  is known  about it?  There  is here  a 
direct  relationship  between  known  data  and  likelihood 
of  implementation.  The  nearer to use,the  greater the 
chat1ce  of  successful  prognostication of  the  impacts, 
but  the  less  the  chance  of affecting events. 
ii)  Is  th<  innovation or technology  need-oriented,  and  how 
was  the  need  determined?  Is it a  market-expressed need, 
or was  it expressed in a  more  conscious manner  - perhaps 
derived  from  trends  or changes  perceived in a  statis-
tical  time  series?  Is it publicly or privately  promoted 
or sponsored?  Is  the  enterprise European?  Is  the 
market  European? - 26  -
iii)  What  possibilities exist,  auu  a~ wnat  point in the 
i~Jention - develo~nent - use  chain,  for modifying or 
co~trolling the application?  This  is clearly  related 
to  sever:.tl  of  t?t~  above  criteria and is important  in 
terms  of  judging the  cost-effectiveness of  a  TA. 
iv)  W1ll  tLe  impacts  (and  these  should be,  and  frequently 
can  be,  estiruc:.~.ted  roughly  in advance)  be  mainly 
political,  ecoll.oruic,  social,  or environmental?  There 
is  a  dile~ua here,  s1milar to  that  posed under i).  If 
the  impacts  ca1.1  be  roughly  outluu~d ahead  of  the  TA, 
is this  a  reason  for doing  a  full  study?  If chey 
cannot 1  is that  a  better reason1 
v)  Are  the  impacts  likely to  be  latent  socially,  environ-
mentally,  geographically,  over tirue?  Are  they  likely  to 
be  severe?  Shvrt,  medium or  loug-term? 
vi)  Are  t[,e  effects  reversible?  If so,at what  level?  What 
are  tl,e  costs  of atter.1pting  reversal at different  times? 
This  po1nt  has  bee11  developed many  times  in relation to 
enviL·or.ruental  or ruo.ce  str1ctly ecological  impacts.  It is 
cl~ar that  wr11.~re  cha.nges  are irreversible  they  should be 
mC:tde  Ofd  .. y  if trLe  bcrn~fit is major and  unobtainC~.ble by 
other n.eans.  The  extrerue  enos  of  such  scales are easily 
t.~ndled;  d1sast1-·ous  impacts  hd.ve  the:i.. r  imchediate  responses, 
both  pu.b lie ai,d  of ficia  1,  aud  t .civia  l  ones  have none.  In 
general  TA  \.!ill  havt:  to  deal witn  the  less  clearly  ciefira'!d 
midJle  ground. 
TA.67.  Littl~ tec.:.hn.ological  ptogre~s will  be  made  ~ithout somt:  risk being 
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taker..  The  two  Ind.jor  risks  would  seen.  tv  be  magnitude  <:H1d  irrevt!rsibility. 
Ic is finally  a  vai.ut.:.  judgeruent  as  to whether,  i£ the  choice is possible, 
grea.te:.r..  weight  is  givt!u  to  the  nurrLue.n  ..  affected,  0r to  the irrcverdibility. 
Ir, rr.any  ~~~es the  di.stiitct:.:.o:.l  c.:lfLl'"~ot  '!:Je  clearly  pre.:;ent.ed.  Certainly no 
mathematical  ?:roceJ..1re  can be  devised.  to  3:rbitrate between  the  two.  We 
sugges  c.  tha.t  whe .re  the  ..;>o~::;ibi li  ty  of  i r:i..·evcr5ible  dG~.IILage  exists, it sltould 
be  a  strong  criteria~ foe  asses~ing the subject. TA.68. 
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Besides  the  characteristics of  the  technology  itself and  of its 
iwpacts,  we  must  consider  the  methods  which  can  be  used  in the  assess-
ment.  Many  techniques  have  been  proposed or used  - cost benefit analysis, 
cost  effectiveness,  games  theory,  relevance trees,  systems  analysis, 
and  so  forth,  as  above.  An  indication,  from  a  first  examination of 
the  subject,  that well  tried techniques  existed to  deal  with  the  problem, 
would  be  a  favo11rable  indication.  Convel:"sely,  many  of  the  more  important 
and  interesting problems  presented will  ha"e  no  obvious  path  to  their 
solution.  Some  of  the  effort of the assessors must  be  reserved  for 
problems  less  amenable  to  quick  results  but  giving useful  basic insights 
into methodology. 
TA.69.  The  TA  function  of  Europe  Plns  Thirty could also  coordinate and 
TA.70. 
even  improve  the  TA  of member  countries.  In this it might  follow  the 
arrangements  made  for national  R & D programmes,  which,  beginning in 
1976,  are  to  be  automatically  communicated  to  the  Commission  from  their 
moment  of conception,  and  then  by  the  latcer to  sectoral  coordination 
conunittees  and  to  CREST.  Such  a  procedure  could only  be  built up  slowly 
and  tentatively.  There  is  an  enormous  amot.tnt  of  TA  done  in  the member 
countries,  and  an over-ambitious  programme  could  completely  swamp  Europe 
Plus  Thirty.  But  we  think if things were  encouraged to  develop  in this 
direction it would  surely  lead in time  to  the  avoidance  of duplication 
and  economies  of  scale. 
Conclusion 
The  link between  forecasting and  technology  assessment  is both 
clear and  ~trong.  The  tie is,  in fact,  so  close  that as  the  concept  of 
technology  assessment  wins  wider acceptance,  technological  forecasting 
and  planning studies  are not  infrequently equated with assessments,  des-
pite the  latter's  focus  on  secondary  and  indirect  impacts  of  technology  on 
the  envi1orunent  and  society at  large,  as well  as  on  technology itself. 
The  fonnulation  of  economic  programmes  would  be  hamstrung without  some  under-
standing of  likely  future  economic  trends.  Similarly,the  development  of 
policy  for cqntrolling technological  change  - and  that is what  technology 
assessment  is all  about  - would  be  much  more  difficult if lacking a  sense 
of  future  trends  in  technology.  It would  be  tempting to believe that  a - 28  -
unique  set  of  strict rules  could  be  promulgated by  which  subjects  could 
be  chosen  for  assessment.  Experience  indicates,  however,  that  in the 
final  analysis  any  such  set will  be  no  more  than  a  checklist relating 
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to  feasibility  and  cost  on  the  one  hand  and  opportuneness  and magnitude 
of  the work  on  the other.  It is  as  important  to  see  that  such  lists do 
not  exclude major  issues,  as  to  see that  they  are  ordered in correct 
priority.  The  main  difficulty of  criterion listing is that  in using 
such  a  list you may  find  you  have  done  the  TA  while  you  are trying to 
decide whether to  Jo it. 
TA.71.  The  difficulties posed  in the  above  discussion  are real.  In 
the initial stages  Europe  Plus Thirty must  deal with  current  and  pros-
pective  impacts  of  technology  large  enough  to  be  important,  yet  of  a 
size which is capable  of being  dealt with  so  as  to produce  an  outcome 
usable  for  policy  formation.  The  rnedium  to  long-term is suggested  as 
being  the  correct  time  span.  The  probable  impacts  should fall  in the 
field of  interest of  a  number  of  institutions.  The  assessment  should 
use  the knowledge  existing within these institutions.  It should  join 
with  this inputs  from  external groups.  Europe  Plus Thirty  should 
tackle  several areas,  possibly interlinked,  and  deal  with  those  impacts 
which  lie beyond  the  concerns  of  existing policy.  Only  by  experience 
can the  conflicting interests be  reconciled in the first years  of 
Europe  Plus Thirty's TA  work. 
TA.72.  About  seven people within Europe  Plus Thirty  should,  we 
think,  be  engaged  at  any  one  time  on  TA. 
We  give more  detailed  recommendations  in Part  IV  below. PART  IV 
IV .1. 
rv.2. 
IV. l. 
EUROPE  PLUS  THIRTY 
The  Questions 
It is  now  time  to  draw  the  threads  of  our  report  together 
and  to  make  a  concrete  recommendation  about what  should  be  done.  We 
have  been asked  two  questions. 
The  first is:  "Should the  European Communities  undertake  a 
study entitled  'Europe  Plus  Thirty'  concerning  the  foreseeable  or 
possible  developments  over  the  next  thirty years which  dre  likely 
to affect  the  progress  of  Europe;  and,  if so, will  this  study  make 
it possible in particular to create  a  forecasting  instrument which 
can  be  constantly updated?" 
To  this we  answer yes.  We  recommend  that  a  forecasting 
instrument  should  be  created,  and  we  describe it below. 
Our  terms  of  reference continue  by  asking  for "definitions" of 
certain other matters, "if the  answer were  yes".  These matters are: 
"The  method  or methods  to  be  used;"  and "the characteristics which 
define  the content,  i.e.:  the  limiting conditions;  the areas  to  be 
included;  the structure of  the  study;  the  implementing procedures." 
Parts  I  and II  of  this  report  have  sought  to  provide all these 
"definitions"  except  the  last,  to which  we  turn below. 
The  second  question we  were  asked was:  "Should  the  European 
Communities  create  their own  Technology Assessment Office  .?" 
To  this we  answer:  no,  for  the  reasons  given in Part  III of this 
report.  Since  we  answer no,  we  are asked "to determine what  other 
possibilities" are "available to the  Community  for carrying out  the 
task of  technology assessment". 
We  think  that  technology assessment,  or assessments,  should be 
carried out  by  the  continuing instrument  Europe  Plus  Thirty,  as  an 
integral  part of its work.  The  ingredients of  good  technology 
IV r  v.  ~~. 
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assessment  are  technological,  social,  and  economic  forecasting  and 
analysis,  and  they will  be  going  on  in Europe  Plus  Thirty anyhow. 
a  large extent,  the  same  people  should  do  both. 
To 
The  new  instrument  must  belong to  the  Community,  and  be  peculiar 
IV 
to it.  There  are at  the  moraent  proposals  for  forecasting or forward-looking 
instruments  in various wider international  organisations  to which  the nations 
of  the  Community  belong:  in the  U.N.  family  of  organisation8-,including the 
World Bank,  and  especially in OECD.  These,  and  perhaps  particularly the 
last,  are valuable initiatives.  But it would  not  do  if the  Conununity  had 
to  rely  on  them  alone.  It must  not  be  condemned  to  look  into its own 
fucure  solely  through,  for instance,  OECD  spectacles,  since  they will 
inevitably have  North  American  and Japanese  tints.  OECD  is an  organisation 
for  the  developed world as  a  whole,  of which  the  European  Community  is  only 
a  part;  and  although West  European  interests  largely  coincide with American 
and  Japanese interests,  they  do  not  dlways  and  entirely  do  so.  Thus  the 
Community,  especially  since it is  a  public  power  constituted under national 
and international  law,  and  the  other organisations are not,  must  have  its 
own  forecasting  instrument,  serving its own  purposes. 
Tenns  of Reference  for  Europe  Plus Thirty 
rv.s.  We  propose  the  following terms of  reference  for  the  continuing 
instrument Europe  Plus  Thirty. 
l.  To  provide  the  European Ccnununities wiili a  comprehensive  capability 
for  long-term  forecasting  and  other ways  of  thinking  about  the 
future  as  a  basis  for  examining alternative policies  and  strategies 
for  the  Community,  including: 
a)  a  continuous  output of  long-term  forecasting  related  to  the 
planning needs  of  the  Communities; 
b)  a  scanning,  look-out,  or early warning  system with  regard  to 
impending  dangers,  conflicts or  uew potentialicies; 
c)  an  information centre available  for  use  by  the  institutions 
of  the  Community,  by  its member  governments,  by  other 
organisations,  and,  through  its publications,  by  the  general 
public; 
u)  a  monitoring  system  for  social  and  other  developments,  aimed 
at obtaining  a  satisfactory data  base. rv.6. 
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2.  To  create world-wide  links with  other organisations  carrying 
out  related work. 
3.  To  carry  out  research  relevant  to  the  ac~uisitio~ of  this 
capability,  including 
Jllethodological  development; 
post  hoc  policy  evaluations. 
4.  To  carry out  specific policy-oriented studies  or  req1Jest  from 
the  institutions  of  the  Community,  membe'!:'  goYernments.  o'!:'  other 
appropriate agencies  or organisations. 
5s  To  undertake  technology  assessments  exploring as  fa~ as  necessary 
the  social,  economic,  environmental  and other  consequence~ which 
contemplated  technological  policies or developments  might  have, 
and  comparing alternative policies or developments. 
6.  To  undertake  these  functions  not  only  on  request.  but  also  as  the 
Board  of  Europe  Plus  Thirty(l)  considers  necessary. 
Structure 
The  job  of  F.urope  Plus  Thirty bas  been  described  Above  under  the 
headings  of methodology  and of sectoral  content;  and  in the  proposed 
IV 
Terms  of  Reference.  It will  be  a  job  of  enquiry,  reflexion,  and  synthesis; 
that is to  say,  a  certain number  of  people will  have  to  find  things out, 
think about  th~ill,  and put  their thoughts  togtther.  And  when  that  has 
been  done,  the whole will  have  to  be  put  in a  form which  does  in  fact 
help  policy makers  to  make  policy,  as  opposed  to  burdening  them with yet 
more  kilos  of  free-standing  knowledge. 
IV.7.  The  proposed Terms  of  Reference  carry implications  for  the  structure 
of  the organisation.  Many  things  must  be  reconciled.  Europe  Plus Thirty 
must.  have  both adequate  resources "in house''  and  a  flexible  method  of 
drawing in outside  resources  as  required.  It must  also create working 
conditions  in which  people  of ability and  experience will  be  ~illing 
to  spend  part  of  their lives;  people  who  will neither be  prepared to 
botttbinate in  a  vacuum,  far  removed  from  the  reality of planning,  nor 
wish  on  the  other hand  to  be  absorbed into  the  day-to-day machinery 
(1)  See  below. IV.B. 
IV.9. 
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of  the  Cormnission.  It must  ensure  that what  the  Community  gets is a 
clear-cut,  c,.stom-built  account  of  the various  possibilities and 
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strategies  open  to it, related to  one  another in a  consistent and  comprehen-
sive way,  and not  a  mere  catalogue  of what various  other people in other 
places  have  thought  possible or desirable. 
To  meet  these  needs,  three  elements will  be  necessary  for the 
management  structure of  the  continuing instrument  Europe  Plus Thirty. 
We  call  them  the  passive network,  the active network,  and  the  central 
team. 
The  Passive  Network 
In the passive network,  the central  team would  simply  keep  track 
of what  was  going  on  elsewhere,  and would  reflect upon,  and as  far as 
possiGle  synthesise,  the work of others.  It would  keep itself informed 
of  the work of all  relevant  forecasting  and analysis institutions  and 
teams;  they would  include  the  services  and  dependent  institutions of 
the Couunission  of the European  Corwnunities,  other international organisations, 
government  departments,  university departments,  independent  research 
institutes and workers,  and  firms,  both inside and  outside  the Community. 
IV.lO.  This  way  of working is necessary but not  sufficient.  Neither the 
primary work  nor the  purposes  for which it was  done  would  be  under  the 
control,  or even  open to  the influence of,  Europe  Plus  Thirty  as  an 
instrument  of  the  Community.  The  questions  asked would  be  chosen  by 
other social entities  (national  governments,  fiuns,  academic  research 
boards,  etc.)  and  the  answers  would  be  provided within the  limits  of 
vision of  the  primary  producers  (national,  industrial,  academic,  etc.). 
Europe  Plus Thirty would  only  come  in when  the  important  part was  over. 
It would  be  like  someone  listening to conversations  between other people 
about  things which might  or might  not  be  of interest.  Europe  Plus 
Thirty would  be  able  only  to  report  the conversations,  and  comment  on 
them;  it would not be  free  to  take  part in  therrt.  Moreover,  wholly 
passive work attracts passive  people. - 5  -
The  Active  Network 
TV.ll.  In  the active  network, a  small  central  team would itself 
fonnulate  the  questions  to  be  asked,  or the  research  programmes  to  be 
undertaken.  It would  then  let contracts  to existing organisations 
(research institutes, university  departments,  uteilLber  government  units, 
and  so  on)  and would  keep  closely in touch with  the  contractors  during 
the work.  It would call together groups  of outsiders  to  grapple with ad 
hoc  problems.  The  close  links with  the  external world  so  created would  be 
essential if Europe  Plus  Thirty is to  know  what  is going  on  elsewhere 
and to exploit  for the benefit of the  Community  the  great  corpus  of 
knowledge  and  experience  existing inside and  outside Europe. 
IV 
IV.l2.  But  this  t_cn  is  not  enough,  for it could  provide  neither the  continuity 
of  experience,  nor  the  crucial ability to adapt  and  present difficult and 
complex  arguments  year after year in a  consistent manner which  Europe  Plus 
Thirty would  need if it is to  serve  the  needs  of  the Community's  policy 
makers.  In other words,  it would  provide  the  professional  authority 
which is essential if the  advice  offered is  to  be  heeded,  but  the  advice 
needs  to  be  adapted very  carefully to  the  needs  of  the  recipient  and  no 
organisation relying entirely on  advice  from  outside,  no  matter how  high its 
quality,  can  be  effective.  It has  to  have  a  precisely tailored capability 
for  doing work itself.  We  ther~fore regard it as  essential  to  combine 
the  network  concept  (both passive and active)  with that  of  a  strong 
central  team. 
The  Central  Team 
IV.l3.  It will  not  be  enough if the  central  team merely  fo~ulates its 
own  questions  and  designs its own  research  programmes.  It must  also 
answer  some  of  the  questions  and carry out  some  of  the  research itself. 
Especially it must  carry  out  much  of the integrated forecasting des-
cribed  in I .4.  above.  This  would  be  an  "in-house"  operation;  the 
members  of  the  team would work  together in one  place,  an  arrangement  which 
would  secure  the  advantages  of cross-fertilisation and  of multiple  employ-
ment  of  individuals.  Forecasting and  technology  assessment  could be 
pursued  side by  side,  by  the  same  people.  A  given n1ember  of the  unit 
could be  working  on  more  than  one  question at the  same  time  and,  in an - 6  -
operation v..'hich  -.
7e  1.re  convinced  should indeed  be  interdisciplinary 
and "croc;s-sectoral",  that is  a  big advantage.  The  people would meet 
not  only  3cross  the work  table but also in private life,  and  professional 
collaboration WOltld  be  fortified by  personal  knowledge  and  understanding. 
The  resulting  h1.HTJUS  of  shAr.ed  perception and  common  worki11g  methods 
wo1tld  be  fertile  for  con~~ptual breakthrough and methodological  innovation. 
IV.l4.  If the  Community  were  to  decide  to  limit  Europe  Plus  Thirty to an 
extended network  structu~e, it would  be  able  to  point  to  the  small  number 
of  people  in the central  team:  ''Look,  only  ten professionals."  In a 
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tiJTJe  of  retrenchment  and  of  scepticism about  new  instruments  (and we  report 
in such  a  tim~)  that  i.s  attractive.  But  "only ten professionals" would  imply 
many  and  costly outside  contracts..  A  larger number  of in-house professionals 
would  imply  fewer  and  cheaper outside contracts.  It evens  out. 
IV.lS.  Moreover,  the  Commission  and Council  of  the  Conununity  are not 
alone in the world  in  f~~ 7ouring retrenchment.  The  greater its dependence 
011  outside institutions,  the  greater the  risk that  the work  of Europe 
Plus  Thirty will  be  interrupted by  someone  else's  retrenchment,  over 
v..Thich  the  Community  would  have  no  control.  Research  institutes and 
departments  do  sometimes  collapse.  This  is a  reason  to  favour  in-house work. 
IV.l6.  So  we  think the  right  solution is a  mixture  of all three ways  of 
working:  passive network;  active netw0rk;  and central,  in-house,  team. 
It is a  question of  proportion.  We  think  that in terms  of cost  these 
three  parts  should,  ~hen Euro~e Plus  Thir~y is  operating at full  strength 
(see  below  on  "build-up'')  compare  roughly  as  follows: 
PassivP.  network: 
Active  network: 
In-house 
We  should  repeat  for clarity's  sake:  these  proportions  are 
proportions  of cost,  not  of man  hours.  As  we  emphasised in I.4., much 
of  the  raw material  of  forecasting lies in  time  series  and many  other sorts 
of statistical data.  Most  of what  will  be  necessary  as  statistical input 
is collected already  by  the  services of member  governments,  of the 
Commission,  and  of other international  organisations.  The  labour involved - 7  -
in  that  is  m.:tny  times  what  would  be.  inV"olvcJ  in  Europe  .Plus Thirty.  But 
it  i.s  already  done  for existing  purposes,  c:tn.d  the  extra  demands  wade 
upon  these  services  by  Europe  Plus  'f11irty  w~ll  be  relatively very  Sl!lall. 
'fhe  cost  of all  those  man-hours  to  Europe  Plus Thirty wi 11  therefure  be 
small  in any  case  (though  of  course it w:;.ll  t.ave  to  d~vote so:ne  resources 
to  specifying ics  requirements  for  st.:ttist..L.cal  iilpucs,  artd  to  dige!:;t..L.ng 
the  statist:.;.cs  ic  obtains). 
Constitution 
'l'l1c  Board 
lV 
1 v. 17.  Any  sizeable  team  of  research ";,,·oncers  neeas  a  govern::.ng  board  to  help  to 
dcccrwirtc  its general  direction of worK  ir,  accordar.ce  wit.h  broad  priorities  and 
l10rizons,  to  protect it from  political att.:tck,  attd  to sift the  ciemar.ds 
which  may  be  made  on it.  A  research  team  needs  a  compass,a  lightning-
conductor,  and  an umorella;  and  these  three  fu~ctions can  be  com~ined in 
or.e  governing  body,  provided its members  are  rightly  chose!t. 
IV.l8.  We  suggest  then that  Europe  Plus Thirt:y  should have  a  Goveruing Board, 
consist1.ng of  perhaps  ten members,  plus  a  Chdinnan,  plus  t!te Director:, 
making  12  in all.  The  Board  should meet  perhaps  twice  a  year.  The 
Chainnan  should expect  to work  certainly half-Lime,  though  perhaps  not 
full-Cl.lue.  Between meetings  he  should attend espec1.ally  to  the  external 
relation~ of  Europe  Plus Thirty:  with  the  Conuru.ssion,  the  Parliament  c.nd 
member  governments  (as  discussed  below),  and with the  publl.c. 
IV. 1 g.  There  should also  be  two  Vice-Ch<:.ti rmen,  wrto  wou"i..d  expect  t0  rio  so.:.~e 
work  for  Europe  Plus Thirty  between  Board  meetings,  ar.d  to <Epuci~e 
fur the  Chainndn  as  necessary.  The  Chaint.an  aud  the  t-w·o  Vice-Gr.aint.l!n 
should  together fonn  an  Execut1ve  CoaunitLee  of  the  Board,  wh.1.cn  tne 
Director should dlsu attend as  appropridte.  IL  might  a~so have  d  ~erso~~el 
con~ittee  (see  below). 
rv.2o.  Tl1e  respunsibili.tie::.  0£  t:.he  Eoard  s.ftould  be  to  :::.eLt.l.e  the  bro.::td  progr.:tfitfite 
of w0rk  a  few  years  ahead,  and  the  Ludgetary  a~d staif a:locations 
for  different  projects.  It would  approve  contr~cts  io_  wo~k to  be 
done  for  Europe  Plus Thirty  by  otr,er  ir.~titut::.or.s  a.:,d  it wou:d  screen, - 8  - IV 
with  the  advice  of  the Director,  requests  from  the  Commission,  the  Parliament, 
and  ltlCilLber  govern111ents  for  pieces  of  work  to  be  done.  This  last will  perhaps  be 
particularly arduous  in the  field of  technology  assessment;  there  may 
be  far more  work  requested  than can  be  done  with  the money,  and  the 
Di  rccLor  should  noL  have  to  carry  the  political  burden  of  saying  no. 
Nor  should  he  have  to carry alone  the  burden  of  formulating,  making 
known,  and  defending  the criteria by  which  particular requests  for work 
are  accepted,  rejected,  or deferred. 
IV.21.  Three  qualities  have  to  be  present  among  members  of  the  Board. 
It must  include  people who  understand  forecasting  and  technology assessment, 
people  who  understand  the  fields  in which  forecasting is  done,  and  people 
with political  experience.  If there  were  not  enough  understanding  of 
forecasting and  technology  assessment,  the  programmes  and  research policies 
might  become  shortsighted,  too  analytical,  not  synthetic  enough.  If 
there were  a  lack of  sectoral expertise,  they might  neglect  the  need  for 
hard  a11d  valid inputs.  If there were  a  lack of political experience, 
they  might  become  too  academic,  and  not  so  useful  to  decision-makers. 
IV.2/.  We  think therefore  that the total membership  of the  Board  -
eleven without  the Director - should be  split  roughly  three ways 
between  1)  general  expertise in  forecasting  and  technology assess-
liLCnt'  2)  sectoral  expertise  in the  fields  for  forecasting  and  technology 
assessment,  and  3)  political  experience. 
IV.23.  To  fulfil  the  function  we  assigned to  him  above,  the Chairman  of the 
Board  should  be  strong in general  political  experience  of the world 
around.  One  of the Vice-Chairmen,  then,  should be  strong in  forecasting 
and  technology  assessment  in general.  The  second Vice-Chairman  should 
have  experience  of budgeting and  financial  management.  Of  the  remaining 
eight members,  we  think  two  should be  strong in  forecasting  and  technology 
assessment  in general  (making  three with the  first Vice-Chairman),  two 
should  be  strong in political experience  (making  three with  the Chairman), 
and,of  the  remaining  four,  one  should be  strong in each  of the  following 
fields  or groups  of  fields  in which  forecasting and  technology  assessment 
will  be  done: 
1.  Social,  political,  educational 
2.  Resources,  energy  and  environment 
3.  Science,  Technology  and  Industry 
4.  Economics  and  finance - 9  -
Naturally,  a  reasonable  balance  should be  observed among  the 
nationalities of the  Community. 
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JV.24.  We  reconunend  that  the  Board  of  Europe  Plus  Thirty  should  be  appointed  by 
Lite  Couuttission  of  tl1e  European  CoulJt,Unities.  The  proposal  is  open  to criticism 
in that it might  be  held to make  Europe  Plus Thirty  too  much  an  instru-
ment  of  one  of the institutions of the  Community.  But  after much 
thought  we  have  concluded that this  disadvantage is  outweighed by  the 
advantage  of  convenience  and simplicity.  The  Commission would  no  doubt 
take  appropriate  soundings  before making its choice. 
IV.25.  We  recommend  that the  Chairman  and members  of the  Board  should 
be  appointed initially for  four years  in order to  provide stability 
during the build-up of  Euro.pePlus  Thirty.  (See  below.)  After that 
there  should  be  a  scheme whereby,  say,  one  quarter of the membership 
resigned  every  year.  This  scheme  should be worked  out  jointly by  the 
Board  of  Europe  Plus Thirty and  the  Commission  during the initial  four-
year period. 
Members  of  the  Board  should  be  appointed as  individuals,  and 
there  should  be  no  alternates,  the  latter being appropriate only where 
a  Council  or Board  consists  of delegates  or representatives. 
The Director 
IV.26.  The  Director should be  appointed by  the  Board.  He  should work 
full  time,  and  should  be  the professional  and academic  head  of Europe 
Plus Thirty.  He  should sit with  the  Board  and with the  Executive 
Conunittee.  We  think he  should not  have  a  vote  in the  Board  (and this 
is perhaps  the  place to  say  that we  hope  the  Board  will  not  often have 
to vote at all).  The  Board  should be  able to  dismiss  the Director. 
1f the  question of his  dismissal arises,  he  should  be  informed of the 
reasons  and  should be able  to  discuss  them in person at  a  full meeting 
of the  Board  If the matter is proceeded with,  he  should not  have 
the  right  to  be  present at the  Board  meeting when  the  decision is 
taken.  We  include these  rather grim  remarks  not  because we  fear  Europe 
Plus Thirty may  be  the sort of institution where crises  occur,  but 
because  of the need  for clear provisions  about what  is to happen if 
they  do. - 10  -
IV. 27.  The  Director should,  under  the  Board  ,  hire  and  fire  staff mem-
bers.  Tl.e  Board  should  consider whether it would  be  helpful  to 
establish  a  small  persorwcl  corrunittee,tu  which  the  Director would  refer 
his  p£oposals.  This  would  3void his  having  to  take  sole  responsibility 
[oc  decisions,  some  of  which  may  be  painful. 
IV.28.  Tl.e  D~rector should  be  assisted by  two  Deputy  Directors  and  by  an 
They  should  be  the  professional  and  academic 
adjuta.-.ts  of  the  Di.rector,  and  their professional  skills  should  be  com-
plementary  to  those  of  the  DirectoL·.  The  Ad1ninistrator  should be 
responsible  for  personDel,  pay  and  logistic matters.  It might  be 
necessary  for  there  to  be  an  Accounting Officer as  well;  we  are not 
~u.:ilified  to make  a  recommendation  about  thi.s. 
The  staff of  Europe  Plus Thirty 
IV.29.  Whi.le  let  prir.ciple  the  right  size  for  the  central  teCiffi  of  Europe 
Plus  Thi.rcy  must  be  determined  by  the  tasks  whicb  are  laid  on  it, 
there  are  also professional  considerations.  Given  terms  of  reference 
approx:i.n.ating  to  tl1ose  suggested  above,  the  size n1ust  be  sufficient  to 
guarantee  good  Luks with  the  existing p:rofessioual  nt:!Lworks,  and  to 
allow  a  leve~  'Jf  internal  de0ate  high  er~.vugh  to maintcJin  the  quality  of 
o·utput  In:.:cdeci  by  the  institutions  of  the  Conununity.  These  two  con-
sicie.cdtior.s  jointly sec  a  lower  limit.  ThoLtgh  there are  examples  oi 
teariiS  Jf m::.croscopi.c  size which  perforrn "WOi1ders,  they  oftot?.n  have  narrow 
ta.sks,  a11d  do  not  r~.~ed  to  rrLair~.tain  competence  over  the  yea:r.·s.  We 
believe that  the  concept  of  a  rrdni1num  viabie  size is applicable  to  work 
of  the  k~ad we  have  been  describing  and  thdt  for  Europe  Plus Thirty it 
is  aro~nd 30  protess~onals. 
Tht:!ce  is  also  an  upper  limit,  less  sharply  defined,  but  neverthe-
less  real  efiough,  at which  concrol  of  the  ~uality of  output  begins  to 
overload the  direc~ing st&ff.  We  thin~ it lies at  about  100  graduates. 
IV.30.  We  have  naturally  given most  careful  consideration to  tl1e  figure, 
between  these  upper  and  lower  luHi ts,  wnich  we  should  reconnnend  for 
Europe  Plus  Th1rty.  In giving our view,  we  use,  as  a  conven1ent  short-
ha~d,  nuffibers  of  graduate professionals.  In  our  discussions  we 
coitsidered  three  barHls,  nwrLely  30-50;  50-75;  and  75-100.  All  these 
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arc  figures  to  be  reached  at  the  end  of the  five-year  build-up  (see 
below). 
The  band  30  - SO  is acceptable.  We  are  agreed  that if economy 
dictates  the  adoption  of  some  figure  in  this  band  as  the  target  to  be 
reached  after  five  years,  it would  be  worth  launching Europe  Plus Thirty, 
but  preferably  on  the  understanding that  the  final  figure  should  be 
regularly reviewed,  and  should  be  raised  as  soon  as  financial  con-
siderations  could  be held  to  permit it, 
Over  SO,  we  are  confident  the  thing is worth  doing.  We  think 
the  results  would  be  better  as  the  figure  approached  100,  but  the  re-
turns,  though  real,  would  then  be  diminishing. 
unnecessary  and  unduly  cumbrous. 
Our  conclusion  therefore is: 
Less  than  30:  probably not  worth it. 
30  - 50:  worth it, but  likely to 
outputs. 
so  - 7 5:  good 
Over  100,  we  consider 
lead  to  rather  sketchy 
75  - 100:  better,  but  nc.<:.  all  that much  better. 
Over  100:  not  necessary. 
;1.  The  team  needs  to  be  a  mixture  of  specialists  and  of  people, 
perhaps more  extrovert,  who  are  skilled in  organising the knowledge  of 
others,  as  well  as  having  specialist knowledge  of their  own  to contribute. 
Such  people  usually  identify themselves  quite early in their careers. 
IV.J?  Many  of  the  people recruited will  be  academics  and civil  servants. 
But  industry  and  finance  both need  to  be  represented  in  Europe  Plus 
Thirty,  so  that it can  include  some  direct knowledge  of  how  that world 
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ticks.  The  point  applies  to all parts  of  industry:  management,  research 
and  unions.  A  system which will attract  people  from  these  important  non-
academic  fields  into the life and  work  of Europe  Plus Thirty needs  to  be 
evolved,  perhaps  through  special "industrial  fellowships",  well-remunerated, 
and  tenable  for  a  limited  period  on  terms  which  provide  a  return ticket 
to  the  person's  own  organisation. 
T\'.33.  Throughout  our  report  we  have  stressed the need  for  "task  forces" 
of  outside  people,  brought  together  by  Europe  Plus Thirty  for  various - 12  -
lengths  of  time  and  at various  frequencies,  to  identify  problems,  to 
analyse  them,  to  discuss  methodolo~y,  to  find  factual  inputs,  to  concoct 
scenarios,  for  brainstorming,  and  so  on.  This  way  of  work  should  be  a 
revular  part  of  life,  and  there  should  be  budgetary and  logistic  provision 
for  it.  Some  of  these  task  forces  rni?ht  with  advantarre  be  composed  111ainly 
or  eveL  wholly  of  member  state officials,  whether  seconded  or  part-time. 
IV.34.  We  have  also,  in  certain  fields,  implied reliance  on  part-time 
people,  whose  main  work wuuld  be  outside Europe  Plus Thirty,  but  who 
would  be  Europe  Plus Thirty's established contacts  in those  fields. 
They  too must  be  provided  for. 
IV· 3 5 ·  There  must  be  scanning and  scouting.  Hembers  of  the  central  team 
must  travel  to  see  what  is going  on  in  other  forecasting  centres,  both 
inside  and  outside  the  Community.  And  they must  also travel  outside  the 
Community  so  that  their work  on  relations  between  the Community  and  the 
rest  of the  world  should never  become  unrealistic  or  acadelltic. 
There  should  also  be  much  attention  paid  (as  we  mentioned  in I.3 above) 
to maintaining  a  broad  and  up-to-date knowledge  of world  political 
trends.  The  sources  for  this are not  hard  to  come  by,  but it requires 
thought,  and  a  little money. 
IV.36.  As  many  as  possible  of the  team members  should  be  skilled in 
expressing themselves  in writing,  at  least  in  their  own  language.  This 
ability does  not  always  accompany  originality of thought.  Some  spec-
ialists undoubtedly  have  difficulty in  expressing what  they  have  to  say 
clearly and  concisely,  and  too many  such  people would  be  a  handicap  to 
Europe  Plus Thirty.  This  would  be  true  even  in  a  national  organisation, 
speaking  one  language.  In  a  multilingual  organisation it is  even  truer, 
since  a  poor  translation  of  an  infelicitous text can  easily  carry work 
backwards. 
IV.37.  The  terms  of  employment  to  be  offered to the  staff should  en-
courage  the  best  to  come  forward.  But  life should not  be made  too  cosy, 
or  else Europe  Plus Thirty would  be  in  danger  of  passing through  the  same 
life cycle  as  we  have  seen  in  so many  other  organisations:  a  splendid 
start, with  a  young  and vigorous  staff,  declining into stale mediocrity 
within  15  - 20  years.  There  is  only  one  way  to  prevent  this: setting 
time  limits  to  the contracts  of  the  professional  staff members.  A  few 
will  be  so  outstanding that  they  should  be  encouraged  to  stay  as  long 
as  they will.  Others  who  have  become  part  of  the  "corporate memory" 
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of  the  group  should  also  stay  to maintain  that  function.  Most  should 
be  on  limited contracts,  say  of  4  to 6  years,  though  this could clearly 
not  become  the  rule until Europe  Plus Thirty had  been  built up  to  its 
intended  strength.  The  details  are  less  important  than  the  principle 
that  the  organisation,  right  from  the  start,  should  be  automatically 
self-renewing. 
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If this is  to  be  the  pattern,  there must  be  flexible  pension  pro-
visions,  so  that when  each worker  goes  back to his  own  country  his  future 
security has  not  been  jeopardised. 
IV. 38.  The main  output  of Europe  Plus Thirty will  be  ideas written  and 
printed  on  paper.  Single-nation  organisations,  broadly  similar,  find 
that if all this  paper,  and  other aspects  of the  work  and  administration, 
are  to  be  handled  efficiently,  about  1.2 to  1.5  support  staff members 
are required  for  every  professional.  Given  the multinational nature 
of Europe  Plus Thirty  and  the  consequent  load  of translation,  it would 
be  as  well  to  budget  a  little above  this:  perhaps  1.5  - 2.0  persons 
per  graduate  professional.  If it were  decided that  some  services 
could  be  provided  from  outside,  a  corresponding reduction  in numbers 
could  be made.  But  we  are  against  pressing  a  search  for  economies 
through  sharing of  services  too  far,  because  we  suspect  that Europe 
Plus Thirty may  sometimes  have  to react quickly,  which is easiest if 
everything lies ready  to  hand  and  is operated  by  staff whose  main 
motivation is the  good  repute  of the  team,  even  when  it means  working 
against  the  clock. 
Periodical  turnover  of staff is  less necessary in  the  case  of 
support  staff.  Indeed,  since the services  they  provide will  largely 
be  part  of the collective memory  of Europe  Plus Thirty, it would  be  as 
well  to opt  in their case  for  a  pattern  of more  permanent  employmeRt• 
IV.J9.  It would  be  desirable  for  a  staffing inspection to  be carried 
out,  say  every  two  years,  so  that the  provisions  are  kept  at  an  effi-
cient  level,  neither  over-generous,  nor  too  parsimonious.  This 
could  be  done  by  inspectors,  commissioned  by  the Council  of Europe 
Plus Thirty,  who  would  be  professionals with relevant  experience. 
IV.40.  As  to  the  internal  structure of Europe  Plus Thirty,  we  suppose - 14  - IV 
it is  inevitable  that  the  staff will  be  organized into "divisions"  of  some 
kind  or other.  These  could  be  arranged  by  professions  (eg  technolo-
gists,  sociologists,  economists,  etc)  or  by  study  areas  (eg  energy, 
('nvironment).  Cross-working  between  divisions will,  of course,  be 
essential.  The  work  programme will never  follow  a  particulQrly tidy 
pattern.  Indeed,  it is not  desirable  that it should  do  so)  since 
following  the  by~ways of  thought  can  lead  to useful  insights.  The 
Director  should  be  given  freedom  by  the  Board  in this  respect. 
IV. 41.  The  staff of  Europe  Plus Thirty,  if they  are  of  the right quality, 
will wish  to  take  part  in  the development  of  forecasting  technique. 
But  (depending  on  the recruitment  of  one  or  two  really outstanding 
individual workers)  it might  be  valuable  to  underline  a  commitment  to 
methodology  by  setting up  a  small Methods  Group,  to act  as  a  focus  for 
such  studies, 
IV.42.  If Europe  Plus Thirty  becomes  a  source of useful  inputs  to the 
Commission  and  the  Parliament,  it is also  likely to  be  regarded,  from 
time  to  time,  as  a  possible  source of unintended  embarrassment,  even  as 
an  object  of  suspicion.  This  is a  problem which  does  not  confront  a 
purely  academic  research organisation,  but  one  which  needs  to  be  faced 
up  to,  given  the  policy-oriented nature  of  so  much  of Europe  Plus Thirty's 
work.  The  practical  solution  to  the difficulty has  been  found  elsewhere 
to  be  complete  openness  between  those carrying  out  studies  and  those 
who  devise  and  administer  the  policies  to which  they  are relevant. 
Publication 
IV.43.  The  arguments  for  Europe  Plus Thirty's  publishing all its work 
are  strong.  They  are  that Europe  Plus Thirty will  be  dealing with matters 
of  public  concern,  about  which  the  public has  a  right  to  be  informed, 
that  open  publication  provides  a  safeguard  against  error  or  prejudice, 
and  that  publication  can  be  a  bait to attract  good  workers. 
IV.44.  The  arguments  against  publishing everything are  equally clear: 
much  of  the  information  used will have  come  from  government  or Commission 
sources,  and  some  of it may  be  privileged;  mutual  confidence  between  Europe 
Plus Thirty  and  the institutions of  the  Community  would  be  forfeited if 
disclosures were  made  which  afterwards  proved  embarrassing;  some  of  th~ 
reports made  by  Europe  Plus Thirty will  be  no more  than  a  step  on  a  1cr:. 
road  to  po licy-u1aking. IV.45. 
IV. 46. 
IV.47. 
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It is clear that  the  main  output  of  Europe  Plus  Thirty's 
work would  be  of  substantial  public interest,  as  well  as  of  scientific 
interest to  other professionals.  It would  comprise  a  series of 
forecasting  exercises  expressed in  terms  of alternative  futures  and 
goals  for West  European  society:  teleonornies,  to use  the  language 
of  this  report.  It would  also  comprise  a  number  of  long-term studies 
of  social  and  other developments within  the Community,  "impact assess-
ments"  of  technological  and  other aspecc.s  of Community  policy,  and 
studies  of  the  relationships  between  the  Community  and  the  rest of  the 
world.  The  publications  should be  explicit regarding assumptiomand 
value  judgments  built into the analysis,  and  the  details  of  the 
technical  approaches  that are used.  We  would  expect  to  see  a  regular 
series  of  books,  annual  or biennial,  together with occasional 
papers  reflecting the  changing priorities of  the  programme.  We 
would  also  expect,  subject  to  their contracts,  some  more  specialised 
books  and  papers  from  the  individual  team members,  as  in any  other 
healthy  research organisation.  Publication should be  in as  many 
Community  languages  as  possible. 
We  recommend  that  publication should be  the  rule,  but 
that unpublished  studies  should not  be  excluded if there is  good 
reason  for non-publication.  The  decision  should  be  taken  by  the 
Board  of Europe  Plus  Thirty. 
Relations  of  Europe  Plus  Thirty with  the Institutions of 
the  European  Communi ties,  and with their member  g~v.e.rnu1ents 
None  of  the  questions we  have  asked ourselves  is more 
important  that that  of  the  relationship between  the  continuing 
instrument  of  Europe  Plus  Thirty and  the  institutions of  the 
Communicy:  the Commission,  the  Parliament,  the  Council,  and  the 
Court.  It is  important  because,  no  matter how  good  the  forecasting 
and  technology  assessment  Europe  Plus  Thirty does,  if that work is 
not  available  to  the  right  people at the  right  time,  it will  be 
wasted.  Equally,  if the  needs  of  those  people are not met  by 
Europe  Plus  Thirty,  the  instrument itself will  have  no  justification. 
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IV.48.  Contacts with  the  Institutions of  the  Community  should be 
rather close  and  continuous,  but  they  should not  be  so  close as 
to  deprive  Europe  Plus Thirty of  the  intellectual  independence 
which will  be  its  justification,  or to  prevent it getting on with 
its job. 
IV.49·  We  think that  th·e  relations  between  a  professional  body  and 
the  executive or  legislature it exists  to  serve are best  regulated 
by  close attention to what  happens  at  the  top.  If that is rightly 
conceived,  things will  probably  come  right  lower  down.  So  the 
Chairman  (and/or Director)  of  the Board of Europe  Plus Thirty should 
have  access  to  the  President  of  the Corrunission,  and  to  each  of  the 
Commissioners  severally.  He  would  thus  be  able  to  lay before  each 
Commissioner  results which  concerned  the latter's particular field 
of work,  and before  the  President  results which  concerned  the work 
of  the  Commission  as  a  whole.  This  would not,  of course,  imply 
that  Europe  Plus Thirty had  any  right  to  policy  recommendation. 
Conversely,  the President  of  the  Commission,  and  each 
Commissioner  severally,  should have  the  right  to  send  for  the 
Chairman  or Director of  Europe  Plus Thirty. 
IV.SO.  Individual  stdff members  of  Europe  Plus Thirty would  have 
their own  contacts with  those  Commission officials who  were most 
nearly concerned with  their work,  bearing in mind  the  complementary 
needs  on  the  one  hand  for a  free  flow  of information,  and  on  the 
other for  the academic  and professional  independence  of  Europe  Plus 
Thirty.  It might  be  desirable  to  formalise  these  relationships  by 
having  one  official or section in each Directorate-General  responsible 
for maintaining contact with Europe  Plus Thirty.  But  that would  risk 
carrying into  Europe  Plus Thirty the  compartmentalisation which 
already afflicts the  Commission,  and  on  the whole  we  would  rather 
see  the  growth  of  one  centralised planning unit within the 
Commission,  which  could  be  Europe  Plus Thirty's main  place  of 
contact. 
IV. 51.  So  much  for  the working relationship we  hope will  develop;  there 
remains  the  administrative relationship.  We  think. such  a  broad  and 
generalised  instrument  as  Europe  Plus Thirty  should  depend  from  the 
Commission  as  a  whole~  ~nd should  thus  be  the responsibility  of  the 
President  of  the  Commission. 
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IV.52.  No  less  important  than  the  relationship of Europe  Plus Thirty with 
the  Commission  will  be  its relationship with  the  Parliament.  If the 
European  Parliament  is to  develop  over  the  years  to  become  a  more  in-
fluential  assembly  for  general  policy debate,  and~ fortiori if it is to 
assume,  following  the direct  elections  planned  for  1978,  some  of  the 
functions  of  a  true  legislature,  then it and  its committees  should  have 
the  same  access  to what  is  going  on  in Europe  Plus Thirty,  and  the  same 
right  to  affect what  goes  on  in Europe  Plus Thirty,  as  the Commission  has. 
Indeed,  this  should  be  so  even  if there is no  increase  in  the  powers  of  the 
Parliament. 
IV.53.  The  relations  should  therefore  follow  the  same  pattern  as 
that  recommended  above  for  the Commission.  The  Chairman  of Europe  Plus 
Thirty should  have  access  to the President  and  Secretary General  of  the 
Parliament  and  they,  conversely,  should  have  the right  to  send  for  him. 
IV 
But  the European  Parliament  works mainly  through its committees,  and most  of 
the  1najor debates  in its plenary  take  place  upon  a  report  from  a  committee. 
It may  be  that  the  Committees  would  in  due  course  feel  the  need  to  develop 
with  Europe  Plus Thirty  a  system  of hearings,  following  that which  is 
already  growing  up  with  other  institutions. 
IV.54.  We  come  now  to  the Council  of Ministers.  Relations  between  the 
Council  and  the Commission  are  quite  likely to  change  in  the  coming 
decades.  The  whole matter is subject  to  continuing debate,  and it is no 
part  of  our  task  to  become  involved  in  that  debate.  We  must  take  the 
situation as  we  find it.  If there is no  change,  we  imagine  that Europe 
Plus Thirty would  lay before  the Commission  the  sort  of  teleonomies  we 
have  outlined  in  earlier  sections  of this report,  and  its technology 
assessments,  and  whatever  special  problem-oriented  studies  had  been  done. 
There  would  then  be  discussions  between  the  Commission  and  Europe  Plus 
Thirty,  and  the Commission  would  draw its deductions  for  policy;  for 
instance that  such  and  such  a  possible goal  or  strategy  should  be  adopted, 
and  the  alternatives  should  be  rejected.  The  Commission  would  then  lay 
its conclusions  before  the Council  in  the  form  of  proposals,  including 
also the  teleonomy  or  other backing ruaterial  which  had  been  provided 
by  Europe  Plus  Thirty.  If the Council  wanted  to  have  clarifying discussions, - 18  - IV 
those  discuss,ions  would  be with  the  Commission,  and  the  Chainnan 
or Director of  Europe  Plus  Thirty should  take  part  in  theut  as  part  of 
the  Commission's  team.  If the  Council  wanted  any  particular future-oriented 
studies  undertaken,  then it could  no  doubt  instruct  the  Colllmission  to  procure 
Lhcut  lro1u  Europe  Plus  Thirty,  and  the Commission would  set about  this in the 
usual  way,  by  approaching  the  Board  of  Europe  Plus  Thirty. 
Accordingly,  we  recor.unend  that  relations  between  the  Council  of  l'1inisters 
and  Europe  Plus  Thirty should not  be  formally  regulated.  If either wanted 
personal  contact with  the other,  we  hope  it could be  arranged,  but  there  seems 
no  need  to  establish  reciprocal  rights  and  duties. 
Iv.ss.  We  make  this  recommendation  in  today's  situation.  If there  is  a 
change  in  the  relations  between  the  Council  and  the  Commission,  or if 
the  Council  makes  a  major  chan5e  in its method  of work,  or if it acquires 
a  powerful  secretariat of its own,  or  if yet  further-reaching  institutional 
changes  come  about  as  a  result of moves  towards  European  union,  then  the 
matter  should be  re-examined.  We  think  the  Board  of  Europe  Plus Thirty 
should,  as  part of  its normal  work,  keep  all  this  constantly under  review. 
Europe  Plus  Thirty may,  in  any  case,  have  a  contribution  to  make  to the 
studies which will have  to  precede  any  constitutional  changes. 
IV.56.  We  discussed  in Part III above  the  possibility that Europe  Plus 
Thirty might  be  or become  useful  to  the  European  Court of Justice.  In 
this  case,  the  initiative would naturally come  from  the  Court,  which  could 
ask  for  studies  or advice  from  Europe  Plus Thirty  through  its  Board 
as  the  need  arose. 
IV. 57.  The  extent and  form  of  the  linkage  between Europe  Plus  Thirty  and 
the  long-term planning  and  forecasting  institutions of  member  governments 
is  something  we  do  not wish  to  be  categorical about.  These  links  should 
clearly be  as  intense  and  habitual  af:  they can  be  without changing  the 
nature  of  Europe  PlJs Thirty as  a  Community  instrument.  They will 
obviously differ from  country  to  country,  since  the national  structures 
themselves  differ.  The  purpose  should  be  to  achieve  benefits  both ways, 
with Europe  Plus  Thirty  doing  work which  is  useful  to  member  governments, 
and  member  governments  providing  the  inputs  which  are  useful  to  Europe 
Plus  Thirty.  It might  be  useful  for member  governments  each  to  designate 
one  office or official  to  handle  their contacts with Europe Plus  Thirty, 
and  it would  clearly be  useful  for  these national officials  to  meet  from 
time  to  time  at the  vremises  of  Europe  Plus  Thirty.  Whether  these 
meetings  should  be  formalised  into  a  committee  of national  representatives 
advisory  to  the  Board  of  Europe  Plus  Thirty  is  a  matter which  requires 19 
further  thought  and  discussion  among  those  who  would  be  concerned. 
IV.SH.  But  we  would  certainly like  to  see  Europe  Plus  Thirty  develop  a 
subsidiary  function  as  a  forum  where  national  long-term planners  and 
forecasters  can meet  and  informally discuss  matters  of  common  interest 
on  the  Community  level;  we  are  aware  that  such  a  forum  is  lacking at 
present. 
Responsibility  for  Funding 
IV.59  The  question  who  pays  for  Europe  Plus  Thirty  is  bound  up  with  the 
question  who  has  the  right  to  ask it to  undertake  work.  We  will 
consider  the  latter first. 
Although all sorts  of  people  and  institutions would,  we  hope, 
suggest  work  to  Europe  Plus  Thirty  and  find  its output useful,  yet 
the  need  for it has  been  expressed specifically by  the  Council  and 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  and  our  own  study was  set 
up  by  the  Commission  on  a  decision of  the  Council.  Europe  Plus  Thirty, 
as  we  see  it, will  be  the  Commission's  baby,  and  we  hope  the  Commission 
will  always  consider it legitimate  offspring.  We  have  already described 
how  the  Board  of  Europe  Plus Thirty ought  to  decide  'tvhat  work  is  done, 
and  to  act as  a  filter  for  requests  for  work.  First and  foremost,  it 
should entertain requests  from  the  Commission,  the  Parliament  and  the 
Court. 
IV.60.  We  think it should  also entertain requests  from  certain other  bodies 
I  ' 
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and  the  qualifications  for  the  right  to  suggest work  should  be  reviewed  by  the 
Board  of  Europ~ Plus  Thirty  from  time  to  time.  To  start with,  we  think  that 
(as  soon  as  there  is staff enough)  suggestions  should  be  entertained  from 
member  governments  of  the  Community  and  from  the  European  Investment 
Bank  (as  we  discussed  in Part III above).  Later  they  could  also  be 
entertained  from  other organisations  and  associations  so  long  as  they  were 
the  European  association or grouping  of whatever it was.  For  instance,  a 
European  industrial association,  or  a  European  association of  trade  unions, 
should  have  this  right,  but  a  particular firm,  a  particular  trade  union, 
or  a  national  association of  firms  or  unions,  should  probably not.  We 
also  envisage  joint projects  between  Europe  Plus  Thirty and  other inter-
national  organisations. 20 
When  Europe  Plus  Thirty is well  and  truly under way,  and  its use 
is established  beyond  doubt,  then it might  be  possible  to  consider 
widening  the  list of organisations having  this  right. 
IV.61.  All  this,  though,  ought  to  be  subject  to  an  overriding rule  of 
financial  proportion.  We  are  sure  that  the  continuity and  the  vitality 
of  Europe  Plus  Thirty will  depend  on  its having  absolutely assured  fund-
ing  for  a  reasonable period  of  time,  from  one  source,  and  on  its never 
accepting more  than  a  certain amount  above  that  from  all other  sources 
put  together.  We  think it should never  be  allowed  to  depend  for more 
than  a  quarter of  its  income  on  sources  other  than  the  European  Community 
itself,  and  we  think  that  the  greater part of  that quarter should  come 
from  member  governments.  Only  by  the  imposition of  such  a  ceiling will 
it be  possible  to  ensure  staff security,  an  orderly workload,  and  the 
avoidance  of  financial  anxieties  and  dangers, 
IV. 62.  We  recommend  that Europe  Plus  Thirty should  have  as  much  financial 
and  administrative  independence  as  possible,  since  only  thus  can it 
achieve  the  necessary academic  and  professional  independence.  The  money 
it receives  from  the  Commission  should  come  to it in a  quantity negotiated 
and  settled  (with  an  inflation/deflation clause)  for  a  reasonable  number 
of years,  so  as  to  permit  the  development of  long-term forecasting  pro-
grammes  in  an  atmosphere  of  confidence.  We  particularly recommend  that 
its funds  should  be transferred to it as  a  bloc vote,  and  that  the allo-
cation of expenditure  for  this  or  that particular part  of its work  should 
be  the responsibility  of  the  Board  of Europe  Plus Thirty and,  under it, 
of  the  Director  assisted by  the Administrator.  We  also  recommend  that 
the  payments  of salaries,  allowances,  expenses  and  contract  fees  should 
be  administered  by  the  Director  and Administrator  of Europe  Plus Thirty 
under  the  final  control  of  the  B<!>ard  and  its Budgetary Committee. 
Europe  Plus Thirty will  be very  small  compared with  the Commission  itself, 
and must  operate  independently. 
Build-up of Europe Plus Thirty 
IV. 63.  Technology assessments may  be  fairly quickly  done,  but  forecasting 
work  is  long-term work  by its nature.  We  are  anxious  that  Europe  Plus 
Thirty  should  be  given  time  to prove  its value,  and  the value  of  such  long-
term work  as  this is not  quickly  proven.  We  have  in mind  a  period  of 
several years;  a  year  or  two,  or  even  five  years,  are not sufficient. 
IV 
We  recommend,  therefore,  that Europe  Plus Thirty should  be  guaranteed 
a  minimum  life of  ten years.  Ten  years would  be  enough  for it to build 
up  a  procedure  of integrated  forecasting,  to  produce results,  and  even  to 21  -
allow  a  few  years after their appearance  during which European  decision-
makers  can  judge their utility.  Less  than  ten years would not  be  enough 
for  this. 
IV.64.  The  ten-year  build-up of Europe  Plus Thirty  should  be  divided  into 
three  phases: 
l)  A  preparatory  phase,  probably  of  one  year. 
2)  A  four-year  build-up. 
3)  A  five-year  undisturbed  run. 
At  the  end  of this  ten-year  programme,  the  Commission,  the  Parlia-
ment  and  the  Council,  or  whatever  at that  time are the  power  centres  of 
the Community,  should  assess  the  achievements  and  the utility of Europe 
Plus Thirty,  and  decide whether  or not  to  arrange  for  a  new  ten-year  pro-
gramme. 
1.  The  Preparatory  Phase 
IV.65.  During this  phase  the  Board  should  be  appointed  and  should 
select the  first Director.  Jointly with  the  Board,  the  Director 
should  draw  up  a  plan  ror  the  phased build-up over  the next  four  years, 
and  for  the  work  structure and  working methods  to  be  achieved at the  end 
of it.  Arrangements  for meshing with  the Commission's  work  ~hould be 
devised.  Premises  should  be  obtained.  On  the  choice of  Board  mem-
bers  and  of  the  first  Director will  depend  the  success  of the whole 
enterprise.  If the  right  people cannot  be  found within  d  year,  the 
preparatory phase  should  be  extended  to two  years,  or should be  deemed  to 
run  from  the  moment  when  the  first Director  takes  up  his  duties. 
2.  The  Four-Year  Build-up 
IV.66.  It takes  a  long  time to obtain  the  services  of first-rate people, 
and  we  are  sure that Europe  Plus Thirty will not  be  worth having unless 
it is  staffed by  first-rate people.  So  during this  four-year  phase, 
with the  plan  devised  during the  preparatory phase  in hand,  the Director 
should take  on  staff in  an  orderly manner,  and  the  administrative infra-
structure  should  be  built up.  The  build-up will not necessarily  be  the 
same  for  technology  assessment  as  for  forecasting.  Probably  technology 
assessment  could  develop rather  faster,  and  so  could certain ad  hoc 
studies which might  be  called  for. 
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IV.67.  We  t  .. ink it may  well  take  two  or  three years  from  the  beginning 
of this  stage  for  the  first  forecasts  to appear.  As  we  see it, then, 
the  first  forecasting work  might  begin in the  first year of  this 
second  phase  and  appear  in  the  third year.  Not  until Europe  Plus Thirty 
is  up  to  full  strength,  at  the  end  ot  five  years,  will it be  possible  to 
undertake work  on  the  scale we  have  been  discussing in this report. 
IV.68.  At  first,  Europe  Plus Thirty would  have  to  devote  a  greater  prop-
ortion of its resources  to  the  passive network  (as  we  described it above) 
than  the  lifk  suggested.  The  proportions  suggested  on  page  6  should  be 
achieved  only  at  the  beginning of the third phase.  During  the  second 
phase it would  in  any  case  be necessary  for  Europe  Plus Thirty  to  become 
thoroughly  familiar with all the  relevant work  already  being done.  The 
balance would  then  swing  gradually,  over  the  four-year  period,  from  a 
somewhat  passive  pattern  of work  towards  the  active control  of research 
and  r2sults which must  be  achieved  as  soon  as  possible. 
IV 
IV.69.  We  have  been much  perplexed  by  the  question whether  to  recommend what 
kind of  forecasting  should be  undertaken first  during this build-up period. 
Should we  recommend  priorities?  We  have  decided not  to  because we  think that 
these  priorities  can  only  be  settled in the  light of  two  factors  which  are 
unknown  to  us:  first, what  problems will  appear urgent  in the  first half of 
1977  (which is the earliest this question  could  realistically be  settled)  and 
second,  in what  fields will  good  people  first  become  available?  It should in 
any  case  be  the  purpose  of  Europe  Plus  Thirty  to  reach  truly integrated work 
as  soon  as  possible. 
IV.70.  As  we  have  said above,  part at  least  of  the  technology  assessment  could 
be  done  by  the  same  people who  are  doing  the  forecasting.  The  links  between  TA 
and  technological,  economic,  and  social  forecasting are  so  obvious  that we  need 
not  labour the  case  for  embedding  the  TA  work  in Europe  Plus Thirty. 
IV.71.  Still,  there  is  a  case  for having  one  or  two  people  who  are  primarily 
concerned with  TA  work,  especially with  planning it in advance.  Towards  the 
beginning of the  four-year build-up,  an  inter-disciplinary team  of about  5  - 7 
people  could be  assembled,  from  among  those  in Europe  Plus  Thirty,  to  do  what-
ever TAs  may  be  called for.  The  shape  of  such  a  team might  usually  be:  natural 
sciences  and  technology:  2;  economics:  1;  social  sciences  (including,  where 
appropriate,  law):  2.  Five  is  the  minimum;  seven would  be  better.  We  do  not 23  IV 
think it necessary  to  follow  the  example  of  the  American  Office  of Technology 
Assessment  and  build up  to  40  or 50  in  two  years,  with  300  or more  outside 
panelists.  They  do  this  because  they  are closely tied to  Congress,  which 
demands  instant  results. 
Probably  the  first TAs  done  by  Europe  Plus  Thirty might  take  about 
eighteen months;  as  experience was  gained this  could  be  speeded up  to  twelve 
months.  We  think it quite  important that Europe  Plus  Thirty should not  start 
with  one  TA  only;  it should undertake  two  at  the  same  time,  which  should  be 
possible if it takes  eighteen months  over  them.  Naturally,  the  length  of  time 
and  the  mix  of  people will  depend  on  the  job. 
IV. 72.  There will  be  a  big  role  in  TA  for  outside contracts and  for brain-
storming visits,  perhaps  even  bigger than in forecasting as  such.  We  do  not 
envisage  contracting out  whole  TAs  to  existing institutions.  None  of  them 
appear yet  to  be  able  to  ~ake a  European view.  (See  Part III above). 
3.  The  Undisturbed  Run 
IV. 73.  By  the  first year of  the  third phase,  being  the  sixth year of Europe 
Plus  Thirty's existence,  the  staff would  be  at full  COtuplement,  the  balance  of 
expenditure outlined on  page  6  would  be  achieve~,  and  the operation would 
be  under way  as  intended. 
We  include here an  Illustrative Table of  the first  ten years' 
activities of  Europe  Plus  Thirty.  It is not  meant  to  be  followed  precisely, 
but  mainly  to  show  what  we  mean  by  the  three  phases  of  the  build-up. PHASE 
Preparatory 
Build-up 
Undisturbed 
Run 
YEARS 
1 
(or  1-2) 
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ILLUSTRATIVE  TABLE. 
WORK 
Council  appointed.  Director  chosen,  work 
structure and  plan  developed,  premises 
obtained. 
2  Staff assumed.  Forecasting begins.  High 
proportion  of "listening 
post" work.  Technology 
assessment  be~ins. Task  forces 
organised. 
3  Staff assumed.  First  forecasts  appear. 
First technology assessments 
appear. 
TAs  continue  and  appear  from 
now  on. 
Staff assumed.  First ''Teleonomic"  forecast-
ing  appears.  Increasing prop-
ortion of contract work  and  in-
house work. 
5  Staff completed.First  forecasts  updated. 
6  Staff complete.  First  full  teleonomy  appears. 
7 
Integrated "teleonomic
1 fore-
casting continues.  Stable 
proportion  achieved  between  in-
house,  contract,  and  listening 
post work. 
All  work  now  fully  integrated  and  the  "double 
cone"  approach  fully  exploited. 
8  Second teleonomy  appears. 
9  As  Year  7. 
10  Third  teleonomy  appears.  Commission,  Parliament 
and Council  begin  to  review  achievements  and 
utility of Europe  Plus Thirty. 
IV 
11  Review  completed,  and  decisions  taken  about  future 
of Europe  Plus Thirty. 25  IV 
Cost 
TV.74.  We  turn  now  to the  question  of cost,  and  we  base  our  calculation 
on  a  figure  of  75  professionals.  This  is the  figure  which  we  adopted  at 
page  11  above  ~s  the  optimum  to  be  reached at  the  end  of the  five-year 
build-up,  and  it also corresponds  approximately with the  sum  of the  pro-
fessionals  recommended  in  the chapters  of  part II  and  in  part III. 
Taking  an  average  number  of supporting staff per  professional  of  1.5,  the 
total number  of  employees  at  the  end  of  the  build-up period would  be  about 
185. 
IV. 75. 
Allowing  for  a  reasonable  figure  for  external  contracts,  symposia, 
conferences  for  presenting work  done  etc.,then at  1975  prices  the  annual 
running cost,  after build-up to this  figure,  would  be  5.6 million units 
of account.  For  detai  1 s,  see Annex  4 • 
If a  lower  figure  were  adopted  for  the number  of  graduates  at  the 
end  of  the  build-up period,  the  annual  cost would  be  less,  in direct  prop-
ortion.  At  this  point we  would  like to  remind  the reader  of what  we  said 
in  the  last  paragraph  of  our  General  Introduction. 
Geographical  Location 
The  right  geographical  place  for  Europe  Plus Thirty will  be  that 
which  best  suits its  functional  place.  We  have  suggested it should  have 
a  close relation with the  European  Commission,  but not  too close.  Ideally, 
Europe  Plus  Thirty  should  find premises which  are  not  less  than  one  and 
not  more  than  three  ho;..;.1·::.  r  :L.)r  to door,  from  the offices  of  the 
Commission.  Less  than  one  l:WLcr  would  mean  time-wasting  and  too  close 
contacts.  People would  be  dropping  in  for  no  good  reason,  both ways. 
Europe  Plus Thirty would  risk becoming  an  organ  of day-to-day advice, 
which it should not.  More  than  three hours  would mean  that  every meeting 
required  an  overnight  stay. 
and  that  too would  be  wrong. 
Personal  contact would mean  an  expedition, 
It would  tend  to remotE and  academic  work. 
IV.76.  There  is another  important  question:  should the  office of Europe 
Plus Thirty  be  in a  city or  in the  country?  A  place  in  the country 
would  have  the advantage  of  peace  and  quiet.  A  place  in the  city,  and 26 
especially  in  a  great city,  would  have  the  advantage not  only  of that 
surrounding intellectual  effervescence which  is  only  found  in  a  metro-
polis,  but  also of  a  wider  choice  of  schools  for  the  children  and  jobs 
for  the  spouses  of staff members. 
We  would  like to  see Europe  Plus Thirty staffed by  people with broad 
and  lively minds,  and  largely  by  younger  people.  Such  people  are more 
likely to  be  attracted to work  in  a  great city than  to  the  calm  of  the 
countryside.  There  is also  the  danger  of  an  integrated  team  becoming 
hermetic  or  eccentric,  and  this would  be  less  in  a  metropolitan  environ-
ment.  We  recommend  accordingly  that  a  place  in  a  great city should  be 
chosen. 
IV.77.  One  last  factor:  the  number  of  beautiful  old  buildings which  form 
part of the  architectural heritage  of Europe,  and  for which it is difficult 
to  find  a  use,  is  so  great that we  think it would  be right to  choose  one 
of these,  or  several  small  ones  if they are close  togeilier.  The  future 
grows  out  of  the  past,  and  we  would  like to  see this truth symbolised  by 
the  use  of  a  fine  old  European  building or  buildings  for  studies  about  the 
European  future. 
Name 
IV.78.  We  are not  quite  satisfied that  the name  "Europe  Plus Thirty", 
which  was  invented  by  Commissioner  Dahrendorf  and  has  been  given  by  the 
Council  of Ministers  to  our  own  study,  should necessarily  also  be  that  of 
the  continuing instrument  we  recommend,  although  we  have  used it through-
out  this report.  It is  short  and  easy  to  say,  but  we  have  fo~nd when 
telling our  friends  about it that it often takes  a  lot of  expl8{:-ing. 
"Plus Thirty what?"  they  ask:  "Thirty more  countries?"  ''Thirt'T wise men?': 
On  the  other  hand,  the  obvious  alternatives are mostly  forbidc~  ::gly 
IV 
pro  1 ix:  European  Long-term Forecasting Institute,  European  Fu :>-'res  ~~e  :>e<.:J..C·.:>: 
Institute~ etc.  It might  be  possible  to  name  the in strumcnt  <:ilter  the 
place where  it sets  up  house. 
We  recommend  that  the question  be  left open  as  long as  possible in 
case  anyone  comes  forward  with  a  better  suggestion  in  time.  They  may 
well not,  and  in  that  case  "Europe Plus Thirty" will  serve pretty  well. A.l.1. 
A.l.2. 
A.l.3. 
ANNEX  1  'J'HE  PATTERN  OF  FORECAST lNG  IN  THE  WORLD  -'-
Surveys  of  Forecasting Activicy 
An  OECD  survey  in  1966  of  the  US,  Westen1  Eurvpe  and  Israel 
identified  100  organisations with  a  pennanent  forecasting activity  (60% 
in industry),  arJ.d  from  196R-70  the  Couilc:l l  of  Europe  s  .rveyed  long-range 
forecasting efforts in  ten Western  E~ropcan countries.  Of  the  292  organi-
s~tions ider.t:ified  by  the  latter 101  w•:'re  in  government,  66  in universities, 
and  12  were  intec-governrnental  agencies.  'Ihe  remaining  113  were  private, 
independent,  non-profit  groups.  The  breakdown  between countries  was  as 
follows:  Belg:Lum  (12},  Denmark  (6),  the  Federal  Republic  of  Gennany  (33), 
France  (70),  1taly  (22),  the  Netherlands  (18),  Norway  (15),  Sweden  (7), 
Switzerlartd  (13)  and  the United  Kingdom  (84). 
A  vJOrld-wide  survey  by  P.E.P.  (a  London  Consultancy)  in  1970  lists 
269  sources  L1  gove rmnent  and  outside.  The  continuing world-wide  survey 
carried  oGt  by  Irades  from  1972  lists  200  organisations  (mainly  non-
goverrunental)  specialising in  forecasting  and  a  further  700-800  engaged  in 
it.  The  Centre  for  Integrative Studies  of  the  University of  New  York  at 
Binghalllpton  carried out  surveys  in  1970  and  1972  of  forecasting  in the 
United States.  The  survey  indicated an  increase  in activity of  some  50°/o. 
A  non-selective world-wide  survey  by  the  Futures  Group  (an American  Con-
sultancy)  in  1973  identified  937  institutions in  42  countries with at  least 
one  recent  substantive  futures  project.  Of  these  532  were  based  in  the  United 
States,  90  elsewhere  in America  (mainly  Canada),  224  in Western  Europe,  36 
in  the  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern Europe,  and  55  in other countries  (.nany  in 
Japan).  The  breakdown  of  this  was  20-30%  each  in industry,  universities  and 
independe~ inst~tutions,  and  8%  in Government,  the  rest being made  up  of 
individ~als and  associations.  A  survey  published  in  1974  by  the  Woodrow 
Wilson  School  for International  Scholars  in the United States  identified 
97  projects  focusing  on  'growth'.  In  another ongoing  and  uncompleted 
survey  for  the  United Nations,  the  Centre  for Integrative Studies  has 
contacted  several  thousand  institutions,  about  1000  of  them  in  Europ~,  who 
are  believed to  engage  in  some  kind  of  forecasting activity,  of  which  about 
230  have  replied confinning their ir:.volvernent. 
The  objectives  and  definitions  used  in these  studies  differed, 
which  affected  the  pattern  recorded  by  each.  The  numbers,  or  the 
impression  given  about  any  particular institute,  may  be  misleading; 
,.,  Surveys  such  as  this Annex  tend  to  be  out  of  date  fro.-rt  the  moment  they 
appear.  The  Co;u..:nission  would  appreciate it if readers were  to  send  in 
any  corrections  or amendments  to  keep it up  to  date. A.l.S. 
A.l.6. 
A.l.7. 
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for  example,  an  addition might  be  the  result of  a  slight shift  in 
emphasis  of  ongoing work  or  the  setting up  of  a  large  forecasting 
institute. 
Casting one's net very wide,  as  these  studies  have  done,  is 
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more  suggestive  than  informative.  Institutions  come  and  go;  aims  may 
be  taken  asachicvcJJJ('nls,  and  so  on.  In  dealing with existing forecast-
ing  capacity,  Europe  Plus  Thirty will  have  to  be  careful  not  to  put  its 
eggs  into  untried baskets. 
Forecasting  in  the  European  Community  Countries 
Belgium 
There  is relatively little forecasting  activity  in  Belgium 
(compared with  the  Netherlands,  say,  a  country with  similar  population). 
The  general  planning  agency  in Belgium  is  the  Bureau  du  Plan 
established  in  1959  which  is part of  the  Economic  Ministry.  In 
pr;1cl icc  it is  responsible  to  the  Prime  Minister  and  other ministers. 
Primarily,  the  Bureau's  task  is  to  prepare  an  economic  plan  dealing 
with  public  and  private  investment  (e.g.  regional  investment  incentives) 
and  to  produce  indicative  (i.e.  extrapolative)  forecasts.  The  current 
plan  prepared  in  1970  extends  until  1975.  However,  from  1971  the 
Plan  has  included  social  and  cultural  i~sues and  there  is  an  attempt 
to  construct  a  satisfactory set of  social  indicators. 
Integration of  growth  factors  takes  place  in  a  variety of  ways. 
Recently  a  sophisticated  regional-national  econometric  model  has  been 
introduced  to  supplement  existing accounting  procedures.  An  input-
output model  is  used  in  the  preparation of  short-term government 
economic  policies. 
Each  region  in  Belgium  is now  required  to  prepare  a  sectoral 
plan  taking  into  account  all  economic  and  social  factors  (e.g. 
transport,  land  use,  industry).  The  integration of  these  plans  is 
carried out  by  the  Ministry of  Urbanism. 
Further  poljcy co-ordination at  a  national  level  takes  place  in 
the  CMCS  (Ministerial  Committee  on  Economics  and  Social  Co-ordination). 
The  CMCS  itself has  little research capability,  and  to  some  extent 
shares  responsibility with  the  Planning  Bureau. i ... l.G. 
A.l.9. 
A.l.lO. 
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Forecasting  takes  place  1n  each Ministry  although  only  fe..,r  have  muc·l 
research capability.  Fairly sophisticated methods  are  used  in  the 
Ministry of Transportation  which  also  conunissions  studies  ~:md  llw 
lnstitut  National  du  Logcmcnt  and  the  Ministry  of  Education.  There 
is,  in  addition,  a  National  Committee  on  Economic  Growth  which  has 
representatives  from  government,  unions  and  business.  Responsibility 
for  environmental  issues  is currently  shared  between  several ministries 
and  agencies. 
Forecasting research  is conducted at  a  number  of universities. 
The  Catholic University of  Louvain  has  a  programme  of  demographic 
research,  and)like  the  Free  University of  Brussels,makes mid-term 
economic  forecasts. 
Industry  in  Belgium operates  largely without  government 
intervention  and  this,  as  elsewhere,  tends  to  reduce  the  volume  of 
governmental  forecasting.  Regional  policy  in Belgium is  an especially 
sensitive  issue,  and  this  too  is  a  major  factor militating against 
comprehensive  long-term forecasting  in Belgium. 
Denmark 
A.l.ll.  Of  the  ten  European countries  covered  in  the  Council  of  Europe 
A.l.l2. 
study~
1 benmark has  the  fewest  organisations  listed,although  there  has 
been  increased activity in  the  last  few years. 
In Government,  most  of  the  bigger ministerial  departments  do 
their  own  forecasting,  but very little of  this work  is  general  or 
carried out  on  a  regular  and  systematic  basis.  The  Budget  Department 
of  the  Ministry of  Finance  has  carried Ollt  short,  medium  and  long-term 
torecasting for  the  public  sector  and  the whole  economy.  In 
particular,  a  working  group  was  set up  in  1968  to  assist  a  cabinet 
committee  to  co-ordinate  long-term economic  planning  in  govern-
ment  departments;  this  group  has  prepared  two  15  year 
planning reports  on  the  main  groups  of  public  expenditure  in  Denmark. 
The  latest report  (1973)  also  covered the  main  areas  of  the  private 
sector of  the  economy,  trends  in  private  consumption,  industrial 
production,and  the  impact  of  new  technologies.  Short-term economic 
forecasting on  a  regular yearly basis  is carried out  in  the  Ministry 
of  Economics,  which  also carries out medium-term  forecasts  for  the 
(1)  See  page  1  of this Annex A.l.l3. 
A.l.l4. 
A.l.l5. 
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ECE  in  cooperation with  the  Treasury  and  the  Bureau  of·Statistics. 
the  Bure3u  of Statistics itself also  prepares  demographic  and  labour 
J orcc  forcuists.  The  Bureau's  co1uprchcnsive  input  output  table  for 
lY66  was  used  in the  above  wentioncd  long-tenn  government  planning,  as 
well  as  in  several  sectoral  forecasting projects. 
In  the  Economic  Council,  established by  Statute in  1962,  Denmark 
has  an  institution similar to  the  U.K.  National  Institute for  Economic 
and  Social  Research  (see  later).  It is an  independent  government-financed 
body  which  makes  short-term  (a:r,d  to  some  extent mediuru-tenu)  economic 
forecasts  alternative  to  the  government  forecasts.  The  Council  also 
performs  longer-term structural analyses  of particular sectors  such  as 
housing  and  agriculture. 
Public  service and  regior,al  forecasting is carried out  by  the 
National  Planning Corrmittee  Secretariat,  set  up  in  1961.  The  activities 
of  the  Secretariat have  included  regional  population  forecasts  to  the 
year  2000,  forecasts  of manpower  demand  and  supply,  and  public expenditure 
forecasts  up  to  1985.  Statistical extrapolation techniques  are mainly 
used.  The  Danish Building  Research  Institute has  undertaken studies  on 
technological  forecasting,  and  produced  a  critique of  forecasting methods, 
concluding  that Delphi,  scenario,  rnorphological  and  network  techniques 
cannot  yet  replace more  traditional methods,  but  should  be  used  as  aids  to 
planning.  The  Institute itself has  used Delphi  in a  study  of possible 
scientific fields  to  be  established in the next  30  years. 
Non-goverr,ment  institutes in Denmark  carrying  out  forecasting are 
few  in  number  but  tend  to  be  engaged  exclusively in  futures  studies. 
Tl~c  Academy  of  Futures  Studies  is  an interdisciplinary organisation, 
founded  by  a  group  from  universities  and  industry specialising in the 
study of changing  social  systellis.  The  related Institute of  Futures 
Research  is  sponsored by  so~e 40  industrial  companies  and also undertakes 
contract  research.  Its work  is  primarily  concerned with industrial  prob-
lems  and  technological  forecasting,  with  a  time  span  of  up  to  ten years; 
methods  used  include morphology,  trend extrapolation,  simulation ntodels 
and  com?uterised cross-impact  techniques. 
The  Society  for  Fut~res Research,  established in  1968,  has  a 
more  ger.eral  educational  function  than  the  two  organisations  above. 
Surr.mer  schools,  meetings  and  colloquia are arranged,  and  the  society 
prod~ces the  only  Scandinavian  journal  of  futures  research. A.l.l6. 
A.l.l7. 
A.l.l8. 
A.~.  i '). 
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Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
In  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  there  has  been  no  detailed 
overall  economic  plan or  long-term co-ordination except  that  implied 
by  the  Marshall  Aid  Programme.  An  ad  hoc  'Commission on  Economic  and 
Social  Change'  was,  however,  set up  in  1971  by  the  Federal  Government 
to  examine  and  suggest  policies with  regard  to  technological,  economic 
and  social  change.  The  Commission  is  due  to  report  to  Parliament  in 
1975. 
Medium-term  foreca~ts of objectives  prepared  by  the  Ministry  for 
Economic  Affairs  form  a  basis for financial  planning.  This  forecast 
attempts  to  harmonise  production capacity with  revenue  and  expenditure. 
The  calculation does  not consider alternative  growth rates  and  economic 
or  financial  strategies. 
Several  Federal Ministeries  have,  however,  for  some  time  been 
engaged  in  long-term forecasting with  a  time  horizon of  1985  to 1990 
They  include not  only  the  Finance Ministry,  but  also  the 
Bundesministeriuru (BM)  Wirtschaft  (economic  sectors,  development  forecasts) 
and  BM  Arbeit  Und  Soziales  (labour market,  social  security requirements), 
the  BM  Inneres  (regional  and  urban  land  use  planning), the  BM  Wissenschaft 
und  Bildung  (educational  needs  ),  and  the  BM  Forschung und  Technologie 
(specific  technological  issues). 
Nevertheless,  planning which  influences  regional  and  structural 
developments  has  intensified in recent years,  and  between  regions 
plans  are  becoming  more  co-ordinated.  Through  the  Federal  Programme 
of  Regional  Planning  set up  in  1969- )_ 970,  it is  in  tended  to 
begin with extrapolation forecasts  up  to  1985  and  then  to  update 
these  regularly  in  the  light of  perceived regional  needs.  Examples  of 
co-ordinated activity are  the  overall  Education  Plan  instituted at 
the  national  and  regional  level  by  the  Bund-L~nder Kommission  fUr 
Bildungs  Planung,  and  the  Second  Development  Plan  for  Federal 
Highways  (197l-19b5).  Both  of  these  plans  are  based  on  cohort  and 
regional  analysis  of  population  trends. 
The  Bundeskanzleramt  (Chancellor~ office)  evaluates  existing 
public  programmes  (such  as  pensions,  health,  housing  and  agriculture). 
Extrapolations of  the  social  and  financial  trends  over  an  average 
of  10-15  years  are  made.  The  forecasts  used  by  Ministries  are 
produced  either by  internal  research units or  by  Government  supported A.l.21. 
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or owned  research units  (e.g.  Studiengruppe  fUr  Systemforschung, 
and  the  Sachverstandigenrat which  corresponds  roughly  to  the  Danish 
Economic  Council). 
As  in the United States,  there are  a  number  of  private and 
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non-profit  agencies  engaged  in forecasting,  and  the  goverrunent  relies 
on  the  forecasts  of  these  agencies  to  some  degree.  For  example,  in 
planning transport  and  energy  the  government  uses  the  long-term  fore-
casts  of  the Institut  fUr Wirtschaftsforschung.  Battelle  (Frankfurt) 
has  contributed  to  forecasting  labour markets,  foreign  trade  and  social 
environment. 
A.l.22.  Coordination  between  the Federal,  state,  university and  industrial 
A. 1. 23. 
A.l.24. 
activities differs  rather widely,  depending  upon  the  respective  partners 
and  i-.:he  field of  concern.  The  Genuan  Government  in  fact  intervenes 
in  private business  less  than  in  (say)  the United  Kingdom  or France, 
largely because  there is  a  much  smaller publicly  owned  sector;  in 
this  respect also  the  FRG  is  similar to  the  US.  In addition to  this, 
somewhat  wider  powers  are vested in the  L'=lnder  (state  governments) 
than  in other EEC  countries. 
However,  cooperation takes  place  in other ways.  For  example, 
research  into  employment  (labour market  and vocational  research)  is 
carried out  by  the Institute of Employment  Research  of  the  Federal 
Employment  Institution,  which is a  self-governing body  .... ·epresenting 
employees,  employers  and  public  corporations.  A  range  oi time  horizons 
are  adopted,  forecasts  are made  using  extrapolative methods.  Work  of 
this  nature  is also  taken  into consideration by  government,  for  example 
in the  Education  Plan. 
About  8-10%  of  German  industrial  enterprises  have  a  staff unit 
working  on  forecasts  of  technological  and business  trends  over more 
than  five  years  ahead.  Within private  and  semi-private institutions 
such  as  Zentrurn Berlin  fUr  Zukunftsforschung and Battelle e.V.,  there 
is  considerable  experimentation with methods  of  forecasting  such 
as  Delphi  and  simulation modelling,  although there appears  to  be 
a  general  impressivn that these methods  are  rarely used at  present  in 
industry or government. A.l. 25. 
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France 
Compared with other  EEC  countries,  a  high proportion of  planning 
and  forecasting  is carried out  in France  by  central  government  agencies 
rather  than  by  local  or  regional  authorities. 
A.l.26.  France  was  one  of  the first  EEC  nations  to  engage  in  comprehensive 
A.l.~7. 
A.l.28. 
A.l.  29 
long-range  government  planning.  The  Commissariat  General  du  Plan  (or 
Plan  for  short)  was  set  up  in  1946.  The  purpose  of  the  first 
Plan,  covPring  the  years  1946-53,  was  to  relieve  long-standing 
economic  stagnation  through  large-scale  investment  in  a  few  key  sectors 
such  as  energy,  steel,  cement,  railroad  and  farm  machinery.  It was 
based  on  a  sectoral-economic  rather  than  a  regional  analysis,  using 
rather unsatisfactory data.  A first attempt was  made  to  construct  a 
national  accounts  framework. 
From  1954,  the  Plan widened  in  scope  to  include  social  as  well 
as  economic  capital  expenditure,  and  its construction made  use  of  the 
new national  accounts  framework.  In addition sectoral  targets were 
complemented  by  regional  development  programmes. 
Since  the  3rd  Plan  (1958-61)  the  time-horizon  has  been  extended 
to  ten years.  Conventional  extrapolation of  demographic  and  macr0-
cconomic  trends  is  used,  and  the  rationale  is  that  structural  changes 
are  better  identified  through  a  longer-range  approach.  In  this way, 
possible  repercussions  arising  from  the  Plan  itself could  be  taken  into 
account  in  its formulation.  By  the  4th  Plan  (1962-65),  programmes  were 
bcjng  developed at  the  regional  level  and  co-ordinated  through  the  Plan. 
With  the  5th  Plan  (1966-71)  the  approach  used was  to  develop  a 
comprehensive  report  dealing  less with macro-economic  variables  than 
with  substantive  sectoral  issues  (agriculture,  education,  R & D etc) 
and  qualitative considerations  on  social  and  cultural  conditions  and  the 
consequences  of  economic  growth. 
For  the  preparation of  the  6th  Plan  (1972-75)  a  two-pronged  approach 
was  adopted.  On  the  one  hand  several  "analytic"  studies  were  prepared 
on  a  wide  range  of  problems:  social  development  (eg.  life style, 
patterns of  consumption  and  leisure,  urban  development,  demography, 
manpower  mobility)  energy, transportation,  telecommunications,  and 
postal  services.  In  parallel with  this went an  integrated  study called 
1985  - France  Confronts  Fu~ure Shock. A.l. 30. 
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For  the  7th Plan  (1976-80),  as  well  as  a  number  of  sectoral  studies 
along  the  lines  of previous  work  (e.g.  energy  and  transport),  two  broad 
social  issues  were  approached  in  a  future-oriented  way,  the  family,  and 
the  role  of  work  in society and  for  the  individual.  In addition  a 
"thirrl  generation"  of  integrated  futures  research  took  place  under  the 
so-c.1lled  Piganiol  Report,  "Towards  real  growth",  which  explored  the 
long-term potential of  economic  growth  in  the  light of current energy 
crises,  and  made  large-scale  proposals  to  narrow  the  perceived  gaps 
between measurable  increases  in  living  standards  and  social well-being. 
A.l.31.  Very  many  agencies  and  non-governmental  institutions collaborate 
A. 1. 32. 
A.1.33. 
with  the  Plan:  INSEE(l)  and  the  Direction  de  la Prtvision of  the  Ministry 
of  Finance  provide  the  data  base  as  well  as  policy studies  and  projections. 
DATAR, ( 2)  an  interministerial  agency  responsible  for  regional  policies, 
has  a  strong capability  for  long-range  studies  on  land-use  planning  and 
alternative  schemes  for  the  geographical  distribution of  population  and 
economic  activity.  Several  departments  have  their own  capacities  for 
policy analysis  and  long-range  forecasting  and  planning,  including 
Defence  (Centre  de  Prospective et d'Evaluation),  Foreign Affairs  (Centre 
d'Analyse  et de  Prevision),  Public Works  (Service  des  Affaires Economiques 
et Internationales),  etc. 
The  Commissariat General  has  a  staff of  about  150  (in total 
approximately  2000  people  are  working  on  the  Plan).  Coordination  of 
the  many  agencies  engaged  by  the  Plan  is  complex,  but  broadly  speaking 
the  planning  function  is achieved  through  'horizontal'  services  concerned 
with  economic,  financial  and  social matters  which  cut across  'vertical' 
sectoral considerations  by  joint committees  including  government, 
industry,  the  trade  unions,  and  agriculture. 
As  with all  forecasting  activities,  it is not easy  to  say  how  much 
notice  is  taken  of  the  Plan  by ministries,  and  development has  not 
actually  followed  the  Plan very closely.  The  1956-65  projections 
failed,  for  example,  to  take  into  account  the  tremendous  upsurge  in 
social capital  expenditure  of  that decade.  The  methods  of analysis 
used  in  the  Plan  have  varied;  input-output  tables  were  used  from  the 
3rd  Plan  (such  as  Fifi,  a  physical-financial model),  but  some  of  the 
attempts  to  introduce  sophistication,  such  as  five-year  forecasts  of 
trends  in  technical  co-efficients,  were  found  impossible • 
.. 
(1)  Institut National  de  la Statistique et des  Etudes  Economiques. 
(2)  Delegation a l'Am~nagement du  Territoire eta l'Action Regionale. A. l • '~I~. 
A.l.J5. 
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As  in other countries,  individual ministries .carry out  their  own 
short  and  medium  term assessments,  and  there  has  been  an  attempt 
to  institute Planning,  Programming  & Budgeting  System  (PPBS)  in most 
ministries. 
In  the  business  sector,  a  number  of  private  and  public  enter-
prises  do  a  lot of  forecasting  on  market  trends  and  technological 
developments  for  the  needs  of  their  own  long-term  investment  progra~ming. 
Sof'le  of  this work  is  done  in conjtmctionwith university  groups  (for 
example  the  University of Grenoble.) 
A.l.36.  Some  research  institutes are  under  contract  to  government  agencies 
( 1) 
A.t.·n. 
A.l.38. 
for  future-oriented  studies,  eg.  BIPE  on  technological  innovations, 
CREOOC( 2 dn  household  life-styles,  GEPf3dn  long  term  patterns of  international 
trade. 
Finally,  one  should mention  the  role of "turntable"  between 
publjc  and  private forecasting units  played  by  the  private  association 
''F'uturibles"  which  publishes  a  journal  on  futures  research,  as  well 
ilS  organising regular  round tables  on  future  policy issues  and  long-
term trends. 
Ireland 
Ireland's  first economic  programme  was  initiated during  1957-8  by 
the  Department of  Finance.  Simple  and  unsophisticated  in composition, 
the  plan,  which  covered  a  five-year  period  from  1959,  focussed  largely 
on  agriculture  and  set very modest  growth  targets.  It is considered 
to  have  been  an  important  psychological  boost  to  Irish national  morale. 
A.l.39.  The  Second  Programme  was  the  first real  a.ttempt  to  establish  a  national 
plan  for  Ireland,  and  for  this  the  Econorr1ic  Development Division was 
set up  in  1959  in  the  Department  of  Finance.  Work  began  in  1962  and  to 
some  extent  followed  French experience.  The  Second  Programme
1 extended 
to  7  years  (1964-1970~ was  much  more  sophisticated  than  its predecessor. 
A  national  accounts  framework,  together with  simple  extrapolation was 
used.  An  attempt  to  construct  input-output  tables  as  a  cross  check  on 
these  forecasts  was  made.  The  overall objectives were  not  achieved  and 
it is  generally considered  that  the  growth rates set  by  the  Programme 
were  too  optimistic.  For  the  Third  Programme  (1969-1972),  similar 
methodologies  were  employed  but  less  sophisticated  in  terms  of  the 
sectoral  detail,  and  the  time  span was  shortened  to  four  years. 
(1)  Bureau  d'Infovmations  et  de  Pr~vis1ons Econorniques 
(2)  Centre  de  Recherche  et  de  Documentation  sur la  Consornrnation 
(3)  Groupe  d'Etudes  Prospectives  sur les  Echanges  Internationaux. - 10  -
However,  the  Third  Programme  covers  a  wider  range  of  is_sues,  and  in 
particular more  details of  social  policy.  The  need  for  better 
demographic  forecasting  became  apparent  and  it was  subsequently 
improved. 
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A.l.40.  Many  of  the  forecasts  used  by  the  Economic  Development  Division 
A.l.4l. 
arc  based  on  work  by  the  National  Institute of  Economic  Research  and 
the  Institute for  Industrial  Research.  The  other major  research 
organisation  is  the  Economic  and  Social  Research  Institute,  set  up  in 
1959  to  conduct  applied  social  research  into  questions  of  Irish 
dcvclopmcnl,  largely concerned with  demographic,  socio-economic 
matters  and  agriculture.  Originally  sponsored  by  the  Ford  Foundation, 
this  is  now  a  government  department. 
There  is relatively little long-term forecasting  activity in 
Italy although  since  the war  successive  attempts  have  been  made  to  set 
the  regional  imbalance  between  North  and  South  in  the 
pPrspective  of  a  long-term national  plan.  One  proposal  for 
integrating  the  economies  of  the  North  and  South was  rejected  in  1962 
as  being  little more  than  an  extrapolation of  existing  trends.  The 
first national  economic  programme  under  the Ministero  del  Bilancio  e  della 
Prograrnmazione  Economica was  the  Pieraccini Plan  (1966-1971)  which 
attempted  to  resolve  the  structural  imbalances  in earnest.  An  inter-
ministerial  Committe~  for  Economic  Programming was  set up  to  coordinate 
the activities of all public  authorities.  In practice  the  plan was  too 
latP  and  too  weak.  Nevertheless,  the  setting up  of  special  regional 
planning committees  was  part of  a  general  move  towards  planning  in 
the  1960's.  Inter-ministerial  planning is coordinated  to  some  degree 
by  the  Ministry of  Planning.  A  hi-regional  mid-term national  growth 
model  is  in operation.  It is  intended  to  develop  this  ivto  an  econo-
metric  model  for  the  20  administrative  regions.  There  are  a  number 
of  industrial  and  independent  institutions  engaged  in forecasting. 
A.l.42.  IRADES  work  on  on-going  documentation  on world-wide  forecasting 
activity has  already  been mentioned.  The Istituto  Studi 
Prograrnmazione  Economica  (ISPE),  The Istituto  Ricerche  Economica 
Applica  - Futuribili  (IREA)  and  the  Centro  Informazioni  Studi  ed 
Esperienze  (CISE)  all  conduct  research  into  economic  forecasting. 
A.l. 43.  With  a  large  public  industrial  sector,  forecasting within 
individual  companies  is  important  in Italy.  FIAT,  ENI,  Pirelli, - 11  - Ann.  1 
Montedison  and  the State  Railway all operate  forecasting  departments 
.:1nd  sotue  are  experimenting with  siwulation  techniques.  The  Agnclli 
Foundation  and  the  Olivetti  Foundation  sponsor a  nwubcr of  social 
iorecasting projects. 
A.l.  44  The  GIPT  (Gruppo  Interaziendale per  le  Previsioni Tecnologiche-
Intercompany Working  Group  for Technological  Forecasting)  is an 
infonnal  association of  several  main Italian finns,  promoted  in  1970 
with  the  aim  of verifying the validity of  the  approach  to  technological 
forecasting  (TF)  adopted  by  industry.  This  is  done  by  forming  working 
groups  with  technical  experts,  often  from  the  R & D  department  belonging 
to  the  several  firms  involved. 
A.l.45.  The  only  study  to  look at many  economic  and  non-economic 
regional,  sectoral  and  social  trends  in Italy simultaneously was 
"Projetto 80"  carried out  by  ISPE  in 1969.  This  was  designed  to  gear 
national  planning to  long-term  forecasting.  The  study  included  techno-
logical  forecasts  of  the Italian production  system  by  CNR  (The  National 
Research Council).  The  basic  economic  studies were  carried out  by  CSPE 
(Centro Studi  e  Piani  Economica). 
Luxembourg 
A.l. 46.  Forecasting in Luxembourg  has  been  going  on  since  1964 mainly 
in  the  EEC  context,  though  some  independent  long-term  forecasting is in 
progress  in Amenagement  du  Territoire. 
A.l.47.  Economic  budgets  are worked  out  by  the Service Central  de  la 
Statistique et  des  Etudes  Econorniques  (STATEC)  and  used  for  the  prepara-
tion of  the  State budgets,  as  well  as  on  the  European  Co~nunity level. 
Mediurn-terlfl  forecasts  (5  years)  are also  STATEC's  concern.  This 
work  has  been  pursued since  1964 within  the  framework  of  the  European 
study  group  on  medium-tenn  economic  forecasts.  In  1970  and  again  in 
1975  the  Minister of National  Economy  convened  round  tables  to establish 
5-year forecasts  of  production,  investment  and  employment.  Forecasts 
have  been  published by  STATEC  in  1966  (1965/70)  and  in  1971  (1970-75). - 12  - Ann.l 
A.1.4n.  In the  field of  long-term planning,  mention must  be  made  of the 
Government's  endeavours  since  1970  to  establish a  "Programme  directeur 
/ 
d'amenagement  du  territoire",  based  on  forecasts  to  the  year  2000 
of  population,  agriculture,  industry,  services,  investLlient,  housing, 
health  and  social  overheads,  environment,  etc.  This.work has  been 
divided  into  35  sectoral  progran~es and  is being carried out  under 
contract  by  a  specialised French  firm with  the  collaboration of the 
Luxembourg ministries.  Progress  has  been  retarded by  the  intrinsic 
difficulties of  the  subject,  the  limited personnel  resources  and  the 
difficulties of coordination. 
A.l  .. 49.  Mention  should be  Hlade  also of  two  recent  studies  by  STATEC:  a 
population  forecast  up  to  the year  2000  and  an  analysis  of  the  trend 
and  the  cycle  over the  last 30  years  of  steel production,  Luxeaibourg' s. 
major  industry. 
A.l.SO. 
A.l.Sl. 
The  Netherlands 
Government  forecasting  in  the  Netherlands  is  indicative  and not 
directedexplicitlytowards  the  formulation of  policies.  Planning is 
largely ministerial  and  regional  and  consequently  largely based  on 
independent  projections.  The  three main  government  planning  agencies  -
the  Central  Planning  Bureau,  the  Social  Planning  Bureau  and  the 
Physical  Planning  Bureau  - are  located within  the Ministries  of 
Economics,  Housing;  and  Culture,  Recreation  and  Welfare,  respectively. 
The  Central  Planning  Bureau  is unofficially responsible  to  the 
Council  0f Ministers.  It has  a  total of  130  staff which  has  remained 
constant  for  about  10  years.  It was  set up  after  the war (Jan  Tinbergen 
was  the  first Director)  to  undertake  overall  planning,  but  evolved 
instead  a  short  term  economic  forecasting role.  A  'Central  Economic 
Plan',  a  one-year macroeconomic  forecast  of  the  Netherland's  economy, 
is  published  annually,  and  studies  are  made  of  the  likely effects of 
policy options.  Since  1963,  medium  term  forecasting was  begun, 
covering  periods  of  3-10 years;  two  such  studies have  so  far  been - 1 ")  -
published,  a  third being  due  in  1975  to  cover  the  period  up  to 
1980.  Work  is  proceeding on  an  experimental  longer  term  integral 
model  including economic,  demographic,  social  and  health  factors, 
education,  housing,  pollution and  employment. 
Ann.  t 
The  Central  Planning  Bureau  also  has  a  co-ordinating role;  when 
conflicts arise  between ministries,  the  Planning  Bureau  maps  out  the 
alternatives  but  remains  fairly  independent. 
A.l.52.  Mclhods  used  by  the  Central  Planning  Bureau  include  econometric, 
A.l.5J. 
A.l.54. 
A.l.55. 
statistical  and  model-building  techniques.  Methods  similar  to  cost-
benefit  analyses  are  used  to  incorporate  social  and  environmental 
issues  from  an  economic  standpoint.  The  Dutch  have  attempted  to 
employ  non-linear relations  in econometric  models  although  in  general 
this  was  found  to  be  more  sophisticated  than  the  data available would 
stand.  The  Dutch  Government  appears  to  take  more  notice of  the 
findings  of  its economic  models  than  any  other  governments.  This  may 
be  because  of  the  nature  of  Dutch government,  which  perrni ts  non-
elected experts  (eg.  professors of  economics)  to  be  seconded  into  the 
Cabinet. 
Long.-range  forecasts  in all  aspects  of  land-use  planning  are 
undertaken  by  the  State Planning Service which  has  been  in existence 
since  1941.  This  physical  planning  agency  has,  as  one  of  its tasks, 
the  preparation of national  reports  on  physical  planning  policy;  it 
develops 
1structure  schemes•  for  planning  in  such fields  as 
communications,electricity,  waste  disposal,  waterways  and  airports. 
As  an  example,  the  national  report of  1966  gave  an  indication of 
highway  infrastructure  in  the  year  2000.  The  Agency  also  produces 
regional  forecasts  and  policies. 
The  Social  Planning  Bureau  has  been  in existence  for  about  one 
and  a  half years  and  commissions  research  and  prepares 
1state of  the 
nation•  type  reports.  This  bureau  is not  independent  of  imrr.cdiate 
day-to-day  decisions  and  issues  and  is not  a  full  time  planning  agency. 
The  recently established Scientific Council  for  Government  Policy 
has  been  set up  in  an  attempt  to  integrate  the  po1icies of  the  other 
Government  planning agencies,  although  these  agencies  are  not  formally A.l.56. 
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subordinated  to  the  Council.  It is  responsible  to  the  whole  cabinet 
nnd  is  required  to  formulate  long-term policy  problems  and  forecasts 
for  Holland  as  a  whole,  and  to  develop  an  integrated  long-term basis 
for  priority determination,  including recommendations  for  changes  in 
institutional  arrangements  and  resources  for  long-term planning.  In 
fact,  the  purpose  of  the  Council  is  to  take  a  wide  and  unfettered 
view of  long-term objectives  and  represents  a  formal  acknowledgement 
by  government  of  the  need  for  considerable reappraisal  of  trends  and 
goals.  In  this  respect it is similar  to  the  Swedish  Secretariat for 
Futures  Studies  (see  later).  It is entitled by  law  to  publish whatever 
conclusions  of  its work it wishes.  The  Council  has  been  formally 
established but  is essentially experimental. 
These  organisations all  use  data  supplied by  the  Central 
Bureau  of Statistics.  This  Bureau  has  produced  demographic  projections 
using rather  simple  extrapolation methods,  and  apparently  taking no 
account  of migration.  Estimates  for  the  year  2000  have  been  repeatedly 
revised  downwards,  from  20  million  in 1969  to  15.4  to  16  million  in  1973, 
which  has  required revision  in  the  long-term forecasts  produced  by 
the  other  Bureaux.  The  technique  used  is likely  to  be  refined 
shortly.  Institutional co-operation has  been  established with  the 
Physical  and  Economic  Planning Offices with respect  to  regional  and 
labour  force  projections. 
A.l.57.  Apart  from  the  work of  the  above  bodies,  some  ministries make 
separate  studies  in  their  own  fields.  The  Ministries of  Defence, 
Foreign Affairs,  Agriculture  and  Housing  (through  the  Physical 
Planning  Agency)  are  undertaking  long-term programmes.  The  Ministry 
of  Justice uses  3imple  analysis  by  precursive events  to  forecast 
crime  statistics,  assuming  a  four-year  delay  compared with  the  USA. 
The  Ministry of  Economic  Affairs  is conducting  long-term studies of 
energy  problems,  although  this work  is  soon  to  be  transferred  to  the 
Central  Planning  Bureau. 
A.l.58.  Each  of  the  eleven  Dutch  provinces  has  a  so-called provincial 
11
planological
41 service,  with responsibilities  similar  to  the 
1
'State 
,. 
Planological  Service but restricted  to  their  own  regions.  For  the 
area  around  Rotterdam,  a  new  public  authority call  'Rijnemond'  is 
carrying out  forecasting  and  planning of  harbour  activities,  industrial - 15  -
development  and  environmental  issues  connected with  the  development 
of  the  harbour  and  related industries. 
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A.l.59.  As  in other countries,  technological  forecasting  is carried out 
by  large nationalised industries  such  as  Netherlands  Railways  and  PTT 
(postal,  telegraph  and  telephone  services).  Private  industry  in 
Holland  is  dominated  by  large corporations  such  as  Philips  and  Shell, 
both  of which  have  groups  active  in general  futures  research. 
A.l.60.  There  are  several  non-industrial  institutes  in Holland,  either 
partly or  totally  independent  of  government,  carrying out  forecasting 
in  specific areas.  The  foundation  'Future  Shape  of Technology', 
partly  supported  by  the  Government,  is  studying  important  technological 
developments  and  their  impact on  Dutch  society.  The  Institute of 
Agricultural  Economics,  also mainly  government  funded,  forecasts 
agricultural  production,  consumption,  labour  force  etc.,  methods  used 
include  trend extrapolation,  linear  programming models  and  mathematical 
models.  The  Netherlands  Economic  Institute,  a  private organisation, 
carries out  long-term economic  forecasting. 
A.l.61.  The  'Limits  to  Growth'  study had  an  enormous  impact  in Holland, 
more  copies  of  the  book  being  sold~  capita  than  in  any  other 
country.  This  interest is reflected  in  a  number  of  projects which 
began  in  Universities after its publication.  Project Global  Dynamics 
was  set  up  in  1972  at Eindhoven  to  analyse  the  MIT  world  models  using 
control-theory  techniques,  and  is continuing with  general  methodological 
work.  Work  on  a  separate world  simulation model  was  begun at  the Free 
University of Amsterdam,  but  this  study  is  now  restricted  to 
agriculture. 
The  United  Kingdom 
A.l.62.  In  the  United  Kingdom  long-term planning  is  largely  the 
responsibility of  individual ministries  and  of  the  local  authorities. 
A.l.63.  Apart  from  short-term forecasts  the  Treasury carry out  five-year 
public  expenditure  plans  (in  the  United  Kingdom  this constitutes  50% 
of  GDP)  which  draw  upon  the medium-term  forecasts  developed  in 
different  departments  (i.e.  each  department  is  asked  to  estimate what 
it will  spend  in  the  next five  years).  The  forecasts  are  exten~ed in - 16  - Ann.  1 
outline only  up  to  10-15 years  to  indicate  aggregate  effects on  the 
economy.  Detailed forecasts  are only  extended  beyond  five  years when 
technical  lead  times  require. 
A.l.64.  Most  ministries carry out  5  - 10  year  forecasts.  For  example, 
forecasts  for at least  10  years  are made  by  the  Department of Health  and 
Social  Security of hospitals and  social  services;'  by  the  Department of 
the  Environment  for  road  and  transportation planning,  housing  and  the 
construction  industry;  the  Department of  Education etc.  A wide 
variety of methods  are  employed.  Population projections  from  the 
Government  Actuary  Department  (set up  in  1929)  are based  on  cohort 
extrapolations,  although  in  the  light of recent experience with wide 
variations  for  population  projections  for  the  year  2000  more 
sophisticated methods  are  comtemplated.  Departments  concerned with 
transportation,  urban  development  and  manpower  planning have  all 
experimented with computer  models.  The  recently established Department 
of  Energy uses  several very  sophisticated methods  in an  attempt  to 
forecast  the  future  pattern of energy  demand  15-20 years  ahead.  The 
Ministry of  Defence  and  the  Defence Operational Analysis  Department 
engage  in  long-term studies.  There  is  some  official coordination 
between ministries  through  interdepartmental  committees,  but  there  has 
been little systematic attempt at producing  a  comprehensive  development 
plan. 
A.1.65.  The  failure of  the  'stop-go'  policies  around  1960  led  to  a  type 
of  indicative  economic  planning,  and  in  1965  a  National  Plan was 
produced.  This  showed  the  output  and  trade  levels required  to  sustain 
a  certain growth  rate  and  balance of  payments.  By  1968  the  Plan was 
recognised  as  over-ambitious.  In  1969  a  less  ambitious  and  more 
flexible  Plan  •the Task Ahead•  examined  various  economic  alternatives 
for  the  United Kingdom.  A detailed  •social  accounting matrix'  (input-
output model),constructed as  part of  the  Cambridge  Growth  Project) 
contributed  to  the  Plan.  Much  of  the work was  done  by  NEDO  (National 
Economic  Development Office)  and  its subsidiary sectoral  councils 
working  directly with  industry.  NEDO  also is  the main  forum of 
discussion between  government  (DepartmenUof Trade  and  Industry),  employers 
(Confederation of British Industry)  and  the  trade unions  (Trade  Union 
Congress).  The  discussions  are mainly  concerned with short or medium 
term matters. - 17  -
A.l.66.  Regional  planning boards  attempt  to  forecast  econom1c  activity 
in  the  regions  (including  Sc~land and  Wales  and  Northern  Ireland). 
Local  authorities  (ie.  towns  and  rural  areas)  are  required  to  submit 
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a  'structure plan
1  which  designates  land use  for  the  foreseeable  future 
(10-20 years).  Local  structure plans  are  intended  to outline 
strategies  for  an  area  taking  into  account  economic  and  social  and 
planning factors.  They  contribute  to  regional  plans  and  indirectly  to 
central  government  regional  investment  policy  (investment  incentives, 
employment  subsidies etc.).  Structure plans  are  based  on  straightforward 
projection methods,  supplemented  by  more  sophisticated regression analyses, 
time  series analysis etc.  and  there  are  several more  experiments  such 
J  ) 
as  the  dynamic  modelling of city growth. 
A.l.67.  The  short-term Treasury  Forecast  is paralleled by  similar fore-
casts  (also  based  on  econometric modelling methods)  of  the  London 
Business  School  and  N.I.E.S.R.  (The  National  Institute of  Economic 
and  Social  Research),  a  semi-independent  institute which  orginally 
began  these  forecasts  in 1959  at  the  request of  the  Treasury  to 
provide  a  cross-check on  the  Treasury  Forecast.  Some  50  economists 
are  employed  in  the  Treasury.  The  Bank  of  England  al~o makes 
influential  short-term pronouncements.  In recent years  the 
difference.  between  the  Treasury  short  and medium-term  forecasting 
models  has  reduced  and  the  two  have  been  largely  integrated. 
A.l.68.  Two  new  departments  have  recently  been established  in  the  United 
Kingdom  government with  a  brief  to  consider  longer  term  issues.  The 
first is  a  small multi-disciplinary  group  in  the  Cabinet Office,  the 
Central  Policy  Review Staff,  set up  to  consider  long  term strategic 
objectives  and  to  promote  in-depth studies of  important  departmental 
issues  such  as  energy,  race  relations  and  regional  policy.  The 
second  small  group  set up  is  the  DepRrtment  of  the  Environment's 
'Systems  Analysis  Research Unit'.  It is  looking at  a  variety of 
growth  factors  up  to  the  end of  the  century,  and  has  constructed 
experimental  'world models'.  The  setting up  of  this  department was  a 
result of  the  1973  United  Nations  Conference  on  the  Environment  held 
in Stockholm.  Although  small,  both  groups  are  believed  to  represent 
significant departures  from  traditional  thinking,  but neither  publish 
anything. 
A.l.69.  Commissions  and Committees  such as  those which  produced  the  Robbins 
Report  on  Higher Education  (1963)  and  the Roskill  Enquiry  on - 18  - Ann.  1 
the  Third  London  Airport  a~e an  important way  of  assessing  the  impact 
of  specific  trends  or  technologies.  Such  investigations  show  up  most 
of  the  problems  of  long-range  forecasting.  One  of  the  most  extensive 
modC'l.l  ing exercises  in  the  United  Kingdom  was  the  Royal  Commission  on 
Population or  )l)'JO.  Despilc  many  allcrnativc  proj12clions,wi~h much 
supporting analysis,  the  actual  population,  twenty  years  later,  is 
outside  the  range  of alternatives  suggested. 
A.l.70.  Research  funds  to universities  from  government  are  largely 
channelled  through  the  Research  Council~ although  government 
departments  contract studies  directly both  to  universities  and  to 
specialist private organisations.  The  Horne  Office,  for  example, 
makes  extensive  use  of  a  wide  range  of  agencies with  a  forecasting 
element  specialising in social  problems  such  as  the  Institute of 
Criminology,  the  Tavistock Institute,  the  Institute of  Community 
Studies,  and  "Political  and  Economic  Planning"  (PEP).  The  latter 
organisation has  carried out  a  survey of  forecasting methods  and 
performed cost-benefit analyses. 
A.l.71.  The  Research Councils  have  their own  research institutions but 
in  general  these  do  not  undertake  forecasting.  Exceptions  are  the 
Institute of Terrestial  Ecology  in  the  Natllral  Environment  Kesearch 
Council,  which  has  undertaken work within  the  International Man  and 
Biosphere  Programme  and  the  Survey Research Unit set up  to  advise 
on  methods  of  data collection and  analysis  for  social  research. 
A.l.72.  Among  nationalised industries,  forecasting  is carri2d out 
extensively  by  the  Post Office  and  the  National  Coal  Board,  both of which 
have  long  technological  lead  times.  The  Central  Planning Unit  of  the 
Coal  Board  is mainly  concerned with  5-10  year  perspectives,  but with 
some  work  up  to  the  year  2000.  The  Board has  a  large Operational 
Research  Executive which  collaborates with  the Planning Unit  in 
drawing  up  forecasts  by  means  of  simulation models.  The  Post Office 
maintains  a  10  year  rolling Business  Plan but  examines  possible 
alternative  developments  up  to  the  end  of  the  century.  British Rail 
are  interested in social  futures  to help  determine  contexts within 
which  possible  long-term  investments will  come  to  fruition;  they  are 
currently conducting  a  large-scale Delphi  survey.  In  the electronics 
industry,  the  independent Electrical Research Association carry out - 19  -
forecasting  in  a  number  of  fields,  using modelling,  cross-impact  and 
Delphi  techniques.  This  association is  sponsored  by  government 
departments  and  various  private companies. 
A.l.73.  The  Science  Policy Research Unit  in  the  University of  Sussex  is 
carrying out  a  programme  of  long-term forecasting  in  a  number  of 
fields  including energy,  agriculture,  and materials.  Methods  used 
include  computer  modelling  and  scenario writing.  As  in  the  case  of 
the  IREP  project in Grenoble,  the  energy  research  is sponsored  by 
several  private  and  public  industries.  A number  of  specialist depart 
ments  are  active  in particular fields,  eg.  at Queen  Mary  College 
(linear  programming  energy model),  East Anglia  (climatology), 
Aberdeen  (agriculture),  and  Cambridge  (Department  of  Applied 
Economics  and  Department  of Control  Engineering,  ~he latter concerned 
mainly with methodology). 
Forecasting in Eastern Europe 
A.l.74.  Planning methods  in  Eastern European nations all resemble  the 
Soviet  pattern  in  that fairly rigid  3  and  5  year  plans  based  on 
similar methods  are  prepared. 
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A plan of co-operation for  forecasting  between  COMECON  countries 
wus  adopted  in  1971  and  a  five-year  programme  to  examine  the 
implications of  this was  established.  Different countries accepted 
certain responsibilities;  for  example,  Czechoslavakia undertook  to 
co-ordinate  the  project  and  carry out methodological  research  into 
forecasting  techniques.  Nevertheless,  the  varying experiences  of 
Eastern European nations make  it worth considering  them  in turn. 
Czechoslovakia 
The  first complete  long-term forecasting  study  for  Czechoslovakia 
was  provided  by  the  Academy  of  Sciences'  Institute of  Philosophy  and 
Sociology  in  1966.  This  study  took  seven years  and  employed  about 
100  researchers  from  many  disciplines.  Problems  of  social  forecasting 
have  been  studied  !n  depth  in  the  institute using various methods  such 
as  Delphi,  extrapolation  and  cross  impact.  Scientific  and  technological 
forecasts  and  studies  are  made  by  the  Institute of  Economics  and 
Management  of Scientific  and  Technological  Development. 
A.l.76.  In  1971  the  Czech  Government  attempted  to  co-ordinate  forecasting 
3ctivities in order  to  prepare  a  forecast  for  the  nation up  to  1990. - 20  - Ann.  1 
The  areas  considered  include  broad  economic,  social  and.technological 
issues  and  detailed sectoral  studies of,  for  example,  life style, 
housing  and  machinery  (including computers  and  automation). 
Ucmocratjc  Republic  of  Germany 
A.l.77.  As  with other Eastern European nations,planning  in  the  Democratic 
Republic  follows  the  Soviet pattern of  a  5-year  plan backed  up  by  short 
and  long-term forecasts.  The  State Planning Commission  is  the  major 
agency  and  this reports  directly  to  the  Council  of Ministers.  The 
Planning Commission  pays  much  attention  to  the  elaboration and 
application of mathematical  economic  models  .at all  levels of manage-
ment.  Both  static and  dynamic  sectoral  input-output models  are  used 
in  conjunction with  dynamic  econometric models  (constructed  from 
regression equations)  and  simulation models  designed  to  forecast  5-10 
years  ahead.  For  longer  range  forecasts  availability of historic data 
presents  significant problems.  Simulation  and  other models ·have  been 
built by  the  Research  Institute of  the  Planning  Commission  for  use  by 
ministries. 
Hungary 
A.l.78.  Hungary  has  had  National  Economic  Planning  for  over  26  years  but 
until  recently its scope  extended  for  only  5  years. 
A.l.79.  As  in  the  Soviet Union at the  beginning of  the  1960's,  an  attempt 
was  made  to  formulate  a  20-year  plan.  This  experimental  exercise was 
abandoned,  although  the  experience  gained was  used  in  the  development 
of  a  15-year  plan  (1971-1985).  This  project began  in 1968  and  was 
directed  by  the  National  Planning Office who  co-ordinated  a  network 
of  committees  on  manpower  and  living standards,  industrial  developatent, 
construction  and  building materials,  agriculture  and  food,  transport 
and  communications,  foreign  trade  and  regional  planning.  Much  of  the 
work  is carried out  in consultative  committees  set up,  for  example, 
by  the  Hungarian Academy  of Sciences.  Comparative  studies of  industry 
are carried out  by  the Central Statistical Office  and  the  Institute of 
Industrial  Economics  using  a  variety of methods  including modelling. 
A.l.80.  In  Hungary  the first attempt  to make  a  plan using mathematical 
methods  was  in  the years  1963-65  in preparation for  the Third National 
Plan  (1966-70).  In  the  preparation of  the  fourth  5-year  plan  the 
Ministry of Metallurgy  and  Machine  Industry attempted  to  test  the - 21  -
effectiveness of modelling methods  against  traditional modes  of 
planning.  One  reason  for  the  establishment of  long  term  forecasting 
was  that it is considered  that a  five-year  forecast  is  too  short for 
planning an entire process.  (Typically  50-60 % of  investment  to  be 
realised during  any  five-year period  is already committed at the 
outset of  the  period).  It is  interesting  to observe  however  that 
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this  five-year  forecasting was  considered  too  long-term by many  Hungarian 
compa~ies who  preferred  to  develop  instead a  three-year  forecasting 
model. 
Poland 
A.l.81.  The  importance  of planning  in Poland  appears  to  have  increased 
over  the  last fifteen years.  The  primary sources  of official 
forecasts  are  the Polish Research  and Prognostic  Committee  'Poland 
2000
1  in  the  Polish Academy  of Sciences,  the  'Main Forecast Commission' 
and  the  Forecast Commissions  in  the  different government  departments. 
A.l.82.  In principle,  there  is an  interrelated system of plans  for  socio-
economic  development;  perspective plans  for  periods  of  ten  to  twenty 
years,  regular  five  year plans  and  annual  and  other short-term plans. 
Besides  this over-lapping series of national plans  there  is  a  parallel 
process  whereby  these national  plans  are  broken  down  into  comprehet~sive 
development  plans  for particular regions.  Regional,  industrial  development 
is  increasingly supplemented  by  spatial and city planning (i.e.  residential, 
recreation and  services  planning). 
A.l.83.  'Poland  2000'  was  established  in  1969  to  examine  possible  socio-
economic  developments  and  land  use  planning  up  to  1990.  As  such,  its 
main  task is  to  prepare  forecasts  of social  and  cultural  developments. 
Considerable effort is put  into  theoretical and methodol6gical  studies, 
in particular,  the  preparation of  'synthetic'  forecasts  which  would 
relate  together  the  activities of  the  various  planning departments. 
'Poland  2000'  provides  a  major  input  into  'perspective'  planning  and 
reports  to  the  Planning Commission at  the  Council  of Ministers. 
Reports  on  demographic  changes,  patterns  of settlement,  employment 
and  education and  energy and  other resource  stocks have  been made 
to  date. - 22  -
Rumania 
A.l.fl4.  In  Rumania  tho  Central  Commission  of  Prognosis,  set up  in  1971, 
cotlllllissioncd  long-r.111gC'  forc•casting  lo  provick  a  fr<~mPwork 
for  llw  National  Plan.  The  work  is  conducted  in  university  rest'arch 
in.slilutcs,  such  a.s  the  Laboratory  of  Pros!Jeclivc  Research  al  Rucharcst 
University  and  industries
1  and  synthesised  by  the  Prognosis  Commission. 
The  forecasts  in  some  sectors  up  to  1990  and  2000  are  intended  for 
the  preparation of  the  sixth National  Plan  (1976-1980). 
The  intention is  to  add  15-year  forecasts  and  some  25-year  forecasts 
Lo  the  rigid five-year  plan  (similar  to  the  20-year  forecast  included 
in  French  five-year  plans). 
The  methods  used  include  input-output analysis,  experimental 
simulation modelling  and  Delphi  exercises. 
Soviet  Union 
A.l.85.  Long-term  planning  in  the  Soviet  Union  has  a  long history 
beginning with  the  GOERLO  plan  initiated by  Lenin.  The  first 
comprehensive  attempt  at  long-term planning was  during  the  late  1950's 
when  the  State  Economic  Council  focussing  on  long range  planning 
issues was  established alongside  Gosplan  (the State  Planning Committee 
with  responsibility  for  short-term matters).  The  main  activity of 
the  State  Economic  Council  was  to  prepare  a  20-year  forecast  for  the 
period  1961-1980.  This was  a  very  large-scale project.  Many 
institutions  took  part  and  sixty commissions were  set up  to  deal with 
specific  issues:  economic,  scientific,  technological  and  social. 
Only  a  few  results were  subsequently  published.  Among  the  forecasts 
still considered  satisfactory  in  1969  were  the  forecasts  of  scientific 
and  technological  progress.  Despite  a  certain amount  of  success  the 
State  Economic  Council  was  disbanded  in  1961  following  the  forecast  and 
attention focussed  on  the  preparation  by  Gosplan of  a  succession of 
rigid 5-year  plans within  the  framework  of  ideological  goals.  (The 
9th  Plan  (1975-1980)  is now  in preparation).  Static  input-output 
sectoral  analysis  is  the main  tool  employed  although  some  attempts 
have  been  made  to  introduce  dynamic  elements. 
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There  is apparently much  less  'spin off'  from military planning 
activities  than  in  the  United States.  Nevertheless,  there  is  d  con-
siderable  amount  of  experimentation  in  the  Soviet  Union  with  sophisticated 
ror('Casting  .sysl<'ms  utilising computer  methods,  e.g.  integrated  systems 
of  teritorial  and  production models  which  employ  optimisation  routines 
to  indicate  routes  to  national  goals.  However,  especially  in  the 
technological  and  scientific fields,  the  collected opinions of many 
expert  committees  are  relied upon  (with  up  to  40  experts  on  each 
issue).  The  Academy  of Science  is  the  co-ordinating body  for  much  of 
this activity.  Statistical  informat1on  is  provided  by  the Ministry of 
Industry  and  Trade  and  the  National  Institute for  Statistical and 
Econornic  Research.  Studies  of  forecasting methodology  are  conducted 
by  the  Institute of  Social  Research. 
Forecasting elsewhere  in Europe 
Austria 
A.l.87.  The  primary  instrument of  planning  in Austria  is  the  federal  budget. 
The  only real  long-term planning  in Austria  is  the  ten-year  federal 
investment  programme,  which  is prepared  in 3-year  stages  and  includes 
medium-term plans  for  school  construction,  telephone  systems  and  railways. 
A.l.D[).  The  Finance Ministry  depends  heavily on  the  Austrian Institute 
for  Economic  Research,  and  also  commissions  the  Institute for 
Advanced  Studies  to  do  short  and medium-term econometric  forecasts. 
A.l.89.  The  Institute for  Economic  Research  uses  both  econometric  and  non-
econometric  methods,  and  is  the  only Austrian centre  to  deal  with business 
cycle  analyses  and  forecasts.  The  Institute for  Advanced  Studies 
was  a  pioneer  in macroeconometrics  and  prepared  the first macro-model 
of Austria.  Input-output  and  game  theory methods  are  also  used.  It 
is undertaking  empirical  projects  in sociology,  such  as  a  study of 
health  services,  and  a  project  on  social  indicators  is under  way.  Most 
studies  are  done  for  the  government,  a  number  of  government officials 
being on  the  board of  the  Institute. - 24  -
Norway 
A.l.90.  In  Norway  a  National  Plan  is  prepared  covering  a  period of 
four  years,  to  coincide with national  elections.  The  Plan,  which 
covers  such  areas  as  pollution,  social  policy,  education,  population, 
leisure pursuits  and  working  conditions,  is  a  combined  forecast  and 
political  programme;  it is more  political  than  Sweden's  long-term 
survey.  The  plan  is  presented  in April  of  the  election year,  and 
used  as  a  focus  of  political debate  prior  to  the  October  elections. 
During  the  Government's  reign  the  plan  is used  as  a  benchmark  for 
political  success  or  failure.  The  plan is prepared  by  ad  hoc  study 
groups  in collaboration with  the  Finance Ministry. 
A.l.91.  The  Economics  Department  in  this Ministry  performs  both  long-
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term  (up  to  2000)  and  short-term forecasting using econometric models. 
Modelling  is also  a  main  activity of  the  Central  Bureau  of Statistics, 
who  use  highly  disaggregated  input-output methods,  with  data  supplied 
by  different ministries.  These  models  seem  to  be  used  to  a  comparatively 
great extent  in  policy formation.  A third major  institution performing 
economic  forecasting  is  the  Institute of  Economics  at  the  University of 
Oslo  which  has  pioneered  work  in econometric modelling. 
Sweden 
A.l.92.  For  some  time  the  most  ambitious  attempt  to  create  a  broad  planning 
base  in  Sweden  has  been  the  "long-range"  (5-year)  economic  forecasts 
commissioned  by  the  Ministry of  Finance.  The  first  such  forecast. 
was  prepared  in  1948  by  an  independent  committee  of experts,  and  since 
1965  they  have  been carried out  by  the  Secretariat for  Economic 
Planning.  The  latest forecast was  produced  in  1970.  A  form  of  Delphi 
has  been  used;  data  is gathered  from  responses  to  questionnaires  to 
government  agencies,  local  authorities  and  industry,  analysed 
by  the  Industrial  Institute for  Economic  and  Social  Research  using  an 
input-output model, the  data is  then  ext~polated and  returned to  respondent~ 
for  their  comments.  Its object  is  to  aid  Government  planning  and 
assist communication  between  sectors of  the  economy.  Short-term 
forecasting  is  done  both  by  the  Secretariat and  by  the  independent 
Institute  for  Business  Research.  The  National  Institute for 
Economic  Research  prepares  quarterly  economic  forecasts  in collabora-
tion with  the  Finance Ministry.  An  input-output method  is used.  The 
Royal  Academy  of  Engineering  also  conducts  studies  into  forecasting. - 25  -
A.l.9'J.  Government  planning  and  forecasting  is  also  fairly  extensive 
in  the  fields  of  dE"fence,  regional  d~velopmcnt and  physical 
developments.  Time  hori.zons  vary  from  1  to  15  ye.:.1rs.  ln  1071,  the 
Prime  Minister  appointed  a  working  party  lo  consider  various  asp<'cls 
of  futures  studi(•s  in  Sweden.  The  main  :lim  was  to  enable  l.hc 
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Covernment  to  evaluate  Lh<'  need  for  more  systPmat ic  efforts  in  the  fulllrt's 
field.  The  report  of  the  working  party,  "To  Choose  a  Future"  was 
( 1) 
published  in  1972.  Following  this,  a  Secretariat for  Futures  Studies 
was  set up  in  1973  to  consider  fundamental  longer-term  issues of 
social values  and  objectives.  The  Secretariat has  begun  to  set  up 
a  study  group  on  technology  assessment,  and  has  planned university 
courses  to  promote  future-oriented education  and  research.  The 
Government  are  taking  increasing interest and  in  the  1974-75  budget  SKr 
4  million was  allocated specifically  to  futures  research. 
Switzerland 
A.l.94.  There  is little central  planning  in Switzerland;  only recently 
has  the  Federal  Government  attempted  to  develop  a  legal  basis  for 
national  planning,  its historical  role  being only  to  produce 
suggestions or  rules  for  the  cantons  to  debate  and  implement.  Recently, 
the  Federal  Government  did  reach  a  consensus  on  a  national  development 
scheme,  which  the  Delegierte  fUr  Raumplanung  are  studying.  The 
group  has  developed  a  population model,  a  traffic model,  and  input-
output models  of agriculture  and  the  environment. 
A.l.95.  -A  ~epor~ on  planning was  co-ordinated at  the  University of 
St Gallen  by  Professor  Kneschaurek.  This  study consists of  forecasts 
of  population,  traffic,  agricultural  production  and  energy  in 
Switzerland,  up  to  the  year  2000. 
Forecasting  in  the  United  States 
A.l.  96  Forecasting  in  the  United  States  is characterised by  a  high 
degree  of  decentralisation  and  lack of uniformity.  This  arises 
from  the  pluralistic nature  of  the  organisational  and  institutional 
structure of  the  country.  The  continental nature of  the  nation 
and  its three-tier governmental  structure  (federal,  state  and  local) 
contributes  to  this  diversification.  Much  organised  social  and  economic 
activity  takes  place  outside  of  government  control  in  universities, 
( 1)  "To  choose  a  future"  - a  basis  for  discussion and  deliJerations  on 
Future Studies  in Sweden  - Royal Ministry  for  Forei~ Affairs  in 
cooperation with  the Secretariat  for Future Studies  (1972). - 26  - Ann.  1. 
private businesses  and  private and non-profit agencies.  For example, 
there are  eight government  and non-government  forecasts  of 
short-tenn economic  trends which are  used  by  the American Statis-
tical Association,  in arriving at their  1average1  forecast. 
The  four  major  long-range  efforts  for  the  United  States  are 
an  inter-agency  growth  study  by  the  United States  Department of  Labour, 
an  inter-industry forecast  by  the  University of Maryland,  the 
w:tl c ,- resources  prograrrnne  by  the  Department  of  Commerce  and  national 
J 
anrl  regional  economic  projects  by  the  National  Planning Association. 
The  methodology  for  the  projects  varies.  The  inter-industry study uses 
a  dynamic  input-output model.  Although  there  are  no  national  overall 
'growth projects',  about  12  states  and  local  communities  are  examining 
their  particular situation. 
A.l.97.  Nevertheless,  the  United  States  Government  has  periodically 
set  up  corrnnissions  to  investigate  problems  of  a  long-term 
character.  Typical  is  the  Paley  Commission  set up  after  the  Korean 
War  to  consider  the  long-term  demand  and  supply  situation up  to  1975 
for  raw  materials  in  the  United  States.  In  the main,  extrapolative 
techniques  were  used.  For most,  but not all,  raw materials  demand 
was  under-estimated. 
A.l.98.  Several  government  agencies,  such  as  the  Environmental 
Protection  Agency  and  the  Office  for  Technology  Assessment,  have  been 
established  in response  to  the  perceived need  for  means  of assessing 
ar.~  controlling  the  impact  of  technology. 
The  Environment  Protection Agency  (EPA)  was  set up  in  1972  to 
monitor  pollution and  other  environmental  hazards  and  to  suggest 
remedial  legislation.  Considerable  effort has  been  put  into  the 
construction of  simulation models  of  the  ecological  and  social  systems 
considered  by  the  EPA. 
A.l.99.  The  Office of  Technology  Assessment was  founded  in  1972  as  an 
advisory  arm  to  Congress  to  help  identify physical,  biological, 
economic,  social  and  political impacts of  technologies.  Technical 
staff may  number  20-25  professionals,  assessments  being carried out 
principally  by  outside contractors  and  consultants. - 27  - Ann. 1 
A.l.lOO.  The  Science  and  Technology  Office of  the  National  Science 
Foundation  (NSF-)  was  se.t  up  in  1973  to  assist  the  Di_rector  of  the  NSF  to 
carry out  the  functions  of  the  former  Office of  Science  and 
Technology.  This  office assists  the Director  i.n  providing  ndvice  on 
national  civilian S  & T  policy,  developing  technical  options, 
appraising overall  effectiveness offederal  and  national  R & D efforts 
and  recommending  policy  and  programme  action  towards  the  achievement  of 
national  goals. 
A.l.lOl.  Co-ordination of  federal  social  forecasting efforts,  by  and 
large,  is minimal  and mainly  ad  hoc  throu6h  Senate  Committees  of 
Investigation  and  a  large  number  of  inter-dependent  planning 
committees~  Mechanisms  for  inter-agency co-ordination  include 
the  statistical services offered by  the Statistical Policy Division of 
the  Office  of  Management  and  Budget,  and  the  environmental  impact 
statements  required  by  the  Environmental  Protection Act  of  1972 
for  certain proposed  federal  actions. 
A.l.l02.  Beginning  a  decade  ago,  a  drive  to  introduce  PPBS  into 
governmental planning was  attempted.  This  was  in  use  by  1961  at  the 
Department  of  Defence,. and  all executive  departments  (directly 
under  the  President)  and  22  government  agencies  were  included.  The 
aim was  to  bring  to  the  foreground  the  basic  choices  in research  and 
in  the  application of  research.  These  departments  ana  agencies 
did  their  own  planning  and  forecasting;  there was  no  master  plan'. 
At  the  same  time  a  number  of  federal  programmes  called for  the 
preparation of  state plans.  Both  PPBS  and  federal  plans  achieved 
mixed  results,  and  much  criticism was  mounted  against  them. 
Nevertheless,  they were  and  are  an important  feature  of  American 
public  policy.  PPBS  involves medium-term  forecasting  of  GNP  and  the 
distribution of output.  Some  experiments with  public  expenditure 
models have  also  been  made. 
A.l.l03.  There  has certainly been  a  substantial  increase  in  the  number 
of  forecasting  institutions  in  the  United  States  since  the mid-sixties. 
Survey results  suggest  that  the  proportion of non-government  institutes 
is rather  low  in  the  United States  (perhaps  5-10%,  compared with  20-40% 
world-wide)  with  uni~rsities accounting  for  10-15%,  industry  20-25%, 
the  remainder  being distributed between non-profit  making  organisations - :l~  - Ann •.  1 
and  consultancies.  There  is much  private  sponsorship of  futures  research 
(35%  of  individuals  are  working  on  contracts  provided  by  private 
business)  and  there  are  a  large  number  of  consultRncies.  Several 
studies  are  sponsored  by  benevolent  organisations  (such  as  the  Ford 
Foundation,  Energy  Policy Project).  Several  major corporations 
(eg.  General  Motors)  carry out major  short-term economic  forecasts. 
A.l.l04.  However,  a  recent  survey  concludes  that  the  number  of  people 
engaged  full  time with  futures  research  in  the  United States has not 
expanded  significantly since  1969  in comparison with  the  vast 
increase  in  people  involved with  the  future  in many  different ways  (eg. 
concern with  long-term effects of  S  & T.)  Also,  within futures 
research  itself,  the  earlier emphasis  on  'forecasting'  and 
'prediction'  seems  to  have  shifted  somewhat  towards  the  'normative' 
approach  of  exploring overall costs  and  benefits of  alternative 
courses  of  action. 
A.l.l05.  For  many  of  the  large  number  of organisations  in  the  United 
States,  futures  research  is not  the  main  activity.  There  are  only 
about  six non-governmental  organisations  (and  perhaps  only  two 
governmental  organisations)  in  the  United States  that can  be  said  to 
be  involved  in full  time  futures  research.  These  non-governmental 
organisations  include  independent  private corporations  like  The  Futures 
Group  (in Connecticut)  and  Forecasting International  Ltd.  (in 
Washington),  the  non-profit  Institute for  the  Future  (in c;lifornia); 
academic  groups  like  the  Center  for  Futures  Research  (at USC);  and  the 
Center  for  Futures  Studies  (at Portland State University);  quasi-
professional  organisations  like  the  World  Future Society  (in 
Washington,  D.C.);  and  the  ad  hoc  research organisations  like 
Governor  Rockefeller's  Commission  on Critical Choices. 
A.l.l06.  A recent  survey  of  methods  currently used  showed  that  since 
1969  there  has  been  a  reduction  in  the  popularity of  Delphi  and 
quasi-Delphi  techniques.  Scenario writing maintained  a  high  ranking 
in order of  preference.  This may  be  attributed  to  the  relatively 
large  inflow of  social  scientists  and  educators  into  the  futures 
field.  Simulation  is used  extensively. - 29  - Ann..  1 
A.l.l07.  The  United States  provides  a  home  for  'forecasting spectaculars  ' 
such  as  the  Hudson  Institut~s  'Year  2000'  or  the  Club  of  Rome's  'Limits 
to  Growth',  and  for  'new'  methods  and  concepts  such  as  RAND'S  'Delphi' 
technique,  which  are  often rather minor  modifications  of  traditional 
methods.  The  publicity campaigns  surrounding  such  works  and  celebrities 
has  led  to,  in  the  main,  healthy  public  discussion.  Government 
agencies  too  have  engaged  in  the  controversy;  for  example,  the  United 
States  Department  of  Health,  Education  and  Welfare  undertook  a  study 
of  the  'Limits  to  Growth'  and  concluded  that no  immediate  policy 
action was  justified on  the  basis of  the  model.  Following  studies of 
several major modelling efforts,  the  National  Science  Foundation 
is now  demanding  greater  'policy relevance'  in  its· own  projects. 
Canada 
A.l.l08.  In  1974,  the Senate Committee  on  Science  Policy has  proposed 
that  a  Commission  on  the  Future  be  set up,  to  act as  a  post-box 
or coordinator of  futures  studes,  in the country  in general. 
A.l.l09.  In the Canadian Federal  Government  there is an  interdepartmental 
counnittee  on  futures  research,  it has  done  11  Delphis,  mainly  through 
consultants,  though  the  government  controls  and  appoints  panel  members. 
The  conuni ttee groups  15  goverrunent  departments,  and  has  a  sub-coauui ttee 
of  5  members  on methodology. 
A.l.llO.  The  Economic  Council  of Canada,  goverTh1lent  appointed  and  funded, 
but  reporting independently,  is hesitant about  the idea  of overall 
forecasting.  It has,  however,  a  large  econometric model,  CANDIDE, 
which  is useful  on  the  impact  of external  trade.  It can  be  used 
for  economic  target-setting,  and  there  has  been  discussion of the 
extension of its use  to "social targets". 
Forecasting in Japan 
A.l.lll.  In  Japan  economic  planning  is carried out  in  the  governmental 
Economic  Planning  Agency,  which  uses  econometric  methods  in construct-
ing plans  and  forecasts  for  five  years  ahead.  Such  a  plan was  made 
in  1972,  taking  into  account  both  economic  and  social variables, 
including  inflation and welfare  indicators.  The  oil crisis has 
necessitated substantial revisions of  this  plan.  The  Agency  regularly 
produces  an  annual  forecast  (using  analysis  and  discussion rather 
than  econometric  methods)  and  a  13  region world  econometric  model 
is being constructed. - 30  - Ann.  1 
A.l.ll2.  The  Economic  Council,  appointed by  the  Prime  Minister,  has  an 
inlcrcsting practice.  The  staff of  the  Council,  which is  drawn 
froHr  the  relevant ministry,  submits  to it every year three alternative 
growth  scenarios,  high,  middle  and  low,  from  which  they  rllake  a  choice. 
This  is  passed  on  as  a  recouuuendation  to  the  Priu1e Minister,  who  by 
accepting or rejecting it affects national  planning. 
A.l.llJ.  In  the  field of  Science  and  Technology,  a  ten year  plan 
conceived  by  the  Prime  Minister's Office was  drawn  up  for  the  decade 
1960-1970  by  an  Advisory  Council  consisting of  expert  academics 
~nJinduslrialists,  and  updated  once  in  the  middle  of 
this  period.  Starting in 1970,  a  sliding ten-year plan, 
u pdatcd every year. has  been made.  The  Japanese  Government  has 
also  recently established  a  Comprehensive  Research  and  Development 
Or).',anisation  (funded  partly  by  private  sources)  to  promote  research 
into  a  wide  range  of  economic,  social  and  technological  issues. 
A.l.ll4.  In  1970,  the  Science  and  Technology  Agency  was  set up  to  establish 
technological  forecasting  as  a  formal  and  recognised activity,  the 
previous  emphasis  on nuclear  energy  and  space  objectives  giving way 
to  a  more  balanced  approach.  This  agency  has  undertaken what  must 
be  the  largest Delphi  exercise  so  far  carried out  in  the world,  with 
400(!  panelists.  The  object  is  to  determine  important  fields  for 
consideration  and  obtain estimates of  probability dates  for  the 
realisation of  selected objectives.  The  agency  has  also  developed 
a  simulation model  of  the  interactions between  scientific research, 
development,  the  acquisition of  new  technology  and  industrial 
activity.  It is  far  more  ambitious  than  similar  aggregate  models 
developed  elsewhere. 
A.l.ll5.  The  Economic  Planning1and  Science  and  Technology  Agencies  also 
have  a  role  in co-ordinating  the  planning  and  forecasting work carried 
out  in  individual ministries.  The  Ministries of  International  Trade 
and  Industry  (MITI),  Finance,  Agriculture,  Construction  and  Transport 
are  among  those with  their  own  in-house  activities.  These  are 
perhaps most  developed  in  MITI,  which,  in view of  pollution  and 
resource  problems,  has  prepared  a  report  'Vision of  New  Industrial 
Structure'  with  a  ten-year  time  horizon.  This  study  involved 
exp2rt  discussion meetings  and  the  use  of  input-output  tables.  MITI 
has  also  used  Delphi  in  a  study  of  electrical  innovations. - 31  - Ann.l 
A.l.ll~  A number  of private  organisations carry out  forecasting;  the 
Nomura  Research Institute,.for example,  performs  technological  fore-
casting for  industry and  government.  Most  large  industries make 
forecasts;  for  example,  the  petrochemical  industry has  produced  a 
five-year  study  to  be  used  as  a  guideline  for  policy making. 
A.~ll7.  The  Japan  Techno-Economics  Society  is  important as  an  initiator 
of  work  in academic  institutions.  A number  of  studies  are  being 
carried out  under  the  auspices  of  the  Society at  the  University of 
Tokyo,  and  funded  by MITI,  including  a  world  simulation model,  and 
input-output economic  models  of Japan.  Work  of  a  global nature, 
with  special  reference  to  Japan,  is  carried out  rather widely,  no 
doubt  reflecting  the  dependence  of  the  country  on  world  economic 
conditions;  such work  is also  being carried  out at the  Osaka  and  Rikkyo 
Universities. 
Forecasting  in International Organisations 
Governmental 
A.l.ll8.  Following  the  retirement  testament of its late  Secretary General 
U.  Thant,  the  United  Nations  has,  in recent years,  deepened  its concern 
with  the  longer-term global  issues,  of which  the  Stockholm Conference 
on  the  Environment  and  that at Bucarest on  population have been  the 
most  striking manifestations.  It has  recently created within its 
Institute  for Training and  Research  (UNITAR)  a  Commission  on  the 
Future.  This  body will  be  active with  regard  to  forecasting methodology 
and  modelling,  in addition  to  stimulating and  coordinating  research  on 
the  future,  on  a  world-wide  basis. 
A.l~l9.  Several  United  Nations  agencies  devote  substantial  resources  to 
forecasting activities,  and  many  also  sponsor work  by outside 
institutions on  a  large  scale.  In general,  the  largest programmes 
have  been  those  for which  the  issues  involved have  required  a  high 
level of  international  cooperation  (in  that  the  actions  taken  by  one 
country strongly  influence other countries)  and  are  comparatively 
non-controversial. 
A.l.l20.  Environmental  issues  in particular satisfy these  conditions. 
The  UNDP,  for  example1 has  projects  on  the  Mediterranean,  Caribbean, 
Arctic,  and  Pacific;  UNESCO  has  sponsored  and  coordinated  the  world-
wide  ecological  study,  the  Man  and  Biosphere  Programme,  for which  a 
substantial  amount  of  simulation modelling  is being  used,  it being A.l.l21. 
- 32  -
felt  that  'Systems  and modelling  approaches  can help  to  bring about 
greater coherence  and  significance'. 
Mathematical modelling  is also  used  by  the  International  Labour 
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Office  (a  study of  prospects  for health  and  socio-economic  development). 
Indeed,  United  Nations  agencies  in general  appear  to  be  showing 
considerably more  interest in sophisticated methods  than national 
governments;  the  E.C.E.,  for  example,  has  made  a  study of econometric 
forecasts  and  holds  discussions  on methodology. 
A.l.l22.  United  Nations  agencies  publish volumes  of statistics pertinent 
to  their own  specialities,  and  often  use  these  as  a  basis  for  trend 
extrapolations.  The  FAO,  for  instance,  has  published projections  of 
supply and  demand  for  food  in under-developed  countries  up  to  1985. 
The  European Centre  for Coordination of  Research  and  Documentation  in 
the  Social  Sciences  has  carried out a  major project,  'Images  of  the 
World  in  the  Year  2000'. 
A.l.l23.  The  OECD  has,  in recent years,  shown  an  increasing  interest in 
longer-term problems  and  trends.  At  the  beginning of  the  1960's 
and  again of  the  1970's,  its Council  at Ministerial  level  issued 
forecasts  of  the  economic  growth  prospects  of  its countries  and  of 
the  membership  as  a  whole  for  the  decade  ahead.  OECD  undertakes 
annual  reviews  of  the  economic  policies  of  each  of its member 
countries  in which  the  implications  of  forecasts  for macro-economic 
policy are  stressed.  In general,  however,  the  OECD  economic 
forecasts  are  of  short and  medium  range.  Similar  reviews  and  fore-
casts of national policies are  undertaken  on  a  periodic basis  in 
environmental,  science,  educational,  social  and  aid policies.  The 
OECD  has  undertaken  a  pioneer  study of  technological  forecasting 
and,  more  recently,  has  published  a  review of  technology  assessment 
activities  and  methodologies;  it is also active  in  the  field of social 
indicators.  The  recent OECD  energy  studies  cover  the  problems  of 
energy supply  and  demand  until  1985  and  beyond,  while  research  and  development 
aspects  are  considered  in  an  even  longer-term perspective.  A study of 
the  long-term passenger  transport  requirements  between  the main  European 
cities has  been  undertaken  in cooperation with EEC.  A proposal  is now 
under  discussion,  on  the  initiative of  the  Japanese  government,  to  under-
take  a  programme  of  study on  the  long-term problems  of member  countries. - 33  - Ann.  1 
OECD  is a  major  source  of comparative  data  on  a  wide  range  of 
sectoral activities  including  economics,  trade,  monetary  transactions, 
agriculture,  energy,  tourism,  employment,  education etc.  In  this  way 
it complements  the  statistical work  of  the  United  Nations  and  its 
specialised agencies,  by  p~oviding comparative  data more  rapidly and  often 
in greater detail. 
Although  the  work of OECD  is more  future  oriented  than  that of 
most  of  the  other  international organisations,  little or no  attempt 
has  been made  as  yet  to  take  an ·integrated approach  in forecasting, 
or  in  identifying  the  interconnections  and  cross  impacts  of  the  various 
sectoral  trends. 
A.l.l24.  The  forecasting  done  by  and  for  the  European  Communities  has 
already been described  in I.l. 
Non-governmental 
A.l.l25.  In  the  academic  field,  the  International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis  in Vienna  is  the  result of  an  agreement  between  the 
U.S.,  the  Soviet Union,  and  East and  West  European  countries,  to 
cooperate  in various  studies of  international problems.  IIASA  was 
set up  in  1972  and  is  staffed by  scholars  from  a  wide  range  of Western 
and  Communist  countries,  most  of  whom  are  on  short-term secondment  from 
other institutions.  Environmental,  energy  and methodological  studies 
predominate  in  the  Institute's programme,  and  many  projects  involve 
sophisticated  mathemat~cal and  simulation  techniques. 
A.l.l26.  An  attempt  to  cultivate  transdisciplinary research  on  the  major 
world  problems,  on  a  long-term basis,  is  undertaken  by  the  International 
Federation of Institutes of Advanced  Study  (IFIAS)  which  was  set up  in 
1972  under  the  auspices  of  the  Nobel  and Rockefeller  Foundations.  Its 
objective  is  to assist its  23  member  institutes,  most  of which  are 
highly specialised,  to  conceive  their work within a  social,  economic 
and  human  framework.  A number  of  research projects  are  in progress, 
in which  the  relevant member  institutes and  other scientists  take  pa.rt. 
There  is strong participation by  the  Soviet Academy  of  Sciences.  In 
some  ways  the activities of  the  Federation can  be  regarded  as  an  academic 
complement  to  the  work  of  the  Club  of  Rome  - indeed  several members  of 
its Board  of Trustees  are  prominent members  of  that Club. - 34  - Ann .l 
A.l.l27.  The  Club  of  Rome  is  strongly  involved  in  forecasting.  The  chief 
concern  of  this  purely  infonnal  group  is with what it tenns  "the world 
problcmatigue",  the  tangle  of  inter-connecting problems  which  confronts 
contemporary  society and  which,  in  the  view of  the  Club,  cannot easily 
be  tackled with  traditional  policies  and  instituti~ns.  The  Club  of 
Rome  has  two  functions  - to  stimulate  research which will help  to 
elucidate  the  interactions between  the  various  elements  within  the 
problematigue,  and  secondly  to  discuss with  decision-makers  in 
governments  and  industry  the  implications  of  these  problems  and 
interconnections  on national  and  industrial policy. 
A.l.l28.  The  European  Cultural  Foundation,  set  up  in  1954,  is also  involved 
in  general  forecasting activities;  its aim  is  the  'promotion of cultural, 
scientific and  educational activities of  a  multi-national  character and 
of European  inspiration'.  The  Foundation makes  use  of inter-
disciplinary discussion  groups  and  scenario  writing 
rather  than mathematical  techniques.  Its major project is  'Europe 
2000'  which  consists  of  studies of alternative social  structures  in 
the  fields  of education,  industrialisation,  urbanisation  and  rural 
society  in  the  21st Century. 
A.l.l29.  Another  example  of  international cooperation  is  'Project Link' 
initiated by  the  United  States  Soci8l  Sciences  Research Council  to 
examine  the  feasibility of  forging  links  between national  econometric 
models.  The  idea  is  that each participating country provides  estimates 
of its local  inputs  and  import  and  export prices  from  its own  national 
model,  these  data  being  used  centrally,  mainly  to  forecast  future  world 
trade.  These  data are  fed  back  to  participants  for  possible  re-
evaluation of  their own  estimates. 
A.l.l30.  The  ~lorld Futures  Studies  Federation provides  a  forum  for 
conferences  with  delegates  from,  particularly,  Eastern and  Western 
Europe  and  the  United  States. 
A.l.l31.  There  are  international consultancy organisations  which  undertake 
forecasting  and  related work  under contract;  the  largest of  these 
maintain  quite  an  extensive  capability,  and  the  best bear comparison 
with  the  best governmental  and  academic  work.  Several  U.S.  based 
organisations  have  offshoots  in Western Europe. - 35  - Ann.l 
A.l.l32.  Most  international  firms  carry out  forecasting,  particularly  those 
with  long  technological  lead  times.  Methods  used  include  Brainstorming 
and  Delphi;  studies  involving sophisticated methods  are also  undertaken 
but are  usually contracted out  to  other organisations. ANNEX  2 
An  Interaction between European  Parliamenta5ians 
and  the Mesaroyic-Pestel World  Model 
A.2.1.  On  February  24  - 26,  1975,  on  the initiative of the  Commission  of 
the European Communities,a meeting was  held at the Medizinische  Hochschule, 
Hanover,  when  seven members  of the parliaments  of Community  countries, 
some  of whom  were  also members  of  the  European Parliament,  were  personally 
to "interact" with the Mesarovic-Pestel World Model. 
The  parliamentarians present were: 
P.-B  Couste 
G.  Fllfmig 
Lord.Kennet 
C.  Meintz 
K.  Helwig  Petersen 
Senator Mary  Robinson 
J.C.  Terlouw 
France 
Gennany 
Britain 
Luxembourg 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Professors Mesarovic  and Pestel,  certain members  of  their  team,  certain 
members  of  the  Europe  Plus  Thirty Project Board  and  Team,  and  about  15 
other observers,  some  from  the  European Commission,  were  also present. 
Presentations  and  Activities 
A.2.2.  The  structure of  the  model  and  its modes  of operation were 
described by  Professors Mesarovic  and  Pestel and  members  of  their 
team. (l)  The  model  is global  in scope,  disaggregated  into  ten 
geographical  regions  and  nine  economic  sectors,  and  is highly 
complex,  containing about  100,000  relationships.  These  relation-
ships  are  contained  in a  so-called  'causal stratum'  and,  in 
operation,  are  supplemented  by  input values  specified by  the  operator. 
Values  which must  be  specified are  of  two  types:  'policy'  variables 
(i.e. allocation of  resources  between sectors)  and  'parameter' 
variables  (such as  potential oil reserves,  about which  uncertainty 
exists).  The  specification of  these Yariables  constitutes  the 
(1)  See  "Mankind  at the  Turning Point" by  Professors Mesarovic  and 
Pestel  and  IIASA  conference  proceedings:  "Multilevel  Computer  Model 
of World  Development  System"  by Professors Mesarovic  and  Pestel 
(6  volumes)  (Laxenburg- 29th April  - 3rd May,  1974). 2 
operator's  'scenario',  the  repercussions  of which  are  to  be 
indicated  by  the  model.  These  variables  can  be  given  in 
qualitative  form  (e.g.  a  choice  made  between  high,  medium  or 
low  values)  or  f1Uantitativc  (numericnl)  form. 
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A.2.·3.  The  model  was  in  a  state  where  two  particular  issues  could  be 
A.2.4. 
A.2.5. 
explored:  the  world  oil  and  food  situations.  On  the  first day 
some  sample  runs  of oil scenarios  were  made  and  result.5  discussed. 
On  the  second  day,  the  parliamentarians  were  given  the  opportunity 
personally  to  operate  the  model,  on-line via  terminals  in  the 
conference  room,  allowing  them  to  study  the  repercussions  of 
alternative  scenarios  directly. 
Reactions  of  the  Parliamentarians 
The  parliamentarians all felt  that  the  operation had  been 
useful,  and  also  that computer models  in general  could  form  a  use-
ful  input into  the  policy-making process,  and  could help  to  reduce 
uncertainty in decision-making. 
Obviously,  the  model  did not address  itself  to  the  kind  of 
problem with  which  theywere  often concerned in their 
day-to-day work.  Firstly,  the  scale  of  the  problems  considered  in 
the  model  was  very  broad;  the  parliamentarians were  usually concerned 
with  comparatively  'small'  decisions,  while  the  model  considered 
gigantic  ones.  Politicians  were  normally  engaged  in  forming  policy 
within particular sectors,  and  were  not  used  to  discussing cross-
sectoral  policy.  Secondly,  the  time  scale  covered  by  the  model  runs 
(up  to  fifty years)  was  far  greater  than  that normally  considered  by 
parliamentarians,  who  were  often  forced  to  be  concerned with  short-
term  issues  with  an  eye  on  the  next election.  On  the  other hand, 
one  member  of  the  Mesarovic-Pestel  team,  who  had  been  sitting with 
the  parliamentarians  and  coaching  tfuem  in  the  interaction procedures, 
gave  the  opinion  that  they  used  the  model  "better"  than  the  average 
group  of  the  same  education,  since  they were  "already aggregated  to  the 
right  level",  i.e.  used  to  thinking  farther  and  wider  than most  people. A.2.6. 
A.2.7. 
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Most  of  the  parliamentarians  thought  that  the  model  had  an  indirect 
value,  in  that it helped  them  to  step  back  and  survey  long-:erm  issues. 
One  compared  it to  a  religious  retreat.  This  view  is  in  line with  its 
makers'  own  hope,  that it can help  to  form  conceptual  guidelines  for 
policy rather  than  specific policies.  Some  parliamentarians  remarked 
that it forced  them  to  think far  and  wide. 
One  parliamentarian devoted  considerable  preparation  and  care  to 
"trying  the  standard solution of  lower  energy  consumption  and  lower 
growth  in  the  West  and  seeing if I  inadvertently kill a  few  million 
Asians".  None  of  the  parliamentarians was  flummoxed  by  the  inter-
action process,  though  some  learned  to  do  it much  more  slowly  than 
others,  and  continued  to  do  it for  longer.  Several  asked  searching 
questions  about  the  relation between man,  machine  and  reality.  The 
experiment  confirmed what  was  already known:  you  don't  have  to  be  a 
computer  professional  to  use  a  computer,  or a  systems  analyst  to 
understand  a  system. 
Conclusion 
The  meeting was  not  to  judge  the  place of computer modelling  in 
forecasting or  the  validity and  merits  of  the  particular model  used. 
It was  simply  to  try,  for  the  first  time,  a  direct interaction between 
a  group  of parliamentarians  and  a  model,  in order  that  the  parliamentar~ans 
could  assess  the  possible utility of  such  a  technique  from  their point 0f 
view.  Obviously  any  conclusions must  be  highly  tentative,  because  thEre 
is no  guarantee  that  the  group  was  representative  of  the  parliamentariaJs 
in  the  member  countries,  nor  that  the  model  was  representative  of  the  real 
world.  Although  reservations  were  expressed  regarding  the  value  of 
large-scalemodels  inview of  the  diversity and  complexity  of  the  policy-
making  process,  the  feeling of  the meeting was  that such exercises  could 
provide  a  useful  stimulus  to  discussion about broad  long-term developments 
and  could act as  an  educational  aid  to politicians.  We  sum  up  by  quoting 
the  words  of one  of  them:  "It is hard  to  believe  once  a  policy-maker has 
been  introduced  to it that he  would  just say  thank you  very much  and  walk 
away. A. 3.  1. 
A. 3.  2. 
ANNEX  3 
TECHNOLOGY  ASSESSMENT  AS  IT  IS  DONE  AT  PRESENT 
Developments  inside  the  European  Community 
Federal Republic  of Germany 
The  Federal Republic  of Germany  is  one  of  the  few  countries 
in which  a  parliamentary discussion on  the  creation of a  central 
TA  institution has  been  seriously undertaken.  The  working  group 
on  research and  technology of  the  CDU/CSU  faction started this 
discussion.  They  elaborated a  proposal  for  the  creation of an 
"Office  of Evaluation of Technological  Development"  in  the  German 
Bundestag;  it was  introduced  in  the  Bundestag  by  the  opposition 
in April  1973,  and  was  briefly debated  on  first reading  in May 
1973.  The  proposers  start from  the  premise  that parliamentarians 
are  overtaxed when  assessing complicated  and  expensive  research 
and  development projects  and  that  they  feel  overrun by  concentrated 
expert knowledge.  They  felt  tha~although the  creation of  a 
committee  for  research and  technology provided  the  preconditions  of 
a  certain control  of  technology policy,  to  improve  the  preparation 
of decisions  for parliamentarians  an  institution would  be  necessary 
which  would  identify and  assess  the  social and  economic  effects of 
technological  developments  with  the  aid of  systems  analysis.  The 
Research  and  Technology  Committee  of  the  Bundestag  is called upon, 
ia the  proposal,  to carry out studies  on  the  organisation,  the man-
power,  and  the  finance  for  such  a  TA  institution. 
The  present coalition parties are not  fundamentally  opposed  to 
an establishment advising parliamentarians as  to  the  consequences  of 
technology.  But  they prefer other institutional possibilities. 
The  SPD  warns  against uncritically  taking over  the  American  OTA 
solution,  which was  developed  for  a  system of separation of powers 
typical  of  the  USA  and  differing substantially from  the  German 
system.  Instead it suggests  something  corresponding  to  the  German 
Council  of Experts  for  the  Examination of Economic  Development A. 3.  3. 
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(SachverstHndigenrat  zur Begutachtung  der gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung).  The  SDP  proposes  the  establishment of  an 
"organisational  office"  attached  to  the  Secretariat of  the 
Committee  for  Research  and  Technology  or  to  the  Scientific 
Service  of  the  Bundestag.  This  office would  put  together ad 
hoc  units  to  carry out  TA  contracts. 
In December  1973  at a  TA  hearing parliamentarians  had  the 
opportunity  to  question an  expert panel,  invited by  the  Research 
and  Technology  Committee,  on  the  goals  and  methods  of  TA  and  on 
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the  possibilities of its political  implementation.  At  the 
beginning of  1974  the  Studiengruppe  fUr  Systemforschung  (SfS), 
Heidelberg,  was  asked  by  the  administration of  the  Bundestag  to 
report  on  the  problems  and  methods  of  TA  and  the  possibilities of 
institutionalising it under  the  Bundestag.  This  report  formed  the 
basis  of  a  further  debate  on  the  CDU/CSU  legislative proposal  in 
the  Committee  for Research  and  Technology  in December  1974.  The 
representative  of  the  Ministry  for Research  and  Technology  (BMFT) 
announced  at this meeting  the  willingness  of  the  government  to make 
all  TA  studies of  the  BMFT  available  to  the  Bundestag,  and  to  give 
the  Bundestag  the  opportunity  to  expand  the  subject matter before 
contracting  any  studies.  The  C0mrnittee  did not yet make  a 
recommendation  to  the  Bundestag  for  the  decision  on  the  question 
of  a  parliamentary TA  establishment,  but asked  the  CDU/CSU  to  make 
its  ideas  more  precise.  Finally,  however,  at a  meeting  in April 
1975  the  Government majority  in  the  Committee  for Research  and  Technology 
rejected  the  CDU/CSU  legislative proposal. 
A.3.  4.  In  the  industrial sector,  the Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm  GmbH 
(Ottobrunn)  and  the  Dornier  System  GmbH  (Friedrichshafen),  with 
their large  systems  engineering capabilities,  are particularly 
worthy  of mention.  Some  of  their systems  studies  on  aerospace  and 
other  transport  technologies  can  be  regarded  as  partial TA  analyses. 
Since  1970  industry has  financed  the  Institute  for  the  Study of 
Technological  Developments  (Institut zur Erforschung  technologischer 
Entwicklungslinien  - ITE)  in Hamburg,  which  deals  with  urban  develop-
ment,  transport,  environment  and  associated problems.  Its study 3 
on  passenger  transport  in  large  residential  areas  includes  an 
evaluation of new  alternative  transport  systems  from  the  view-
point of  technology,  the  economy,  and  society and  is  an  example 
of  a  problem-oriented  TA  analysis. 
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A.3.  5.  In  the  non-profit sector,  the  Study Group  for  Systems  Research 
A. 3.  6. 
(Studiengruppe  fUr  Systemforschung e.V.  - SfS)  in Heidelberg,  an 
independent organisation with  a  scientific staff of about  50,  and 
financed  by  the  BMFT,  has  in  the  last few  years  undertaken  a 
series of TA-like  studies,  including  one  on  the  application of 
modern  technical  aids  i.n  schools.  At  the  beginning of  1975  part 
of  the  SfS  was  merged  with  the  systems  engineering division of  the 
Institute  for Applied  Systems  Engineering  and  Reactor Physics 
(Instit~t fUr  Angewandte  Systemtechnik  und  Reaktorphysik  - IASR) 
of  the  Nuclear Research Centre  in Karlsruhe  to  form  a  new  Institute 
for Applied  Systems  Analysis  (Institut fllr Angewandte  Systemanalyse 
- IAS).  The  aim of  this merger  is  to  complement  the  predominantly 
natural  science  and  technology oriented systems  analysis  and 
forecasting  capacity of  the  former  IASR  with  a  substantial social 
science  capacity.  For  1976  the  new  systems  analysis  group  is 
planning,  among  other  things,  an  assessment analysis  of alternative 
concepts  for siting nuclear  power  plants  (e.g.  energy parks)  and  a 
study  on  the  tolerance  limits of environmental  pollution. 
The  Battelle Institute,  Frankfurt,  has  established in its 
department  "Applied  Social  and  Behavioural  Research"  a  divisi0n 
called "Technology Assessment,  Corporate  Social  Accounting  and 
Evaluation Research".  It mainly  deals with  industrial  TA. 
One  of  the  few  studies  in  the  Federal Republic  which  from  the 
beginning was  set out as  a  technology assessment,  is  the  project 
on  a  planned  refinery extension  in North  Baden,  undertaken by  the 
Institute  for  Systems  Technique  and  Innovation Research  (Institut 
fUr  Systemtechnik und  Innovationsforschung  - lSI)  of  the  Fraunhofer 
Society for  the  Promotion of Applied Research  in Karlsruhe. 
Originally  this  study was  conceived of as  a  "participatory assessment", 
in which  representatives  of affected groups,  especially  trade  unions, A. 3.  7. 
A. 3.  8. 
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industry  and  citizen groups  were  to  take  part in a  simulation 
experiment.  But  industry and  the  trade  unions  have  stopped 
participating  so  as  not  to  impair  their  freedom  of decision. 
In  1973  lSI  had  a  staff of  20.  It is  planning  further  TA 
analyses,  for  instance  on  the  impact  of automation  in manu-
facturing  industry. 
If we  are  to  take  a  very broad  definition of  technology 
assessment, we  should  mention  in  this  connection  the  "Max  Planck 
Institute  for  the  Study of Living Conditions  in  the Scientific-
Technical  World"  (Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung  der 
Lebensbedingungen  der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt)  at 
Starnberg near Munich.  In  the main  this  institute pursues 
basic  research.  The  questions  dealt with are  predominantly  in 
the  fields  of conflict research,  consequences  of  atomic warfare, 
environmental  problems,  problems  of  the  'Third World',  the  role of 
science  in  the  world  of  today  and  tomorrow. 
France 
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In France  there  has  so  far  been  no  serious  debate  on  institutionalising 
the  "Evaluation des  Options  Techniques"  (assessment of  technical 
choices)  at the  legislative  level.  One  should,  however,  mention 
that during  the  latest presidential election  the  Socialists pleaded 
that written "environmental  impact  statements"  should  be  legally 
enforced. 
On  the  other hand,  in  the  course  of "planification" government 
authorities  and  institutions have  for  years  taken  the  evaluation of 
consequences  into consideration  in  their plans  and  decisions.  This 
is particularly  true  for  two  areas  of  government  planning,  environment 
and  land  use.  Besides  the  TA  and  TA-like  activities of  such  govern-
mental  institutions  as  the  D~l~gation a l'Am~nagement du  Territoire et 
~ l'Action  R~gionale  (DATAR),  the  Agences  Financi~res de  Bassin,  and 
the  working  group  "Evolution  des  techniques et techniques nouvelles 
au  regard  de  l'Environnement"  (Groupe  D)  of  the  Interministerial A.3.  9. 
A.3.10. 
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Project Group  for  Environment  Problems,  a  new  TA  initiative in 
the  French executive  deserves  special mention,  viz.,  the 
establishment of  the  research  group  EVATEC  (Evaluation Technique) 
by  the  French Atomic  Energy Authority  and  the  Conservatoire 
National  des  Arts et Metiers. 
Great Britain 
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The  debate  on  the  control of  technological  progress  is also 
followed  in Great Britain with  lively interest,  but  the 
institutionalisation of  TA  in  the  legislature on  the  American model 
is not seriously considered. 
The  activities of  the  Programmes  Analysis  Unit  (PAU),  the 
"in-house" analysis  capacity of  the  Department of Industry and  the 
Atomic  Energy Authority,  range  from  testing and  developing methods 
for  the  evaluation of R &  D programmes,  to  the  assessment of 
technological  projects  and  technological  and  social  forecasting. 
The  PAU  carries out analyses  according  to  the  needs  of its sponsors. 
It is not  the  task of  PAU  to  judge which  technological  developments 
or assessment  tasks  have  special  relevance  according  to  overarching 
criteria and  should  therefore  be  given priority.  PAU's  significance 
in promoting  and  spreading  the  idea of  TA  and  its implementation and, 
thus,  in guiding  the  future  development  of British  societ~ is severely 
limited because  nearly all its studies  are  confidential.  Among 
those  which  have  become  known  in detail  there  are  some,  such  as  the 
study entitled "An  Economic  and  Technical Appraisal  of Air Pollution 
in  the  United Kingdom"(l)  and  a  study of  the  dredging  technology(2), 
which  can  be  regarded  as  partial TA's. 
(1)  PAU,  Chilton,  Didcot,  Berks.,  1972. 
(2)  Economic  Study of Dredging Technology,  study prepared by 
the  PAU  for  the  Committee  on Marine  Technology, 
CMT  publication No.  6,  London  1971. A.3.ll. 
A. 3. 12. 
A.3.13. 
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Public  Inquiries  are  not  fixed  in detail  by  law;  they 
arc  initiated by  ministers  after an  appeal  to  central  government 
by  citizens or organisations  against decisions  on  the  local or 
regional  level,  or  immediately by  the minister concerned.  In 
the  last few  years  many  Public  Inquiries have  been carried out 
whose  subject matter and  approach made  them  like TA's.  ~ases 
of  ex post facto  technology  assessments  in  inquiry  form  were, 
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for  instance,  the  inquiries  into  the  accident  to  the  drilling rig 
"Sea  Gem"  (1967),  the  collapse of  the  Ronan  Point Building  in 
London  because  of  a  gas  explosion  (1968),  the  accident at  the  Hixon 
level  crossing  (1968),  and  the  explosion of  the  chemical  plant at 
Flixborough near  Scunthorpe  (1974).  In all  these  instances, 
interviews,  discussions,  investigations,  and  reports  brought  to 
light  important  insights  into  technical  sources  of error and 
weaknesses  in engineering which  affected public  safety. 
Information was  gained which,  had it been  assessed  in  the  technical 
planning  phase,  would  have  led  to  safer construction and might have 
avoided  the  accidents. 
The  Select Committee  on  Science  and  Technology  of  the  House  of 
Commons  does  not carry out assessment  in  the  proper sense,  but it 
does  persevere  in reporting  on  current science  and  technology policy 
problems.  Especially worthy of mention  is  its report of July  1973  on 
the  cancellation of  the  tracked hovercraft project,  dealing with  the 
development  of  a  track-bound high-speed  transport system  on air 
cushions,  which  between  1967  and  the  beginning of  1973  used  up 
£5.25 million. 
The  annual  report of  the  Science Policy Research  Unit  (SPRU) 
at  the  University of  Sussex  for  the  year  1974 mentions  among  others 
within  its programme  "Social  and  Technological  Forecasting and 
Technology  Assessment"  the  following  TA  studies: 
- Technology  assessment of electric vehicles 
(carried out in cooperation with  the  PAU) 
Technology  assessment of  industrialisation in 
developing  countries 
- Technology  assessment of  chemical  weapons. A.3.14. 
A.3.15. 
7 
Not  infrequently,  as  an  argument  against  the  need  for 
installing a  central  TA  institution in Great·Britain,  the 
existence  of several  independent  "public spirited" bodies  is 
brought  forward.  These  can  sometimes  put heavy pressure  on 
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ministries,  with  their memoranda  on  possible  deleterious  side 
effects of applications  of  technology.  Of  the  associations 
which  carry out,  finance  or encourage  TA-like  studies  - mainly 
from  the  environmental  angle  - the  following  are worthy  of note: 
Natural History Society  (independent) 
the  Nature  Conservancy Council  (government  financed) 
the  Countryside  Commission  (government  financed) 
Friends  of  the  Earth  (independent) 
Civic  societies  (independent,  locally active, 
permanent citizen groups). 
The  recently established Council  for  Science  and  Society, 
which  is  financed  by  a  foundation,  includes  the  following  in 
its programme: 
The  standards  to  be  applied,  and  the  procedures 
for  applying  them,  in weighing  "acceptable  risk" 
against anticipated benefits  from new  technologies. 
The  use  of surgical,  pharmacological,  psychological 
and  other  techniques  for  the  control  of  individual 
behaviour  deemed  to  be  harmful  or deviant. 
The  problems  involved  in  the  development  and  use  of 
'harmless'  weapons  for  the  control  of civil disorder. 
The  social  and  ethical  implications  of  the  non-
clinical  use  of mood-control  drugs. 
The  Netherlands 
A.3.16.  In  1974  an  attempt  to  create  a  special  parliamentary TA 
institution was  narrowly defeated  in  the  Dutch  parliament. 
The  Government  White  Paper  on  Science  Policy  (published  in 
December  1974),  however,  devotes  a  paragraph  to  TA  and  suggests A.3.17. 
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a  careful  approach  on  the  national  level,  because  of  the 
international  impact  of most  technologies.  The  paper  goes 
on  to  mention  that discussions  have  started with  TNO  (semi-
government.  Organisation  for Applied  Research)  to explore  the 
possibilities of  performing  some  TA  studies.  Also  the 
Government  paper mentions  agreement  with  the  TA-related work 
of  the  Future  Shape  of  Technology  Foundation which  was  initiated 
by  the  Royal  Institute of Engineers. 
The  TA  unit within  TNO  is working  closely  together with 
related  groups  on  risk analysis,  innovation policy,  and  future 
studies.  The  Future  Shape  of Technology  Foundation also  has  a 
secretariat which  coordinates  future-oriented  studies  performed 
(on  a  voluntary basis)  by  members  of  the  Royal  Institute of 
Engineers.  Although  none  of  these  studies  is  labelled as  TA, 
the  approach  is often multi-disciplinary. 
Developments  in  some  countries outside  the  European  Community 
Canada 
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A.3.18.  In Canada  there are,  as  in most  other economically  advanced 
A.3.19. 
countries,  government bodies  that  carry out at least TA-like 
activities;  for  instance  the  Department of Communications,  the 
Department of  the  Environment  and  its attached  services,  the 
Ministry of  State  for  Science & Technology,  and  the  Science  Council. 
But apparently  the  systematic evaluation of  the  consequences  of 
technology,  going  beyond  traditional cost-benefit analysis,  is not 
yet  seen  as  an  important,  independent duty  of  the  government,  as  it 
is  in  the  USA. 
The  Science  Council  was  founded  in  1966  and  deals with  the  general 
implications  of science  and  technology policy.  Its small  staff is  supported 9  Annex  3 
by  outside  experts  from  different disciplines  when  making 
recommendations  on  science  and  technology  policy.  In  view 
of its statutory functions,  the  Science  Council  sees  itself 
in  a  key  position as  far as  initiating TA  studies  is  concerned. 
Its growing  interest in TA,  as  a  reflection of  government  and 
private worry  about  the  use  or misuse  of  technological possibilities, 
comes  out clearly in  a  TA  background  and  case  study,  published  in  1974(l). 
In  this  study  the  future  role  of  the  Science  Council  with  regard  to 
technology  assessment  is  seen as,  firstly,  identifying TA-worthy 
technologies  and  problems;  secondly,  as  justifying  the  implementation 
of  TA  studies  to  the  Cabinet  (via  the  Ministry of Science  and  Technology) 
and  to all public  and  private  groups,  whose  briefing  seems  necessary; 
and  thirdly,  to  carry  these  studies  so  far  that a  special  "TA 
Cormnission"  or "task force"  can  be  formed  and  charged with  the 
implementation.  It seems  to  be  the  view of  the  Science  Council 
that no  new  body within  the  executive  is necessary  for  this.  They 
do  not  regard  the  estabLishment of  a  TA  office within  the  legislature 
as  necessary.  One  of  the  reasons  given  is  that - in contrast  to 
the  USA  - decisions  on  expenditure  for  large  technological  projects 
are  taken  in  the  Cabinet  and not  in Parliament. 
A.3.20.  Since  the  end  of  the  Sixties,  after a  long  phase  of hasty 
(1)  M.  Gibbons,  R.  Voyer  (Science  Council  of  Canada), 
A Technology Assessment System  - A Case  Study  of East 
Coast Offshore  Petroleum Exploration,  Background 
Study  No.  30,  Ottawa  1974. 10 
technological  development,  there  are  now  signs  of  a  fundamental 
change  in Japanese  s.cience  and  technology policy and  a  growing 
acceptance  of  the  idea  of  technology  assessment.  After 
demonstrations  in many  parts of  the  country,  the  Law  against Air 
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and  Water Pollution was  passed  in  1968.  In  19 69  ·the  Subcormni t tee 
on  Technology Advancement  of  the  Economic  Council  put  forward  a 
report  on  technology policy,  in which it is stressed  that 
technological  advance  has  to  be  in harmony  with social  developments. 
The  report warns  against  the  life-endangering effects  of  large 
technological  projects  and  proposes  a  "Security and  Welfare 
Control  System"  that is  to  become  effective before,  during,  and 
after  the  realisation of  a  project.  Without  using  the  term 
"technology assessment"  the  report  in its references  to  a  "control 
system",  and  in many  other places,  reflects  the  leading  ideas  of 
the  TA  movement.  In  1971  the  Council  for  Science  and  Technology, 
a  body  of  immense  importance  in Japan  as  far  as  science  and 
technology policy is concerned  and  whose  Chairman  is  the  Prime 
Minister,  formulated  recommendations  for  a  comprehensive  science  and 
technology policy for  the  seventies.  In  these  recommendations  technology 
assessment  is viewed  as  one  of  tbe  bases  for  technology policy. (l) 
A.3.21.  In May  1971,  the  Ministry of  International Trade  and  Industry 
A.3.22. 
(MITI))announcing  its  industry-·technology policy for  the  seventie~ 
recommended  that  the  emphasis  of  future  government  responsibility 
be  on  development of policies  to  control  and  guide  industrial 
technologies;  to  this  end  technology  assessment  is  seen as  an 
important means.  The  government  is advised  to  build TA  into 
industrial policy as  an  intrinsic part,  in order  to  do  justice  to 
the  social desire  for  a  better quality of  life and better environment. 
It was  made  clear  to  private corporations  that their existence would 
be  called  in  question,  if they  do  not harmonise  their  technological 
developments  with  those  of  society at large. 
With  regard  to  a  TA  action programme  MITI  makes,  among  others, 
the  following  recommendations: 
(1)  Japanese  Science Policy  in  the  1970's;  A Report  of  the  Council  for 
Science  and  Technology,  Tokyo  1971. A.3.23. 
A.3.24. 
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At first,  the  technologies  to  be  evaluated are  those 
whose  development  is easily foreseeable  and  which  have 
wide  impacts  on  the  social environment. 
The  organisation  responsible  for  TA  shall  be multi-
disciplinary and neutral,  so  that  technological  impacts 
on  society can  be  evaluated  comprehensively  and  objectively. 
The  legislative  system  is  to  be  included  in  the  process 
of  forecasting,  analysing,  and  guiding  technological 
developments. 
Before  government  R  & D  projects  are  begun,  assessment 
analyses,  which  could  lead  to  the  abandoning  or changing 
of projects,  are  to  be  carried out.  After  the  completion 
of R & D projects,  but before  the  application or pro-
duction phase,  the  newly  developed  technologies  are  again 
to  be  assessed.  If there  is  a  strong  suspicion  that 
privately developed  technologies might have  deleterious 
effects  on  society,  an  assessment  is  to  be  made  immediately. 
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In  1971  the  Planning Bureau  of  the  Science  and  Technology Agency 
(STA)  began  a  study programme  on  technology  assessment  that,  among 
other  things,  addressed  itself to  the  following  questions: 
What  subjects  are  suitable  for  government  TA  1 
What  organisations  should  carry out assessments,  falling 
under  the  responsibility of  the  government  ? 
What  methods  are most  suitable  ? 
How  can  science  and  technology policies  be  brought  into 
harmony  with other policies of  the  government with  respect 
to  TA  ? 
Pilot case  studies were  undertaken  to clarify  these  questions. 
TA  and  TA-like  activities are  als0 carried out or sponsored 
by  other ministries  and  governmental  bodies,  such  as  the  Ministry 
of Transport,  the  Economic  Planning Agency,  the  Environment Agency A.3.25. 
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or  by non-profit or private  organisations  such  as  the  Japan 
Society  for  the  Promotion  of  the  Machine  Industry,  the  Japan 
Research  Institute,  and  the  Institute  for Policy Sciences. 
Sweden 
Sweden's  strong  interest  in  the  idea  of  TA  should  be  viewed 
in  the  context of  its highly  developed  environmental  awareness. 
In  1967  the  OECD  and  the  Swedish Ministry of  Agriculture 
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organised  an  international  seminar  in  Stockholm  on  the  possibilities 
of cooperatively measuring air pollution.  In  1969  investigations 
with  TA-like  characteristics were  started on  the  impacts  on 
health  and  the  economy  of  a  nuclear  power  plant sited near  a  town. 
In  1970  the  Swedish  Coast  Guard  Service  was  commissioned  to  put 
together  a  3-year  programme  to  combat  the  oil plague  in  the  waters 
around  Sweden.  They  were  particularly concerned with evaluating 
alternative oil  transport  technologies.  In  1970  the  Swedish 
Environmental  Protection Agency  put  forward  a  "de-escalation 
programme"  to  reduce  environmental  dangers;  it demanded  an 
upper  limit for  the  sulphur content of heating oil  and  warned 
against  the  toxic effect of  so 2  in  the  atmosphere.  Swedish 
scientists also  warned  against  the  long-term  indirect consequences, 
namely  the  destructive effects  of  sulphuric  acid  in rainfall  on 
forests  and  in water.  Because  of  the  international  connotations 
of  this  problem,  environmental  pollution via  sulphuric  acid  and 
sulphur dioxide  was  taken  as  the  subject of  a  study which  was  the 
main  scientific contribution of  Sweden  to  the  United  Nations 
Conference  on  the  Human  Environment  in Stockholm  in  1972. 
A.3.26.  The  creation of  an Office  of  Technology Assessment  in  the 
USA  was  closely  followed  by  the  advisory bodies  of  the  Swedish 
government  dealing with  science,  research,  and  technology.  The A.3.27. 
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Royal  Commission  on  Future  Studies  brought out a  report  in August 
1972  on  the  future  shape  of  Swedish  society;  in it among  other 
th1ngs  the  necessity of  technology assessment  is  stressed.  On 
the  basis  of  this  report  the  Swedish  Secretariat for  Future 
Studies  attached  to  the  Prime Minister's Office  was  established at 
the  beginning of  1973.  For  1974/75  the  Secretariat,  which  only 
has  a  small  permanent staff,  had  at its disposal  a  budget of about 
g  500,000  for  contracting out  to  contractors.  The  main  effort 
of  the  Secretariat's work  is  going  into  the  very  comprehensive 
fields  of "the  labour market  in a  future  perspective",  "resources 
and  growth  in  a  global  and  national  perspective,"  "Sweden  and  its 
role  in  the  world". 
the  Secretariat. 
TA  activities  form  only part of  the  work  of 
USA. 
The  Office  of Technology Assessment 
The  Committee  on  Science  and Astronautics  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  in  the  American  Congress  began  studies,  in  the 
mid-60's,  on  the  negative  side-effects of  the  use  of  technology. 
In  1966  the  Subcommittee  on  Science,  Research,  and  Development 
of  the  Committee  on  Science  and Astronautics  published  a  report 
on  the  primary and  secondary  impacts  of  technical  innovation;(l) 
it was  there  that  the  term  "technology assessment"  was  used  for 
the  first  time.  The  report also  demanded  that  an "early warning 
system"  be  established  in Congress  with  the  aim of discovering 
the  negative  and  positive effects  in  the  use  of  technology. 
(1)  U.S.  Congress,  House  of Representatives,  Inquiries, 
Legislation,  Policy Studies  Re:  Science  and  Technology: 
Review  and  Forecast,  Second  Progress Report of  the  Sub-
Committee  on  Science,  Research,  and  Development  to  the 
Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics,  89th Congress,  2nd 
session,  u.s.  Government Printing Office,  Washington  1966. A.3.2R. 
A.3.29. 
A.J.JO. 
A.3.31. 
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In March  1967  Emilio  Daddario,  a  democratic Representative 
and  chairman  of  the  Subcommittee  on  Science,  Research,  and 
Development,  proposed  legislation  in Congress  on  the  establishment 
of a  "Technology Assessment Board".  In  the  summer  of  1967  he 
( 1) 
laid before  Congress  a  report  in support of his plans,  which 
includes  a  definition of "technology assessment".  The  aim of 
this  legislative proposal  was  not  to  have  a  decision made  on  the 
creation of  a  Technology  Assessment  Board,  but  rather  to  initiate 
a  discus~ion on  technology  assessment  and  its institutionalisation 
in Congress. 
In  the  period  thereafter,  Congress,  with  the  help  of  four 
studies,  which  it commissioned,  studied  the  problems  of  TA. 
The  studies were  undertaken  by  the  Library of Congress,  the 
National  Academy  of  Engi~~ering,  the  National  Academy  of Sciences, 
and  the  National  Academy  of Public Administration.  The  Subcommittee 
on  Science,  Research,  and  Development also organised many  seminars 
and  hearings,  both  to  have  the  basic  information  in  the  studies 
evaluated,  and  to  supplement it. 
The  second  legislative proposal  in April  1970  found  supporters 
from  both parties.  It demanded  a  TA  office  for  the  legislature, 
gove-rned  and  supervised  by  a  TA  Bvard.  Several hearings  on  the 
organisation of  an Office  of  Technology Assessment  (OTA)  followed; 
they  led to  a  third proposal  laid before Congress  in July  1970  and 
February  1971.  Out  of  this  proposal  came  the  Technology Assessment 
Act  passed  by  the  House  of Representatives  in February  1972,  accepted 
with  a  few  amendments  by  the  Senate  in September  1972  and  signed  by 
the  President in October  1972. 
In  1973,  on  the  basis  of  this  law,  the  organs  of  the  OTA  were 
created,  that is  the  Technology  Assessment  Board  (TAB),  the 
Director of  the  OTA  and his  staff,  and  the  Technology Assessment 
Advisory  Council  (TAAC): 
(1)  U.S.  Congress,  House  of Representatives,  Technology Assessment 
Statement of E.Q.  Daddario,  Chairman,  Subcommittee  on  Science, 
Research,  and  Development  of  the  Corrmittee  on  Science  and 
Astronautics,  90th Congress,  lst session,  U.S.  Government 
Printing Office,  Washington  1967. A.3.32. 
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The  TA  Board  is made  up  of  6  senators  and  6  representatives, 
belonging  in equal  proportions  to  the  minority  and  ma:ority 
party,  as  well  as  the  non-voting  director of  the  OTA.  It 
is  the  political governing  body;  among  other  things,  it 
decides  what  studies  are  to  be  undertaken. 
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The  director of  the  OTA  is elected by  the  Board  for  6  years,  and 
has  to  manage  the  office according  to  the  guidelines  of  the 
Board. 
The  TA  Advisory Council  is made  up  of  10  members  nominated 
by  the  Board,  the  Comptroller General  and  the Director of 
the  Congressional  Research  Service.  It has  to  pass  judgement 
on  the  work  of  the  OTA;  to  check  TA  results  and  to make 
proposals  for  work. 
The  OTA  is entitled  to  call  on  the  services of  the  Congressional 
Research  Service  and  of  the  General  Accounting Office.  It is also 
to  cooperate  closely with  the  National  Science  Foundation,  in order 
to  avoid  duplication of research activity.  The  chairmen of  the 
Committees  and Joint-Committees,  the  TA  Board  and  the  director of 
the  OTA  (after prior consultation with  the  Board)  have  the  right  to 
initiate  technology  assessments. 
A.3.33.  The  first chairman  of  the  TAB  was  Senator Edward  M.  Kennedy, 
·h'ho  was  succeeded  in  1975  by  Congressman Olin E.  Teague.  The 
first director of  the  OTA  is Emilio  Q.  Daddario.  Among  others, 
Jerome  B.  Wiesner,  the President of MIT,  belongs  to  the  TAAC. 
A.3.34.  The  Office  of Technology Assessment  began  sponsoring projects 
early  in  1974.  Priority for contracts  is  given  to  six areas:  food, 
energi,  the  oceans,  materials  resources,  health,  urban mass  trans-
portation.  In November  1974  the  OTA  let its largest contract so  far. 
For$  500,000  Braddock,  Dunn  and MacDonald,  Inc.,  who  have  mostly 
specialised in  the  analysis  of weapon-systems,  are  to  carry out a 
study  on  "potential  on- and  offshore  risks,  costs,  and  benefits 
of exploiting  the  potential  uses  of  the  outer continental  shelf off 
the  coasts  of  New  Jersey and  Delaware,  with particular emphasis  on 
oil  and  gas  recov'ery  and  transportation,  and  the  siting of nuclear 
power  plants". A.  3. JS. 
A.3.36. 
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Inventories  of  TA  activities  in  the  USA 
The  most  comprehensive  inventory of  TA  activities  in  the 
USA  so  far  was  commissioned  by  the  National  Science  Foundation 
(NSF)(l)  and  carried out between  1970  and  1972  by  Peat,  Marwick, 
Mitchell  & Co.  According  to  this  inventory government authorities 
such  as  the  Food  and  Drug  Administration,  the  National  Bureau  of 
Standards  and  the  Department of Commerce  began  in  the mix-sixties 
to  contract out or carry out  themselves  assessments  on  new 
medicines,  transport  systems,  communications,  etc.  Around  500 
of  the  2000  government  agencies,  research institutes,  universities, 
associations  and  corporations  contacted  in  this  study answered  that 
they  had  groups  carrying  out  TA  studies.  In  total  1342  studies were 
mentioned,  which  corresponded  to  the  TA  definition used. 
divided  up  in  the  following  way: 
Federal  Government  559 
States  and  Communities  140 
Commercial  undertakings  362 
Private  research institutes, 
associations,  foundations,  etc.  148 
Universities  133 
1,342 
They  are 
Apart  from  the  inventory by Peat,  Marwick,  Mitchell & Co.,  the 
NSF  financed  two  further  investigations  on  TA  studies.  One  was  by 
V.T.  Coates,  carried out  in  the  framework  of  the  Program of Policy 
Studies  in  Science  and  Technology  at the  George  Washington  University. 
It analyses  technology  assessment  in  the  US  Federal  Government  (1972; 
97  studies). ( 2)  The  other was  a  detailed comparative  analysis  of  a 
selection of  important  TA  case  studies  and  was  carried out by  the 
MITRE  Corporation  (1973;  13  studies). (3) 
(1)  Peat,  Marwick,  Mitchell & Co.,  A Survey of Technology Assessment 
Today,  Washington  1972. 
(2)  V.T.  Coates,  Technology  and Public Policy:  The  Process  of Technology 
Assessment  in  the  Federal Government,  2  vols.  and  summary  report, 
George  Washington  University,  Washington,  D.C.,  1972. 
(3)  M.V.  Jones,  A Comparative  State-of-the-Art Review of Selected u.s. 
Technology Assessment Studies,  MITRE  Corporation,  Washington,  May  1973. A.-~. 37. 
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The  13  comprehensive  TA  case  studies  analysed  by  the  MITRE 
Corporation  (among  them  the  9  studies classified as  "wide-scope 
assessments"  by  V.T.  Coates),  not only had  a  significant  influence 
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on  subsequent  policy decisions;  they  were  also  valuable  in assessing 
the  organisation  and  costs necessary  for  such  studies  and  the 
usefulness  of  the  methods  applied. 
A.3.38.  The  majority of  these  13  studies start from  problems  of  energy 
A.3.39. 
A.3.40. 
supply  and  transport.  An  analysis  of  106  American  TA  studies 
undertaken  by  the  Studiengruppe  fUr  Systemforschung,  Heidelberg, 
revealed  that about  80%  of  these  studies  fall  into  the  categories 
of energy  supply,  transport,  environmental  damage,  and  communication/ 
data-processing.(l)  In  the  education and  health sector  technology 
assessment  in  America  still plays  an  insignificant role. 
Aspects  of  the  organisation of  TA  studies 
Ministries  and  other government  agencies  quite often entrust 
TA  analyses  and  TA-like  studies  to  "in-house" analysis  teams.  Of 
the  97  studies  undertaken  in  the  Federal  Government  and  analysed 
by  V.T.  Coates: 
42%  by  contractors, 
38%  were  carried out  by  in-house  teams, 
9%  in cooperation between  the  government  and  the  contractors, 
6%  by  special  panels  of  leading experts, 
4%  by  inter-agency  groups. 
Partial  TA  studies  were  mainly  done  by  contractors. 
V.T.  Coates  has  established  that  the  US  Federal  Authorities 
- when  contracting out  - give  preference  to non-university  institutions, 
Only  15%  of  the  97  investigations went  to  university  teams  (of  a 
total of  42%  for  outside contracts).  Of  the  9  "wide-scope  assessments" 
only  one  was  carried out by  a  university. 
(1)  Studiengruppe  fUr  Systemforschung,  Expert Report  on  Technology 
Assessment,  commissioned  by  the  German  Bundestag,  Heidelberg, 
August  1974. A.3.41. 
A.3.42. 
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The  organisation and  general methodology of many  of  the  more 
recent  TA  analyses  - not only  in  the  USA  - have  been  influenced 
by  a  study of  the  MITRE  Corporation published  in  1971:  "A  Technology 
Assc•ssmcnl  Methodology",  which  was  carried out  in conjunction with 
and  on  commission  of  the Office of  Science  and  Technology  (Executive 
Office  of  the  President).  This  six-volume  work  contains  a 
proposal  for  a  general  methodology  (procedural  plan)  for carrying 
out  TA  analyses,  as  well  as  5  model  case  studies  for  checking  and 
demonstrating  the  proposed methodology. (l)  "A  Study of Technology 
Assessment",  a  report commissioned  by  the  American  Congress  from  the 
Committee  on  Public Engineering Policy of  the  National  Academy  of 
Engineering  and  published  in July  1969,  has  also bee;.  of considtrable 
importance  for  the  shaping of  TA  studies. ( 2)  It contains  3 
experimental  TA  case  studies  on  the  subjects  of  technology of  teaching 
aids,  subsonic aircraft noise,  and multiphase health screening. 
TA  activities of  the  OECD 
The  OECD  is at present probably  the most  "TA  active"  inter-
national organisation.  At  the  beginning of  1970,  it called upon 
its member  states  to  participate  in  the  solution of  the  conflict 
between  desirable  and  necessary  technical  innovation and  unforeseen 
dam~ge to  the  human  environment;  and  to  become  active  in  the 
assessment of new  technologies  before  and after their introduction. 
TLt:re  are,  in particular,  two  bodies  of  the  OECD  which  deal with 
these  problems;  namely  the  Environment Committee  (until  1970  the 
Committee  for  Research Cooperation)  and  the  Committee  for  Scientific 
and  Technological Policy. 
(1)  The  MITRE  Corporation,  A Technology  Assessment Methodology,  project 
summary  and  6  vols.,  Washington,  D.C.,  1971. 
(2)  U.S.  Congress,  House  of Representatives,  Committee  on  Science  and 
Astronautics,  A Study  of Technolcgy Assessment,  Report of  the 
Committee  on  Public Engineering Policy,  National  Academy  of 
Engineering,  July  1969,  U.S.  Governrrtent  Printing Office, 
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A.-~.Ld.  The  Environment  Committee  of  the  OECD  is made  up  of  Sector 
A.3.44. 
A.3.45. 
A.3.46. 
Management  Groups  for water  (1967),  air (1968),  chemicals  (1971), 
and  urban  environment  (1971).  They  are  composed  of  government 
officials  from  the  corresponding  departments  in  the  member  states. 
These  groups  have  carried out a  series  of  environmental  studies, 
that can  be  called "partial assessments".  This  is also  true  of 
some  studies  undertaken by  ad  hoc  groups  of  the  Environment 
Committee,  in which  certain environmentally dangerous  technologies 
or industries have  been  analysed  and  where  the  economic  and  political 
consequences  of protection measures  have  been assessed. 
The  Environment Committee  is  paying  increased attention  to  the 
analysis  and  evaluation of  environmental  policy measures  (taxes, 
subsidies,  licences)  with particular emphasis  on  the  effects  of 
environmental  protect1on  technolog{es  on  the  competitiveness  of  the 
industries  concerned. 
The  Committee  for Scientific and  Technological  Policy of  the 
OECD  has  taken  up  TA  in  the  stricter sense.  One  of  the  three 
main  points  in its programme  for  the  seventies,  is  the  assessment 
of probable  social  and  economic  consequences  of  technological 
innovation.  On  this basis  an  Advisory Group  on  Control  and 
Management  of  Technology was  formed  in  1973.  It deals  with 
questions  of  technology  assessment,  but especially with  the  political 
problems  and  aspects  of  implementing  TA  studies within  the  OECD. 
An  expert panel  of  this Advisory  Group  supported  the  OECD 
Secretariat in setting up  methodological  guidelines  for  TA  studies. 
The  members  of  the  Advisory  Group  took  stock of  TA  in  their 
countries  and  placed  the  results at  the  disposal  of  the  OECD 
Secretariat for  a  comparative  analysis.  Further it worked  out a 
preliminary  and  very general  list of  fields  in which  on  the national, 
multi-national,  and  OECD  level,  TA  studies  seem  particula~ly essential. 
In July  1974  in  a  meeting  of  the  Advisory Group  the  following  subjects 
were  selected  on  which national  research  teams  are  to  carry out TA 
analyses,  which  the  OECD  later wants  to  bring  together  in a  comparative 
report: New  Urban  Transportation  Systems 
Humanised  Working  Conditions 
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Telecommunications  as  an  Instrument of Regional 
Planning  and  Balanced Regional  Economic  and 
Social  Development. 
Annex  3 A.4.1. 
A.4.2. 
ANNEX  4 
Cost  of Europe  Plus  Thirty 
This  appendix  supplements  page  25  of Part  IV  above. 
In  arriving at a  cost  figure  for  Europe  Plus Thirty at  the  end  of 
its build-up  phase  the  number  of professional  staff  is established 
at  75  for  the  reasons  given  on  page  11  of Part  IV. 
Taking  an  average  number  of  supporting staff per professional 
staff member  of  1.5 results  in some  110  supporting staff at the 
end  of  the  build-up  phase. 
If we  assume  the  division of cost at the  end  of  the build-up  phase  as 
being  2/3  in-house cost and  1/3  contracts,  (see Part IV,  P•  6.)  the  average 
cost of  professional  staff including overheads  (in 1975)  is 32.000  units 
of account,  and  the  average  cost of supporting staff is  16.000 units  of 
account.  The  cost of  Europe  Plus  Thirty at the  end of  the  build-up  phase 
is  thus  as  follows  (at 1975  prices):-
a.  in-house  wo~k 
professional  staff 
supporting staff 
b.  contracts 
c.  publications  - seminars  etc. 
U.A.  (1975) 
2.400.000 
L  760.000 
1. 200.000 
240.000 
5.600.000 
Build-up  of staff and  cost during  build-up  phase 
In  the  table  below,  the  costs  are  given  for  each  of  the  first five 
years  of  the  Europe  Plus  Thirty institute. 
Numbers  of  Cost  in 
professional staff  U.A.  (1975) 
preparatory phase  2  150.000 
ls  t  year of build-up  15  1.100. 000 
2nd  year of  build-up  35  2.700.000 
3rd  year  .. of build-up  55  4.100.000 
4th year of build-up  75  5.600.000 2 
We  are  not  sure  a  support  ratio of  1.5/1.0  is high  enough.  l.l 
.1  !ligiH'r  figun'  W<'n'  ;Hiopl<'d,  sny  J/1,  tilt'  incn'liSt'  C;llt  t';!.·;i\y 
be  calculalcd. 
N.B.  We  have  ~OL included  anything  for  the  cost of  the  :ouncil 
of  Europe  Plus  Thirty.  It will  be  small  compared with 
the  rest and  we  recommend  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities  work it out with  the  first Chairman. 
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